



STUDIES IN INDIAN HISTORY

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Rajasthan Through the Ages

The Heritage of Rajputs



VOLUME

1

Editors

R.K. GUPTA • S.R. BAKSHI

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The encyclopaedic study of five volumes on *Rajasthan Through The Ages* is an academic exercise which have deep links of various phases of the subject. It covers the rich heritage and culture of various rulers along with their dynasties, their impact on early administration, religion along with Tod's *Survey of Rajasthan*. It covers a huge area of Jaipur, Mewar, Marwar, Chittor and other regions.

Besides it has deep links with chivalry and administrative capability of several rulers of the region. It has emphasis on bureaucracy, nobility, caste system among Hindus and Muslims, rituals and festivals, language and literary activities. It has coverage of Mughal rule, Marathas, Mahadji Sindhia, Malwa, Gujarat and British relation with the princely states. Indeed all the historic details have been covered in a comprehensive method.

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
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**RAJASTHAN THROUGH
THE AGES**

Volume 1

The Heritage of Rajputs

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Volume 1

The Heritage of Rajputs

Editors

Dr. R. K. Gupta

Dr. S. R. Bakshi



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Contents

<i>Preface</i>	v
1. Origin of Rajputs	1
2. Assimilation of Rajputs	25
3. The Impact of the Mughals	43
4. Growth of Feudalism	48
5. Development of Agriculture	56
6. Early Rajput Administration	65
7. Religion (800-1000 A.D.)	81
8. Emergence of Rajputs: 12th-16th Centuries	95
9. Struggle for Survival: 1200-1315 A.D.	103
10. Tod's Survey of Rajasthan	130
11. Mewar	200
12. Jaipur	248
13. Marwar	302
14. Other States	330
<i>Index</i>	358

Preface

It is indeed a fact that Rajputana, now known as Rajasthan, played a most significant role in the annals of our history. The chivalry of the Rajputs dominated mostly in North India and their administrative skill was indeed proverbial in several respects. The contents of this encyclopaedia give a rich glimpse of the events of importance dealing with a few centuries.

The first volume deals with the heritage of the Rajputs and contains fourteen chapters. These are origin of Rajputs, the impact of the Mughals, growth of feudalism, development of agriculture, early Rajput administration, aspects of religion, emergence of a new phase, struggle for survival, Tod's survey of Rajasthan, and states of Mewar, Jaipur, Marwar and other regions.

The second volume has deep links with Battle of Haldi Ghat, the attack on Kumbhalgarh, expedition to Mewar, the Padmini legend, Abul Fazl of Rajputana, the legacy of Mewar, Rajputs as talented people, Chonda and Khumbho, Rana, Banga, the Rajputs vs Mughals, recovery of Chittor, and India in 1572. All these events have been covered under Rajput: Society, Culture and Administration.

The third volume in the sequence covers Rajput chivalry and martyrdom. It has deep links with the Kachhawaha nobility, the state and the ruler, bureaucracy and the people, the traditions and status, life of nobility, caste system among Hindus, caste system among Muslims, domestic life, religious beliefs and rituals, festivals and language and literary activities.

The fourth volume gives a glimpse of several phases of Jaipur rulers and their administration. Numerous rulers had to deal with other powers in order to strengthen their sway.

The contents have been weaved into fourteen chapters, viz. Man Singh as a ruler, Raja Jai Singh and Mughals, Raja Jai Singh and Shivaji, Ram Singh and Bishan Singh, Sawai Jai Singh and Rajputana, Ishwari Singh as a ruler, Sawai Madho Singh, Jaipur State and Delhi and Delhi Government, Mahadji Sindhia and Jaipur, Rajputs and Marathas, relations with the British and reign of Ram Singh II.

The fifth volume deals with Marwar and British Administration. It contains eleven chapters along with the appendices. The contents have links with relations of Malwa and Gujarat, relations with Rajput chiefs, administrative and economic aspects, Mewar and the British, Rising of 1857 and Mewar, beginning of reforms, cultural achievements, Maharana Sajjan Singh and his reforms, Maharana Fateh Singh and struggle for independence, Fateh Singh's abdication and an assessment along with relevant appendices.

We have collected the material from several institutions, viz., Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, Indian Council of Historical Research Library, Sapru House Library, Jamia Millia Islamia Library, Delhi University Library and Jawaharlal Nehru University Library. We have also used material, relevant to the subject, of the well-known authors. We feel much beholden to these scholars. Besides we are grateful to the members of the academic institutions for their support during our researches.

1

Origin of Rajputs

The Rajputs certainly represented a new historical force in early medieval India and they dominated the Indian scene for several centuries. As Vincent Smith said many years ago, "They (*i.e.* the Rajput clans) became so prominent that the centuries from the death of Harsha to the Muslim conquest of northern India, extending in round numbers from the middle of the seventh to the close of the twelfth century, might be called with propriety the Rajput period."¹ The political authority of the Rajput clans was, of course, confined to northern and western India; eastern India as well as the south remained outside their political jurisdiction. But northern and western India assumed a new significance during this period in view of the continuous threat of Muslim invasion. That threat became a material factor in Indian history with the Arab occupation of Sind and reached a further stage with the Turkish occupation of the Punjab. (Geography made the Rajputs the *Pratiharas* or door-keepers of India.) The immunity of the South to foreign incursions till the close of the 13th century was due to a large extent to the strenuous discharge by the Rajputs of this tremendous responsibility. While the conquering Cholas directed their military resources to naval and political exploits outside the boundaries of India, the Rajputs kept the north-western invaders at bay for several centuries and protected the sanctity of the Indian soil as long as possible. When, finally, they failed to protect the dyke, the whole of northern India succumbed to

the flood of Turkish rule and the opening of the South was only a question of time. With all its territorial limitations, therefore, the political power of the Rajputs gave a definite shape to historical forces affecting the entire sub-continent. There was a compelling force as also a historical purpose behind the chivalrous exploits of the Rajputs. From this point of view it would not be wrong to speak of a 'Rajput period' of Indian history.

The rise of the Rajputs to political prominence was seemingly accidental. Vincent Smith, who was the first European writer—apart from Tod, of course—to appreciate their historical significance, said that "the Rajput clans, never heard of in earlier times,... begin from the eighth century to play a conspicuous part in the history of northern and western India."² The fall of the Gupta Empire created a political vacuum, leading to a scramble for power among various local dynasties of which the Pushyabhutis attained ephemeral importance during the brilliant rule of Harsha. A second—and worse—period of disintegration followed his death, and northern India did not attain political stability till the Gurjara-Pratiharas, a Rajput dynasty, succeeded in establishing an empire larger in extent and stronger in sustained power than the Pushyabhuti Empire. Meanwhile the Arabs had occupied Sind. The eighth century witnessed the emergence of two historical forces of enduring significance: the appearance of the Muslims in the combined role of invaders and rulers and the appearance of the Rajputs in the role of defenders of the old order. It seemed as if the old Indian dynasties were too exhausted to play an active political-cum-military role and a new element in the population—more vigorous, less spoilt by climate, intoxicated by the first taste of power—came forward to fill up the vacuum and create new history.

This striking historical phenomenon demands an explanation, and it is here that the question of racial and environmental factors comes in. The Rajput dynasties claimed—*after* their accession to power—descent from the ancient Kshatriyas of Brahmanical literature, and this claim was accepted by their Brahman panegyrists who dominated contemporary society, can historical criticism accept this interpretation of their origin? If there were really no break in the continuity of the

traditional system, it would not be easy to explain either the rise of so many ruling families with a dynastic background which required careful explanation from Brahmin courtiers, or the new vigour and tenacity with which the struggle against the Muslim invaders was carried on for several centuries. In any case, the replacement of old dynasties by new dynasties of uncertain origin is a *prima facie* feature of the political changes during the "Rajput period", and there should be a historical clue to this apparent puzzle.

The available evidence on the origin of different Rajput dynasties has been scrutinised thoroughly by many writers during the last fifty years, and it is hardly possible to throw new light on this controversial subject on the basis of the data already examined. But it is possible to emphasize certain points and to see the picture as a whole instead of viewing it from the angle of any particular dynasty. The chronology of the dynastic inscriptions should also be kept in view so that the development of a conventional pattern of genealogical explanation might not escape our notice.

The Gurjara-Pratiharas were chronologically the earliest, and historically the most important of the Rajput dynasties. The earliest inscription referring to the origin of the dynasty is the undated Gwalior (Sagar-Tal) stone inscription³ of Bhoja I, according to which the ancestor of the family was Saumitri or Lakshmana, the younger brother of the Epic hero Rama, who was "the door-keeper (*pratihara*), since he repelled (the enemies) in the battle with Meghanada". Moreover, Vatsaraja is described as "foremost among the most distinguished Kshatriyas" and as one who "stamped the noble race of Ikshvaku with his own name by virtue of his blameless conduct". This inscription must have been issued some years before 893 A.D., the earliest epigraphic date for the reign of Bhoja's successor (Mahendrapala). (It claims solar descent for the dynasty and explains the term *Pratihara*, but it is significantly silent on the term *Gurjara*.) A different explanation of the term *Pratihara* is given in the Jodhpur inscription of Bauka⁴ (of the *Pratihara* dynasty of Rajputana) which says: "Inasmuch as the very brother of Ramabhadra performed the duty of door-keeper (*pratihara*) this illustrious clan came to be known as *Pratihara*". This variation does not affect the main point, *viz.* the solar origin

of the dynasty, which is upheld in this inscription also. So far as literary evidence is concerned, we find Rajasekhara, the well known dramatist, describing his patron Mahendrapala as "ornament of the race of Raghu"⁵ and "leader of Raghu's family."⁶ Mahipala is described by the same dramatist as "the pearl-jewel of the lineage of Raghu."⁷ Thus the tradition of solar descent seems to have taken root. In the Harsa stone inscription of Chahamanavigraharaja II (dated 973 A.D.)⁸ there is a reference to "the universal sovereign of the earth in Raghu's race" who is usually identified with one of the later Pratihara monarchs.⁹

This epigraphic tradition of solar descent is connected chronologically with the period during which the Gurjara-Pratiharas were the dominant ruling dynasty in Northern India. The testimony of Rajasekhara has little independent value, for a court poet had to glorify his patrons and to exalt their lineage. This tradition might have been acceptable if it had originated at the initial stage of the rise of the dynasty and not at that stage of imperial prominence where the temptation to establish a link with the heroic age of the Epics would be readily endorsed by obliging Brahmin courtiers. The inscriptions are silent on the question of origin till the glorious days of Bhoja.

Another difficulty in the way of accepting the epigraphic tradition is its silence in regard to the term *Gurjara* associated almost inseparably with the family name *Pratihara* as also with the history of the dynasty. What is particularly significant in this connection is the well known explanation given in the Rajor stone inscription (dated 959 A.D.) of the reign of Mathanadeva,¹⁰ a feudatory of Vijayapala of Kanauj. The word *Gurjara-Pratiharanvayah* in this inscription has been taken to mean that the Pratiharas were a clan of the Gurjaras, a foreign tribe of Central Asian origin which entered India along with the Hunas. The suggestion that the word *Gurjara* should be taken in a geographical sense to indicate the "and of the Gurjaras"¹¹ is unacceptable because in the same inscription we have reference to "fields cultivated by the Gurjaras". The same word could hardly have been used in the same record to denote a region as well as a tribe. The statements of Arab writers like Al Ma'sudi on the struggle between the Muslims and the *Jurz* indicate that the word *Gurjara* was used ordinarily in the tribal—

and not in the geographical—sense. The same conclusion follows from references in Rashtrakuta records to their struggle with the Pratiharas. For example, Govinda III is described as “destruction to the valour of the head of the thundering Gurjaras.”¹²

Ordinarily an isolated reference in a single inscription of an obscure prince should not be allowed to set aside a century-old epigraphic and literary tradition. But the Rajor inscription deserves special consideration because it is not directly connected with the imperial Pratihara family and is, therefore, comparatively free from court influence, and also because it is the only epigraphic record which gives us an explanation of the curious compound *Gurjara-Pratihara*. It fills up a gap which the composers of the imperial genealogies appear to have ignored deliberately.

Although the evidence of the Rajor inscription seems to be decisive (provided the foreign origin of the Gurjaras is accepted), some supplementary points may be noted in this connection. The Kanarese poet Pampa calls Mahipala *Ghurjararaja*. He could hardly have used the word *Ghurjara* in a geographical sense, for the Gurjara country was only a small portion of Mahipala's vast empire and it would be unusual to designate him as the ruler of that small portion only. To take the word in a tribal sense seems to be more appropriate in the context of his imperial position. A more significant fact is the use of “certain outlandish personal names” by the Pratiharas of Mandor from whom the imperial Pratiharas might have branched off. Thus the Jodhpur inscription of Bauka¹³ mentions two alternative names for Harichandra and Narabhatta—Rohilladdhi and Pelliapelli respectively. The use of two names—one Sanskritic and the other apparently non-Indian or non-Sanskritic—seems to be an indication of the survival of non-Indian influences in a Hinduised family.¹⁴

It must, however, be remembered in this connection that the Jackson-Bhandarkar theory of the foreign origin of the Gurjaras¹⁵ cannot be treated as anything more than a working hypothesis. The arguments on which that theory is based are open to substantial criticism.¹⁶ The verbal similarity between *Gurjara* and *Khazar* cannot be stretched too far as historical evidence unless it is reinforced by more positive arguments

based on well ascertained facts. It has been argued that "there are positive grounds for dissociating the Gurjaras ...with the Hunas". It is true that literary and epigraphic references to the Hunas are silent in regard to the Gurjaras, but in view of the admittedly subordinate position of the Gurjaras in relation to the Hunas this *argumentum ex silentio* need not be given much weight. Moreover, it is unnecessary to assume any close connection between the Hunas and the Gurjaras in order to prove that latter's foreign origin. Our information about the foreign incursions of the later Gupta period is very unsatisfactory, and we cannot exclude the possibility that the Gurjaras entered India before the Hunas, or along with the Hunas, in a separate stream. That there is no record of their "clash with the native powers" is hardly surprising in view of the paucity of sources relating to that disturbed period.

The distribution of the Gujar population in the wide belt of territory from Peshawar in the north-west to Rohilkhand in the east, in Jammu and Kashmir, in the eastern districts of Madhya Pradesh, and in Rajputana is good *prima facie* evidence of tribal migration from beyond the Khyber Pass. The Gurjaras could hardly have spread themselves over such a vast area if they had been, as a recent writer has suggested, "living in obscurity somewhere in Rajputana" before "lust for power impelled them to rush head-long that they came into contact with others and carved out a number of Kingdoms which ultimately formed the nucleus of the big Gurjara empire." Apart from the absence of any reference to the Gurjaras in pre-Gupta or early Gupta records—a negative fact of some significance—it is difficult to believe that a small local tribe of Rajputana could multiply so as to provide migrants for the vast area indicated above. Nor should it be forgotten that the political authority of the Gurjara-Pratiharas never extended to the Peshawar region, Central Punjab or Jammu and Kashmir, so that we cannot connect the Gujar settlements in these areas with the expansion of the Gurjara political power. In the absence of satisfactory epigraphic evidence the distribution of the Gujar population should be accepted as tentative evidence of the foreign origin of the Gurjaras and, consequently, of the Gurjara-Pratiharas.

Bardic tradition describes as the Pratiharas as one of the

four tribes belonging to the *Agnikula* group, the other three being the Paramaras, the Chaulukyas and the Chahamanas. The story of the fire-pit on the summit of Mount Abu is fairly well known, but it is necessary to remember that it has different versions. For example, the version recorded by Tod (which was based on the *Prithviraja Raso*) was different from the version accepted by Cunningham.¹⁷ According to Tod, four heroes came out of the sacrificial fire in response to the prayer of the sages to Mahadeva for help against the *daityas* who were disturbing their sacrifices. Among them one "had not a warrior's mien" and was placed as "guardian of the gate"—an obvious explanation of the term *Pratihara*. "A second issued forth, and being formed in the palm (*chaloo*) of the hand was named Chalooka. The third was Paramar, and the fourth Chauhan". In Cunningham's version, the Solanki was born from Brahma's essence, the Paramar from Siva's essence, the Pratihara from Devi's essence and "from the fount of fire sprang up ... the Chahuwan".¹⁸ Apart from these two main versions, there is one tradition ascribing to Indra, the creation of a "mace-bearing figure" from the fire-pit who was given the name *Paramara* (slayer of the enemy).¹⁹ Abul Fazl records the tradition of the fire-origin of the Paramaras in a different form.²⁰ There the hero is born in a temple of fire to protect fire worship against the intrigues of the Buddhists.

Apart from the inherent improbability of the supernatural origin of the founders of several ruling families, we must not overlook the admittedly unhistorical character of the *Prithviraja Raso* attributed to Chand Bardai.²¹ It has been reported that the story of *Agnikula* is not mentioned at all in the original version of the *Raso* preserved in the Fort Library at Bikaner.²² In that case it must be taken as a very late fabrication. As the different versions of the story are obviously derived from a single tradition their authenticity is open to a common suspicion.

The epigraphic records of the Pratiharas and the Chahamanas do not refer to the *Agnikula* story at all. Inscriptions of the reign of Chaulukya Bhima II, however, refer to the story in connection with the Paramaras. Abhavatilaka Gani, the well known commentator on Hemachandra's *Dvyasrayatnahakavya*, says that the Paramaras were created by the sage Vasishtha

to help him in his quarrel with Visvamitra over the cow Nandini. Thus the *Agnikula* story was not unknown in the Chaulukya Kingdom, but it was not connected locally with the origin of the ruling dynasty of Gujarat.

Padmagupta's *Navasahananka charita*, which was composed towards the beginning of the 11th century, narrates the story of the fire-origin of the Paramaras.²³ The hero sprang out of the sacrificial fire on Mount Abu at the behest of the great sage Vasishtha and forcibly wrested his cow from Visvamitra. It is obvious that the court poet gave the official version of the origin of the ruling dynasty. It is therefore, not quite correct to say: "The earliest reference to the fire-pit origin of the Paramaras is contained in records which belong to about the middle of the 11th century."²⁴ It is true that the earliest *epigraphic* mention of the story is to be found in the Udaipur *Prasasti* of Udayaditya²⁵ which says: "Through his (Vasishtha's) power, a hero arose from the fire-pit (on that lofty mountain, called Arbuda), who...brought back the cow...". This story was repeated in several later inscriptions,²⁶ but its origin is clearly to be found in Padmagupta's work which is historically as valuable—or as open to the charge of partiality and exaggeration—as any epigraph. The story gained wide currency in the 12th and 13th centuries, as references in Chaulukya inscriptions and in Abhayatilaka Gani's commentary show. It would not be surprising, therefore, if it found mention even in the original version of the *Prithviraja Raso*. It is not possible, in the face of this evidence, to accept the view that "the *Agnikula* myth...is a fabrication of perhaps the fifteenth century."²⁷

Although the details of the *Agnikula* story were not accepted by the European writers, they generally used it as corroborative evidence in favour of the theory of the foreign origin of the Rajputs. For example, Vincent Smith quoted with apparent approval Crooke's remark that the story "represents a *rite* of purgation by fire, the scene of which was southern Rajputana, whereby the impurity of the foreigners was removed and they became fitted to enter the Hindu caste system."²⁸ This statement implies a geographical connection between Rajputana and the four dynasties of the *Agnikula* group. It also implies a ceremony of purification by which foreigners were admitted formally into the traditional Hindu caste system as Kshatriyas.

The theory that Bhinmal in southern Rajputana was the centre of the Pratihara dominions at the initial stage²⁹ has been challenged and we are now told that the early Pratiharas had their seat of power at Ujjain.³⁰ But *Gurjaratra-bhumi* or central Rajputana occupies an important place in Pratihara history. Different branches of the Chahamanas ruled over different parts of Rajputana, e.g., Sakambhari, Ranthambhor, Nadol, Jalor, Chandravati and Abu. Although Malava was the centre of Paramara power, minor branches of the clan ruled over Chandravati and Abu, Banswara, Jalor and Kiradu. The Chaulukyas conquered Abu and from time to time cast their covetous eyes on Bhinmal, Nadol and other parts of Rajputana. Thus the four dynasties connected by tradition with the *Agnikula* story were associated geographically with the Abu region. The importance which is accorded uniformly to Arbuda in different versions of the story might have some historical basis.

The *Navasahasanka-charita* gives us the earliest recorded version of the *Agnikula* story. The Paramaras of Malava were not directly connected with the Abu region till the days of Vakpati Munja who, we are told, "led his army into the neighbourhood of Mount Abu" and, "having conquered Mewar and its neighbourhood, reached the country of Marwar."³¹ These exploits might have brought Mount Abu within the range of the contemporary poet's fancy, but the question of removing "the impurity of the foreigners" does not arise in connection with the Vasishtha-Visvamitra quarrel which provided the occasion for the creation of the mythological ancestor of the Paramara dynasty. Padmagupta's story could, however, hardly be an isolated product of the poet's fertile imagination. Its origin might be traced to an ancient tradition incorporated in the *Ramayana*³² which says that the Sakas, the Pahlavas, the Kambojas and other non-Aryan tribes were created by Vasishtha to fight against Visvamitra in connection with the dispute over the *kamadhenu*.³³ The similarity is quite evident and it was quite natural for Padmagupta to utilise an Epic tradition which had acquired some sanctity through the lapse of time.

Probably the Muslim menace was not considered to be serious for the Rajput principalities of central and western India at the time when Padmagupta's *katya* was composed. The first phase of Arab aggression after the conquest of Sind (which had

been met by the imperial Pratiharas) was over; the Muslims of Sind were divided and weak. The Turkish phase had hardly begun; Sultan Mahmud's raids had not yet affected Rajputana and the Ganges-Jumna Doab. It was enough that the hero emerging from the fire-pit should defend a Brahmin sage against a Kshatriya; it was not necessary that he should play the role of a defender of the faith against non-believers.

The *Raso* version of the *Agnikula* story accepted by Tod was much later in date and echoed the dangers of the age of Turkish conquest. The *mlechchhas* who destroyed ancient temples and broke venerated idols might well be compared with *daityas* who rendered impure the sacrifices of the sages. It was natural, therefore, that the story should take a new turn, investing the hero with the halo of a champion of the orthodox religion. His super-natural birth from a sacrificial fire-pit seemed to give him divine commission for the destruction of the *daityas*. The *Raso* story would thus appear to be an excellent mythological interpretation of the struggle of the Rajput ruling clans against the Muslim invaders. It has faint echoes in epigraphic as well as in literary evidence. An inscription of the 14th century,³⁴ for example, says that when the Solar and Lunar races became extinct, the sage Vatsa created Chahamana to suppress the *asuras* disturbing his sacrificial rites. According to the *Prithvirajavijaya*,³⁵ Chahamana was born in the *surya-mandala* to destroy the *mlechchhas*.

Even in this later version of the *Agnikula* story there is no direct reference to any ceremony of purification intended to facilitate foreigners' admission into Hindu society. But we are probably entitled to draw the inference that the dynasties of the *Agnikula* group were recognized as Kshatriyas rather late in history and presumably in recognition of their struggle for Hinduism against the Muslim invaders.³⁶ It is, however, difficult to say why the story in any of its versions does not cover the other Rajput clans which satisfy these two conditions, e.g. the Chandellas, the Kalachuris, the Gahadavalas. Probably it was current chiefly in and around Rajputana and related to those Rajput clans only which were geographically connected with that region. Mount Abu, as we know, plays an important role in the story.

Whatever the implications of the *Agnikula* story might be,

it is necessary to study it in the light of the available epigraphic evidence on the origin of each of the four dynasties grouped together in literary tradition. So far as the Pratiharas are concerned, we have seen that epigraphic testimony is almost conclusive: the connection between the Pratiharas and the Gurjaras—in all probability a foreign tribe—seems to be well established. In the case of the Chahamanas, however, there is no such virtually decisive epigraphic evidence. The *Agnikula* story is unknown to the Chahamana inscriptions and literary works connected with the dynasty (with the exception of the *Prithviraja Raso* even as late as the 14th century. It is not mentioned, for example, in the Bijolia stone inscription³⁷ (c. 1169 A.D.) or in the *Prithviraja-vijaya*, or in the *Hammiraniahakavya* of Nayachandra Suri, the grandson of the guru of Hammira of Ranthambhor who was defeated by Alauddin Khalji in 1301 A.D. That inscription records the birth of Samanta, the earliest representative of the Chahamana family on its list, in the *Vatsa* gotra at Ahichchhatra-pura which has been identified by Ojha with Nagaur in the former Jodhpur State. The connection with the sage Vatsa is mentioned in other inscriptions³⁸ also. It is presumably on this ground that the Chahamanas have been described as the descendants of a Brahmin claiming the *Vatsa gotra*³⁹

The priestly affiliation of the Chahamanas has been recognized also by D.R. Bhandarkar in whose opinion they belonged originally to a foreign tribe known as the Khazars (later called the Gurjaras).⁴⁰ Although it was quite possible for a family of foreign extraction to secure recognition as Brahmins, Bhandarkar's arguments in favour of treating the early Chahamanas as members of a priestly class are not quite convincing. He relies practically on the reference to the *Vatsa gotra* in the Bijolia stone inscription which, however, is too far away chronologically from the origin of the family. His arguments connecting the Khazars with the Chahamanas have also been challenged.⁴¹ In the present state of our knowledge it is not possible to say that there is any really conclusive evidence in support of the theory of foreign origin in the case of the Chahamanas. Apart from the vague implications of the *Agnikula* story there is hardly anything on record which prevents

us from ascribing to them an indigenous origin. They might or might not have been Brahmins or Kshatriyas. They might have been a clan without social distinction to which solar origin⁴² or Brahmanical origin was attributed by courtiers after their rise to political power.

In the case of the Paramaras the earliest available epigraphic evidence against the theory of foreign origin is practically decisive. The Harsola plates⁴³ (948 A.D.), which are at least half a century older than the *Navasahasanka-charita*, state that the Paramara ruler Vappairaja (Vakpatiraja I) was descended from the family (*kula*) of the Rashtrakuta ruler Akalavarsha (Krishna III). This clear testimony of the earliest available inscription of the dynasty cannot be set aside by later literary or epigraphic evidence. Moreover, the connection between the Rashtrakutas and the Paramaras seems to be established by the assumption by Vakpati-Munja of distinctive Rashtrakuta titles like *amoghavarsha*, *srivallabha* and *prithvivallabha*.⁴⁴ The significance of the use of the *garuda* symbol on both Rashtrakuta and Paramara grants should also be noted in this connection.⁴⁵ If the Paramaras came to Malava from the Deccan,⁴⁶—it is quite likely that it was a case of migration from the south,—they could hardly be the descendants of foreigners entering India through the north-western gate.

According to D.R. Bhandarkar, the Chaulukyas of Gujarat were "in all likelihood, of Gujar origin". He found no epigraphic evidence in support of this assumption, but in his opinion "there can be no doubt that Gujarat of the Bombay Presidency bore this name only after the Chaulukyas conquered and occupied it. If the Chaulukyas had not been of Gujar extraction, it is inconceivable how that province could have been named Gujarat (Gurjaratra) when it was uptill their advent known as Lata."⁴⁷ But the association of the name of Gujarat with the rule of the Chaulukyas does not appear to be well established. Literary evidence seems to make a distinction between the ruling family (*i.e.* the Chaulukyas) and the Gurjara-land over which they ruled. Mularaja is described in Somesvara's *Kirtikaumudi* as one "who was chosen by the Fortune of the kingdom of the Gurjara king"—a statement which would be meaningless if the territory occupied by Mularaja was not

associated with the Gurjaras before his accession. There is really no positive evidence to connect the Chaulukyas with the Gurjaras, nor is it easy to accept the arguments recently advanced in favour of the theory that the Chaulukyas were Sulikas or Sogdians coming to India from Central Asia.⁴⁸

There is little doubt that Mularaja, the founder of the Chaulukya kingdom, was the son of a Chapotkata princess and (as the Vadnagar prasati⁴⁹ of the reign of Kumarapala, dated 1151 A.D., says) took captive "the fortune of the kingdom of the Chapotkata princes". Hemachandra calls him King of the Chaulukya-*vamsa*.⁵⁰ In one of his inscriptions his father is called Raji and designated *Maharajadhiraja*⁵¹ but in Merutunga's chronicle he is described as a young pilgrim to Somnath who impressed the Chaotkata ruler by his skilful horsemanship. Whether Raji was a ruling prince cannot be ascertained. There is no reference either in epigraphic or in literary evidence to the paternal territory of Mularaja who specifically claims to have acquired the *Sarasvata-mnandala* by the prowess of his own arms.⁵² He may have been connected with a petty ruling family, but there is nothing on record to connect him with any foreign tribe.

The theory of foreign origin has found no place in regard to the Chandellas of Jeja-Bhukti. The story of the union between a young Brahmin widow named Hemavati and Chandrama (the Moon), resulting in the birth of a son named Chandravarman who established the Chandella kingdom, has rightly been dismissed by Vincent Smith as a "silly legend", although he has discovered in it an "implied admission that the pedigree of the clan required explanation, which was best attained by including it in the group of 'moon descended' Rajputs, and adding respectability by inventing a Brahman ancestress."⁵³ The story is found in the *Mahoba Khand* which is usually treated as a part of the *Prithviraja Raso* attributed to Chand Bardai. No historical importance can be attached to this late work of uncertain authorship and date.⁵⁴

Epigraphic evidence is hardly more helpful. The tradition of the Chandellas' descent from the Moon is mentioned in the Khajuraho stone inscription of Dhanga⁵⁵ (dated 954 A.D.). The genealogy begins with the creator of the universe, from whom arose Atri who begot *muni* Chandratreya. From him arose

“princes who had the power to destroy or protect the whole earth.” In this family was born *nripa* Nannuka, the first king of the Chandella dynasty. Variants of this genealogy are found in other inscriptions.⁵⁶ Even poetic imagination could not bridge satisfactorily the gulf between the creator of the universe and the first historical ruler of the Chandella dynasty. There is, however, one common point between epigraphic evidence and literary tradition: descent from the Moon is the basis of the story. But there is no attempt to connect the dynasty with any of the heroes of the well known Lunar dynasty glorified in Epic tradition.

The name of the dynasty is indicative of its traditional connection with the Moon. The earliest inscription of the dynasty (the Khajuraho stone inscription of Dhanga, dated 954 A.D.) gives the name ‘Chandratreya’. In other inscriptions we find variants such as ‘Chandrella’, ‘Chamdella’, ‘Chandella’ and ‘Chandela’.⁵⁷ Kielhorn thought that ‘Chandratreya’ was really a later Sanskritised form of ‘Chandrella’. In any case the form ‘Chandratreya’ is practically unknown to literary tradition.

In the absence of positive epigraphic or literary evidence some European writers assumed that the Chandellas were in origin a non-Aryan clan intimately associated with the *ab original* Gonds and Bhars of Central India. Vincent Smith held that the Chandellas were originally Hinduised Gonds,⁵⁸ but Russell thought that they sprang from the *ab original* Bhars.⁵⁹

This distinction is immaterial. What is really important is the question of evidence on which the main conclusion—the *ab original* descent of the Chandellas—is based. It is on the whole obvious that the legends on which Vincent Smith and Russell relied cannot be treated as reasonably trustworthy evidence. The only more or less concrete factor is the doubt cast upon the respectability of the family by the story of Hemavati which, however, is unknown to epigraphic tradition. But this doubt can hardly be construed as an indication of the *ab original* origin of the family. Smith presumed that the Chandellas had no connection with the foreign immigrants from the north-west on the ground that they are not covered by the *Agnikula* story. But we have seen that the *Agnikula* story is no conclusive evidence of foreign descent. In any case we

cannot draw the inference that dynasties outside the scope of that story must be of indigenous origin. If the Chandellas were really a clan of impure descent (as Smith suspected on the basis of the story of Hemavati), they might as well have derived their impurity from foreign descent.

To say this is, of course, not to argue that they were Hinduised foreigners. The best course seems to be to leave the question open instead of accepting the Smith Russell theory as the final word on the subject.

The inscriptions of the Gahadavalas are unusually modest so far as statements on the origin of the dynasty are concerned. There is no reference at all to its descent from the Sun⁶⁰ or the Moon or from any mythical sage or hero. There are references to its Kshatriya origin in several inscriptions⁶¹ and we are told that the dynasty came to power after the destruction of the Solar and Lunar dynasties.⁶² The genealogy is traced to Yasovigraha who is described simply as "a noble (personage)... (who) by his plentiful splendour (was) as it were the sun incarnate."⁶³

Attempts have been made to treat the Gahadavalas as a mere Sept of the Rashtrakutas instead of recognising them as a separate and independent clan.⁶⁴ Here the available evidence is altogether unconvincing.⁶⁵ Indeed, it might be said that there is really no evidence at all apart from the omission of the Gahadavalas in the lists of clans in the *Rajatarangini*, the *Kuinara-palaciarita* and the *Prithviraja Raso*. Such negative evidence proves nothing. There is no trace of the migration of the Gahadavalas from the South (*i.e.*, the Rashtrakuta territories) to the North. This difficulty has been sought to be removed by reference to the rule of "Princes born in the Rashtrakuta lineage" over Kanauj in the 11th century. There is, however, no reliable evidence of any dynastic connection between these princes and the Gahadavalas.

There is at least one inscription which mentions the two dynasties—the Gahadavalas and the Rashtrakutas—side by side without indicating that the former is a sept of the latter.⁶⁶ Moreover, in two of the lists of the 36 royal tribes compiled by Tod the Gahadavalas are mentioned as "a separate and single tribe". In spite of such recognition, however, Tod says that "the Gaharwar Rajput is scarcely known to his brothers

in Rajasthan, who would not admit his contaminated blood to mix with theirs."⁶⁷ Geographical distance might account for this exclusion of the Gahadavalas from the compact Rajput society of Rajputana, but there could hardly be any reference to their "contaminated blood" if they were known to be the descendants of the Rashtrakutas. The Paramaras were never treated as guilty of contamination on the ground of their connection with the Rashtrakutas.

The peculiar word "Gahadavala" has never been satisfactorily explained.⁶⁸ It occurs in the Gahadavala inscriptions very infrequently; indeed, only four references have been found. Nor did this dynastic designation secure recognition from the contemporaries of the Gahadavalas. We are told that "neither any of the numerous contemporary inscriptions of other dynasties nor any of the few literary works available, seem to have been acquainted with the name Gahadavala, though there are some stray and scanty references to Govindacandra and Jayacandra in literature."⁶⁹

This curious hesitation of the Gahadavalas to use their dynastic name in their own inscriptions is inexplicable unless we assume that it had some inglorious association of which Tod's reference to "contaminated blood" might be a faint echo. It is possible—though nor certain—that the Gahadavalas were, during the initial stage of their rise to power, tributaries of the Ghaznavids. In that case they would naturally be looked down upon by the other Rajput clans which made no such humiliating compromise with the Turks. But this supposition does not explain the alleged contamination of blood.

Vincent Smith refers to an old Gorakhpur tradition according to which the Gaharwars are descendants of Raja Nala and migrated to Kasi from Nalapura for Narwar (near Gwalior).⁷⁰ Stories about some "Gahirawar" rulers of Kasi are found in the *Mahoba Khand* in connection with the legends about the origin of the Chandellas. The association with Kasi shows that the Gaharwar migrants from Central India as well as the "Gahirawars" were intended to be identified with the Gahadavalas although the "Gahirawar" rulers mentioned in the *Mahoba Khand* are unknown to sober history. The story of Nala is a crude tradition connecting the Gahadavalas with the ancient Kshatriyas and it has some indirect support in the epigraphic

claim to Kshatriya origin. The story of migration from Central India seems to be a faint indication of *ab original* origin which might explain Tod's reference to "contaminated blood". A local legend current among the present Gaharwars of U.P.⁷¹ traces the Gahadavalas back to an obscure descendant of Yayati. This has been interpreted as a hint that "the Gahadavalas were originally an unimportant autochthonous tribe, who came into prominence as Kshatriyas only after seizing political power and championing the cause of Brahmanism."⁷²

The epigraphic records of the Kalachuris—a branch of the Haihayas—connect them with ancient Kshatriyas of Lunar origin. For example, an inscription of the Kalachuris of Gorakhpur begins the genealogy from Atri and carries it down through Haihaya and Kartavirya Arjuna to the founder of the family and his successors.⁷³ Another inscription of the same branch (but of a different family) carries the list upwards to Vishnu.⁷⁴ The inscriptions of the Kalachuris of Dahala also trace their descent to Vishnu, the mediate progenitor being "Haihaya-chakravarti" Kartavirya Arjuna. As the Kalachuris are connected in epigraphic tradition with the Narmada region⁷⁵ and as there is no bardic tradition connecting them either with foreigners or with *ab original* tribes, their claim to Kshatriya origin is less open to suspicion than similar claims of other clans.

Apart from the principal Rajput dynasties of the pre-Muslim period—those dynasties which succumbed to the Turkish invaders—we have to take notice of three ruling dynasties of medieval Rajputana: the Guhilots of Mewar, the Rathors of Marwar and the Kachhwas of Amber-Jaipur.

The Guhilots were among the oldest Rajput ruling dynasties though they did not attain political prominence during the golden age of Rajput ascendancy in Northern India. The problem of the origin of this celebrated dynasty has been discussed by several scholars from different points of view. In D.R. Bhandarkar's view the Guhilots were originally Nagar, Brahmins, who were of foreign origin.⁷⁶ This theory has so far held the ground, although the orthodox theory of the Solar origin of the Guhilots still commands some support.⁷⁷

Bhandarkar relied mainly upon epigraphic evidence⁷⁸ and literary tradition. That Bappa was a Brahmin is indicated by certain verses in the Chittor and Achalesvara inscriptions (of

1274 A.D. and 1285 A.D. respectively) and also, more distinctly, by the *Mamadeva prasasti*. The Chittor inscription describes him as a Brahmin coming from Anandapura which Bhandarkar identified with Vadnagar on the basis of miscellaneous evidence such as the *Vadnagar prasasti* of the reign of Kumarapala, the Alina charters of 649 A.D. and 656 A.D., the tradition current among the Nagar Brahmins and popular stories. The well known work *Lkalinga-inahatmyu*, composed during the reign of Rana Kumbha, refers to Guhadatta, the founder of the Guhila clan, as belonging to a Brahmin family emigrated from Anandapura. The same work tells us that Vijayaditya, the ancestor of Guhadatta, was the ornament of the Nagar race. These two statements show that the Guhilots were known in Rana Kumbha's reign as descendants of Nagar Brahmins. Moreover, the *gotra* of the Guhilots was *Vaijavapa* (as indicated in the *Ekalingamahatmya* and the *Rasikapriya*, a commentary by Rana Kumbha on Jaidev's *Gita-Govindam*) which was one of the *gotras* among the Nagar Brahmins at least as early as the 13th century.

The tradition of the Brahmin origin of the Rana's family is, indeed, as old as the Atpur inscription of 977 A.D. and can be traced up to the 16th and 17th centuries in Abul Fazl's *Ain-i-Akbari*⁷⁹ and Nainsi's *Kinyat*. Against this continuous tradition is to be set the significant expression *Raghuvamsa-Kirtipisunah* in Naravahana's inscription of 971 A.D., showing that even before the date of the Atpur inscription the Guhilots had begun to advance the claim of Solar Kshatriya origin. Indeed, there are conflicting traditions about the caste of the Guhilots—a fact noted by Nainsi in the 17th century—and Bhandarkar's identification of Anandapura with Vadnagar (on which the theory of foreign origin is largely based) raises some difficulties. Yet it would be difficult to assume an indigenous Kshatriya origin for the Guhilots in view of their historical association with the Gurjara-Pratiharas and geographical association with Rajputana.⁸⁰

The chronicles of Marwar are unanimous in tracing the descent of the Rathor rulers of Marwar and Bikaner from the Gahadavalas of Kanauj.⁸¹ This tradition has some support in epigraphic evidence. A later inscription, dated V.S. 1686, describes Siha, the founder of the Rathor dynasty of Marwar, as "Kanojiya-Rathoda."⁸² This description might, however, be

an echo of the bardic tradition. That tradition had already taken shape, for the *Ain-i-Akbari* describes Siha as a nephew of Jayachandra.⁸³ In the Bithu inscription,⁸⁴ Siha is described simply as "Rathoda" and there is no hint at all of any relationship between him and the Gahadavalas. It must be admitted, however, that the facts recorded in this inscription are quite consistent with the bardic story.

We must remember in this connection that the Rathors never called themselves Gahadavalas. Indeed, the practice of inter-marriage between the Rathors and the Gahadavalas is a significant indication of the fact that the two clans are different in origin.⁸⁵ The *gotras* of the two clans are different, but this is no positive indication of difference in origin because it might be due to the adoption of a new priest after the arrival of Siha in Rajputana. In any case, even the acceptance of the bardic tradition cannot solve the problem of Rathor origin, for—as we have seen—the origin of the Gahadavalas cannot be precisely determined.

These difficulties have been sought to be removed by the theory that the Rathors were the descendants of the Rashtrakutas of Badaun.⁸⁶ The Rashtrakuta principality of Badaun was conquered by Qutb-ud-din in 1202 A.D., but princes of the dynasty probably continued to rule in Kanyakubja-desa for some years more.⁸⁷ Siha "Rathoda" might have been a descendant of this dynasty who migrated to Rajputana after its downfall. According to bardic tradition quoted by Tod and Reu, he came to Marwar in 1212 A.D. This date is chronologically consistent with the theory of Rashtrakuta origin; but if Siha died in 1273 A.D. (as bardic tradition, indirectly supported by the Bithu inscription, seems to indicate⁸⁸), he must have been very young at the time of migration. In the Bithu inscription he is called simply "Rathoda" while his father Seta is called "kumara". Thus Seta seems to have been the son of a reigning prince, but not a reigning prince himself, and in the days of his son the family seems to have lost even the traditional glamour of royal descent. This is an adequate explanation of the gap of 70 years between the fall of the Rashtrakuta principality of Badaun and the death of Siha in Marwar. The alleged connection between Siha and Jayachandra might have been a mistake "caused by the fact that 'Jayachandra' was at

the time of Muslim attack actually the sovereign ruler of Kanauj and the overlord of the feudatory Rashtrakuta family of that place."⁸⁹

Literary tradition connects the Kachhwas or Kachchhwahas with the Solar Kshatriyas of Kosala. They are represented as descendants of Kusa, son of Rama, the hero of the *Ramayana*.⁹⁰ Linguistically there can be no derivation of the dynastic name from the name Kusa. Nor is there any really trustworthy evidence indicating any connection between the Kachhwas and the Kachchhapaghatas. Epigraphic records describe the founders of the different branches of the Kachchhapaghatas simply as *Kacchhapaghata-vamsatilaka* or *Kacchhapaghatan-vaya*.⁹¹

Tod records the traditional connection of the Kachchhwahas with Kusa, refers to the Kachhwa principalities of Narwar and Gwalior (but not to the principality of Dubkund) and says that Dhola Rai, "expelled the paternal abode ... laid the foundation of the Stole of Dhoondar" in 967 A.D.⁹² As the principality of Narwar seems to have been established in the last quarter of the 11th century,⁹³ Dhola Rai could hardly have been "expelled the paternal abode" before 967 A.D. "Sora Singh, prince of Narwar", who was Dhola Rai's father according to Tod, is unknown to epigraphic records. Actually there is no conclusive evidence connecting the Kachhwas of Amber with the Kachchhapaghatas of Gwalior, Narwar or Dubkund except the nominal similarity in the names. Dhola Rai might well have been an adventurer of unknown origin who established a small principality in an *ab original* area by treachery. It is significant that the names of Dhola Rai and his successors (Kankul, Maidal Rao, Hoondeo, Koontul, Pujoon, Malesi, Bcejul, Rajdeo, Keelun, Joonsi) are not conventional Rajput names at all. If Tod's stories about the long contest between the early Kachhwa rulers and the mines are accepted as an authentic account of the rise of the dynasty, the possibility of Dhola Rai's origin from *ab original* stock would perhaps be precluded. But there is no evidence at all of Kshatriya origin.

This brief survey of the problem of the origin of the principal Rajput dynasties would indicate that even scholarly discussions extending over several decades have not given us indisputable conclusions. (We can hardly complain of paucity of sources; inscriptions, literary works in Sanskrit and Hindi and unwritten

traditions handed down from generation to generation are available for critical study.) The main difficulty lies in the fact that the evidence is in most cases more or less conventional and stereotyped; similar traditions find expression in different forms in different types of sources. This basic uniformity of the available information loses its historical significance to a large extent because it incorporates supernatural or obviously unhistorical elements. It is unlikely that the discovery of new inscriptions will improve our position, for epigraphic records usually conform to the traditional pattern. The inscriptions of the early medieval period are not objective historical narratives like the Allahabad *prasati* of Harishena. What they reflect primarily is poetic fancy, supplemented by vague generalisations and stimulated by dynastic interest. We can hardly expect that the composer of any dynastic inscription left the beaten track and recorded the unvarnished truth. We must satisfy ourselves, in the present circumstances, with unsatisfactory conclusions.

Notes and References

1. *Oxford History of India*, 3rd (revised) edition, p. 190.
2. *Ibid.*
3. *Epigraphia Indica*, Vol. XVIII pp. 99-114, Annual Report, Archaeological Survey of India, 1903-04, pp. 277-288.
4. *J.R.A.S.*, 1894, p. 4, *Ep. Ind.*, XVIII, p. 8-99.
5. *Viddiasnlabhanjika*, 1, 6.
6. *Balabharata*.
7. *Balabharata*, I, 7.
8. *Ep. Ind.*, II, pp. 116-130. *Indian Antiquary*, 1913, pp. 57-64.
9. Bhandarkar, *Ind. Ant.*, XLII (1913), pp. 58, 62, H.C. Ray, *Dynastic History of Northern India*, Vol. II, p. 1064.
10. *Ep. Ind.*, III, pp. 263-267.
11. C.V. Vaidya, *History of Medieval Hindu India*, Vol. II, pp. 31-32.
12. Sanjan copper plate of Amoghavarsha I. (*Ep. Ind.*, XVIII, pp. 235-257).
13. *Ep. Ind.*, XVIII, pp. 7-99.
14. Harichandra is described as a "Brahmin well versed in the meaning of the *Vedas* and the *Sastras*".
15. *Bombay Gazetteer*, Vol. I, Part I, Appendix III, *J.B.B.R.A.S.*, Vol. XXI, pp. 413 ff.
16. B.N. Puri, *The History of the Gurjara-Pratiharas*, Chapter I.

17. *Anna's of Rajasthan*, ed. Crooke, Vol. I, p. 113, Annual Report, Archaeological Survey of India, II, p. 254.
18. See *Ep. Ind.*, V, Appendix No. 12.
19. *Bombay Gazetteer*, Vol. X, pp. 185.
20. Blochmann and Jarrett, Vol. II, p. 218.
21. See; IASB, 1887, Vol. LV, pp. 5-65; JARAS, 1927, Vol. I, pp. 203-211.
22. *Indian Historical Quarters*, Vol. XVI, pp. 738-746.
23. Sec XI, 64-76.
24. H. C. Rav, *Dynastic History of Northern India*, Vol. I, p. 841.
25. *Ep. Ind.*, I, p. 236.
26. *Ep. Ind.*, II, p. 180: XIV, p. 295: IX, p. 148, etc.
27. D. Sharma, *Early Chauhan Dynasties*, p. 7.
28. *Early History of India*, 4th ed., p. 412.
29. Smith, *Early History of India*, 4th ed., p. 393.
30. R.P. Tripathi, *History of Kanauj*, p. 226.
31. D.C. Ganguly, *History of the Paramara Dynasty*, p. 22.
32. *Balakanda*, Cantos 54-55.
33. D. Sharma, *Early Chauhan Dynasties*, pp. 4-5.
34. *Ep. Ind.*, IX, p. 79.
35. See II, 68.
36. D. Sharma (*Early Chauhan Dynasties*, p. 6) draws this inference in the case of the Chahamanas.
37. JASB, 1886, Vol. XL, Part 1, pp. 14-15, 28-32, 40-46.
38. *Ep. Ind.*, IX, pp. 70 ff., 79 ff.
39. D. Sharma, *Early Chauhan Dynasties*, p. 7.
40. *Indian Antiquary*, XLI, pp. 25-29.
41. D. Sharma, *Early Chauhan Dynasties*, p. 8.
42. Cf. reference to *surya-mandala* in the *Prithviraja-vijaya* and the *Hammiramahakavya* in connection with the birth of the eponymous hero Chahamana.
43. *Ep. Ind.*, XIX, p. 236.
44. D.C. Ganguly, *History of the Paramara Dynasty*, p. 9.
45. H.C. Ray, *Dynastic History of Northern India*, Vol. II, p. 842.
46. Abul Fazl records this tradition (Jarrett, Vol. II, pp. 214 ff.).
47. *Indian Antiquary*, XL, pp. 7-39.
48. A.K. Majumdar, *Chaulukyas of Gujarat*, pp. 9-17.
49. *Ep. Ind.*, I, pp. 296 ff.
50. *Uvya-starnatokavya*, 1,2.
51. *Indian Antiquary*, VI, pp. 101 ff.
52. *Indian Antiquary*, VI, p. 191.
53. *Indian Antiquary*, XXXVIII, pp. 136-137.
54. See S.K. Mitra, *The Early Rulers of Khajuraho*, pp. 14-25.
55. *Ep. Ind.*, I, pp. 122 ff.

56. *Ep. Ind.*, I, pp. 140, 208-209, 217, 325.
57. *Indian Antiquary*, XVIII, pp. 236-239; *Ep. Ind.*, II, p. 30; XX, p. 127.
58. *Indian Antiquary*, XXXVII, pp. 136-137; *JASB*, XLVI, Part I, pp. 229-236.
59. *Tribes and Castes of the Central Provinces*, Vol. IV, p. 441.
60. See Roma Niyogi, *History of the Gahadavala Dynasty*, pp. 31-32.
61. *Ep. Ind.*, IX, pp. 319-328; XIV, pp. 193-209.
62. *Indian Antiquary*, XVIII, pp. 14-19.
63. *Indian Antiquary*, XVIII, pp. 11-12.
64. Sir Asutosh Mookerjee *Silver Jubilee Volumes* (Calcutta University), *Orientalia*, Part 2, pp. 259-261; *JRAS*, 1930, pp. 111-121; C.V. Vaidya, *History of Medieval Hindu India*, Vol. III, pp. 217-221; *Journal of Indian History*, XV, pp. 24-29.
65. Tripathi, *History of Kanauj*, pp. 298-300; Roma Niyogi, *History of the Gahadavala Dynasty*, pp. 30-33.
66. *Ep. Ind.*, IX, pp. 319-328.
67. *Annals*, ed. Crooke, Vol. I, pp. 98, 139. The Rathors intermarried with the Gahadavalas.
68. The connection between Gahadavala and Gawarmad mentioned in a Kanarese inscription of Saka 104, suggested by Dr. R.C. Majumdar, is farfetched (*Indian Historical Quarterly*, VII, p. 634). A local legend current in the Mirzapur district (U.P.) says that a mythical ancestor of the "Gahadavalas overcame the malignant influence of Saturn and gained the title of Grahavara" ("overcomer at the Planet") which was later on corrupted in to "Gaharwar" (Crooke, *Tribes and Castes of NWP and Oudh*, Vol. II, pp. 371-372. *Mirzapur Gazetteer*, p. 204. This explanation is obviously too fanciful for historical purposes.
69. Roma Niyogi, *History of the Gahadavala Dynasty*, p. 30.
70. *JASB*, 1881, p. 3.
71. Crooke, *Tribes and Castes of NWP and Oudh*, Vol. II, pp. 371-372, *Mirzapur Gazetteer*, p. 204.
72. Tripathi, *History of Kanauj*, p. 297.
73. *Ep. Ind.*, VII, pp. 83-83.
74. *Ep. Ind.*, XVIII, pp. 121-137.
75. The Gorakhpur branch seems to have come from beyond the Narmada. See H.C. Ray, *Dynastic History of Northern India*, Vol. II, p. 743.
76. *JASB*, 1989, pp. 167 ff.
77. C.V. Vaidya, *History of Medieval Hindu India*, Vol. II, pp. 84, 332, 337; G.C. Raychaudhuri, *History of Mewar*, pp. 20-27.
78. See *Prakrit and Sanskrit Inscriptions of Kathiawar*.

79. Jarrett, Vol. II, p. 269. This point has not been noticed by Bhandarkar.
80. The tradition connecting the Guhilots with the South (mentioned in the *Ain-i-Akbari* and the *Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri*) is very late.
81. Sir Asutosh Mookerjee *Silver Jubilee Volumes* (Calcutta University), Vol. III, *Orientalia*, Part 2, pp. 259-261; *Reu. Glories of Manvar and the Glorious Rathors*, pp. ix-x, 34, 38-47.
82. *Indian Antiquary*, July, 1911, pp. 181-183.
83. Blochmann and Jarret, Vol. II, p. 191.
84. *Indian Antiquary*, July, 1911.
85. *Indian Antiquary*, XIV (1873).
86. There is no evidence to connect the Rathors with the Rashtrakutas of Hastikundi (in Rajputana).
87. R.C. Majumdar (ed.), *The Struggle for Empire*, Vol. V, pp. 50-51.
88. A.C. Banerjee, *Medieval Studies*, pp. 40-41.
89. H.C. Ray, *Dynamic History of Northern India*, Vol. 1, p. 552.
90. *Archaeological Survey Reports*, I, pp. 56, 106-107, 161-162; III, pp. 1328 ff.
91. *Ep. bid.*, II, p. 237; *Indian Antiquary*, XV, p. 36. *Journal of American Oriental Society*, VI, p. 543.
92. See *Annals*, ed. Crooke, Vol. III, pp. 1328-1336.
93. H.C. Ray, *Dynastic History of Northern India*, pp. 834-835.

2

Assimilation of Rajputs

The history of the principal Rajput dynasties of the pre-Muslim period—those dynasties which succumbed to the Turkish invaders—has a striking feature. If some of these dynasties were of foreign origin, their religion, language, social affiliation and administration (as portrayed in literary and epigraphic evidence) betray no recognisable non-Indian element at all. If, again, some of them were of *ab original* or non-Aryan origin, the manner in which they lived and ruled did not reveal their ancestral socio-cultural legacy. The continuity with the past could hardly have been more complete and more remarkable if the uncontaminated descendants of the ancient Solar and Lunar dynasties had continued to rule without interruption in the sacred land of Aryavarta. The environment had triumphed over heredity to an extent almost unprecedented in history. The process of assimilation seems to have been completed even before the dynasties had seized political power, and as we proceed through their records—epigraphic and literary—we never feel that we are moving in a new world created by alien or unconventional forces. There might be foreign elements in the Hindu population of the "Rajput period", but there were few recognisable foreign elements in the Hindu society and culture or in the Hindu political system on the eve of the Turkish conquest.

As we know, the outstanding fact in the religious history of northern India in the post-Gupta period is the triumphant

progress of the Brahmanical religion. Buddhism disappeared slowly from the land of its birth and Jainism maintained its stronghold only in western India. The disappearance of Buddhism was really a case of merger; the process was accelerated by the identification of the Buddha with Vishnu by means of the theory of incarnation. The similarity between the developed doctrines and rituals of Mahayana on the one hand and the Brahmanical stress upon faith and devotion and the worship of numerous gods and goddesses on the other hand contributed to the absorption of Buddhism by Brahmanical Hinduism, Jainism was not entirely unaffected by the assimilating capacity of Brahmanical Hinduism, but its "innate rigidity and conservative character...enabled it to maintain to a certain extent its special characteristics *vis-a-vis* Brahmanical religion."¹

Buddhism played no part in the history of the Rajput dynasties, although its existence is noticed in inscriptions and in literary evidence here and there. There are scanty references to Buddhism in some inscriptions of the time of Mahendrapala.² In Krishna Misra's *Prabodha Chandrodaya* we have a reference to the flight of the Saugatas into Sindhu, Gandhara, Magadha, Andhra, Huna, Vanga, Kalinga and the land of the *mlecchas*. But the poet, a zealous devotee of Vaishnavism, is not an unprejudiced writer. His contempt for Buddhism found indirect expression through the following words of a Buddhist monk in the drama: "How excellent is the religion of the Saugatas which grants both sensual enjoyments and eternal felicity: it permits us to inhabit elegant houses and to possess women obedient to our wills; it removes the restriction as to the time of eating; it allows us to recline on soft beds and to pass the shining moonlit nights in amours with young damsels."³ The Chandella rulers, however, do not appear to have shared the poet's hostile attitude towards the Buddhists. Some Buddhist images—sculptures of Bodhisatvas, Buddha and Tara—have been found at Mahoba, and expert opinion has assigned them to the 11th-12th centuries.⁴ Much more significant is the fact that, while granting an entire village to some Brahmins, Paramardi took particular care to exclude a portion of it belonging to a Buddhist shrine.⁵ These faint echoes of Buddhism undoubtedly indicate that it was not a living faith in the Chandella dominions; presumably it was too weak to provoke hostility.

In the Gangetic valley, however, Buddhism had retained some vitality. According to epigraphic evidence the Gahadavala Kings extended their patronage to the Buddhist monasteries at Set-Mahet⁶ and Jayachandra became a disciple of Buddhist monk Srimitra "with a pleasing heart and an indescribable hankering."⁷ It is difficult to say whether this meant actual conversion to Buddhism or mere addition of a new god to the pantheon of gods generally worshipped by the Gahadavalas. It should be remembered that Buddha had already been accepted by the orthodox Hindu society as an incarnation of Vishnu. Jayachandra's connection with Buddhism is indicated also by Ibn-ul-Athir's story about his white elephant which refused to salute Muhammad Ghor after its capture on the death of the Gahadavala King.⁸ The sanctity of the white elephant is a well known Buddhist tradition. Whatever the nature and extent of the Gahadavala patronage might be, Buddhism was evidently in a state of decline. Srimitra, we are told, "restored the discipline and recovered many lost scriptures and others of the same kind, belonging to the illustrious site of Mahabodhi."⁴

There is hardly any reference to Buddhism in the inscriptions and literary works of the other Rajput dynasties. In the case of the Chaulukya dominions it has been surmised that "the lingering influence of Buddhism came to an end...by A.D. 1024" when the great Jain monk Vardhamana Suri and his disciple Jinesvara defeated the Chaityavasins in a debate held in the court of Durlabha.¹⁰ This theory is based on the identification of the Chaityavasins with the Buddhists. R.G. Bhandarkar, however, described the Chaityavasins as a Jain sect. Moreover, there is really no evidence to show that Buddhism was so strong in Gujarat in the 11th century that leading Jain monks found it necessary to vanquish this rival creed in an open debate.

Jain temples and *gosthi* are mentioned in some inscriptions of the Gurjara-Pratihara period.¹¹ There is no reference to Jainism in the inscriptions of the Gahadavalas. In the Chandella dominions, however, Jainism seems to have been a living faith. The Digambara sect was probably predominant, for it is specifically referred to in Krishna Misra's *Prabodha-Chandrodaya*. The dramatist says that the Digambaras fled to Panchala, Malava, Abhira and to the sea coast. He also refers to disputes between

the Jains and the Buddhists.¹² Much more important than the prejudiced statements of the poet are inscriptions issued by Jain worshippers, some of whom claimed to be *kulamatyas* of Chandella Kings.¹³ One Pahila, "a devotee of the lord of the Jinas" is said to have been "held in honour by Dhanga" and one Vasavachandra is described as *Maharajaguru*.¹⁴ Devotion to Jainism seems to have been particularly strong in the mercantile community and it is probable that the wealthy *srcsthins* provided the funds for the construction of beautiful Jain temples at Khajuraho and at other places in the Chandella dominions like Dudahi and Madanpur.¹⁵

In Malava and Rajputana, and specially in Gujarat, Jainism was a flourishing faith, thanks to the missionary activities of some well known saints as also to royal patronage. Two Jain teachers, Amitagati and Dhanesvara, lived in Malava during the reign of Vakpab-Munja. Bhoja had a favourite Jain associate named Prabhachandra, and we are told in the *Prabandhachintamani* that the influence of the poet Dhanapala attracted the great King towards Jainism. If Merutunga is to be believed, Bhoja summoned a religious assembly in which the representatives of different sects participated for discussion.¹⁶ Dhara was the birthplace of the great Jain author Abhayadeva who was made "Suri" by Jinesvara in 1031 A.D. Naravarman, the Paramara King, was favourably disposed towards Jainism and held the Jain teacher Vallabha in great veneration. Vindhavarman extended his patronage to Mahavira, who was well versed in Jain theology and grammar. After a temporary reaction against Jainism in the reign of Subhatavarman, the cause of the faith was advanced in Malava by Asadhara, a disciple of Mahavira. There was a flourishing Jain monastery in Ujjain in the 13th century.¹⁷

In Rajputana Jainism secured a fresh lease of life from the missionary activities of Haribhadra Suri of Chittor (8th century) and the great teachers of the Kharatara sect like Jinesvara, Jinavallabha, jinachandra and Jinapati.¹⁸ Some of the Chahamanas decorated Jain temples. Amoraja donated a site for the construction of Jain temples for worship in accordance with Jinavallabha's teachings. He also patronised the Jain scholar Dharmaghosa Suri. Vigraharaj IV built a Jain *vihara* and prohibited the slaughter of animals on certain prescribed days.

Somesvara granted a village to the Jain temple at Bijolia. Prithviraja III employed Jains in his service and honoured Jinapati Suri with a *jayapatra*.

In Gujarat the powerful and elightened patronage of Kumarapala made Jainism the dominant faith. It has been suggested that his acceptance of Jainism may have had "a material object in view, the winning of the support of the powerful and wealthy Bania Corporations, who were predominantly Jain". The expenses of his numerous wars, we are told, "must have drained his treasury, and may have made him increasingly dependent for financial assistance on the Jain community, who appeared to have formed then as now, the backbone of industry, commerce, and banking in Gujarat."¹⁹ This view has been criticised on the ground that "we cannot positively say that the rich community in Gujarat in Kumarapala's day was Jaina just as they are now."²⁰ Whatever the causes of Kumarapala's leanings towards Jainism might be, there can hardly be any doubt that his views and measures provided a remarkable incentive to the spread of the faith, in his extensive territories.

His successor, Ajayapala, is described by Merutunga as a persecutor of Jainism. Henceforth, Jainism, deprived of the patronage of the ruling dynasty, flourished under the patronage of wealthy and influential merchant princes like Vastupala, Tejahpala and Jagadu. It is not a little curious to recall that Vastupala, who is said to have spent fabulous sums in charities and in the construction of temples, was well known to his contemporaries of his martial qualities. In Arisimha's *Sukritasankirtana* occurs the following significant statement: "Thy sword, illustrious Vastupala, beautiful in rising and brandishing, valiant in deed, defeated in the world that Sangramasimha."²¹ The doctrine of *ahimsa* emphasized by Jainism seems to have influenced social customs such as spread of vegetarianism, but it does not appear to have affected affairs of State. Neither Jain teaching nor the conduct of Jain rulers and ministers looked down upon martial qualities or fostered the policy of pacifism.²²

In spite of the lingering traces of Buddhism and Jainism, the world of the Rajputs was really the world of the Brahmanical gods: devotion to the Hindu Pantheon was the predominant feature of religious life. The Gwalior inscription of Gujara-

Pratihara Bhoja describes Nagabhata II as a ruler "who, desirous of the great growth of virtuous acts, enjoined in the *Veda*, performed a series of religious ceremonies according to the custom of Kshatriya families."²³ This reference to "virtuous acts enjoined in the *Vedas*" must be taken as a conventional formula, for the Vedic religion had long ago been transformed into the Brahmanical religion. Among the early Gurjara-Pratiharas Vatsaraja was a Saiva and Nagabhata was a devotee of Bhagavati. Epigraphic as well as numismatic²⁴ evidence shows that Bhoja was a devotee of the Boar incarnation of Vishnu, although he is described also as a devotee of Bhagavati, Mahendrapala was a Mahesvara or devotee of Siva. Mahipala was a devotee of Bhagavati as well as of Surya. The veneration of the Brahmanical gods was apparently firmly established, and one remarkable feature of religious life was the absence of sectarian animosity.

The records of the other Rajput dynasties indicate the same features: predominance of the Brahmanical religion and the peaceful co-existence of the principal gods and goddesses. There are references in Chandella inscriptions to the royal protection of the "three *Vedas*" and to sacrifices "where terribly wielded sword was the ladle, where the oblation of clarified butter was made with streaming blood...."²⁵ But Saivism and Vaishnavism were the predominant cults. Kalanjar had ancient association with Nilakantha Siva. The ascendancy of Saivism began in the reign of Dhanga, and its continuance till the fall of the dynasty is proved by epigraphic as well as archaeological evidence. Some of the early rulers—for example, Yasovarman—were Vaishnavas. Krishna Misra, the author of *Prabodhachandrodaya*, was a zealous devotee of Vaishnavism, although he preached the excellence of the Advaita system of philosophy. Apart from Siva and Vishnu, the worship of Ganesa, Kartikeya, Brahma and Surya was fairly well known in the Chandella dominions.

Although the Chahamanas had fairly close association with the Jains, their devotion to the Brahmanical gods was beyond question. Ajayaraja was a devotee of Siva; so was Arnoraja who, however, showed his leanings towards Vaishnavism by building a temple of Varaha at Pushkar and by extending his patronage to the Bhagavata teacher, Devabodha. Literary evidence particularly the *Harakeli nataka*, shows that Vighnaraja

IV was a worshipper of Siva. Somesvara's title *Prataiw-lankesvara*, implying a comparison between him and Ravana, may be taken as an indication of his devotion to Siva. It is somewhat surprising that Brahma, whose temple at Pushkar was unique in India, did not attract the devotional allegiance of the Chahamanas rulers.

Having regard to the importance of Varanasi in the Gahadavala dominions it would be natural to expect that Saivism would be the principal creed of the dynasty. But the most highly venerated god was Vishnu. The Gahadavala seal represented a figure of Garuda, the mythological *vahana* of Vishnu. Chandra, the first ruler of the dynasty, was a devotee of Adi-Kesava.²⁶ Jayachandra was initiated into the worship of Krishna by a priest described as *Vaishiuwaintjavidhigiiru*.²⁷ In spite of his alleged predilection for Buddhism the last Gahadavala King was a Vaishnava and followed his predecessors in using the descriptive title *Parama-Mahesvara*. Here is a clear indication of the simultaneous acceptance of the Vaishnava and Saiva cults by the Gahadavalas. A curious attempt to harmonise Vaishnavism and Saivism is evident in an epigraphic statement that Hari being commissioned by Hara to protect Varanasi, was born in the person of Govindachandra.²⁸ There are epigraphic indications of the worship of other gods, e.g. Surya, Vinayaka, Kumara. The traditional homage to the Vedas is not withheld. The Rahan grant says that the Creator was born in the person of Chandra to restore the earth to the path of virtue when, after the fall of the dynasties of the Sun and the Moon, the voice of the *Vedas* was almost extinct.²⁹

The Kalachuris were ardent devotees of Saivism. Epigraphic evidence indicates close association between Yuvaraja and Saiva ascetics like Prabhavasiva.³⁰ Yasah-Karna is said to have "reverenced the holy Bhimesvara³¹ with many ornaments."³² An inscription records the foundation of a temple of Siva, with a *matha* and a hall of study, by the widowed queen of Gayakarna.³³ The blessings of Siva are invoked in an inscription of Jayasimha.³⁴ Indeed, Saivism was the predominant faith in the Kalachuri dominions, although there are epigraphic references to Vaishnavism and Buddhism.³⁵

In Malava, where (as we have seen) Jainism was by no means dead, the Paramara rulers were devout Saivas. Donations

for Saiva worship were made by great Kings like Vakpati-Munja and Bhojn, Ujjain had well known Saiva monasteries and an emigrant from Varansi, Bhava Brihaspati by name, served as Superintendent of Saiva temples at Dhara.

The early Chaulukyas were Saivas, although they showed friendly respect and generosity towards the Jains, Jayasimha Siddharaja had as his religious preceptor the famous Saiva teacher of Dhara, Bhava Brihaspati, whom he had brought to Gujarat after defeating the Paramara King. The famous Sahasralinga lake constructed by him was surrounded by 1,008 small shrines, each containing a Siva *lingam*. Even Kumarapala is described in an inscription dated 1169 A.D. (issued obviously after his conversion to Jainism) as "the leader of the princes who worship Mahesvara". Hemachandra also notes his lingering leanings towards the Brahmanical religion. Indeed, it has been suggested "like Harshavardhana, while not ceasing to be a Hindu, Kumarapala favoured and actively promoted the spread of another religion, in his case Jainism."³⁶ His successor, Ajayapala, was a devout follower of the Brahmanical religion; later chroniclers depicted him as a persecutor of Jainism. Vaishnavism was not popular in the holy land of Dvaraka. Jayasimha Siddharaja is the only Chaulukya King who constructed a temple for Vishnu. The ancient temple of Somanatha symbolised the religious spirit of Gujarat and Saurashtra.

Ekalinga is the tutelary divinity of the Guhilots; hence Saivism may be regarded as the original religion of Mewar. The Ranas were the *Deirans*, or Vicegerents, of Siva. The temple of Ekalinga (near Udaipur) is the most important shrine of the Saivas in Mewar. When the Rana visited the temple he superseded the priest in his duties and performed the necessary ceremonies. This peculiar custom may not be entirely unconnected with the well-known tradition that the ancestors of the Ranas were Brahmins. References to the Siva cult are found in inscriptions from the tenth century onwards. There are also references to Vaishnavism which reached the highest stage of development in Mewar in the days of Rana Kumbha.³⁷

It would be too much to expect that the composers of conventional epigraphic records and literary works would take any notice of the religious faith and festivals of the common

people outside the charmed circle of the royal courts and the glittering palaces of the *sresthins*. If the alleged non-Indian or non-Aryan origin of the Rajputs left any trace on popular religion, inscriptions and Sanskrit literary works do not offer us any glimpse into those unorthodox deviations. According to traditions current in the Mahoba region a tribal deity known as Maniya Deo (Devi) was the tutelary goddess of the Chandellas,³⁸ but she is altogether unknown to the inscriptions of the dynasty. Similar traditions may still be current in other regions in connection with other Rajput dynasties, but no systematic attempt has been made to explore their historical significance. Our judgement is based exclusively on records prepared by learned Brahmins and Jains, for whom the unorthodox survivals of an obscure past or the crude ceremonies of the common people deserved no recognition at all. The picture which they have left for us is one of complete assimilation: whatever the origin of the Rajput ruling dynasties might be, they had succumbed completely to the Brahmanical religion. Buddhism was dying; Jainism showed signs of a living faith in western India. But it was the Brahmanical religion in its Saiva and Vaishnava varieties which really shaped religious life.

Social organization in the Rajput States was based on the traditional Brahmanical principles as incorporated in the *Dharmasastras*. The caste system, well defined and consequently rigid, provided the steel frame which sustained the social structure. In Krishna Misra's *Prabodhachandrodaya* we find *mahamoha* (i.e. great illusion) questioning the propriety of distinction between human beings with similar physical features.³⁹ This may be interpreted to mean that, in the poet's opinion, it would be silly to challenge the basis of the caste system. It was the duty of the ruling power to act as the guardian of the existing social order. The Paramara Kings, Udayaditya and Naravarman, for example, declared that their swords were always ready to protect *varna* or caste.⁴⁰ Even Jain ruling authorities took this duty seriously. When Vastupala was appointed the Governor of Cambay he stopped the promiscuous mingling of castes in shops where curd was sold.⁴¹ The Chandellas were anxious not to violate *Dhamna* in any way.⁴² The reference in Chandella inscriptions⁴³ to *svavarna* marriage

and selection of brides from illustrious families (*mahavainsa*) indicates that marriage within one's own caste or within a circle of high families was the general rule.

The Brahmins naturally occupied the highest place in the social hierarchy. A Chandella inscription tells us that a Brahmin done "was ever ready to expound the *Vedas*, the *Vedangas*, *Iithasa*, the *Puranas* and *Mimansa*, and was devoted to *satkarma*."⁴⁴ The six-fold duties (*sat-karma*) mentioned here include: *yajana*, *adhyayana*, *adhyapana*, *dana* and *parigraha*. Gifts of land, dwellings, gold, grain and cows to learned Brahmins were regarded as meritorious acts of faith. References to such gifts are numerous in the inscriptions of different Rajput dynasties. Some grants of Kalachuri Karna claim that the world was deafened by the sound of the engraving of the copper plates which he granted to Brahmins.⁴⁵

Although belonging to the priestly class, the Brahmins were not debarred from joining other professions. The Chandella inscriptions refer to the employment of Brahmins as *Senapati*, *Dharmadhikarin* and *Rauta*.⁴⁶ A Brahmin family supplied officers to the Chandella Kings for five generations.⁴⁷ Lakshmidhara, the well known 12th century compiler of *Dharmasastra* digests, recognises the doctrine of *apad-vritti*, i.e. the principle that in cases of extreme necessity a Brahmin may adopt the profession of any other caste. This might be a necessary recognition of the uncertain conditions prevailing in the Gahadavala dominions as a result of frequent Muslim invasions.

The existence of the Kshatriyas as a distinct caste may be deduced from epigraphic references. Curiously enough, these references are far less frequent than might be expected. For example, only two references have been found in the Chandella records.⁴⁸ It has been suggested that the growing importance of the *Kula* eclipsed the previous practice of mentioning the caste.⁴⁹ The clan system, which dominated the political and social system of the Rajputs in the later medieval period, was probably casting its premature shadow over the 10th and 11th centuries.

The term *Kayastha* was used originally to indicate a class of officials engaged in writing State documents and in maintaining public accounts. Gradually these officials formed an occupational caste. Lakshmidhara does not recognise them

as a caste, and although the term *Kayastha* occurs in some Gahadavala inscriptions, it is not clear whether it is an official designation or the name of a caste.⁵⁰ Some Chandella records seem to indicate that the Kayasthas were recognised as a caste⁵¹. *Cauda kayastha vamsa* is referred to in some Chandella inscriptions of the 9th century'.

It was obviously a Brahmin-ridden society over which the Rajput princes presided in their capacity of the defenders of the faith. Says Alberuni: "The Brahmans, teach the *Veda* to the Kshatriyas. The latter learn it, but are not allowed to teach it, not even to a Brahman. The Vaisya and Sudra are not allowed to hear it, much less to pronounce and recite it. If such a thing can be proved against one of them the Brahmans drag him before the magistrate, and he is punished by having his tongue cut-off."⁵²

Such social tyranny was altogether inconsistent with the traditions of the earlier centuries, when the Brahmans were ready to welcome even foreigners to the Aryan fold and to recognise them as Brahmans or Kshatriyas on the basis of their occupation in their adopted country. But Hindu religion and society lost their customary "dynamic fluidity" and withdrew themselves into a narrow shell of intolerance under the protection of the Rajput ruling dynasties. The process of assimilation had reached its climax; the process of exclusion was in full progress. Old forms were scattered all over the land, but the old vitality was gone.

The same uncritical adherence to the past is evident in the sphere of political organization and administration. The Rajput State in the early medieval period had no distinctive form or machinery which differentiated it from the Hindu State of old, nor did the political speculations of the age (as embodied in the *Laghu-Arhaniti-sastra* of Hemachandra, in the *Sukranitisara* attributed to Sukracharya and in the works of Lakshmidhara) indicate any new approach. The ideas of kingship, for example, are largely based on the thought of the older writers. The divine origin of monarchy is accepted by Lakshmidhara, and in the *Sukranitisara* an analogy is drawn between the functions of the King and the attributes of the different gods.⁵³

The old theory of the seven constituent elements (*angas*) of the State is referred to in a Chandella inscription.⁵⁴ According

to the *Sukranitisara*, "the King is the head, the ministers are the eyes, ally the ears, treasury the mouth, army the mind, capital and *rashtra* are hands and feet".⁵⁵ The head of the State was expected to play the role of the instrument of *Dharma* or the Sacred Law. In several Chandella inscriptions here are references to Kings who were "afraid to offend against the law,"⁵⁶ and the positive duty of adherence to *Dharma* is frequently emphasized.⁵⁷ It was the ruler's duty to force people of different castes to perform their traditional duties.⁵⁸ The divine element in the monarchy is hinted at by comparisons between the Chandella rulers and gods like Vishnu.⁵⁹ Some Chahamanas inscriptions⁶⁰ as well as the *Prithvirajavijaya*⁶¹ identify some princes of the dynasty with Vishnu or one of his incarnations. They were expected to protect the gods, the Brahmins and the holy places⁶² and transgression of *Dharma* was considered to be the gate to hell.⁶³

The Sacred Law, as interpreted by the Brahmins, might be regarded as imposing undefined but real restrictions on the autocracy of the King. It has also been argued that "another check on the autocratic tendencies of a ruler was supplied by the established usage that a ruler should consult his ministers on all important matters of policy, internal as well as external."⁶⁴ No autocrat can rule without the help of ministers, and it goes without saying that capable ministers can influence the decisions of even the most capricious of masters. The fact that the epigraphic and literary records of the Rajput dynasties⁶⁵ make specific mention of some ministers by name might be taken as an indication of the important role which they played in the affairs of State. But they owed their office entirely to the grace of the King; they were neither the representatives of the people, nor did they belong—so far as we know—to a powerful baronial oligarchy like the "over-mighty subjects" of Lancastrian England. Like the Tudor ministers they were powerful only so long as their masters chose to utilise them as instruments of power. Ministerial influence never attained institutional solidarity.

The administrative structure conformed to the traditional pattern. There is naturally some variation in details; some difference in emphasis could hardly be avoided. But a student of Rajput administrative institutions would hardly find anything

which he could not explain on the basis of the ancient works on polity and the epigraphic records of the Gupta period. The terms used for territorial divisions were *Vishaya*,⁶⁶ *Mandala*,⁶⁷ *Avastha*,⁶⁸ *Pattla*,⁶⁹ *Pathaka*,⁷⁰ etc. The designations of the officers are similarly old-fashioned, e.g. *Dharnalekhi*⁷¹ *Dandapasika*⁷² *Mahattama*,⁷³ *Mahasadhantika*⁷⁴ *Mahnpradhana*.⁷⁵ The revenue system reveals little change; the sources of the King's income are practically constant, and the only remarkable new levy noticed in the contemporary records is the *Turushka-danda* realised by the Gahadavalas.

Portions of some at least of the Rajput States were governed by feudatory princes whose relations with the King do not appear to have been well defined. The Gahadavalas had several feudatory princes under them and three different designations were used by these subordinate rulers: *Kanaka*, *Mahanayaka*, *Maharaja*.⁷⁶ The Chaulukyas had their feudatories;⁷⁷ so had the other Rajput dynasties. Indeed, the practice of government through feudatories was a normal feature of the political system of the ancient period, and it was hardly surprising that they should continue to play a similar political role even after the subversion of the old dynasties.

There is, however, one point of interest so far as our study of the Rajput States is concerned. Is it possible to discover in the scanty records relating to the feudatories of this period any trace of the clan system which became the basis of the Rajput political system⁷⁸ in the late medieval period? A statement in a Chahamanas inscription⁷⁹ of 973 A.D. saying that various estates were held by the king and junior princes of the clan "fits in"—we are told—"with the type of Rajput clan-monarchies."⁸⁰ That there is some superficial similarity cannot be denied, but a casual reference in a single inscription of a single dynasty can hardly be construed as a positive indication of a system which was a characteristic feature—at least at a later stage—of all Rajput States. It is quite possible that a more careful study of the epigraphic records of other dynasties might bring out confirmatory data, making it clear that the political implications of the clan system had developed before the Muslim conquest.

Another explanation might be considered in this connection. Was the clan system in its political aspect confined to the real homeland of the Rajputs, i.e., Rajputana? The Chahamanas

inscription referred to above relates to the Chahamana territories in Rajputana. The division of the small Chahamana principality of Nadol for administrative purposes among members of the ruling family⁸¹ might be due to the operation of the clan system. The story of the foundation of the principality of Jalo⁸² by a junior member of the ruling family of Nadol has some resemblance with the story of the foundation of Bikaner.⁸³

We should also note in this connection the description of the so-called "jagirdari system" in the *Lekhapaddhati*. Although that description applies, properly speaking, to the Chaulukya territories, it should be remembered that large parts of Rajputana were at different times under Chaulukya rule. According to this "compilation of models of Government documents and speci-mens of official and other correspondence", the 'feudal' chiefs⁸⁴ held their estates on condition of rendering military service, or of paying fixed annual sums, to the ruler.⁸⁵ But we do not know whether these chiefs were members of the ruler's clan or outsiders who had earned the ruler's favour. Until this crucial question is decided we cannot be sure whether the system described in the *Lekhapaddhati* was the early stage of the traditional Rajput clan system at all.

In conclusion we may make a passing reference to the assimilation of the Rajputs in the held of language and culture. They were as good patrons of Sanskrit as the Imperial Guptas, although their age could not produce a genius like Kalidasa. Rajasekhara, who proudly traces his poetic descent from Valmiki, was not only the court poet but also the *gum* (spiritual guide) or *upadhyaya* (preceptor) of Gurjara-Pratihara Mahendrapala. Krishna Misra enjoyed the patronage of Chandella Kirtivarman. Gahadavala Govindachandra patronised Lakshmidhara and Jayachandra was the patron of Sriharsha, the author of *Naisadhacharita*, "the last masterpiece of industry and ingenuity that the *Mahakavya* can show."⁸⁶ Somadeva, the author of *Lalita-Vigraharaj*, was the court poet of Chahamana Vigraharaja IV, and the Kashmir poet Jayanaka was patronised by Prithviraja III. Of the literary celebrities of the Chaulukya dominions Hemachandra and Merutunga deserve particular mention. Padmagupta was the court poet of Vakpati-Munja and Sindhuraja of Malava. Kalachuri Karna honoured Bilhana on his visit to Benares and extended his patronage to poets like

Vallana, Nachiraja, Karpura and Vidyapati. His interest was not confined to Sanskrit; it extended to Prakrit as well.

Ancient Indian tradition expected ruling princes not only to patronise learning and literature but also to be the direct worshippers of the goddess Sarasvati. *Kaviraja* Samudra Gupta had several successors among the Rajput princes. Paramara Bhoja occupies the foremost place in this regard. The Udaipur *prasasti* calls him *Kaviraja*.⁸⁶ A large number of works on different subjects—grammar, poetics, lexicography, architecture, philosophy, medicine, astronomy—are attributed to him. "It is true that all these works were probably largely written by the literary men living in his court; but a prince who had such wide sympathies and could inspire scholarship in so many varied fields of knowledge must ever remain a remarkable personality in the records of time."⁸⁷ His predecessor, Vakpati-Munja, is described in the Udaipur *prasasti* as a ruler who "cultivated eloquence, high poetry and the art of reasoning" and "completely mastered the lore of the Sasfras."⁸⁸ To quote Padmagupta: "after Vikramaditya departed, after Satavahana went, divine Sarasvati found rest with this friend of poets."⁸⁹ There are scattered references to verses attributed to Vakpati-Munja.

Chahamana Vighraharaja IV composed the drama known as *Harakeli* which, according to Kielhorn, is an "actual and undoubted proof... that Hindu rulers of the past were eager to compete with Kalidasa and Bhavabhuti for poetical fame". Although Gahadavala Govindachandra was not an author, he assumed the rather unusual epithet *sarvavidaya-vichara-vachaspati* which implied a claim (whether justified we do not know) to mastery in all branches of learning. Poetical talents were attributed to Chandella rulers like Vidyadhara and Paramardi, and at least one Chandella inscription includes proficiency in arts and poetic talents among the personal qualities of ruling princes.⁹⁰ The tradition of royal scholarship and literary efforts survived the Muslim conquest and Rana Kumbha of Mewar reminded his contemporaries of the legendary genius of Paramara Bhoja.⁹¹

The literature of the "Rajput period" was undoubtedly rich in variety, but it lacked in originality as also in real artistic beauty. The inscriptions of the period, composed usually in the

conventional *kainja* style, may occasionally claim some literary excellence; but we look in vain for the simple directness of the Asokan records or the majestic manliness of the Allahabad Pillar inscription of Samudra Gupta. It is really an age of imitation, not of creation. Despite their physical virility the Rajputs could not dam the tide of intellectual decadence which had begun to rise in the post-Gupta period. Their *digvijaya* could not give India—even Northern India—political unity and a consolidated imperial structure, nor could their patronage bring a new vitality to the decaying literary culture of their predecessors.

Notes and References

1. R.C. Majumdar (ed.), *The Struggle for Empire*, p. 402.
2. *Memoir of Archaeological Survey*, Vol. III, p. 124, *Memoir of Asiatic Society of Bengal*, Vol. V, p. 64.
3. Taylor's translation, pp. 63-64. A tenth-century inscription found in Mewar refers to a guru as "the thunderbolt to the mountains of pride of the Sugntas" (A.C. Banerjee, *Medieval Studies*, p. 34.)
4. *Memoirs, Archaeological Survey of India*, No. 8.
5. *Ep. Ind.*, XX, p. 130.
6. *Indian Antiquary*, XVII, pp. M-64.
7. *Indian Historical Quarterly*, 1929, p. 26.
8. Elliot and Dowson, Vol. 11, p. 251.
9. *Indian Historical Quarterly*, 1929, pp. 14-30.
10. A.K. Majumdar, *Chaulukyas, of Gujarat*, p. 310.
11. *Ep. Ind.*, IV, p. 310. *Annual Report of Archaeological Survey*, 1908-9, p. 108.
12. Taylor's translation, pp. 63, 36-37.
13. *Indian Historical Quarterly*, Vol. XXX, pp. 183-15.
14. *Ep. Ind.*, I, p. 136
15. *Archaeological Survey Reports*, 11, p. 434; X, pp. 92, 96; XXI, p. 172.
16. *Prabandhachantamani*, pp. 52, 63.
17. D.C. Ganguly, *History of the Paramara Dynasty*, pp. 249-254.
18. A Mewar inscription of the 10th century refers to a guru "who was the medicine for the disease of the *syadvad* (Jainism)". (A.C. Banerjee, *Medieval Studies*, p. 34.)
19. H. C. Ray, *Dynastic History of Northern India*, Vol. II, p. 997.
20. A.K. Majumdar, *Chaulukyas of Gujarat*, p. 122.
21. VIII, 46
22. A.K. Majumdar, *Chaulukyas of Gujarat*, pp. 328-324.

23. Ep. Ind., XVIII, pp. 108, 112
24. Smith, *Catalogue of Coins in the Indian Museum*, Vol. I, pp. 232-233, 241-242.
25. Ep. Ind., I, pp. 126,129,131,135.
26. *Indian Historical Quarterly*, 1949, p. 37.
27. Ep. Ind., IV, pp. 117-120.
28. Ep. Ind., IX, pp. 319-328.
29. *Indian Antiquary*, XVIII, p. 14-19.
30. *Memoirs*, Archaeological Survey of India, No. 23, pp. 122-129.
31. Identified with Bhimesvara *lingani* in the temple at Draksharama (Godavari district).
32. Ep. Ind., 11, p. 4; XII, p. 213.
33. Ep. Ind., II, pp. 7-17.
34. *Indian Antiquary*, XVIII, pp. 214-218.
35. Mirashi, *Corpus Inscriptionum Indiarum*, Vol. 17, pp. lxxiv, ci, cxi.
36. A.K. Majumdar, *Chaulukyas of Gujarat*, pp. 121, 315.
37. See A. C. Banerjee *Medieval Studies*, pp. 34-37.
38. *Indian Antiquary*, XXXVII, p. 137.
39. Taylor's translation, p. 17.
40. D.C. Ganguly, *History of the Paramara Dynasty*, p. 24.
41. A.K. Majumdar, *Chaulukyas of Gujarat*, p. 334.
42. Ep. Ind., I, p. 126.
43. Ep. Ind., I, pp. 126 144,200.
44. Ep. Ind., XX, p. 128.
45. Mirashi, *Corpus Inscriptionum Indiarum*, Vol. IV, p. ci.
46. *Indian Antiquary* XVII, p. 235; XXV, p. 207; Ep. Ind., I, p. 146.
47. Ep. Ind., I, pp. 207-214.
48. N. Bose, *History of the Candellas*, p. 152.
49. *Indian Culture*, Vol. XIV, No. 2, pp. 52-53.
50. Rama Niyogi, *History of the Gahadavala Dynasty*, pp. 224-225.
51. Ep. Ind. XXIV, pp. 108-109; I, p. 333.
52. Sachau, *Alberuni's India*, Vol. I, pp. 125-126.
53. R. C. Majumdar (ed.), *The Struggle for Empire*, pp. 269-274.
54. Ep. Ind., I, p. 198.
55. I, 122-124.
56. Ep. Ind., I, pp. 126,131-132; *Indian Antiquary*, XVI, pp. 204.
57. Ep. Ind., I, p. 143; XX, p. 127; *Indian Antiquary*, XVI, pp. 203, 205; XX, p. 127.
58. Ep. Ind., I, pp. 198-203.
59. Ep. Ind., I, pp. 219-327, *Indian Antiquary*, XVIII, p. 238.
60. *Indian Antiquary*, XIX, pp. 215-219; XLI, p. 19.
61. I, 33; VIII, 10.
62. *Lalitavivgraharaja*.
63. *Prithviraja-vijaya*, VIII, 741.

64. D. Sharma, *Early Chauhan Dynasties*, p. 194.
65. Chahamanas: *Lalita-Vigraharaja; Kanhadade-prabandha*. Chandellas: *Ep. Ind.*, 1, p. 201. Paramaras: *Prabandha-Chintamani*, p. 33. Gahadavalas: Lakshmidhara's *Kritvakaipataru* Chaulukyas: *Ep. Ind.* IX, pp. 151-132, II, p. 437.
66. Chandellas: *Op. Ind.* XX, pp. 125-128. Gahadavalas: *Ep. Ind.*, XIV, pp. 193 ff. Paramaras: *Ep. Ind.*, XIX, p. 74. Chaulukyas: *Indian Antiquary*, VI, p. 192.
67. Chandells: *Ep. Ind.*, XX, pp. 125-128. Paramaras: *Progress Report of the Archaeological Survey, Western Circle*, 1921, p. 54. Chaulukyas: *Ep. Ind.*, X, p. 76; *Indian Antiquary*, XLII, p. 258.
68. S.K. Mitra, *Early Rulers of Khajuraho*, p. 163.
69. Chandellas: *Bharat Kala Bhavan Plates (Ep. Ind., XXXI)*. Gahadavalas: *Ep. Ind.*, IX, pp. 319-328. Paramaras: D.C. Ganguly, *History of the Paramara Dynasty*, p. 244.
70. Chaulukyas: *Ep. Ind.*, XXI, p. 172; *Indian Antiquary*, VI, p. 200. Gahadavalas: Roma Niyogi, *History of the Gahadavala Dynasty*. pp. 156, 158.
71. Chandellas: *Ep. Ind.*, XX, p. 131.
72. Paramaras: D.C. Ganguly, *History of the Paramara Dynasty*, p. 244.
73. Gahadavalas: *Indian Antiquary*, XVIII, pp. 19-20.
74. Paramaras and Chaulukyas: A.K. Majumdar, *Chaulukyas of Gujarat*, p. 228.
75. Chaulukyas: A.K. Majumdar, *Chaulukyas of Gujarat*, pp. 228-229.
76. Roma Niyogi, *History of the Gahadavala Dynasty*, pp. 161-165.
77. A .K. Majumdar, *Chaulukyas of Gujarat*, pp. 254-255.
78. See Lecture V.
79. *Indian Antiquary*, XLIII, p. 60.
80. R.C. Majumdar (ed.), *The Struggle for Empire*, p. 277.
81. D. Sharma, *Early Chauhan Dynasties*, pp. 138, 202.
82. *Annals*, ed. Crooke, Vol. II, pp. 1123-1124.
83. They were called *Ranaka* or *Bhokta*. As we have seen above, the term *Ranuka* is used in Gahadavala inscriptions to indicate a feudatroy.
84. *Lekuapaddhati (Gaikwad Oriental Series)*, pp. 7, 9, 23.
85. Das Gupta and De, *History of Sanskrit Literature*, p. 325.
86. *Ep. Ind.*, I, p. 235
87. H.C. Ray, *Dynastic History of Northern India*, Vol. II, p. 872.
88. *Ep. Ind.*, I, pp. 235, 237.
89. XI, 93.
90. *Ep. Ind.* XX, p. 127.
91. H.B. Sarada, *Maharana Kumbha*. pp. 163-168.

3

The Impact of the Mughals

The impact of Mughal culture on Rajasthan was limited and confined to the court nobility and upper section of the official class, in the religious and cultural life the rulers and the people adhered to a great extent to their traditional beliefs and customs, but their court life, formalities and manners were influenced by the Mughals. The Mughal influence came not all at once, but it penetrated slowly and gradually and was adopted after long resistance in most parts of Rajasthan. But the new pattern gathered round it the traditions of the past, and was stamped with a form that was unique and interesting. Thus, when we speak of the Mughal influence in dress, diet and manners, we mean not alone of what the Mughals gave to Rajasthan but also what had evolved out of the contact of the two important and prominent races, the Mughals and the Rajputs, and which became a legacy of the age under review.

Dress and Ornaments

A study of the sculptured art¹ and literature² of the early years of our period relating to the dress of deities and persons of eminence shows that neither the male nor the female costumes were marked by variety. The main garment worn by both was a wrapper which covered the waist and the shoulders simultaneously. The lower garment was a *dhoti* which was fastened round the waist and had elaborate plaiting in front

and behind. The upper body was covered with a piece of cloth either in full fold or narrow fold. The folds of the *dhoti* worn in the 16th century were scanty.³

But when many of the rulers of Rajasthan entered into alliances with the Mughal emperors and began attending the Mughal court and exchanging presents, they gradually adopted the Mughal dress. A few instances will clear the point. When prince Karan of Mewar first visited the Mughal Court in 1615 A.D. a rich dress of honour was presented to him on behalf of Nur Jahan. When he took leave all sorts of clothes, carpets and cushions placed in a hundred trays were bestowed on him.⁴ From the *Khulasa-i-Shahjahani* we learn that the prince was given *Serpech*, *turra-i-Marvarid*, *murassa-Jadau*, *bala-bandi*, and *urbasi-Murassa*.⁵ Hereafter dresses and ornaments of Mughal patterns were adopted by the dignitaries. From the *Dustur Kumwar* we come across several kinds of dresses and ornaments such as *nur-i-Badla*, *alamgiri*, *alamgiri-Farrukhshahi*, *choli-Furmkhshahi*, *ijar-Bafta*, *phenta-Mohnudi*, *jamah*, *kurta* and *chint-Mnhammadi* which were used by dignitaries of the Jaipur court on festive occasions. In the *Siyaha Huzur* there is a reference to *Farrukhshahi-Serpech*. We learn from our sources that one Gaj Singh of Jodhpur was bestowed *farrukhshahi* turban, *kampech*, *phenta*, *gospech*, etc., by Shah Jahan on several occasions.

The portraits of Vijay Singh of Jodhpur and Sawai Jai Singh of Jaipur in full dress with trousers, *patka*, *chakdar-jamah* and crested turban with flat folds depict the dress worn by rulers of Rajasthan in the later part of our period. The head decoration and ornaments, referred to by Muslim chroniclers, consisted of *turra*, *serpech*, *bala-bandi*, *dugdugi*, *gospech*, *fateh-pech* and pearl necklaces of several styles. These dresses and ornaments were neither purely Rajasthani nor Mughal. They constituted a kind of synthesis evolved during the later part of the 17th and earlier part of the 18th centuries.

From our study of illustrated manuscripts⁶ and sculptured art⁷ of the early medieval period we know that the female dress, as *sari*, bodice and petticoat remained the basic dress after the traditional fashion in Rajasthan. But after Mughal contact it underwent some changes. There were now long bodice, short sari and petticoat at several folds. This is clear from the paintings and illustrated manuscripts⁸ of Rajasthan of the late

17th and 18th centuries. As regards ornaments, it is difficult to say, what exactly was the contribution of the two peoples, the Rajputs and the Mughals. It is, however, certain that nose-pin and other variously designed ornaments as painted in the *Bhagwat Dasham Skandha* of picture gallery Jaipur palace are modifications of the Mughal and Rajput styles.⁴

This kind of evolution in dress and ornaments of male and female was the result of frequent mixing of the two people of royal status. Other persons of respectably means also adopted the fashion in dress and ornaments, and it became in course of time the standard fashion of the age. But the common people as sculptured at Rajnagar-band¹⁰ and ladies as painted in the *Ragmala*¹¹ series and the *Ekadashi Katha*¹² retained their traditional costume.

Diet

The common people in Rajasthan retained old menu. The common man ate preparations of maize, barley, bajra, gur and curd. From the *Intakhab-i-jahangir*¹³ we learn that food distributed to the destitutes at Ajmer on Fridays had curd also. Other preparations which ordinary citizens and villagers liked were *gugari*, *ghat*, *rab*, *sogra*, *rota*, etc. The most common dish of our records¹⁴ served at banquet on the occasion of marriage was *lapsi*. The staple food of people in Rajasthan consisted of grains and stuff which were produced in this part of the country and which could be prepared simply by adding water, curd and gur.

After old manners the people in Rajasthan retained the habit of not dining with those who were not of their class. Serving august and sacred personages with special reservation continued till the concluding years of the period.¹⁵ The accounts of certain suits filed at the Court of Jodhpur that have come to us through the *Havala Bahi*,¹⁶ show that debarring a man from privilege of dining with one's own caste or community was regarded as the greatest punishment. Our literary sources give a list of other dishes of sweets, vegetables, soups and solid fare which were fried and saturated with spices, sugar, perfumes and dried fruits. These dishes with further changes became popular with the rulers, courtiers and other wealthy people

who had developed contact with the Mughals. The reference to *Babur-bar*, *kachari* in the *Raj-Vilas* and *palao*, *murabba*, *Khursani khichri* in the *abhaya-Vilas* indicates Mughal contact. These stuff have been mentioned in *Bikaner Gazal*, *Jaisalmer Gazal* and *Udaipur Gazal*, as available in the shops, and show that these eatables gained popularity among middle class also who could afford to purchase them.

As regards manners and etiquette observed at the time of dining Rajasthan had its own peculiarities. It is difficult to go into details here, but a few examples would indicate their nature. If we take table manners as detailed in the *Nityvidhi*, cleanliness was the most important consideration. High-born Brahmans would put on silken dress and would not touch any one who has not taken his bath. In a small spot known as *chauka*, which was cleaned with mud and cowdung, food was served and nobody was allowed to eat anything outside it. This community ate what was prepared by themselves and abstained from eating food or sweets sold in the market. In this respect Mughal contact brought no change as far as Brahmans were concerned. Some of the paintings reveal a rigid discipline at meals observed by this conservative section of the society upto the concluding period of the 18th century.

In villages nearly all the communities had the same system of dining, uninfluenced by the Mughals. *Rab* and *rota* may conveniently be enjoyed putting them in a cup of bigger size or a dish of a medium size. They would not mind if these stuffs were served on a leaf-plate. On the occasion of feast villagers would like to squat on the ground and dine in different groups. Ladies will receive their share in their baskets which sometimes contain their children.¹⁷

In the towns people of middle class preferred to sit down on pieces of mat or *pantiyas* which were spread to accommodate several persons. Ladies would have first preference to dine in feast. Among the nobility and princes table manners of the Mughals began to be observed. They used a superior kind of silken cloth with artificial flowers of gold and silver as *dastarkhwan*, and dishes were arranged thereon. They sometimes made use of spoons, dishes, cups of silver or gold. The food was brought from the kitchen in bowls or vessels of silver or

gold. In this respect the princess of Rajasthan had adopted some of the manners which were practised by the Mughals.¹⁶

Notes and References

1. Panels at Osian, Vijayastambh, Mamadev Temple, Kumbhalgarh, Delwada temple, Abu, Badoli, Kiradu, etc., refer Marg Rajasthan Sculpture, pp. 335-37 and my article on Chittor and Kumbhalgarh, College Magazine, Udaipur,
2. *Rno-Jaitsi-ro-Chhand* (ALB), vv. 27, 367, pp. 6, 20. For the costumes of the male dignitaries in medieval Rajasthan see my article in *The Researcher*, Vol. II.
3. C.N. Sharma: *Kalpasutra and Dresses*, *Journal of Indian Museum*, Vol. XII, 1956, pp. 69-71.
4. *Tuzuk*, R & B, pp. 278-334.
5. MS. *Khudasa-i-Shajhan-nama*, f. 240.
6. *Kalpasutra* — my article referred to above, 'Lady figures,' V.S. 1536.
7. Sculptures of Udai-Shyam temple of Udaisagar (from my notes).
8. Seven painting; of Rasik Priya series (*Mewar Kulan*), second quarter of the 17th century, Khajanchi Collection, Bikaner.
9. *Bagawat Dasham Skandha*, No. AG 198, 1792 A.D., 'Copies offer food' the City Place Museum, Jaipur; N-C. Mehta: *Studies in Indian Painting*, p. 21.
10. G.N. Sharma: *Society and Culture as depicted from Carving of Rsjasmudra*, JRUU, 1961
11. Three paintings from *Ragmala* series, early 18th century' 11.5x19.5 cms., Khajanchi Collection, Bikaner.
12. *Ekadashi Katha*. f.n. IS (SBLU).
13. *Intakhab-i-Jahangirshahi*, E&D, VI, p. 449.
14. *Bhandar* No. 4, 'Rasta' No. 10, V.S. 1743; *Vatsangrnih*, f. 355; *Khyat Bikaner-ra Rathodari*. No. 189/11 (ALB), f. 55.
15. *Arsha Ramayan* (illustrated), f, 8a (SBLU); *Bhagwat Dasham Skandha* (illustrated), 1792 A.D.; Art Gallery, City Palace, Jaipur, 'A Feast to Brahmans'.
16. G.N. Sharma; *Society and Culture as revealed from Havela Bahi*, JRUU, 1961.
17. Illustrated MS. of *Panchatntra* (PPJ), Village scenes.
18. *Haqiqat Bain*. V.S. 1883, 1885, etc.; *Bhagawat Dasham Skandha*, Court feast, Art Gallery, Palace Museum, Jaipur; *Tazkirat-ul-Waqiat*, Stewart, pp. 83-83; *Am*, (1873), pp. 58-59.

4

Growth of Feudalism

Feudalism, as we understand it, is a term invented by scholars of the eighteenth century. It cannot profitably be explained as a counterpart of either "aristocracy" or "nobility". The meaning of these words is limited to certain section of the peoples who enjoyed rights and privileges without owning cor-responding obligations of significant nature. It is really very difficult to find out a satisfactory definition for feudalism. If we use this term, we use it for our convenience, with certain reservations.

The inscriptional as well as the literary and documentary sources lead us to believe that in some form or other there flourished the so-called feudalism right from the sixth century to our own days. It originated as a result of a long series of loosely related facts and events. Its preliminary form was something like a socio-economic political organization or institution which emerged out in order to make an end of the domination of the indigenous peoples holding their sway in scattered habitation in various regions of Rajasthan. This extraordinary circumstance makes us believe that the origin of the so-called feudalism lies in certain stages of responses and changes. The responses were from the Rajputs who were anxious for their ascendancy and challenges from the tribal people of the region. The resistance offered by the Bhils, the Minas, the Johiyas, etc., to the Guhilots, the Chauhans, the Bhatias, etc., supports our view. In brief, the ascendancy of the Rajputs in the sixth century and onward and their struggle against these

indigenous tribes led to the development of a new tendency towards the growth of socio-economic structure, which was later on bound by political and military ties. The use of the words 'Samant', 'Rajputra' and 'Bhukti' in the early epigraphs adequately explains such a tendency towards monopolization of power in the hands of 'the few' as against the decaying indigenous units located at different centres.

This struggle between the indigenous units and the emerging authority further emphasized the necessity of the birth of a new order based on the principle when 'the few' may give protection to the peace-loving classes, and at the same time hind 'the few' in a common tie of political and military adjustment. This situation further led them to demarcate the division of their respective areas, scope of their power and the nature of the province of their responsibilities. This led to a mutual understanding between the groups having diverse interest—one choosing the task of economic benefits and the other shouldering the responsibility of local defence. We know that a batch of merchants preferred to live under Shiladitya of Guhil dynasty in a hilly region of Aranyaka Ciri, as evidenced by the Samoli Inscription of 646 A.D.

This kind of economic benefit delegated greater authority to a group which can provide a large number of people to remain alert for defence and military service. Thus, a small group of the fighters became the political leaders: lords and vassals, who wielded both military and political power. The ascendancy of the Guhilots, the Chauhans, the Rathors and other Rajputs adequately explains the position and power of the Lord vassal group on the one hand and peasants, cowherds, craftsmen and traders on the other. Subsequently this relationship aided to the growth of sizable socio-economic political structure which was responsible for organizing powerful and effective States of medieval Rajasthan.

But we must not lose sight of one very important incidence which was the outcome of the new socio-economic political structure. The incidence is nothing but internecine wars and struggles among the neighbouring States. The Guhils and the Rathor rivalry or the rivalry between the Guhils and the Chauhans of the 10th and 12th centuries further strengthened the relationships between one group and the other, owing

allegiance to one common sovereign. Thus, the Guhilots grouped them with the Rathors and the Rathors grouped them with the Chauhans in such wars. It is curious to note that slowly a network of feudal relationship grew up among different clans which are all classed as *Sambandhins* (relations). Of course, sometimes the *Samants* owing to their allegiance to a common lord fought against each other. The fissiparous tendencies became inherent in the feudal organization.

These wars with the neighbours brought in wake a number of subordinates to the lords. Such subordinates were subjected to humiliation of various categories—serving the Lord, attending his person and following him in the warlike pursuits. In course of time, such a servitude turned into loyalty or rebellion. In the seventh century, as Aparajit's inscription informs us, Aparajit defeated his powerful enemy named Var Singh, who later on became the chief of his army. Examples of rebellions within the feudal order are not lacking during the early medieval centuries. The Guhils of Chatsu and those of Kalyanpur and Khed are the examples of rebel chiefs in their initial stage.

Thus, feudalism is an institution or organization which came into being by the force of circumstances peculiar to the age, in a form of socio-economic political structure, bound by mutual interest and ties of personal relationship and loyalties.

It has been a fashion on the part of some modern writers to use the term *Zamindar* loosely for all the ruling chiefs of Rajasthan, who had recognized Mughal paramountcy. The main arguments that have been advanced in support of this assumption are that the princes of Rajasthan were the tribute payers of the Mughals and were the holders of *jagirs* granted by the Mughal Emperors. This status, according to them, presupposed their subordinate position in the Mughal Order.

A detailed study of the problem leads us to the conclusion that the Rajput Chiefship seems scarcely to have subordinated itself to the Muslim authority in political sense. The early Muslim invaders, after defeating their adversaries, were never sure of their subordination, though they had offered submission and made firm the condition of the usages of service. The writer¹ of the *Taz-ul-Maasir* uses, invariably, the term '*Rat*' for such chiefs. As a result of the capitulation of the forts of Jhain, Ranthambhor and Siwana the historian of Alauddin Khalji

recognizes the position of the local *Rais* and *Rajas*, despite the fact that new cities of the people of faith arose in their place.² Babur also recognized the local political functions³ of Vikramjit (Vikramaditya), the son and successor of Rana Sanga, who had suffered defeat at his hand. In brief, these conquerors were content with their victory, while the *Rais* and *Rajas* were left to themselves.

With the coming of Akbar a new attitude developed between the emperor and the Rajput chiefs. Akbar, cautiously enough, left these chiefs free to enjoy their internal authority. The princes of Rajasthan, on their part, agreed to pay tribute and supply a local force. The only State where the Mughals restrained from exercising greater control was Mewar. The emperor acknowledged their hereditary position and titles as the *Raja*, *Rai*, *Maharaja*, etc.⁴ Man Singh was known as Mirza Raja and Akbar bestowed upon him the title of *Farzand*.⁵

Jahangir who followed the policy of his father informs us that the *Rajas* (of Rajasthan) enjoyed sole authority over their internal administration.⁶ Shah Jahan, Aurangzeb and his successors also reckoned and recognized their traditional status and power. They have never addressed them as *Zamindars* in their official capacity. In a *Farman*⁷ Salim addressed Rai Singh (Bikaner) as a *Raja* who was "the choicest of the Grandees of the stable Empire." In another *Farman*⁸ from the Emperor Jahangir, dated the 6th *Mehar*, Raja Sur Singh has been called "the cream of his peers and pride of his brothers," In the same *Farman* he has conveyed the Greetings of *Ram Ram*. Similarly, Shah Jahan has addressed Raja Sur Singh, in one *Farman*⁹ as "Pride of his Equals".

Similarly, the author of the *Maasir-ul-Umara*¹⁰ has acclaimed the worth of Jaswant Singh by regarding him "the head of the *Rajas* of India." In one of the *Farman*s,¹¹ dated the 14th *Jamadi-us-Sani*, Maharaja Gaj Singh has been praised as the best of the *Rajas* of Hindustan. His name has been associated with the title of Maharajadhiraja Maharaja Gaj Singh Bahadur. These examples are sufficient proofs to show that the princes of Rajasthan continued to enjoy trusted position and rendered faithful and valuable services to the Mughals. The emperors never failed to confer on them titles and honours befitting their dignity and status.

Of course, there are references in the works of the imperial chroniclers, where some of the princes of Rajas than have been termed as *Zamindars*. Abul Fazl refers to the *Zamindar* of Durgnarpur who wished to send his daughter to Akbar's harem, is a case in point.¹² The conception of the official historian, in such matters, was usually guided by the notion that "the whole country, with the exception of the *Khalsa* lands, was held by the *Amirs* as *Jagir*," Hence, if anything was noted regarding them in an official record, the *Rajas* and *Rah* were termed as *Zamindars*.

But in fact we know that the whole country, as stated by Abul Fazl, was not under the Mughal nobility. The friendly *Rajas* of *Rajas than* were the masters of their patrimony over which the Mughal Government had no control. Within their region they were free to act in a manner they liked. In judicial and civil administration their powers remained unchallenged. Views such as those of Abul Fazl, therefore, on the term, *Zamindars*, in the context of Rajput rulers, are subject to a correct interpretation and scientific analysis.

The confusion, it seems, arose out of the double-responsibilities these *Rajas* had to share. They were the hereditary owners of their kingdom, and at the same time they were the rank-holders or *Mansabadars* in the military set-up of the Mughals. As for the Mughal services, which they were required to discharge, they received *jagirs* in the *sarkars* of different *subas* instead. Sometimes these *Jagirs* were confiscated and again restored with the exception of some *sarkars* or *parganas*. There are several instances of such awards, restorations, reductions of *jagirs* during the course of the relations of the Rajput princes and the Mughals. To Udai Singh, better known as Mota Raja, all his possessions were restored to him with the exception of Ajmer; by way of compensation he received several districts in *jagir* in Malwa.¹³ Maharaja Rai Singh of Bikaner received several *parganas* in *jagir* in *suba* Ajmer, *sarkar* Hisar, *sarkar* Multan and *sarkar* Surat in the year 1599. These rulers were occupying two positions, one as rulers of their States and other as military assignees. As military assignees they were at liberty to quit their posts but as masters of their dominions their position remained unshaken. In fact, there was no parallelism between the *jagirs* in lieu of Mughal service and the landed property

in their principalities. Strictly speaking there was no legal connection between the two status. They were overlords for their subjects, they may be *zamindars* for their military employees. At any time, the military rank could be given up without losing their ancestral holdings. The events following the death of Jagat Singh (Mewar) and Jaswant Singh (Marwar) brought about ruptures of significant nature, well-known in the annals of Rajasthan.¹⁴ Both Jagat Singh and Jaswant Singh rose to the position of trust Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb, but their sons changed their allegiance. This kind of complete autonomy enjoyed by the rulers of Rajasthan explains the inadequacy of the title of *Zamindars* used for them.

Moreover, to categorize the hereditary chiefs of Rajasthan as *Zamindars* does not help to determine their intrinsic importance and status. If at all there could be any category it could be governed by the degree of internal autonomy enjoyed by these rulers. For instance, Mewar was exempted from the obligatory attendance at the court and submission of the *dola*.¹⁵ They maintained the greatest degree of independence, as the contemporary writers admit.¹⁶ They openly showed defiance on several occasions and did not pay regular tribute. Haroti seems to have enjoyed more independent and honourable terms than the other States except Mewar.¹⁷ In both these cases the control of the Mughal authority was not short of a nominal allegiance. The other States like Amber, Jodhpur, Bikaner, etc., had to bear the burden of furnishing a fixed quota of men and money and undertake the obligation of personal service and regular attendance at the court. This kind of clear variation in the conditions, binding them to subordination, at least, leads us to think about the letter and spirit of the term *Zamindars*, applied indiscriminately for all the princes of Rajasthan. If we are not prepared to discriminate between the two sets of States, we ignore the importance of the heroic resistance offered by some and wisdom of speedy submission to authority showed by the other.

Unfortunately, the term *Zamindar* has also been used loosely for the *Omrahs* of high and low status Morel and seems correct in analysing the later Mughal nobility in these words; "What we see is a royal household full of slaves, who could rise, by merit or favour, from servile duties to the charge of a province,

or even of a kingdom, essentially a bureaucracy of the normal Asiatic type." What Moreland has said was noticed by Bernier¹⁸ also regarding the nobility of Aurangzeb's time. He said, "The *Omrahs* mostly consist of adventurers from different nations, who entice one another to the court, and generally persons of low descent, some having been originally slaves, and the majority being destitute of education." We know for certain from the account of Shah Nawaz Khan¹⁹ that the *Zamindars* belonged to all classes, high and low. If the nature of the nobility was similar to what Bernier has made us believe, it would be not fair on our part to class the so-called Rajput *zamindars* with such depraved rank-holders.

In Rajasthan and elsewhere, the term *Zamindars* began to be used for all the prosperous cultivators who tilled the soil and *Sahukars* who had dealings in land mortgaging. Hence to identify *Zamindars* with the chiefs of Rajasthan is beyond our imagination. If the title of *zamindars* would have been meant for the chiefs the commoners or subjects of the States could never have dared to use it so cheaply for all. In the *khataunis* and *pattas* of Bikaner, Udaipur and Jodhpur, there occur several names of cultivators and *Sahukars* whose landed property has been termed as *Zamindars*. Thus, the two important tendencies at work towards *Zamindari* make the title of *Zamindar* untenable.

Using the term *Zamindar*, then, in the sense of the complete subordination and inferior position of the rulers of Rajasthan, as emphasized by some writers of our own times, we have to conclude that neither the Rajasthan States were within the orbit of *Zamindari* nor the Mughal rulers had any intention to use the term in the sense some of us understand it. Hence the idea of applying the terminology of *zamindar* to the Rajasthan chiefship is unscientific.

Notes and References

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2. *Tarikh-i-Alai*, Elliot 111, pp 74-78.
3. *Babur-nama*, Vol.11,, pp. 612-13,
4. *Ain-i-Akbari*, 1, pp. 323, 347, 348, 353, 361, 362, 384, 421, 449, 495, 509.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 361.

6. *Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri*, II, p. 100.
7. *Bikaner Fur man*. No. 5.
8. *Ibid.*, No.66.
9. *Ibid.*,No. 75.
10. *Maasir-ul-Umara*, Vol. I, p. 755.
11. *Farman* No. 80 from the Emperor Muhammad Shah Alam to Maharaja Gaj Singh, 4th July, 1709.
12. *Ain-i-Akbari*, I, p. 585.
13. *Tabaqat-i-Akbari II.*, 444.
14. For their cordial relations please refer to my book, *Mewar and the Mughal Emperors*, Chapters VII-VIII. 15.*Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri*. (P.T.), Vol. I, pp. 134, 145.
16. *Jagannath Rai Inscription*, V. 51; Zahid Khan, *Kulnsat*, p. 259.
17. *Vanshabhaskar*,, pp. 22h5-68
18. Bernier: *Travels in the Mughal Empire*, pp. 211-12.
19. *Maasir-ul-Umrah*.

5

Development of Agriculture

Agriculture

The most important element in the economic life of the people of medieval Rajasthan was agriculture. Although many different political and social factors had affected the development of agriculture through centuries, the basic facts of land, soil, system of cultivation, produce, rural manufactures and industries, taxes, etc., had been the foundations of rural life and their effects had always been apparent in the rural economy.

Land

Land was indeed the most important factor in agriculture. The supreme control which rested with the rulers, as suggested by their titles, such as the *Prithvipal*¹ and *Bhupal*² belonged to the princes. From the expression like *adeshato*³ (by the order of), generally used in copper plate grants and *pattas*, it is certain that these chiefs had the authority to reapportion the land after certain period or at the death of original owner of the land. They had the right either to confiscate the land or transfer it from one cultivator to another or one owner to another. By the order⁴ of Maharana Jai Singh Joshi, Maya Ram was allowed to reoccupy his land in Jawar in V.S. 1753 (1696 A.D.), which had been confiscated. Similarly, Joshi Naga's land in Samta was

again conferred upon him in V.S. 1788 (1731 A.D.),⁵ Village Bhaduda of Godwad *parganah* which had been confiscated was returned to the original owner in V.S. 1813. Such lands fall into five legal categories as *khalisah* (reserved land), *jagir*, *bhum*, (rent-free land), *sasan* (*muafi*) and *charnot* (meadow and common land).⁶

The most important of these lands is *khalisah* which by the right belonged to the State, but in actual practice those who cultivated it were its masters as long as they paid the rent. The cultivators generally, as now, remained undisturbed in their possessions so long as they paid the land revenue—*bhog* or *hasil*. By virtue of holding *pattas* the farmers were the occupiers of rights of mortgage and sale, and enjoyed an indestructible title to the land so long as they paid the assessment upon it. This right, in a sense, was as a rule permanent and unlimited and could be sold or passed on in inheritance. To all practical purposes, therefore, *Khalisha* lands belonged to their holders. They were sold, mortgaged and given on contracts, as revealed from the contemporary documents.

The second category was that of *jagir* applied only to lands which were held by *Jagirdars* as their share of right of inheritance in lieu of which they were required to offer services of military, civil or political nature. Such holders paid a fixed annual tribute, variously called *chhatunda*, *rekha*, *chakri*, etc., etc. These lands were not usually liable to confiscation save for some grave political offence.

The third category was the *bhum*, held by *Bhumias*, who paid a nominal quit-rent—*bhum barar*, and performed such services as watch and ward of their villages, guarding the roads, escorting treasures, etc. As long as they did not neglect their duties they remained holders of land for ever. But such lands could not be sold.

The fourth category was of *sasan* or *muafi* granted to Brahmans, Gosains and other priestly castes, as well as *Charans* and *Shots*. The holders neither paid tribute nor performed service. The land made into *sasan* or *muafi* could not be sold or otherwise alienated but must be kept in tact in perpetuity with only its yield utilized for the purposes subserved by the condition specified in the grant for *sasan* or *muafi*. The donors usually conferred upon the donees like Kadua, Rupa,⁷ Deva,⁸ etc., the

perpetual right of possession over the land assigned to them in regular succession from fathers to sons, and from sons to grandsons, as long as the Sun and Moon existed in firmament.

In cases of such land mortgages were not uncommon. Such transactions were conducted in the presence of the relations, neighbours and other elderly men of the village who acted as witnesses. *Dhulev deed*⁹ of V.S. 1807 (1750 A.D.) is a case in point, where Trivedi ladva's wife, a sasan-holder recorded the mortgage deed of the land in the presence of Kapurji, Sadanand and Amri, who were persons of some status and were also her relations. The examples of deeds of this nature are abundant during the period of our study, which show that the purposes subserved by the condition of *sasans* have been defeated.

The fifth was *charnota* lands (meadows and common lands) used as grazing grounds, and which were the common property of the village as a whole or of several villages jointly.

Thus, land formed the most important source from which the village derived its livelihood. The bulk of people of the period under review in the villages was employed in the cultivation of land. From the traditional and occupational aspects not only the agricultural classes like the Gujars, fats, Dhakads, etc., were engaged primarily in agriculture, but there were other castes also which were directly or indirectly connected with agricultural pursuits. The entire life was, as it is now, a co-operative undertaking. The farmers were taken to the tilling and harvesting the crops while their women assisted them in looking after animals sharing in farm labour. The farmers boys worked, as they do even now, for a number of years as shepherds, goatherds or cattleherds, till they reached the age of adolescence. The carpenters and blacksmiths co-operated with the husband-men in making and mending ploughs and other implements. A class of people engaged themselves in lending money to farmers and helping them in exchanging village produce. From the point of view of occupational structure the Rajasthani villages, like the villages in other parts of India, were largely homogeneous units with land as a significant factor in the socio-economic life.¹⁰

As the amount of land allotted to each family was fixed by tradition, it was divided generation after generation among the successors of the original owner. As a result, the land was

divided into several plots, called *katkas*.¹¹ At the time of the division of land the quality of the soil, its nearness to water and similar other factors were taken into consideration. Several copper plate grants¹² refer to such small plots as at *nadi* (rivulet), *magro* (hill), *mahudo* (a kind of tree), *pati* (lowland), etc., in numerous widely scattered separate small plots. The drawbacks of this system were as obvious as they were numerous. It was difficult to cultivate fields broken up into small oddly shaped plots lying far apart. Narrow strips running up and down, when ploughed longitudinally, must have brought rapid deterioration through erosion. From the point of view of profit the cultivator of a small plot could not produce as much as needed for the maintenance of his family; the obvious result was either impoverishment or abandonment of the plots. On account of fragmentation of holdings, Navla Kaka,¹³ Lalo Hemaro¹⁴ and Devlo Kukaro,¹⁵ for example, had to abandon their small share in the village of Bamaniva (Mewar), Bhuvai (Bikaner), Seda (Sirohi) respectively in the 18th century and become hired labourers in their villages, as evidenced by the notes of cancellation in the records of their holdings.

Classification of the Soil

In Rajasthan the soil was classified and reclassified variously from time to time. In early medieval times the land that could be irrigated by one well was called *Kashavah*¹⁶ or a land that could be irrigated by one *Kasha* or leather bucket. The land adjacent to common highway was termed as *sadhara*¹⁷ and the fields bordering on a stream or near a well were classed as *kachha*.¹⁸ This very class of land, namely, one near a well, began to be called *dolika*,¹⁹ *doli*, *dimada* or *dhimda*²⁰ in the 14th, 15th and 16th centuries.

During the 17th and 18th centuries a fresh classification of the land was made. The land began to be classed as *diwala* (irrigated land), *talai* (dry land from a pond), *kankada* (outlying fields), *gulathans* (marshy land), *vida* (grass-land), *rankhada* (soil covered with loose stones), *nadi* (land adjacent to a rivulet), *mala* (black loam), *magro* (hilly), *hakat-yahata* (cultivable and irrigable land), *vadi* (land for gardening) and *gorma* (manured home land).²¹ At a later stage, it was classed as *chhai* (watered

from wells), *sairaba* (watered from canals) and *burani*²² (depending on rainfall).

The greater part of the territory of Rajasthan comprising Jodhpur, Bikaner, Jaisalmer, Shekhawati and Ajmer consisted of sandy soil. In the valley of the Banganga it was either black cotton or rich alluvial loam.²³ In Bundi the land was mostly of *mala* (black loam) category *Chicknot* (black soil), *matiyara* (sandy loam) and *bhura* (brown loam) were other kinds of soils.²⁴

The System of Cultivation

No detailed reference to the system of cultivation, then in vogue, are available. But whatever scanty account has been made available to us reveals that practically it did not differ much from the present system followed in the villages, which have not been influenced by the modern system of cultivation.

The method employed in agriculture was nearly the same as we find today. Division of land in pieces known as *katka* or *batka* was very common. These *katkas* or *batkas* were further divided in small squares called *kyaria*. The *Chikli plate*²⁵ of VS. 1540 (1483 A.D.), refers to two *katkas* of an agricultural land belonging to Vena. Similarly, the *Panchatantra*²⁶ painting preserves sixteen square divisions of a small piece of land enclosed by a hedge, called '*vada*' of thorny shrubs to prevent stray animals. When the crop came to its ripening time, regular watch was conducted by the owner of the land so that it might not be devoured by birds or beasts. Larger fields were looked after by hired watchmen who were given a share of the produce at the time of the collection of the crop. The service of this nature was termed *rakhavali* in several documents.²⁷

The main agricultural implements were the same as *kudali*, *phavdo*, *ghenti* etc., used several hundred years ago. Ploughing with wooden ploughs drawn by oxen was in vogue. The importance of plough was emphasized to the extent that the cultivable land was measured by *hala*. One *hala* consisted of 50 *bighas* and one *halva* or unit of two *hala* amounted to 100 *bighas*.²⁸ Harvesting with sickle and winnowing by tossing corn in the wind, as it is done now were the common methods adopted in agriculture.²⁹

Irrigation

In this part of the country several means were adopted for irrigating fields. The earliest reference of this is found in the Pratapgarh inscription of V.S. 1003 which mentions irrigation through leather bucket called *koshuvahaka*. Babur noticed irrigation through leather buckets in Bayana. He says: "At the well-edge they set up a fork of wood, having a roller adjusted between the forks. Tie a rope to a large bucket, put the rope over the roller, and tie its other end to the bullock. One person must drive the bullock, another empty the bucket. Every time the bullock turns after having drawn the bucket, out of the well, that rope lies on the bullock-track, in pollution of urine and dung before it descends again into the well.³⁰ Equally interesting is Babur's account of the Persian-wheel which he noticed in the district of Baxana. In describing this method of irrigation he says: "People water by means of a wheel. They make two circles of ropes long enough to suit the depth of the well, fix strips of wood between them, and on these fasten pitchers. The ropes with the wood and attached pitchers are put over the well-wheel. At one end of the wheel-axle a second wheel is fixed, and close to it another on a upright axle. This last wheel the bullock turns; its teeth catch in the teeth of the second, and thus the wheel with the pitchers is turned, A trough is set where the water empties from the pitchers and from this the water is conveyed everywhere"³¹ He also refers to a third method of irrigating the field according to which men and women carry water in pitchers by turns with great labour.³²

Nizamuddin, author of the *Tabaqat-i-Akburi*, confirms the method of irrigation through buckets, in the territory of Bikaner. According to him the bucket was drawn by a bullock by means of a rope passing over a wheel at the top of the well, and the rope so long that a drum was required to make the bullock-driver hear, for the well was so deep that a call would not reach him.³³ Irrigation through channels or drains cut out from lakes or tanks, mentioned in the *Rajaprashasti*, was also in vogue. This type of irrigation suited level lands.

Pictorial evidence is available in the *Pustak-Prakash*, Jodhpur, which preserves sketches of irrigation by means of Persian-wheel which rotated with the help of oxen. The *Nathacharitra*

painting depicts a bucket of leather suspended from a string over the wheel and two men attending the process of diverting water from one field to another.

The Produce of the Land

The agricultural produce of Raps than 35 a whole did not differ from what it is today except for the newly introduced cultivation of cabbages, tomatoes potatoes, and the cultivation of wheat in Ganganagar district and Bikaner. In villages, where irrigation facilities through wells and tanks existed, rows of rich fields, rich rosary of pulses and fine fields of sugarcane were found.³⁴ The principal crops of the desert area was *jauar* (millet), *bajra*, (barley) and *moth*.³⁵ In fertile areas of oases and rivulets of Sanchor, Jaisalmer and Bikaner wheat, gram, *mung*, oil-seeds and cotton were grown.³⁶ Gram, coriander, pearl-millet and grey-gram were the chief crops of *Hadoti*.³⁷ Rice was the chief produce of Vagad and Chhappan wheat and gram were grown in Uparnal, wheat, rice and gram, maize, hemp and pulses were sown in Mewar, and rice, wheat, gram and pulses were produced in the Jarga valley.³⁸ All types of foodstuff were grown in the fertile areas of Amber.³⁹ According to Manucci,⁴⁰ wherever there existed water facilities and productive soil in the *subah* of Ajmer harvests were plentiful and so also milk and butter. Pratapgarh was known for rice, wheat, cotton and poppy plant⁴¹. The Jodhpur records⁴² give an exhaustive list of the crops collected from villages of Chhahar, Hunasro, Harharro, Kisigaro, Matrvaro and Pokhran of *Khalisah* (reserve area) *parganah* of Marwar of which pearl-millet— *mung* (*phasechus mungo*) grey-gram, oil-seed, cotton, wheat and coriander were important

These various kinds of land produce were appropriated to different seasons. Autumn harvest was termed as *sialu*, and spring *unalu*.⁴³ The former was the more important in that it covered a larger area, and the poor classes depended almost entirely on it for their annual food supply; on the other hand, the money value of the spring harvest was generally greater, and it was often said that the agriculturists looked to it to pay their rent and the moneylenders on whom they were usually dependant for everything.

Notes and References

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2. Vijayastambha inscription, V.S. 1517 (1460 A.D.), Part H, v. 3; Sarda: *Kumbha*, p. 212.
3. Copperplate grants No. 1725, V.S. 1389 (1332 A.D.) No. 866, V.S. 1723 (1656 A.D.) No. 1471, V.S. 1772(1715 A.D.), etc. (ODRU).
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5. Patta of Maharana Sangram Singh, 8th of the dark-half of Kartika, V.S. 1788 (1731 A.D.), No. 26/17, Jagir(ODRU).
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36. *Nensi's Khyat, ff. 12 and 61.*
37. *Ibid., f.34*
38. *Ibid., f. 12*
39. *Ibid., f. 97.*
40. *Manucci; Storia-do-Mogar, II, p. 425.*
41. *Nensi's Khyat, p. 127 (ed. by Asopa);Tod, Annals,, III, pp. 1670-71.*
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6

Early Rajput Administration

The information we have about Rajput administration, specially with regard to Rajasthan, is neither abundant nor satisfactory. Pratihara inscriptions mostly refer to their State officials as *purusa* or *rajapurusas* without referring to their functions. Greater details can be had from the records of their feudatory States, of which the most important is Mewar. The records of the Gahadavalas who succeeded the Pratiharas in their sovereignty of Uttar Pradesh can also be utilised.

The Ruler

The head of the Pratihara administration was the ruler. He was hereditary, and is given the imperial title *Parainabhattaraka Maharajadhiraja Paramesvara* by his feudatories. But the Pratihara rulers call themselves mostly *rajas* and *maharajas*, thereby reminding one of the modest title *raja* used by Asoka, Maurya. Perhaps they were more interested in emphasising their cultural achievements than their power and wealth. Nagabhata I and Nagabhata II have been compared to Narayana. Bhoja I called himself *Adivaraha*. Eager perhaps to win the support of every section of society in the fight against the Muslims, they by their actions made the people believe that there was not any god of theirs to whom their Pratihara masters were not equally devoted. Thus if three successive members of the dynasty were alive at a time, the family could simultaneously have in itself

worshippers of Mahesvara, Bhagavati and Surya. And if the people cared to study the annals of the dynasty, they could see that the Imperial Pratiharas worshiped also Visnu the destroyer of the demon, Naraka.

The Pratiharas seem to have preferred being popular despots, for they like Jinesvara believed that "good people could not live in a kingdom where the ruler acted arbitrarily." A ruler had to heed the advice of his court and of his old and experienced ministers and counsellors who were its prominent members; and a check even more effective was the existence of a powerful feudal class strongly represented in the royal court and next to the ruler the most important institution of the kingdom.

The Royal Court and its Two Sthanas

The royal court had two sections, the *mahasthana* and the *abhyantara sthana* or the inner court. Attendance in the latter was restricted to a select number of people enjoying the ruler's fullest confidence, e.g. the *rajni*, the *yuvaraja*, the ministers and the *senapati*. The *Mahasthana* on the other hand, was attended by the representatives of all the classes who had any stake in the State. Thus it consisted of *mantrins*, *senanayakas*, *mahapratiharas*, *mahasamantas*, *mahapurohitas*, *dhannastheyas*, learned Brahmanas, great poets, bards, physicians, scholars proficient in various *sastras* and also jesters and courtesans. Matters which did not need any secrecy and the publicising of which was likely to do more good than harm were discussed in this assembly.

Mantrins and Amatyas

The most important constituent of the *mahasthana* was the *mantrimandla* or the Ministry, the importance of which was realised by all. They were the people primarily responsible for the good or bad administration of the State. To them the ruler looked for their approval or disapproval while passing orders. Mahesvara Sun goes even so far as to compare a ruler to a bullock and the minister to a farmer who putting the noose of his intellect through the bullock's nose makes it go wherever

he likes. Elsewhere he states that in the absence of good *amatyas* the kingdom would be as unstable as a boat without a helmsman.

But great though the powers of the *mantrins*, specially the chief one, the *pratihanainatya*, were they carried no written sanction, and the *mantrins* could be removed and replaced by others at the sweet will of the ruler. Hereditary ministers appear to have been common, the general feeling being that they were more attached to the royal house than ministers merely picked up for their ability.

Of other ministers and officers, the chief were the following:

(a) *Sandhivigrahika* (Saranesvara ins., V. 1010) seems to have been a Minister for Peace and War. As he knew more of heraldry than any other officer, he had to draft charters, grants, proclamations and letters to foreign princes. The *Yasastilaka champu* gives thus the qualifications of a *Sandhivigrahika* :

याचयति लिखति कवते गमते सर्वा लिपीच पा ।
आत्मपरिस्थितिकुयालः सप्रतिभ साधिविग्रही कार्यः ॥

We can apply this test to Gupta *sandhivigrahikas*, Harisena and Virasena Saba; and it can be applied equally well to the *sandhivigrahikas* of the early Rajput polity. Very often we find him as an envoy plenipotentiary.

(b) *Aksapatalika*, the highest accounts officer, finds a mention in the Gwalior *prasasti* of Bhoja, verse 23: —

यस्याक्षपटले राज्ञः प्रमुत्वाद् विवसम्पदः ।
लिलेख मुखमालोक्य प्रतिलेख्यकरो विधिः ॥

“As that ruler (Bhoja) was the lord of all riches, *Vidhi* or *Brahma* had (merely) to look at his face to be sure of what he should put down in the account books.”

Aksapatalikas are mentioned also in Mewar inscriptions.

(c) *Bhandagarika* was in charge of the royal treasury and ornaments.

* He should be appointed a *Sandhivigrahika* who reads, writes, versifies, knows as scripts and languages, knows to take care of himself and retains his presence of mind under all circumstances.

(d) The *Mahapratihara* held a very high position in Rajput States. *Mahasamantas* and *Mahadandanayakas* were as proud, it seems, of being the *pratiharas* of their overlords as their descendants in the twentieth century of being A.D.C.s to His Majesty, the King Emperor. A very graphic account of the *Mahapratihara's* duties can be had from Dhanapala's *Tilakamanjari*. He is mentioned as imposing the vow of silence on the loquacious, 'making all officials do their prescribed duties', 'turning out people who had no right to be at the court', 'showing respect with folded hands to those who deserved it', 'threatening the impudent ones' and 'bearing himself with pride.' He taught novices the right way to salute. Not unoften he had to be won over by offering rich presents, for it was through the *Pratihara* that one could have easy access to the ruler.

(e) *Mahadandanayaka*: On military matters, the ruler must have conferred with his *Mahadandanayakas* and *Senapati*.

(f) *Dharmasthas* or *Dharmastheyas*: Judicial officers who decided questions of law were called *Dharmasthas* or *Dhannastheyas*. In religious matters the ruler was advised by the *Mahapurohita*. The *Vyavaharin* mentioned in the Barah plate of Bhojadeva might have been an officer entrusted with the investigation of judicial matters.

(g) *Niyuktaka* was perhaps a departmental head.*

Military Administration

Some idea of the *military administration* of the period can be had by studying the military terms, *mahadandanayaka*, *paikkadhipati*, *kottapala*, and *maryadadhurya* found in inscriptions and literary works. The great confusion prevailing about the exact significance of the term *Dandnnayaka* is best illustrated by the following extract from Dr. B. N. Pur's *History of the Gurjara Pratiharas*;

* Besides these, the royal court included the following household officers, whose importance was due to their influence with the ruler.

(a) *Mahavaidya* or *bhisagadhiraja*, the Royal Physician.

(b) *Naimittika*, the State astrologer.

(c) *Vandiputra*, the royal bard (see Allata's inscription).

(d) *Antarmmsika*, The officer in charge of the royal seraglio.

"The exact meaning and significance of the term is not yet determined. It has been translated as "trying magistrate" (Prinsep), "the great leader of the forces" (Fleet), "Prefect of Police" (Aurel Stein), "Commissioner of Police" (R.S. Pandit) and sometimes left untranslated (Nagarjunikond inscriptions). It appears that he enjoyed a fairly high status.... He was distinct from the *Senapati* (E.I., Vol. XV, p. 283) but was, at the same time, connected with the army (E.I., Vol. VI, p. 92, C.I.I., Vol. III, p. 10). His assistance was sought even in civil administration (E.I., Vol. V, p. 49). Such a title was hereditary (E.I., Vol. VI, p. 92; C.I.I., Vol. III, p. 10) and kings sometimes gave their daughters in marriage to *mahadandanayakas* (E.I., Vol. XX, p. 1ff.). It appears that *dandanayakas* were feudatories."

But a comparison of the various contexts in which the word appears makes it clear that the *dandanayaka* was primarily a military officer, though like *Dandanayaka* Vimala, the builder of the *Vimalavasahi*, and *Vaijalladeva* Chauhan, a *dandanayaka* of *Kumarapala*, he could be put in charge of newly conquered territories and asked to discharge not only military but also civil functions. The *Tslakamanjari* speaks of two *Dandanayakas*, one in charge of the south and the other of the north. The *Pratiharas* had a similar though more elaborate scheme, according to which the *Pratihara* army was organized under four commanders—the army of the north warring against *Multan*, the army of the south fighting against *Balhara* and two other armies ready to meet a threat to the empire from any and every side.

The *baladhikrta* was generally a military officer put in charge of a town. The *mahayudhapati* should have been an officer in charge of the arsenal. *Pilupati*, *asvapati* and *paikkadhipati* were respectively commanders of elephant, horse and infantry forces. The *kottapala* was an officer in charge of a *kotta* or fort. He can be regarded as a precursor of the modern *Kotwal*. The *kottapala* of *Gwalior* was a Warden of the Marches as well as governor of the fort, *Rajasthan* had plenty of forts, and the *Rajputs* knew well the technique of fort warfare.

Royal Camp

Very often the army had to remain for months in camps with either the ruler or some royal prince in command. So the camp could be a very elaborate affair. The commander's tent was according to Magha (who appears to have had a very good knowledge of military affairs)* put in the centre and surmounted by a flag which served, as did the big lamp in Akbar's camp, to guide stragglers to their tents. Big officers and *samantas* were accompanied by their wives. Prostitutes lived in tents set apart for them and plied their trade successfully, obviously without any disapproval and the previous permission of army authorities. Merchants also made the soldier's life easy, making available to him almost everything that he could have in a town (Magha, *Sisupalavadha* canto V).

Another writer to give an account of the luxurious life of Rajput camps is Jinesvara Suri. We are told that in the centre was the ruler's tent, and in front of it stood a *mandapa* (where he probably received his officers). The royal elephant was put near the royal tent with she-elephants. Horse stables were to their right and left. Bodyguards surrounded the royal tent and door keepers were put both near the door of the *mandapa* and the royal tent. On both the sides of the latter were rows of garland-makers. After that came in order the stalls of dealers in various scents, jewellers, cloth dealers, grain merchants and sellers of vegetables, fruits and curds. *Smantas* and *amatyas* had tents allotted to themselves. This account though interesting, is rather exaggerated and one cannot be sure whether the Suri had any personal knowledge of camps. But in a camp of the type described by him, an army could live on for months, expecting the besieged either to get tired or run short of essential supplies of commodities like food and water. (*Kathakosaprakirana*, pp. 164-65).

Arms and Equipment

Arms and equipment differed from one branch of the army to the other. Elephants had their bodies covered with armour

* This might have been due to the family in which he was born. His grandfather was a minister of the Chavada ruler. Varmalata, and his father too might have occupied a good position in the State.

and tasks provided with arms. Some of them had their eyes covered with cloth which was removed just before a battle began. On their backs sat archers, partly protected by their *howdahs*. Cavalry was held in high esteem, with the best horses coming from outside and trained thoroughly before being sent to battle. Cavaliers were mostly spearmen. Foot soldiers carried swords and shields. Armour was in use. Camels perhaps formed a separate corps. Magha's description of the camel are frequent and life-like (Magha, *Sisupalavadha*, cantos V and XVIII).

Further details about military dress and equipment can be had from the *Kathakosaprakarana*, *Yasastilaka champit* and the *Tilakamanjari*. The description of the Gurjara, i.e. Pratihara forces, in the *Champu* is as follows:—

1. They had *dhotis* coming up to the knees.
2. Their loins were girt with daggers mounted on the handles of buffalo horns.
3. The close and dense growth of hair that covering their bodies constituted as it were an armour for their entire body.
4. They appeared to be three-headed on account of quivers on both the right and left sides of their heads.
5. They surpassed even Krpa, Krpadharma, Karna, Arjuna, Drona, Drupada, Bharga and Bhargava in shooting swiftly, vigorously, and accurately even distant objects.

It need hardly be pointed out that it is a very good description of a Rajasthani soldier of the early medieval period.

Discipline

Discipline in the early Pratihara armies might not have been bad. But later it appears to have deteriorated. Prostitutes, as already noted, accompanied the army. The *Sadhanikas* (officials in charge of horses) took away straw from the village farms. Soldiers had to be kept off from food crops, fields of sugarcane and the produce of kitchen gardens. Villagers tried to conceal all they could. Even dung cakes were carried to the backyard. Money was put in bronze vessels and conveyed to the house of the *baladhikrta* to be kept as a *nyasa* (pledge) with his ladies (*Tilakamanjari*, pp. 96 ff).

Feudal Set-up

Closely connected with the military administration of the period was the feudal set-up of the period. We read for instance, of high-sounding titles like *Maharajadhiraj Paramesvara* and *Maharajadhiraj*, used respectively by the Gurjaras of Rajor and the chiefs of Siyadoni. Other titles of the same type were *mahasamantadhipati*, *Mahasamanta*, *Mahamandalika*, *raja*, *rajakula*, *Thakkura* and *Kanaka*. They sound rather odd, set next to the modest title *maharaja* assumed by the Pratihara emperors. But the titles are not without some political significance. They show that the feudal chief in the Pratihara empire was a power to reckon with and his influence had been increasing rapidly.

The character of the Rajput armies was highly feudal. The wars of Nagabhata II were fought by the Guhilas of Chatsu, the Chalukyas of Saurashtra, the Pratiharas of Mandor and the Chauhans of Sakambhari and Pratapgarh, Ramabhadra similarly utilized the services of his numerous chiefs.

Indraraja of Pratapgarh served Mahendrapala II and speaks of Bhoja being helped to his eminent position by the Chauhans. Ultimately, the Pratihara empire was probably ended too by a rising of its feudatories.

The Prakrit and Apabhramsa literature of this period throws good light on the growing feudal character of the Pratihara armies and polity. In the *Samarachchakaha*, a Sahara chief on being defeated by Prince Kumarasena recognises not merely his overlordship but also his own feudal kinship with the prince's followers. Thus a Sabara chief, a *Mlechchha* from the *Varnasrama* point of view, and a caravan leader Sanudeva, who was a Vaisya, could regard themselves as *Sambandhins* (kinsmen) because of their allegiance to a common overlord. Elsewhere in the same book prince is represented as regarding a rebel feudatory chief as his elder brother and asking him not to offer apologies to him, a younger brother, but to his father who feudally, one might say, was the father of both.

That sub-infeudation had also become common can be seen from the testimony of literature. The *Tilakamanjari* writes of the grant of the whole of *Uttarapatha* along with its chief towns and villages to Prince Harivahana as his *kumarabukhti*, Anga was similarly granted to the Prince's companion Samaraketu

as his assignment; and the lands to the west of Anga were made over to *Senani* Kamalagupta. Another statement of the book is even more interesting. Harivahana and Samaraketu do not themselves administer their charges. They become *nischinta* (free from anxiety) by distributing the towns and villages of their *bhuktis* among the *Rajaputras* who served them. The distribution of lands among them was according to their *patrata* or merit.

When a ruler marched against his enemies, he was normally joined by the contingents of his feudatories. We have already referred to the feudal armies which served Nagabhata II and Ramabhadra. We find the same thing also in the reign of Bhoja I who made a grant of land to the Kalachuri chief Gunambhodideva, for the service he rendered to his master in the campaign against the Pala ruler of Bengal. In the *Kathakosa* of Jinesvara we are told that Chandakesari had 20000 infantry, 5000 cavalry, and 50 elephants. But in addition to these he could have 3000 troopers. For the land that the *thakkuras* held from their overlord, they had to offer military service. An old word for such service in our epigraphy as well as literature is *Olaga*. It is used in the *Dudhpuri* inscription of the eighth century and the *kathas* of Haribhadra and Uddyotana Suri, both again assignable to that period. The word continued in use for centuries; and was later replaced in Rajasthan by the word *chakari*.

Revenue Administration

Land has always been the mainstay of Indian revenue. The taxes, imposts and cesses, etc. that it had to pay can be classified as follows:

1. *Udranga* or *bhaga* or *dani*, a land tax paid in kind, generally at the rate of 1/6 or more of the produce.
2. *Hiranya* was perhaps the amount of land tax paid in cash. In Dhruva II's Baroda grant of S. 757 it stands in contrast to *dhanya*.
3. *Bhoga* included customary presents of perishable articles like fruit, milk, vegetables, etc. This included also the provision of lodging and bedding for the ruler and his

- officials. It was very much like the *uparikara* of some grants.
4. *Dana* or *Sulka* was the customs duty paid at the *mandapika* or octroi post
 5. *Danda* or fines imposed for ten major *aparadhas* known collectively as *dasaparadha*. These included disobeying the king's orders, murder of a woman, confusion of *varnas*, adultery, theft, pregnancy from one not the husband, abuse and defamation, obscenity, assault and abortion. Fines were levied for other reasons also.
 6. *Abhavayas* or miscellaneous taxes—We read of *talarabhavya*, *selahathabhavya* and *batadhipabhavya*. *Abhavya* was thus an additional impost which the people had to pay for the services of *talara*, *selahatha*, and *batadhipa*. The *talara* looked to the security of a town. *Batadhipa* was perhaps the officer-in-charge of a posse of policemen. *Selahatha* had mainly to do with the countryside and was probably a high officer with executive and revenue duties. In later records his share of revenue is put at ■ ½%.

The Rajor inscription mentions also a number of others, namely, *skandhaka*, *marganaka*, *prasthaka* and *khalabhiksa*. *Skandhaka* was probably a cess at a certain rate per load carried on one's head. *Marganaka* might have been some sort of benevolence. *Prasthaka* looks like the Rajasthani cess called *serino* and might have like it meant an extra levy collected in kind. The meaning of *khalabhiksa* is not clear. In the *Lakhapaddhati* we are told that when the crop was divided between the tenant and the landlord, the 5 artisans of the village, the carpenter, the iron smith, the potter, the barber and the washerman, received handfuls of grain from the barn (*khala*). This being almost of the nature of alms, probably received the name of *khalabhiksa*, i.e. alms from the barn. Such cesses continued to be collected in the medieval period. Other imposts mentioned in the Pratihara inscriptions are *chollaka*, *vaini*, *vaigika*, *kosya* and *mayuta*. *Kosya* might have been levied on *kosa* or leather bucket used in drawing out water from wells. The meanings of the other terms are not clear.

Other good sources of revenue were contributions from feudatories and booty captured from raided territories. The main items of expenditure must have been civil and military

administration, the royal household, religious benefactions and educational endowments. The ruler had the right to exact forced labour. His soldiers were billeted on the villagers. When a man died heirless, his property lapsed to the ruler. He was the owner of all marshy and barren land, wood lands and jungles, mines and salt pits, mango and *madhaka* groves, treasure trove and the like.

Territorial Administration

Extensive tracts of the Pratihara empire were under feudatories bound to their overlords by ties and terms of service about which we have said a few words already. The rest of the empire can be grouped under the heads *bhuati*, *mandala*, *zisaya*, *pathaka*, *chaturasitika* and *dvadesaka*, *bhukti* was the biggest division. Next to it was the *mandala*. It was sub-division into *visayas*; a sub-division that we find also in feudatory States like Sakambhari. The *pathaka* stood next to it. The Varanasi *Visaya* had a division called *Kasiparapathaka*. The Pratapagarh inscription has a *Dasapitragchimapathaka*. From words like *Bhrngarika*—*chatussasti-pathaka*, *Talabhadrika-sattrinsatpathaka* and *chalisapathaka* which we find mentioned in Chaulukya records, it can further be concluded that the *pathaka* was a union of villages, the number of which could vary. A *Tunakupakadvadasaka* is mentioned in the Haras inscription of 973 A.D.; and if we add its evidence to that of many later Chauhan inscriptions we would conclude that this grouping of 12 villages was common enough in Western Rajasthan. *Bhailasvaminahadvadasaka* on the other hand appears to be not a union of 12 villages but of 12 *pathakas* of which one was *Bhrngarika-chatussastipathaka*. We are not sure whether this sub-division existed also in Rajasthan.

The *kotta* or *durga* may be regarded as a representative of the *durga* constituent of a *saptanga rajya*. It included not the fort alone but also the territory adjoining it.* We shall soon be referring to its administration. The smallest administrative unit was of course the village.

Exact details of the administrative machinery in the provinces are not known. But we read of an imperial officer

* See Vaillabhassvamin inscription No. 2, EI, I, pp. 154-62.

called the *tantrapala* in the Harsa inscription of Vigraharaja II; the Una inscription of Balavarman, the Pratapgarh inscription of Mahendrapala II and the *Upamitibhavaprapancha-katha* of Siddharsi Suri. It would appear from these references that the *tantrapala* was a very highly placed officer whose duties consisted in keeping the feudatories in check, looking after the interests of his master on the borders of his empire, and using diplomacy as well as force to gain his objective. He was authorised also to make grants and sign important documents on behalf of his master. In the Pratapgarh inscription the *tantrapala* is given the lofty titles of *mahadandanayaka* and *mahasamanta*. We may compare this officer to the Sipahasalar — Subedar of the Mughal period.

The head of a *visaya* might have been known as the *vasayapati* but we have no idea of the titles used for the heads of the divisions lower than a *visaya*. Perhaps the addition of the word *mukya* to a territorial division sufficed to designate him.

Local Government

We have interesting accounts of local government both from epigraphic and literary sources. The affairs of the fort of Gwalior were managed not only by a Kottapala and Baladhikrta but also a number of non-officials. The defence of the town and its overall supervision fell within the jurisdiction of the Kottapala; but the management of civil affairs was left to a non-official body, the members of which had their turn in the management of the *sthana*, and were therefore known as *varikas*. Attached to it must have been a permanent office like the one at Pehoa which kept a record of transactions and agreements (*E.I.* I, p. 187). Its secretary might have been designated *Karanika*. (See RA, I, pp. 350-51).

In a provincial capital like Siyadoni and probably also in other big towns of the empire were two more institutions, the *mandapika* and the *panchakula*. The entire set up at Siyadoni was as follows (*EI* p-173):

1. *Maharajadhiraja Dhurbhata*.
2. The *Panchakula* consisting of Lodhuaka etc. working under the direction of Dhurbhata.
3. *Kauptika Rasthaka* in the *Mandapika*.
4. *Abua* and *Narasimha* in charge of the *sthana*.

To these institutions we should add also the trade guilds which had a considerable share in the civic, social and economic life of the towns.

The *Panchakula* institution to which we have referred above had its roots very deep in the history of our country. The affairs of Pataliputra in Chandragupta Maurya's days were managed by a board of 30 members consisting of 6 *Panchakulas* or 6 committees of 5 members each. The institution finds a mention in the Gupta records; and had certainly a definite place in the life of the people in the Pratihara Empire. In the inscriptions of the Pratiharas they are described as *tadahisthita*, i.e. supervised or presided over by the king's representative. Later on we read of the *Panchakulas* as *tanniyukta*, i.e. appointed by either the ruler or his representative, which would suggest a decrease in their powers.

That the *Panchakula* registered grants is known from Pratihara as well as post-Pratihara records. And we know from various sources that a *Panchakula* committee of five assisted in the administration of justice. In the *Samaraichchakaha* (p. 270), for instance, one finds investigation being conducted by a joint committee of the *Karanikas* and the *Panchakulas*. The former represented the official and the latter the popular element. In Dhureti inscription of K, 963 we read of the *Dharmakuladhikarana* of the *Panchakula* as managed by the merchants of the place according to their established custom. (CII, IV, p. 372, line 9).

Other functions of the *Panchakula* committee are known from the inscription of Gujarat and the *Lekhapaddhati*, which describe them as arbitrating between disputing parties, giving certificates of sale and concession to traders, farming out villages, collecting the State share of the revenue and taking cognisance not mainly of religious but also secular grants.

Sometimes we read of *mahajanas* or village elders. The *Brhatkathakosa* refers to the punishment awarded by the *Mahajana* on the basis of the popular maxim that he was to suffer whose articles got lost or damaged. In the *Samaraichchakaha*, the *Nagaramahantakas* or the elders of the town, accompany the *karanikas* to investigate the charge of a theft. That the *mahantakas* enjoyed a better status than the *karanikas* can be assumed on the basis of the description of the latter as *tadadhisthita*, i.e. supervised in their work by the former. We read also of a town

assembly as taking cognisance of a quarrel in which it investigated the matter by sending four of its representatives, all of them proficient in *dharma* and *arthasastras*, advanced in age, well established in *dharma* and highly respected by all citizens. These representatives could easily have been members of a *panchakula-dharmadhikarana* to which we referred above. The *Kuvalayamala* also refers to the judicial functions of the *nagaramahallakas*.

The third civic body, the *mandapika* has a very long history. An octroi post was probably given the name *mandapika*, because the *sulkadhyaksa* or customs superintendent set up his office in a *mandapika* or small tent near the chief gate of the city. Megasthenes mentions a municipal committee of 5 members which collected tithes. Kautilya states that the collectors of *sulka* or custom should be 4 or 5 individuals whose duty was to take down particulars of articles imported in or exported from the city and to punish the people who tried to defraud the State. In line 29 of the Siyadoni inscription, we find a *panchakula* in charge of the *mandapika*. But elsewhere in the same inscription the officer-in-charge of it is called *Kauptika*. As the same designation is found in a Shergarh (Kola) inscription in relation to a *mandapika* it would not be wrong to conclude that the *Kauptika* was an officer entrusted with the collection of customs dues; and we should not probably be mistaken also in saying that a civic organization similar to that of Siyadoni existed in Rajasthan.

The *Mandapikas* collected the cesses fixed by the State and used them in the way the State directed. It collected also the miscellaneous cesses called *abhavyas* which were made payable to the *Talara*, the *Kottapala* and the *Selahattha*.

The mutual relations of these civic bodies are not very clear. The *Kottapala* was generally a big *samanta* guided by a *panchakula* or committee of 5 people which represented the *pauras* or citizens. Out of the *Panchakulas* two had a turn at the management of the *sthana* for a period which might have varied. Besides the *panchakula*, the town had also a large number of guilds which managed their own affairs. In other matters also the people had a considerable voice and we can accordingly agree with the view of Prof. K.N. Sastri who rightly observed, that "the real life of society went on in other organizations,

in the temples, in the *mathas*, in the *viharas*, in the villages, in the caste organizations, in merchants guilds all of which flourished independently of the State and went to the king only if they quarrelled among themselves and could not come to an agreement and they wanted an arbitration to settle the dispute. So long as they were functioning without trouble, the king had no place in the social life. (P.K. Code Commemoration, Volume, p. 371).

Police and Judiciary

We shall have a few words about police and judiciary before we finish our account of early Rajput administration. Theft being a serious crime, the alleged thief could be subjected to torture. One accused of deceitful measuring out of corn could lose his tongue, feet and hands. An adulterer could be made to embrace the red hot iron statue of a female. Trial by ordeal was not unknown. Imprisonment was of the most rigorous type.

The *talara*, *dandapasika* or *araksihi*, as a policeman was called, looked to the security of life and property and carried out preliminary investigation in criminal cases. The Chirwa inscription of V. 1330/1273 A.D. mentions *talaraksa* Madana and some others of his family, namely, Uddharana, Yogaraja, Pamaraja and Ksema who held the same post. We find also a class of officers called *Sadhanikas*, whose duty was almost that of the modern Prosecuting Police Inspectors. The Barah Plate of Bhoja refers to an officer called *Vyavaharin* through whose mistake a grant in the Kalanjara *Mandala* remained in abeyance for many years. In small principalities the chief himself must have presided over his court. But in coming to a decision about the case before him and the punishment that was to be given to the accused he was assisted not only by experts in *dhannasastra* but also *Karanikas*. If *Karanika* be regarded as an abbreviated form of *dharmadhikaranika*, he could have been a judicial officer. Of great interest also is the fact that all such officers of the State required the cooperation of the representatives of the people called variously *Nagaramahattaras*, *Nagaramahattakas* and *Panchakulas*.

In villages specially, the people seemed to have taken a

prominent part in judicial matters. An interesting example can be had from the *Kuvalayamala*, where a man named *Mayaditya* is represented as requesting the *Nagaramahallakas* to advise him about his decision to commit suicide, as he had committed the great sin of doing ill to a friend (*Kuvalayamala*, p. 63, lines 16-28). Equality before the law did not exist, for it could not in the social atmosphere of that period. But evenhanded justice seems to have been the objective of judicial administration.

Early Rajput administration was the product of its age. We have neither called it good nor bad, but only given a few facts so that one may, in due course, supplement them from other sources and form one's own opinion about its character. To contemporaries—and they are the ones who had most to do with it—the administration did not appear unsatisfactory. Harisena describes *Vianavakapala Pratihara* as *Sakropama*, i.e. one who equalled *Sakra* or *Indra* (*Brhat-kathakosapresasti*, verse 13). *Sulaiman*, who visited India in the reign of *Bhoja I*, spoke highly not only of the military strength of the empire but also of the fact that no country in India was more safe from robbers. When we remember, that *Harsa* could not, in spite of his incessant labours, ensure this safety in an empire, conceivably smaller than that of the *Pratiharas*, we can easily appreciate the measure of their administrative success. And though we do not have details enough to pronounce a judgment with the fullest confidence, whatever we know makes us feel that Rajput States like *Mewar* and *Sakambhari* too were administered efficiently.

7

Religion (800-1000 A.D.)

Religion has always played a very important part in the lives of Indians, regulating their attitude towards the Supreme Spirit as well as to each other. We have known since the *Rgvedic* period, if not earlier, that essentially there is Unity in life, diversity being only its outward expression, the way in which it manifests itself to the human mind. We call it *Indra*, *Varuna*, *Agni* and *Mitra*. We have been calling it also *Visnu*, *Rudra* and *Brahma*. But giving the Supreme Reality a different name does not make it different from what it is actually. A rose called by any other name smells as sweet. So we all push on towards the same destination, though our ways might be diverse and the names under which we seek it innumerable.

Rajasthan of the period 800-1000 A.D. gave expression to this truth in various ways. It created images of Hari-Hara, in which one face depicted Hari and the other Hara, just to emphasise the truth that both are manifestations, of *Paramatman* and identical with Him.¹ Rajasthan had Hari-Hara images in plenty. There are two Harihara temples at Osia, a place not far from Jodhpur where I am teaching at present. A good example of Hari-Hara is supplied also by an image from Bedla which has been given a *chakra* in one hand to point out its *Vaisnava*, and a *trisula* in the other, to indicate its Saiva aspect. Adding Brahma to Siva and Visnu, their votaries created the Hari-Hara-Pitamaha images of which we have beautiful

specimens in the museums of Badoli and Ajmer. Remarkable in the same line is a Surya image from the Harsanatha temple of Siva, showing Surya as the main deity with Siva, Brahma and Visnu as his aspects. Its central face has the crown of Visnu and Surya. The other two heads are crowned with *jatamukutas*. The six supplementary hands bear a *chakra* and *sankha* (to connote Visnu), a trident and snake (symbolic of Siva), and a book and *kamandalu* (to indicate that the Brahma aspect was also included in the image). From Ajmer Museum we have a *trimurti* in which Visnu occupies the central place. Various *Tritnurti* images find a mention in epigraphic and literary sources.

In fact this syncretist tendency was so strong that a temple sacred to one god would soon become sacred to others too, as a result of the *Panchayatana* technique in which one god occupied the central place of worship and the others the shrines in the four quarters, the east, the west, the north and the south. Such temples are even now common in Rajasthan. The temples of Indradityadeva, for whom we have a donation of the Vikrama year 1003/946 A.D., and the god Trailokyamohana stood within the same premises. Adjoining them was the temple of Nityapramoditadeva (perhaps an idol of Siva). And what is equally remarkable is that all these properties, along with the shrine of Vatayaksinidevi, for which the Pratihara ruler Mahendrapala II made a donation, were managed by a Pasupata named Harisisvara.

In other ways also the syncretist tendency proved irresistible. It had spread from images to temples. From temples it went on to the conquest of *tirthas*. A good instance is Indraprastha which according to the *Padma Purana* had become the abode of all the *tirthas* and gods, by having first been sacred to Indra and Brhaspati. Other *tirthas*, Kasi, Prayaga, Gaya and Ujjayini followed the same pattern. From Rajasthan the best example is that of Pushkar, which though originally sacred to Brahma alone as this *yajnlabhumi*, came to be respected no less by other sectaries. It soon had the famous temple of Adi-Varaha, and the banks of all the three Pushkaras were studded with Saiva temples built mainly by the Chauhan rulers of Sakambhari and Ajmer.

It was this seeing of One in All and revering what is good, wherever it might be, that accounted for the spirit of toleration

characterising the early Rajput period. It was nothing new to India or to Rajasthan, for had not Kṛṣṇa said of yore:—

*Yadyad-vibhutimat-sattoam-Srimad—urjjitameva va/
tattadevavagachchha tvam mama tejomsasmbhavam//BG., X, 41*

“Whatever there is endowed with grandeur, beauty or strength, know that it has sprung only from a spark of my splendour.” The beauty of the religion of that period thus lay in the fact that one could see that Supreme Spirit in every spark and respect it. We needed no secularism to counteract what has come to be known as religious fanaticism.

The best exemplars of this attitude, because they saw truth in every sincere way of approaching God were the great pratihara emperors who changed their tutelary deities from generation to generation. Devasakti was a worshipper of Viṣṇu. His son, Vasaraja, and grandson Nagabhata II were respectively devotees of Mahesvara and Bhagavati. Ramabhadra, the next ruler, paid adoration to the Sun. Mihira being a synonym of the Sun, he went so far as to call his son Bhoja by that name; and Bhoja adopted Bhagavati as his tutelary deity, though he was tolerant enough to build a temple for *Narakdivis* (Viṣṇu) inside his seraglio and his Gwalior inscription began with an invocation to the god Viṣṇu, the enemy of the demon Naraka. Obviously Bhoja looked at religious matters in a light that can be called peculiarly Hindu. He might have thought of Viṣṇu even as a manifestation of Sakti. Any way, though personally a staunch worshipper of Bhagavati, he could hardly have called himself *Adi-Varaha*, unless he held Viṣṇu’s divine achievements in the highest estimation.

In other Rajput families of the period the changes in tutelary deities were not so frequent. The Maharawals of Mewar, for instance, called themselves devotees of Ekalingaji. But they had the highest respect also for other gods and goddesses. Bhartrpatta II granted in 942-43 A.D. a field to the Sun temple of Indraditya. Allata endowed the temple of *Adi Varaha* at Ahar Saktikumara assigned 14 *drammas* annually to a Sun temple. Similarly though the Paramaras of Abu worshipped Achalesvara they patronised liberally the temples of other gods, some among them being also of the Jainas.

Passing on now from the rulers to their people we find that they had the fullest freedom of worship. It was for them to choose which god they would worship, Visnu, Sivz., Brahma, Chandika, Gajanana or even some Yaksa or Naga.² We read of numerous Visnu temples in Rajasthan and their beautiful images. Didwana has given us an excellent Yogasana Visnu, with the lower hands places on each other and the upper ones holding a *vaijayanti-mala*. Of Sesasayi images we have some nice ones from near Kota. Harsanatha and the Rajputana Museum Ajmer. From Baghera (Ajmer Division) we have a well draped and profusely ornamented Visnu wearing a bejewelled *kirita* and holding a mace in his hand, which is the only *ayudha* that has escaped damage. An image of Visnu seated on his vehicle, Garuda, also comes from there. The Trailokyamohana image of Ghontavarsika, already referred to, was probably eight-armed, with *chakra*, *khadga*, *musala* and *parasu* in the right and *Sankha saranga gada* and *pasa* in the left hands. Harsanatha and Sambhar have given us beautiful images of seated Visnu.

Avataravada, the belief that God Visnu incarnates himself to reward the meritorious and punish the wicked, must have been recognised almost universally. So it is only natural that we should find Visnu worshipped in the many forms he is said to have assumed to carry out his mission. An image from Harsanatha shows three faces, in which the side ones represent Varaha and Narasimha and the middle one Visnu. The Jhalawar Museum has Mahavisnu seated on Garuda. Trivikrama can be seen in a niche of the Parvati temple at Buchkala Visnu's Adi-Varah temple has already been referred to. Two reliefs from Ahar represent the *Matsya* and *Kachchhapa* incarnations respectively. A door jamb from Baghera shows the first five *avatars* of Visnu. The other five might have been on a jamb no longer available to us. The position of Rama as an *avatara* was fully recognised. Rajasekhara mentions him both as "Visnu with the name of Rama" and "the seventh *avatara* of Vaikuntha". Varahamihira gives specifications of his image.

But the *avatara* most popular in Rajasthan was Krsna Vasudeva. Haribhadra Suri of Chittor identified Visnu, Kesava and Krsna. That Krsna was the popular god of the Mandor area is proved by the *toranas*, now in the Sardar Museum,

Jodhpur, depicting *Govardhana-dharana*, *Sakatabhanga* and fight with Dhenukasura scenes among others. A fragmentary inscription from the same area refers to Krsna, Radhika and the Gopis. In the Matsya area Krsna's popularity is proved by the Chatsu inscription of Baladitya referring to Krsna and Gopis. Kaman (Bharatpur) has Krsnite epigraphs and images. The scenes from Osia (Jodhpur Division) and Nilakantha Mahadeva of Kekind again depict some episodes of Krsna's early life, showing that in this area Krsna was popular as Bala Gopala. Reference should also be made to the temples of Kiradu, Sadari, Nana, etc.

Even more popular than Visnu was Siva. We have already referred to some of the temples built for him by the rulers of Rajasthan. In Mewar the most famous Siva temple was that of Ekalingaji, regarded as the real ruler of Mewar, the Maharanas being only his Dewans. To the south of Ekalingaji temple stood a smaller structure dedicated to the worship of Lakulisa, the propounder of the Pasupata system, who had by that time come to be regarded as an incarnation of Siva. The temple of Harsanatha was built by the Pasupata teacher Bhavirakta. Most other Saiva temples of Rajasthan, though not all, were under Pasupata control. The Samiddhesvara or Tribhuvana-Narayana temple of Chittor was built by the Paramara ruler, Bhoja I, who was an ardent devotee of Bharga or Mahesvara. The Chauhans built splendid temples at Pushkar, Mandalgarh and Jahazpur. Other important Siva temples had been built at Bijolia, Badoli, Nagda and Kalyanpur.

A number of beautiful images too testify to the popularity of Saivism. The *Lingodbhava* image from Harsanatha, now in the Rajasthan Museum, Ajmer, beautifully depicts the scene of Brahma and Visnu trying to find the two extremities of Siva manifesting himself as a pillar of light. Of other images, we can just refer to the *Tandavanrtya* image of the same Museum, the four-armed Lakulisa in the Sikar Museum, a large number of Siva images from Baghera, four-faced Siva from Jhalarapatan, and the Ardhanarisvara images from Abaneri, Osia and Menal. An *Ardhanarisvara* image is referred to also in the Khandela inscription of V. 701.

Intimately associated with the worship of Siva was that of Sakti known by her various names as Katyayani, Bhavani,

Chandika, Ambika and Kausiki. Interesting descriptions of her worship, partly perhaps modelled on Bana's classic description in the *Harsacharita*, are to be found in the *Kuvalaya-mala-katha*, *Upamitibhavaprapancha-katha* and the *Samarai-chakaha*. Her worshippers included as before the Sabaras, Bhillas and other *adivasins*. "From a tree adjoining her temple, hung," we are told, "pieces of cloth, horns, hooves, tails and heads of buffaloes and rams. The skin of a leopard attached to a long bamboo served as a flag. Inside the sanctum, which was overspread with skin, removed not long before from a victim, was the terrible image of Katyayani holding in her hands, a bow, a bell, a *khatvanga* and the tail of Mahisasura. Human fat was burnt in the lamp placed before her. *Gnggulu* and *bilvas* provided her with incense. The ivory walls of the temple had tridents engraved on them. Wild tribesmen offered her even human sacrifices in the hope that their desires would be fulfilled." (*Samarai-chakaha*, pp. 530 ff.) The *Brhatkathakosa* (931 A.D.) describes the bloody worship of the goddesses Vindhyavasini and Chandamari, the latter of whom is placed in the Yaudheya *visaya*. Nor was Chandika unknown to later works like the *Nabhinandanajinodhara-grantha* and the *Ganadharntardhasataka-brhadvitti*. They, however, reached a compromise with Chandikas votaries by retaining her worship but turning her into a vegetarian, satisfied with the offering of sweets."

That Durga was widely worshipped is known also from various inscriptions and monuments. The porch of the temple of Sakarai or Sankaramata was built in V. 749. The Chauhan ruler Vighraharaja II built the temple of Asapura at Broach towards the end of the tenth century. From Narhad we have an image of Mahisasuramardini assignable to the eighth century. Vasantgarh was a *Saraḍapitha*. Indraraja Chauhan (942 A.D.) was a worshipper of *Vatayaksini*. His prayer to the goddess mentions her as Mahisasuramardini, Durga, Katyayani, and Varada. At Mandor we have the *Astamatrkas*, namely, Durga and their Saktis, Brahmani, Kaumari, Vaisnavi, Indrani, Mahesvari, Varahi and Narsimhi, accompanied by Ganesa. Durga is depicted as *Ganesa-janani* in an image from Baghera. Jagat and Abu were important centres of Durga worship, the latter being considered even as a *Saktipitha*. In the form of Sarasvati she was worshipped by all, Jains as well as non-Jains.

The Jaina image of Sarasvari from Pallu, now in the National Museum, Delhi, is hard to beat for its beauty.

Surya, as we have seen, was very often combined with Visnu and Siva; but he was widely worshipped alone also. Bhinmal was the most important site of Sun worship in Rajasthan; its Sun image called the Jagat-svamin was held in reverence far and wide. The Sun image of Osia, with its waist tied with a scarf and the legs covered with boots, is strongly reminiscent of Magian influence. An inscription of V. 1011/954 A.D. on a pillar of the highly renovated Surya temple of Amer leads one to think that the site had a Sun temple in the tenth century too. The Thamvala inscription of Simharaja dated in V. 1013/956 A.D. speaks of the Sun image called Rannaditya; Ranna here perhaps standing for Rajni as suggested by Prof. D.C. Sircar. We know of a Ratnaditya at Pushkar. In an image from Baghera the attendants, Danda and Pingala, and the female between the two legs of god, have the same style of boots as the Sun. In the Sirohi area specially, Sun worship was so prevalent that no well populated village of the period 600-1400 A.D. was without a Sun temple, Budhadita temple of the Kota area is now well-known. Other important Sun-temples existed at Beda, Pokaran, Kiradu, Bithu, Pali and Chittor.

Associated with the worship of the Sun was that of the *Navagraha-mandala* and *naksatras*. A beautiful panel in the Rajasthan Museum, Ajmer, shows seven *naksatras*, Magha, Purva-phalguni, Uttara-phalguni, Hasta, Chitra, Svati and Visakha and the time deities Kala, Prabhata, Pratah, Madhyahna, Aparahna and Sandhya. A finely sculptured canopy from Baghera has figures of Surya, Chandra, Mangala, Budha, Guru, Sukra, Sani, Rahu and Ketu.

Brahma, whose importance had declined, continued being worshipped in some localities. Vasantgarh had a big temple with a two armed and three-faced figure of the god. There is an old temple of Brahma at Khed and another of Savitri and Brahma at Bithu. Images of the god have been found also at Sevadi (Jodhpur), Basad (Pratabgarh), Sirohd (Kota), Kiradu (Jodhpur), Bijolia (Mewar) and Osia (Jodhpur), Ranakpur (Jodhpur). Sun temple has an image, the upper part of which represents Brahma, Visnu and Siva, and the lower one, the Sun.

A similar image was found at Ramgarh (Kota). Osia and Kiradu have images representing this *chaturdeva* conception. More popular than it was the image of Tripurusa, *i.e.*, one in which Brahma figured as one of the Hindu Trinity, Brahma, Visnu and Siva. The temples of Tripurusadeva are mentioned in Rayapala's inscription of V. 11%, the Ojha Grants of various dates and the *Prthvirajvijayas*. From the *Kanhjadedeprabandha* we learn of the existence of a temple of Brahma at Jalor.

More light on the diminishing popularity of Brahma can be had from the *Puranas* and the *Katha* literature of the period. The *Puranas* tell us that Brahma lost his following because of having falsely said that he had seen the upper end of the pillar of light representing *Sivalinga*. A similar episode is found in the *Mahimnahstotra* of Puspadanta. An account far more interesting, however, comes from a non-Brahmanical work, the *Brhatkathakosa* of Harisena. Finding his own audience hall empty, while people flocked to the assemblies of *Visnu-loka* and *svraga*, Brahma paid a visit to the world of mortals to find out the cause of his unpopularity. He discovered that people had constructed lofty building: for Visnu, Mahesa, Durga and Yaksas, and provided music and dance to entertain them; but they did nothing for him. Even in a *Brahmsala* he had been left unworshipped. Even the Brahmanas, who were his disciples had treated him with scant regard. So to improve his position Brahma began practising severe austerities. But Visnu and Siva distracted him by sending Tilottama. Thus the sum total of the story would be that in spite of all the attempts to revive the worship of Brahma, the gods, Visnu and Siva, remained the favourite deities of the people.

Of minor gods there were many. The worship of Vinayaka or Ganapati must have begun before the Gupta period as eight of his famous names, Vinayaka, Vighnaraja, Dvaimatura, Ganadhipa, Ekadanta, Heramba, Lambodara and Gajanana are found in the *Amara-kosa*. His early role too was a little different. Perhaps a creator of obstacles in the beginning, he, later on, became their remover and was worshipped as a god who rendered easy the way to success. The *Kuvalayamala* mentions Vinayaka among the popular gods to whom people prayed in their hour of distress. Ghatiyala inscription I, dated in 951 A.D.,

begins with salutation to Vinayaka. Ghatiyala Inscription II refers to the figure of "Vinayaka on the pillar". Images of dancing Ganesa have been found at Harsa and Abaneri, besides some other places.

Skanda was during our period regarded as Ganapati's brother. In the *Skandopurana* he is associated with the seven mothers, Kali, Hilima, Rudra, Vrsala, Aya, Patala and Mitra and regarded as the overlord of *Crahas*, *Upagrahas*, *Vetalas*, *Sakinis* and diseases like *uninada* (madness) and *apasmara* (epilepsy). The Kota Museum has a beautiful image of Skanda Karttikeya. As he is left unmentioned by the *Upamitibhavaprapanchakatha*, *Yasastilaka* and *Brhatkathakosa* etc., his popularity might have been on the wane in the tenth century.

From the *Kuvalayamala* we learn of Revanta, a son of Surva and Samjna. He is represented as a horse rider followed by a hound. He delivered people from the terror of forests and other lonely places. Asvins, the twin sons of the Sun-god, are represented in some sculptures.

Another minor god whose worship was very popular was Madana, Ananga or Kamadeva, the god of Love. He held a bow made of flowers. The *tarana* of his shrine was of sugarcane. Sweet fumes of *agaru* scented his shrine. *Sali* rice, sweets, and cane juice were the offerings dear to him. Naturally such a god received fervent devotion from lovers; but he was worshipped also by married women for *saubhagya*.

Some of the Jain *Kathas* refer to the worship of the Yaksas, Dhanadeva or Kubera and Manibhadra. The Rajputana Museum, Ajmer, has an image of Kubera in the *lalitasana* pose. Big-bellied and profusely ornamented, he holds a citron in the right hand and a long purse in the left. Images of the village gods, called Ksetrapalas, have also been discovered. But an image was not essential for his worship. A *sami* tree very often represented the Ksetrapala as well as his shrine.

With so many gods and goddesses, it is no wonder that the number of our sects exceeded half a century. Siddharsi Suri mentions sixty-five of them differentiated from each other by their philosophic doctrines, dress and mode of living. Broadly speaking the Vaisnavas could be put under two heads, the Bhagavatas and Pancharatras; the Mahesvaras under four, the Pasupatas, Saivas, Kalamukhas, and Kapalikas; and the Jainas

under two, the Svetambaras and the Digambaras. The Bauddhas, the last vestiges of whose existence, in Rajasthan have been found in the Kott region were a declining sect.

Another division that cut through classes and communities was due to tendencies that have been increasingly permeating Hinduism since the rise of Buddhism, Jainism and Bhagavatism. People were permitted to perform sacrifice's if they so wished. But they were no longer the popular performances they had been. In other words, people now cared less for *Ista* (sacrifice) constituent of *dharma* than *Purta* which included the digging of wells, excavation of tanks, distribution of free food, establishment of hospitals, maintenance of gardens and orchards for public use. The tendency towards implementing this side of *dharma* was strengthened instead of being weakened by popular movements like Buddhism, Jainism and Bhagavatism which laid stress on kindness to every living being. Sacrifices had been the privilege of the Ksatriyas and the Brahmanas, bringing prestige to the former and money to the latter. The Sudras had nothing to do with them. The *Purtadhurma*, on the other hand was the religion of all, the rich as well as the poor, men as well as women. The concept caught, not because there was anything spectacular about it but because it provided for the needs of our society. Thousands of inscriptions testify to the popularity of *Purtadhurma*. The public spirit that this *dharma* fostered did more good than a government undertaking to do every thing for its people. There is a sense of compulsion when one is taxed, even though the tax be to do good to oneself. There would be a sense of pride in the work, if one feels that he has contributed to it, and contributed volunatrily. That is why the *Puranas* perhaps declared, "*dhyana* is prescribed for *kṛta*, *Yajna* for *treta*, *achara* for *dvapara*, and *dana* for *kaliyuga*.

Another religious institution which appealed to the people was the *tirthayatra*. Pious individuals genuinely believed that the visit to a holy site inspired one with holy thoughts, cut the bond of *karma*, produced great merit, and afforded one a chance of coming into contact with spiritually advanced people. For great teachers like Sankaracharya it must have been a means both of carrying their message and evolving a system that would ensure the continuity of their *sampradaya*. Rightly performed the *tirthyatra* could be a good moral discipline; for

did not the Hindu scriptures lay down that only that *yatri* (pilgrim) secured merit who had complete control over his hands, feet and mind and whose actions were untainted by impurity.

North Indian *tirthas* mentioned most by our sources are ten, Gaya, Varanasi, Hardwar, Pushkar, Prabhasa, Naimisaksetra, Kedara, Kuraksetra, Ujjayini and Prayaga. The *Padma Purana* mentions Kanyakubja as the eleventh great *tirtha* of India. It describes also Indraprastha as a great *tirtha*. Rivers were mostly regarded as sacred and the most sacred of them all was the river Ganga. Varanasi and Ujjayini were sacred to Siva and Multan to the Sun God.

The *Puranas* recognized the limitations of the *tirthayatra*. For instance, the *Brahma Purana* tells us that "a wicked heart cannot be purified by bathing in *tirtha*. If a pot of wine is washed even a hundred times it remains impure." Further though the *Puranas* had much to say in favour of *tirthayatras* they declared also that "Kuruksetra, Prayaga and Pushkar, could all be located in the abode of a person with full control over his sense organs."

But some Hindu religious practices are not so easily defensible as the *tirthayatra*. Suicide at Prayaga is commended by Rajasekhara. Even Yuan Chwang wrote of this practice as follows, 'Before the hall of the temple there is a great tree with spreading boughs and branches and casting a deep shadow. There was a body eating demon there....When a man comes to the temple there is everything to persuade him to despise his life and give it up. He is encouraged thereto, both by the promptings of the heretics and by the seductions of the evil spirit. From very early days till now this false custom has been practised.' The *Mahabharata* permitted suicide at Pehoa and Prayaga; but the imperial Pratihara rulers being men of strong and sturdy common sense do not appear to have encouraged religious suicide.

Hindus believed also in getting free from sin by performing various types of penance. Siddharsi Suri criticised these practices in the following words, "The fool falls from a precipice and has recourse to the *mahapatha*. Immersing himself in water in the month of Magha he dies of cold. Practising the *Panchagnitapa*, he scorches himself with fire. He breaks his head, saluting cows and *pipal* trees. Rendered poor by giving too much in

charity to the *Brahmanas* and *Kumaris* he has to suffer greatly. Such is the condition of the poor man who has faith and is supposed to be free from all impurities.... Desirous of going to *tirthas* he leaves behind his riches, house and kinsmen and wanders about in foreign lands. With a view to satisfying the manes and offering worship to gods he slays living creatures and spends money,...to get heavenly nymphs he enters a whirlpool. To join her husband the woman burns herself to death; with a desire to have *svarga*, wealth, sons and relations, a man performs *agnihotra* rites and sacrifices....He decries the *dharma* characterised by *ahimsa* and sedulously preaches the performance of sacrifices, that entail the slaughter of animals."

Further, the society was a victim to many other superstitions. If one sneezed, the person seated near him would say, 'may you live long and yet be mentally afraid that something inauspicious would occur'. Interpretation of sneezes was almost becoming a science. Belief in astrology was almost universal. Equally great was the belief in so-called sciences like *autpata*, *anga*, *svara*, *laksana*, *uchchatana* and *nimitta*.

A number of philosophical and religious movements characterised the period, 800-1000 A.D. A little before it began, Kumarila Bhatta and Sankaracharya had formulated their systems and carried their message to every part of India. Siddharsi Suri refers to the *Mimamsa* as a new philosophic system. Perhaps the disappearance of Buddhism from Rajasthan may have been due to their influence. There was a marked deterioration in Jainism also, but it was saved from decline by the great work of Hanbhadra Suri who wrote a number of philosophic books, *kathas* and also polemical, tracts. His work was carried on by Uddvotana Suri, the writer of the well known *katha*, *Kuvalayamala*. Another writer who did not good service to the cause of Jainism was Siddharsi Suri. Later on his work was continued by the *Acharyas* of the *Kharataragachchha*. To the end of our period Jainism was a proselytising religion and its followers came from all the Hindu castes. Its great success lay in converting many Rajput families to Jainism.

This was also the period when Tantrikism was coming to the fore. Of the Brahmanical *tantrika* sects, the two referred to most are the *Kapalikas* and the *Kaulas*. The *Kapalikas* used a human skull as their begging bowl and were experts in the

use of *tantrika* rites. The Soma-siddhantins who seem to have been an offshoot of the Kapalikas lived in cremation grounds, took food in human skulls, wore necklaces of human bones, and regarded the world as different as well as non-different from *Isvara*. They offered oblations of human flesh, fat and marrow in the fire, broke their fast with a drink of spirituous liquor in the skull of a Brahmana and worshipped Maha Bhairava with fresh blood gushing from the neck of their victims. The Kaulas indulged in drinking and flouted moral and social conventions to prove their complete adherence to *Advaita*,

Buddhism and Jainism also had a *tantrika* phase, *mantra*, *mudra* and *mandala* being found equally in both. When Buddhism took within its fold peoples of various countries, temperaments and emotional attitudes, people to whom Buddhism was an unfamiliar and new creed—these externals assumed a new importance. These were the things they could copy most easily. When this happened the whole ethico-religious outlook of Buddhism changed. It had now to find a place even for the weird rites of *abhichra*, *marana mohana*, *stambhana*, *vidvesana*, *uchchatana* and *vasikarana*. Nor did it leave out the *Panchamakaras*, *matsya*, *madya*, *mamsa* etc. We have no expert knowledge of *tantrikism* but we feel that the pitfalls in the way of the *tantrika sadhakas* were many and where some succeeded many failed. The ultimate result of the pursuit of *tantrikism* might have been an appreciable lowering in the moral condition of the people.

Notes and References

1. The idea, it may however be remembered, was nothing new to the age. It has been emphasised as early as the period of the *Harivamsa*, where Brahma is said to have had the revelation of this combined figure. We are told that he found "Hara behaving as Hari and Hari as Hara. Hara wielded *sankha*, *gada*, and *chakra* in his hands and had put on yellow dross. Hari donned a tiger's skin and carried a *trisula* and *pattisa*. Hari had Garuda as his vehicle and Hari had the emblem of Bull on his flag." (II, 125, 26-27).

Harihara of the type described in the *Sknda-Purana* was a little different but the emphasis on the essential unity of the two gods is the same. Here we are told that half of his body was that

of Hari and the other half of Hara. On one side was Garuda and on the other the Bull. On the left side his body had the colour of a cloud and appeared like a hill (seen from a distance); the right side was white like camphor. The entire universe appeared like the unity of these two. There was unity everywhere (*Skanda-Purana*). How the great truth experienced and preached by Hindu thinkers has impinged on the modern mind can be seen from the following quotation from Dr. Arnold Toynbee. "Although, of course, I cannot get away from my Judaco-Christian background, temperamentally I am a Hindu. As a Hindu I do not have any difficulty in believing many gods simultaneously, or thinking that a syncretist faith may be the answer for our age. To Hindus it is of no consequence which road, Shiva or Vishnu; all roads one travels-lead to heaven."

8

Emergence of Rajputs: 12th-16th Centuries

The most conspicuous phenomenon of the early medieval period was the rise into political prominence of the new kingly families which are collectively termed as Rajputs. The land which these Rajputs occupied in northern India also came to be called after them—that is, Rajasthan, 'the abode of the princes'. It comprised independent and semi-independent principalities of Jodhpur, Jaisalmer, Bikaner, Ajmer, Sirohi, Udaipur, Dungarpur, Banswara, Pratapgarh, Jaipur, Kota and Bundi. All the vast expanse of this area had been occupied by the Rajputs in the course of a long historical process. Both in this great expansion and in the persistence they had demonstrated remarkable fortitude and determination.

MEWAR

The earliest Rajput clan which had dominated the south-western part of Rajasthan in the 7th century A.D., was that of the Guhilots. During the four centuries that followed the Guhilots of Mewar had to face reverses at the hands of their powerful neighbours, the Chauhans of Sambhar, the Parmars of Malwa and the Chalukyas of Gujarat. However, they remained restive and gathered their strength slowly and steadily.

The defeat of Prithviraj Chauhan by Muizuddin Ghori at the famous battlefield of Tarain and weakness of the kingdom of Cujarat and Malwa offered favourable opportunity to Jaitra Singh of Mewar to consolidate his power. He shifted his capital from Nagda and made Chittor the seat of the government.

But Chittor could not resist the Turks led by Alauddin Khalji, a gifted soldier and general of first order. With a calculated military move he launched a determined assault against the fort. Rana Ratan Singh offered a tough resistance during which he and Lakshman Singh of Sisodia along with his seven sons and thirty thousand Rajputs sacrificed their lives at the altar of national pride. Padmini, the valorous Rani played a novel part in rescuing her husband from the clutches of the Khalji Master, though she failed to save the fort from destruction.

However, taking advantage of the dynastic revolution at Delhi, Hammir in or about 1326 A.D., occupied Chittor and again laid the foundation of the Sisodia rule there. He consolidated his power and extended the frontiers of his kingdom. His influence and leadership was recognized by the rulers of Marwar, Amber and others as far as Gwalior, Raisen, Chanderi and Kalpi. He left a name which is still honoured for gallantry and valour.

The warlike activities and expansionistic tendency of this house reached its zenith under Maharana Kumbha who succeeded in the year 1433. Through his exploits he vanquished his enemies, reduced them to submission and incorporated the parts of Bundi, Chatusu, Abu, Malpura, Sambhar, Nagor, Gagron, Ajmer and Juda within his own. He proudly carried his arms against the Sultans of Malwa and Gujarat, and extended his sphere of political influence beyond Rajasthan.

Kumbha was not only great in war, he was also great in arts of peace. He was an accomplished scholar, learned in the sacred lore, a poet of highest order and a patron of learning. His commentary on the *Geet Govind* and the last part of the *Eklinga Mahatmya* has been attributed to him. He also took great interest in architecture and was an enthusiastic builder. He constructed *Kirtistambha* in Chittor, a monument of his genius and superb architectural taste. His architectural capacity was also manifested in the construction of a line of gigantic forts,

which are the highest achievements of his military genius. Forts like Kumbhal garh, Achalgarh, etc., were constructed and Chittor was repaired to strengthen the defences of his State. For his valour and scholarship he is honoured and is remembered to this day as one of the greatest rulers of Hindu India.

The position earned by Rana Kumbha unfortunately received a setback during Raimal's time due to internal disorder and family feuds. However, his successor Rana Sanga opened his career by establishing fame as one of the greatest warriors of his time and had proved his worth as a ruler and statesman. He had successfully fought against the Sultans of Malwa, Gujarat and Delhi. He acquired his leadership in Rajasthan and challenged the progress of Babur at Khanua. Khanua proved to be a tragic climax to his military career. He proved his worth as the champion of Indian interests, and the protector of Indian culture.

The traditions of Rana Sanga got better expression in Maharana Pratap, who had to face the brunts of Mughal onslaughts earned to their extremes. The Rana on his part shifted the population in and around *girva* and faced the impending danger with courage and fortitude. Though he could not defeat the Mughals at the battle of Haldighati, he with the help of his faithful followers rendered the Mughal highway to Gujarat and Malwa unsafe by his plundering activities. For his successful stand against the Mughals Pratap is recognized as a staunch supporter of independent views and devoted lover of noble cause of freedom.

VAGAD

During the early period under review Samant Singh, a prince of the House of the Guhilots migrated to south-western Rajasthan, fought ceaseless wars against the Bhils and the Chauhans, and set up a separate principality of Vagad. Under the leadership of his successors like Gangadeva, Udai Singh, Gopa, etc., Vagad kept pace with the warlike activities of the Guhilots and maintained hostile relations with the rulers of Mandu and Gujarat in order to keep their territory intact. Some of the rulers of this dynasty like Vir Singh, Dungar Singh,

Karma Singh completed certain works of public utility in the town of Dungarpur and Banswara and raised the status of their small States to a position of pre-eminence.

MARWAR

Another important clan of the Rajputs which had migrated to the western part of Rajasthan under the leadership of Siha, was that of the Rathors. Siha conquered Kher in Mallani district, and planted the first Rathor standard in or about 1234 A.D. The Rathors rose into prominence under Chunda who by the close of the 14th century extended the territory of Marwar by resisting successfully against the attacks of Zafar Khan of Gujarat and Tughlaqs of Delhi. Under the leadership of Jodha, who belonged to the same line, the political status of Marwar was raised and the territory of Marwar under him included important commercial centres like Pali, Merta, Sambhar and Ajmer. In order to consolidate his power, Jodha laid the foundation of a new town in 1459, and named it Jodhpur. His great grandson Ganga supported the cause of Rana Sanga at the battle of Khanua, where two of his generals along with 4,000 warriors laid down their lives for the cause of Rajasthan. His son and successor Maldeva extended his kingdom by vanquishing the neighbouring chieftains, carried his raids against the Khans of Nagor and Jalor, and led his forces up to Bayana in the east and Ratanpur in the south. The fact that Humayun sought the help of Rao Maldeva and Sher Shah could not permanently occupy Marwar, shows that Maldeva was an acknowledged leader of Rajasthan of his period. He by the force of his arms acquired supremacy among all the contemporary rulers of Rajasthan.

Rao Maldeva was followed by Rao Chandrasen, a brave, independent and spiritual ruler. Unfortunately such a spirited warrior had to face the imperialistic moves of Akbar, the great ruler of the Mughals. But Chandrasen by virtue of possessing inflexible and independent disposition took upon himself the calamities of a wandering life in mountains and forest but never succumbed to the temptation of ease and luxury of Mughal court. For sixteen long years he kept himself engaged in

collecting a band of trusted men and continued to fight with the armies of Akbar. He never thought of ending his miseries by shamefully yielding to the supremacy of the great Mughal. However, his sons and successors—Rai Singh, Udai Singh, Sur Singh, etc., entered into friendly alliance, received imperial favours and took leading parts in most of the battles fought out by the Imperial armies in the Deccan, N.W. regions, Kashmir and the Punjab.

BIKANER

Jodha's son Bika being ambitious and enterprising, left his father's home in 1465 A.D. and led an expedition into the region of Jangal, which was then occupied by various tribes. The Bhatias and the Jats measured swords with him, but they were forced to acknowledge his suzerainty. In 1488 he founded the town of Bikaner. Through his dauntless efforts Bika extended his State to the southern limits of the Punjab. His advent marks the commencement of the rule of a new dynasty, which endured over five hundred years. His successor Lunkaran consolidated the kingdom by patronizing art and literature. He was reputed to have taken proper measures to extend help to the famished population of his State. His son Jait Singh defeated Kamran, son of Babur and saved the fort of Bhatner from the yoke of the Mughals. His son Kalyan Singh seems to have realized the advantage of being on good terms with Akbar. Rai Singh, his successor, as a result, remained Akbar's most distinguished general. He offered his services in Attuck, Bengal and the Deccan, and was also given a high command in the Gujarat expedition and was made Governor of Surat. It was he who strengthened his State by the construction of the present fort of Bikaner in 1558.

JAISALMER

Equally valorous were the Bhatias who, under the leadership of Devraj, abandoned their original home and settled in the desert of the north-eastern region of Rajasthan, about the beginning of the 11th century. His grandson Vachha Raj devoted himself to the task of extending the limits of his kingdom. In

the 12th century Jaisal established the capital of his kingdom at Jaisalmer. In the time of Maharawal Jait Singh I, Alauddin Khalji led an army against Jaisalmer. The Maharawal stood against a prolonged siege till in sheer desperation the Rajput ladies performed *jauhar* and the defenders died to the last man. The fort fell in the victor's hand. After two years Maharawal Ghadsi reoccupied it. Jait Singh's successors kept themselves engaged in local conflicts with the neighbouring clans of the north and north-west and the rulers of Jodhpur and Bikaner.

In 1541 Maharawal Lunkaran opposed Humayun with little success. One Maharawal Bhim married his daughter to Jahangir and attained rank and influence in the Mughal court. The Bhati rulers besides being valiant fighters were also patrons of public works. The famous temple of Lakshminath and that of the Sun God of Jaisalmer are ascribed to Rao Lakshman and Rao Berisal. Similarly, dams of the lakes of Jaisalmer, Ghadsisar and Jait bund were constructed by Jaisa, Ghadsi and Jaitai respectively.

CHAUHANS

The defeat of Prithviraj at the battle of Tarain does not mean the extinction of the Chauhan clan. They remained a powerful clan in Rajasthan. They were yet masters of Ranthambhor, Sambhar, Nadol, Jalor, Sanchor, Bundi and Kota. Udai Singh of Jalor, as for example, about 1205 extended his territory beyond Jalor by including Nadol, Bhinmal, Ratanpur and Sanchor. He appears to have come into conflict with the ruler of Gujarat and Saurashtra and asserted his independent position. Kanardeva of the same line was a brave warrior who attempted to defend the fort of Jalor against Kamaluddin Gurg, Alauddin Khalji's commander. The fort fell along with its chosen defenders. Similarly, Vagbhatta, the ruler of Ranthambhor fell fighting when the fort was attacked by Chutmish's general. Hammir, a valiant ruler, offered heroic resistance when Alauddin Khalji besieged the fort with 1,00,000 horse in 1300. With courage and magnanimity Hammir and his men poured out their blood in defending the fort and died fighting bravely. The women and children met their heroic end by throwing themselves into the flames.

SIROHI

Lumba Chauhan has been known as the founder of Deora kingdom of Sirohi Sahasmal, one of the rulers of this branch, founded the town of Sirohi in 1425 A.D. During the time of Lakha the neighbouring States of Mewar, Gujarat and Malwa interfered in the politics of the State and undermined its position. But Jagmal in the early part of the 16th century retrieved its position and undertook military enterprises for the defence of the frontiers of the State. One of the rulers named Rao Surthan was the contemporary of the emperors Akbar and Jahangir. He was a reckless and valiant chief, who, though repeatedly defeated by the imperial army, refused to acknowledge the supremacy of the Mughals.

HAROTI

One Deva Singh belonging to the Hara sect of the great clan of Chauhans, captured the region of Haroti from the Minas and erected Bundi, the capital of the Hadas in 1241 A.D. By defeating local chiefs in and around Haroti he extended his kingdom beyond the left bank of the Chambal. His son Samar Singh was equally ambitious. He renewed the struggle with the Kotia sec of the Bhils and converted their forts into guard houses of the Hadas. Unfortunately, he met his end in one of his encounter against Alauddin Khalji. After him Bir Singh's reign saw tin deterioration of this house. Important strongholds of Mandal garh and Bambawada passed away from his hand and his Stat was forced to pav tribute to the Sultans of Gujarat and Mandu But the position reversed during the reign of Rao Narain, who consolidated his power and joined the Rajput confederacy under the leadership of Rana Sanga against Babur at Khanua. Anothe important ruler of Haroti was Rao Surjan, the contemporary of Akbar. With him commences a new era in the history of Bund. Though he lost Ranthambhor and had to enter into alliance with the Mughal emperor, he attained high position in the Mughl rank and served the empire with determination and devotion.

The Kachhawaha rulers of Jaipur also came into prominence after the battle of Tarain. They increased their resource through

raids against the Minas, Chauhans and Yadavas. Two of the rulers named Udai Karan and Chandrasen of this clan defeated Qaiam Khanis about 1439 and 1467 and brought the productive area of Shekhavati within their territory Prithviraj who lived in the early part of the 16th century, one of the devoted followers of Krishnadas, rescued Rana Sanga from the battlefield. He determined the rank and file of his followers and organized the Kachhawaha nobility. The importance of this dynasty dates from the time of Bharmal when he entered into the fold of Mughal nobility by sealing marriage alliance with the royal personages. His son Bhagwandas and later on his successor Man Singh became persons of distinction as renowned governors and commanders of trust.

MEWAT

In the list of Yadava of Karauli and Tanwars of Dholpur the names of Arunpal and Vikramdeva deserve mention who faced Turkish forces with valour and determination. No history of emergence of Rajasthan is complete without a brief reference to Mewati chiefs of Deeg, Bharatpur and Alwar. These chiefs continued their offence against the Turkish rule. They succeeded in holding out their territory by taking to organized plunder and carried their arms up to the skirts of Delhi. In these activities Bahadur Nahir's name stands pre-eminent. During Sikandar Lodi's reign Adam Khan Mewati held important position of a respected noble at the Delhi court. Hasan Khan Mewati is also remembered as a daring Mewati who joined hands with Rana Sanga against their common enemy—Babar.

Thus, by the end of the 16th century the history of the emergence of Rajputs entered a phase when the State was prepared not to measure swords to solve their political problem but to extend hands of co-operation and good will for the upliftment of the cause of Indian interest.

9

Struggle for Survival: 1200-1315 A.D.

We have already indicated the main changes brought about by Muhammad Ghorī's conquests. The Muslims were now firmly in possession of the Punjab, Sindh, Delhi, Ajmer, Nagor, Kannauj, Banaras, Bihar and parts of Bengal and eager as ever for further conquests. But the Chauhans of Jalor, the Guhilas of Mewar and the Paramaras of Abu and Malwa still wielded considerable authority. The Chaulukyas of Gujarat had received a mauling in 1197 A.D. But they were still a power that counted. Nor had the Chandella dynasty of Bundelkhand become demoralized or paralysed with the death of Paramardin. It produced some strong rulers after him too. In Malwa Arjunavarman Paramara successfully measured swords with Jayasimha II of Gujarat. Even in Uttar Pradesh, the Muslim writ did not run freely. A well-organized Rajput offensive could therefore have crushed the nascent Muslim power; and such an offensive was necessary too, if the Rajputs were to regain their independence and live their own life.

The earliest attempt in this direction was that of the Chauhans of Chandwar. We do not know exactly when they established themselves there. But it is not unlikely that they occupied Chandwar not long after the defeats, of Prithviraja III and Jayachchandra. Further, as their chiefs have been

mentioned as *Sambharirayas*, i.e. rulers of Sakambhari, it is obvious, that they regarded themselves as descendants of the Chauhans of Sakambhari and Ajmer. Thanks to the popular opposition to the Muslim conquerors, the new kingdom soon gathered strength enough to give trouble to the Sultans of Delhi and delay the complete subjugation of the present Uttar Pradesh not only by decades but centuries.

We have from the *Anuvrataratnapradipa* the following genealogy of the rulers of Chandwar up to 1256 A.D.—

Bharatapala of the Chauhan family

Jahada, a younger brother or son of Bharatapala

Ballala

Ahavamalla

As Ahavamalla was on the Chauhan throne in 1256 A.D., it is easy to put Bharatapala, the first member of the dynasty mentioned here, in the first quarter or so of the thirteenth century. He gets only a brief reference, in the *Anubarataratnapradipa*, as a protector of towns, villages, country and people, not because he was unimportant or devoid of achievements but for the simple reason that the poet was interested mainly in eulogising his patron Kanhada of the Lambakurcha (Lemchu) family and his immediate ancestors, Sodha, Abhayapala and Hallana. The details about the Chauhan rulers come in incidentally because the Lemchus had been their counsellors. The most detailed account is that of Lemchu Kanhada's master, Ahavamalla, who was on the throne in 1256 A.D.

This neglect of Bharatapala's achievements by the *Anuvrataratnapradipa* is, however, made up by what I regard as very pertinent though extremely brief references to him in the pages of the *Tabaqai-i-Nasiri*, a history going up to 1260 A.D., which speaks of the great encouragement given to Timur Khan by Sultan Iyaltimish (1211-1236 A.D.) when the former presented himself at the court with Ladda (a son of the ruler of Chandwar captured by Timur Khan in a battle fought near the Chauhan capital). There is no other direct reference to this important engagement. But we are told earlier in the account of Prince Nasiruddin that when he was appointed Governor of Oudh by Iyaltimish in 1226 A.D., he "sent to hell the accursed Bartuh under whose sword more than 1,20,000 Mussalmans

had received martyrdom." Sir Wolseley Haig thought that Bartuh was a ruler of Kamarupa. Hodiwala identified him with Prithu, who, according to tradition current in Rangpur was ruler of Bhitargarh in the Jalpaiguri district of Eastern Bengal. He drowned himself in a large tank in his capital to avoid pollution from the touch of the Kichakas (Mussalmans) who invaded his country from the north. But as pointed out already by Dr. Habibullah, the identification is untenable because Bartuh is mentioned only in connection with Chidh. He had nothing to do with Kamarupa. It is better by far therefore to identify him with *Bharat*, *Bhanitu* or *Bharatapala* who belonged to the area referred to and could therefore have been the natural leader of an anti-Delhi confederacy. It is easy also to think of him as the chief who fought the battle in which the Chandwar prince Ladda was taken prisoner. Perhaps this was the reverse responsible also for the temporary transfer of the Chauhan capital from Chandwar to Rayabaddiya which was another of their strongholds on the river Yamuna.

This opposition to Muslim power by Chandwar appears to have continued. Ahavamalla, the fourth ruler of the line, used all means—force, intrigue and diplomacy—to maintain his independence. "He carried out," we are told, "his duties as a Kshatriya by laying desolate the lands of his enemies. He was the mightily wrestler in the arena of battle against the unapproachable *Mlechchha* ruler. He was like a spear in the heart of the valorous *Hammira*." If we further keep in view the fact that Ahavamalla was on the throne in 1256 A.D., it would be reasonable to conclude that he fought against Hammira (Amir) Sultan Nasiruddin Mahmud of Delhi (1246-66 A.D.).

The remaining History of this brave line can be completed with the help of the *Bahubalicharita* of Dhanapala (composed V. 1454/1399 A.D.) and the *Punyasravakatha* of Raidhu. The resistance of this line to Muslim expansion was a long continued affair which ended only with its destruction at the hands of Sikandar Lodi.

But besides the Chandwar Chauhans there were others also in Uttar Pradesh, who rendered insecure the Muslim occupation of Hindu territories. Iyaltimish had to recover Budaun, Kannauj and Banaras and fight against the Katehanyas, whose resistance

to Muslim domination continued in the succeeding reigns. Expeditions had to be led against them not only in 1242 and 1254 A.D., during Nasiruddin's reign and also in the reign of Balban. Similar expeditions had to be sent into the Doab in 1244 A.D., with results not very impressive in the beginning. But later Balban had more success. Katehar was sacked and burnt. Thus the retention of Budaun, Amroha and Sambhal became temporarily safe for the Muslim conquerors. But Katehariyas revolted again and expeditions had to be despatched against them.

In Bundelkhand, the Chandel ruler, Trailokyavarman recovered Kalanjar and ruled gloriously for nearly thirty-nine years. He was followed by Viravarman, Bhoja varman and perhaps also one Hammiravarman. In between them ruled Hiravarman whose coins have been described in Pheru's *Dravyapariksa*. And besides the Chandellas, we may speak here also of the Yajvapalas who founded a strong kingdom at Narwar and were recognised by Muslim writers as the strongest rulers of Central India, when Nasiruddin and Balban ruled at Delhi.

But the most effective resistance to Muslim penetration was in Rajasthan where the Rajputs either did not submit to the Muslims at all or threw-off the yoke of allegiance at the earliest opportunity. Govinda Chauhan had, on being turned out from Ajmer by his uncle Hariraja, came to Ranthambhor and ruled there as Muhammad Ghor's feudatory. That his son, Valhana, continued to recognise the supremacy of the Delhi Sultans is proved by the Mangalana stone inscription which refers to the victorious reign of Shamsuddin, "the lord of Ghor and Ghazna," and the *gadhapati* Valhanadeva ruling at Ranthambhor. But even this submission had not kept the Chauhans of Ranthambhor safe. Iyalimish captured Ranthambhor in 1226 A.D., with the result that these Chauhans, too had to change their attitude to the Delhi Sultans. When Raziya evacuated the fort of Ranthambhor on being reduced to sore straits by the besieging army of Vagbhata, the day of Chauhan independence dawned again. Twice Vagbhata defeated the Muslim force sent against him, once in 1248 A.D. and then five years later in 1253 A.D. even though the Muslims were led by the redoubtable Ulugh Khan, the future Sultan Balban whom every one feared. All

the success that he had before he returned to the military base at Nagor was the capture of some horses and prisoners.

Finding that he could easily maintain his independence, Vagbhata's son, Jaitrasimha spent his spare energies in fighting against his neighbours. He defeated the ruler of Malwa in an action near Jhamphaitha-ghatta (on the Chambal river, ten miles due south of the Railway Station of Lakheri), slew the Kachhawaha ruler of Ajmer and threatened with death the chief of Karakarala, a place probably not far from Tahangarh. Thus the Chauhans were going back to the traditional policy of increasing their power at the cost of their Rajput neighbours, a policy certainly wrong if we think of its consequences. But for the time being, the potential ill consequences of his actions do not seem to have caused Jaitrasimha any concern. Sultan Nasiruddin Mahmud sent one Malik-un-Nawwab against him in February, 1259. As the *Tabaqat-i-Nasir*, the only source of our information on this point, does not say even a single word more about the expedition, it can be presumed to have been a failure.

In 1282 A.D., Jaitrasimha was succeeded by his son, Hammira. We have plenty of information about him, contemporary as well as late. Ziauddin Barani describes Hammira's struggle with Jalaluddin and Alauddin Khalji. Amir Khusrau gives a fairly good description of Alauddin's attack on Ranthambhor, which would have been more useful to a historian, provided it had less of poetic imagery. Besides, there is a very large number of Hindi and Rajsthani poems, the contents of which have been summarised by us in the introduction to the *Hammirayana* of Bhandau Vyas published by the Sadul Rajsthani Research Institute of Bikaner. Another source book, the *Hammiramahakavya* of Nayachandra Suri is well-known.

In some ways Hammira was lucky. The old Balban passed away in 1286 A.D., leaving the rule of Delhi in the hands of a worthless boy. For nearly four years Hammira had thus a free hand with his policies. He had no fear from Delhi. The Paramaras of Malwa, who could have been a check on his ambitions, were faring no better. In 1283 A.D., half of Malwa recognised Goddadeva, a former minister, as its master. The

legitimate ruler, Mahallakadeva, controlled the other half. Gujarat was under Sarangadeva Chaulukya, a mediocre ruler at the best; and the same can perhaps be said for Samarasimha of Mewar. Under the circumstances, it must have been difficult for Jaitrasimha to resist the temptation of starting on a *digvijaya*; and that this round of conquests had started before 1291 A.D. can be seen from Hammira's inscription of V. 1345/1280 A.D. and the *Miftah-ul-Futuh* of Amir Khusrau which describes the raid of Hammira's *sahani* or cavalry commander into the territories of Malwa and Gujarat. Incursions into the territories of his other neighbours probably continued almost up to the end of the century.

The chief places raided by Hammira were Bhimarasapura ruled by Arjuna, Mandalakrta, Dhara under a ruler named Bhoja II, Ujjain, Abu, Chittor, Vardhanapura, Changa, Sakambhari, Maharashtra, Khandilla, Champa and Kakrala. Of the rulers, Arjuna and Bhoja were perhaps Paramaras. Vardhanapura is Badnor of Mewar. Changa, a Mer fortress, still retains its old name. Champa is Chatsu. Sakambhari, Maharashtra and Khandilla are respectively Sambhar, Maroth and Khandela.

That two of Hammira's major raids had taken place before V. 1345/1288 A.D. is certain from the reference to them in the Balvan inscription which refers also to his two *kotiyajnas*. The forts of Rajasthan (Sambhar, Maroth, Khandela and Abu), the conquest of which is described in the *Hammira-mahakavya* alone, probably felt the weight of his arms a little later. The earliest territory to suffer at his hands was Malwa, where he continued the aggressive policy of his father.

These raids must have brought Hammira fame as well as rich booty; and fame was perhaps what he cared for most, for he soon squandered all his worldly gains in return for merit and public applause earned by the performance of two *kotiyajnas*. To these he invited learned *pandits* from far and wide. A Muslim ruler would have spent the money more gainfully by recruiting a new army. *Digvijaya* was a wrong policy for Hammira; it weakened Malwa, weakened Mewar and weakened him too, for not only did it leave him without the necessary sinews of war but also friends who would stand by him in his hour of need.

This hour probably came sooner than many had expected. The years 1286-1290 A.D. had been of comparative safety for the Hindus. Sultan Qaiqubad was busy with wine and women, with orgies that made him inwardly hated by the proud Turkish nobles and gave the Rajputs a good chance to assert their independence. In 1290, however, the rule of this debauchee ended; and Balban's dynasty was replaced by that of the Khaljis. Its first monarch, Jalaluddin, though by no means warlike, appears to have thought it necessary to attack Ranthambhor. By being under a descendant of Prithviraja III it could arouse hopes of Hindu resurgence. Besides, it was too near Delhi to be allowed political freedom.

According to Muslim sources Jalaluddin encamped near Jhain after a march of two weeks and began plundering the countryside. In the action that followed one of Hammira's celebrated generals met his death. The Sultan occupied Jhain and had its temples razed to the ground. Marching further the Khalji army invested Ranthambhor. Hammira led out a sortie which resulted in great loss to the Khalji army. The siege was consequently raised and Jalaluddin "reached his capital safely without sustaining any loss."

The *Hammiramahakavya* has nothing to say about the Khalji invasion in Jalaluddin's reign. But a comparison of its account with that of contemporary Muslim histories shows that it erred in assigning some events to Alauddin's reign. Actually they occurred when Jalaluddin was reigning. *Senani Bhimasimha*, who marched out to meet the Muslim army, when Hammira was under a silence during his *koti-yajnas*, has to be identified with the Sahani who had led many attacks into Malwa and Gujarat and was slain in a battle with Jalaluddin's forces. Both the sources state that the Khalji ruler returned to his capital, without achieving anything substantial.

The attack on Ranthambhor was repeated during Alauddin's reign. He had money. He had succeeded in driving out the Mongols at least temporarily. His raid on Gujarat had been a success. The temple of Somanatha had been destroyed and looted. Naturally this must have whetted his appetite for further plunder and conquests; and obviously there could be no better objective than the conquest of Ranthambhor the ruler of which

had been hurling defiance at Delhi and siding with the enemies of the Sultanate. In 1298 A.D. when the neo-Muslim Mongol leaders, Muhammad Shah, Kamru, Yalchak and Bar took refuge with Hammira, after their attempt to assassinate the Khalji commander, Ulugh Khan, had failed, Alauddin decided that it was high time to determine the issue of supremacy between the two. It is easy to criticise Hammira for what he did. But for Hammira it was not only adherence to Kshatriya *dharma* but also good policy. War between him and the Khalji emperor was inevitable; there could not be, as they say, two swords in one scabbard. Under the circumstances he was justified in winning over Alauddin's enemies to his own side. He could not possibly have any better friends. But better still would have been winning the affection of his own people and the good will of his neighbours, a thing which he never tried to do. He should have looked also to the financial side of the problem. It was no use performing *koti-yajnas* and then taxing the people heavily to maintain his big armies. So far the loot of the plains of Malwa and Gujarat had provided him with the necessary means. But with these now gone due to the rapid expansion of Khalji power, he had to rely increasingly on the resources of his own land. Delhi also faced a difficult situation for some time. But not being only a great military leader but also a financial genius, Alauddin saved the situation temporarily by regulating the market and fixing the pay of his soldiers.

In the earlier part of his reign, when the situation was not very acute, Hammira tackled it with the help of his minister, Dharmasimha, who was a good financier. But infuriated with the death of his brave Senani Bhimasimha, who could not get timely help from Ranthambhor on account of the minister's insanity, he had Dharmasimha blinded and castrated. When the financial situation began getting out of control, Hammira employed Dharmasimha again; and thereby brought about his own ruin, for Dharmasimha blindly taxed the people, ignoring entirely the good of the people. He is said to have been responsible also for the estrangement between Hammira and his half brother, Bhoja, who finding his presence at Ranthambhor unwelcome, sought asylum with Alauddin Khalji.

But in spite of the heavy odds ranged against him, Hammira

gave a good account of himself. At times his generalship was superb; as to his valour none ever questioned it. The first Khalji army was almost decimated near Hinduvata. Attacked from all sides, the Muslim soldiers fled, leaving behind their camp equipage and even their women who were made by Hammira's general to sell butter-milk in the countryside to advertise his master's great victory. The next Khalji attack was naturally severer and better planned. Ulugh Khan and Nusrat Khan, the Governors respectively of Bayana and Kara, were in command. The other armies of Hindustan were also ordered to co-operate.

This time the Muslim army managed to negotiate the Hinduvata pass; but not being very eager to reach a decision by arms, they tried to negotiate. Ulugh Khan demanded, according to Isami, the death of Muhammad Shah and Kamru. The *Hammiramahakavya* speaks of some more demands, 10,000 gold coins, 300 horses, 4 elephants and the hand of Hammira's daughter, Devaladevi. The terms were scornfully rejected. Hammira put up a strong defence. When the siege had continued for three months, a stone hurled from the fort struck Nusrat Khan who was supervising the construction of a *pashib* and a *gargach*. Two or three days later Nusrat Khan died.

But Alauddin was not the man to give up. Instead of sending reinforcements with one of his generals, he himself arrived with them at Ranthambhor, and the siege was pushed on with vigour. *Gargachs* were built, mining tried, and attempts made to fill the moat with wood and grass. But nothing seemed to succeed against the vigilance of the besieged. Ultimately, Alauddin hit upon the plan to fill the moat not with grass and wood, which could be set on fire by the besiegers but sand which could be had in plenty and would not burn. It was on this solid and unflammable foundation that he set up towers and platforms to reach the fort. But despite all this the fighting went on.

What Hammira could not, however, provide for was famine. According to Amir Khusrau, the scarcity of food was so great that, "even one grain of rice could not be had for two grains of gold"; and when such conditions are reached, disaffection and treachery can be fomented easily. Alauddin won over Hammira's general, Ratipala, to his side; and he in his turn

suborned another general named Ranamalla. Many others too slipped away from the fort. But the Mongol leaders stood by Hammira disdaining to desert him in his last fight. Others who died with him were the brave Virama, Lord of Champa, Taka Gangadhara, Paramara Ksetrasimha, Rajada and Simha. Hammira was a typical Rajput who would have succeeded more, if he had something also of the Maratha in himself.

Ranthambhor was captured by Alauddin on July 10, 1301. The city was sacked and the splendid temple of Bahar Deo (Vagbhata) razed to the ground. Ulugh Khan was put in charge of the fort; but he was disliked so much by the people that he thought it best to reside in a suburb.

Next followed the Khalji attack on Chittor. The main motive for this must have been political; though there must have been strategic reasons also, for one of the best routes to Gujarat passed through the Banas valley. But according to the traditional accounts as found in the *Khyat of Nainsi*, *Tod's Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan*, *Jaisi's Padmawat*, the *Ain-i-Akbnri*, *Tarikh-i-Ferishta* and the *Rajaprasasti*, the attack was due to Alauddin's infatuation for Padmini. In the appendix to this chapter we have tried to show that the Padmini episode need not be taken as a mere figment of Jayasi's imagination; and though Alauddin's lust need not be regarded as the only cause of his attack on Chittor, it may have been one of the motives.

The Sultan started for Chittor on January 8, 1303 and pitched his pavilion between the rivers Beach and Gambhiri. Finding it impossible to carry it by assault, he invested it closely. On August 26, 1303 A.D. the *Rana* seems to have decided to surrender, but his people disagreed and fought on for some time more, with the result that when the fort passed into the hands of the Khalji emperor, 30,000 Hindus were put to the sword in one day. The beautiful Padmini and her companions threw themselves into the fires of *Jauhar*. Thus, as remarked by Jayasi, all that Alauddin secured of the lady he had desired to possess was barely two handfuls of ashes. The *Rana* who passed into the captivity of Alauddin was Ratnasimha for whom we have an inscription, dated Wednesday, the 5th of the bright half of Magha, V. 1359/1302 A.D.

The city was renamed Khizrabad and made over to prince

Khizr Khan. He built a very strong ten-arched bridge on the river Gambhiri, which is serviceable even now. Another inscription at the foot-hill of Chittor, dated 11 May, 1310 A.D. refers to Alauddin as a second Alexander. When in 1313 A.D. or so Khizr Khan had to go away to Delhi, to look after his own interests, Alauddin made over the fort of Chittor to Maladeva Sonigara of Jalor on the condition that he would consider Alauddin his overlord, pay him tribute and serve him with a fixed number of horses.

That Ghiyasuddin Tughlaq continued to hold the fort is proved by another inscription of Chittor mentioning him and his ministers Asaduddin. But these dynastic and official changes did not perhaps affect the position of Maladeva who continued to rule at Chittor in a subordinate capacity. Bardic chronicles mention Jaisa as Maladeva's successor but from an inscription of V. 1392/1355 A.D. to which we refer in the next chapter it can be proved that the Sonigaras continued their stay in Chittor at least up to that year. Some ascribe Hammira's capture of Chittor to force, and others to deceit. But whatever might have been the means used, Rajput chiefs probably rejoiced at Hammira's achievements; for it revived in their hearts the prospect of throwing-off the yoke of Muslim subjection.

Another major conflict in which the Raiputs were involved in their struggle for survival belongs to the history of Jalor. Udayasimha Sonigara who ruled for 52 years, 1205 to 1257 A.D. was in the latter year of his reign master of Nadol, Jalor, Mandor, Badmer, Kiradu, Radadhara, Khed, Ramsen, Ratnapura, Srimala, Sanchor and Surachand. Of these places, some were captured from the Paramaras of Chauukyas of Gujarat. A Sultan of Delhi, probably Iyaltimish, led an expedition, to Jalor and encamped on the bank of the lake Sundar. But he had to pay dearly for it, for we are told that "the water which the Asuras (Muslims) had drunk from the lake Sundara with their mouths was taken by the ruler Udaya out of the eyes of their grief-stricken wives." Udayasimha's grandson Samautasimha, might have been the next ruler to come into conflict with the Muslims. In c. 1296 A.D., he associated with himself his energetic son Kanhadadeva in the work of administration. His choice was fully justified, for Rajput culture and freedom never stood in greater danger than during the reign of Alauddin Khalji.

We have already referred to Alauddin's conquest of Gujarat and the destruction of the temple of Somanatha. Kanhadadeva made the Khalji commander, Ulugh Khan angry by refusing the Khalji army passage through his territory saying "Your army would on its way sack villages, take prisoners, molest women oppress Brahmanas and slay cows. This being against out *Dharma*, we cannot agree to your proposal." The Muslim army consequently took the route through Mewar but on the way back Ulugh Khan came by the Marwar route, as he had decided to punish the Chauhan ruler for his haughtiness. Circumstances, however, favoured Kanhadadeva. The Khalji army was full of discontent, as practically all the booty from Gujarat had been appropriated for the State by the commander-in-chief. Specially discontented were the Mughal leaders who appear to have somehow contacted the Rajputs, before their rising. When the army was encamped at Sakarana, a village nearly 18 miles from Jalor, the camp was attacked from one side by the Rajputs and from the other by the Mughal chiefs, Muhammad Shah, Ilchak, Kamaru and Barq. Ulugh Khan managed to remain unhurt but many of his officers were slain.

For the succeeding 7 years or so one does not hear of any conflict between the Sonigaras and the Khaljis. But in 1305 A.D. when Khalji resources had perhaps been more than doubled, the Khalji army appeared once again before the walls of Jaipur. As the Muslim commander showed himself very conciliatory, Kanhadadeva agreed to go to the Khalji court. But he soon found that it was no place for a self-respecting Rajput chief. Unable to tolerate Alauddin's boast that no Indian ruler could withstand him, he left the Imperial court after challenging the Sultan to do his worst. The fight which lasted for nearly ten years saw many ups and down. The Khalji army had to retire discomfited from before the four walls of Siwana where it was attacked from one side by the besieged and the other by a relieving force commanded by Kanhadadeva.

More Khalji forces joined the siege of Siwana and ultimately in June 1310 A.D. Alauddin himself reached the fort. Kanhadadeva's nephew, Sataladeva, who was in charge of the fort, fought well. But Alauddin constructed a *pashib* from the top of which he succeeded in defiling the main water reservoir of the fort, perhaps a traitor named Bhayala Paramara had also

something to do with the success of Alauddin. The *Jauhar* fires were lit and Rajput soldiers died fighting bravely near the gate of the fort. Even Amir Khusrau was obliged to remark that the besieged were brave and haughty and did not fly even when their heads were cut into pieces.

But even after the fall of Siwana fighting continued as before. Once the situation was so bad for the Khalji army that it decided to raise the siege of Jalor and moved back towards Delhi; but it came back again, and this time their general, Kamaluddin Gur, provided against surprise attacks as well as guerrilla warfare. Waves after waves of Muslim soldiers poured in, new soldiers immediately taking the place of the killed and the wounded. The Muslims suffered heavily but after sometime the Rajput losses were almost as great.

Kanhadadeva was lucky in having the fullest backing of his people in fighting against the invaders; but even here Alauddin succeeded in winning over to his side a man named Bika Dahiya who led the Muslim soldiers into the fort of Jalor by a path, very difficult and unfrequented but negotiable by a determined enemy. The traitor received his due reward as he was put to death by his own brave and patriotic wife, Hiradevi, who running immediately to the palace reported her husband's treachery to Kanhadadeva.

For five days Kanhadadeva and his soldiers continued fighting inside the fort; and then after having consigned their women to the fires of *Jauhar*, they gave up their own lives defending the temple of Kanhasvamin. Legends say that Kanhadadeva did not die; he just disappeared, after having accomplished his mission of destroying thousands of *asuras*.

With Kanhadadeva ended the Sonigara dynasty of Jalor. He was a brave and lovable chief. But as remarked by us elsewhere, "he would have been remembered by posterity not only as a great Rajput but as a great statesman, if he had played a more positive role in Indian politics by combining his own forces with those of the Guhilas, the Chaulukyas, the Parmaras of Malwa or even his Chauhan kinsmen of Ranthambhor in the fight against Alauddin Khalji. But for this lack of foresight Rajput States would not have fallen like ninepins in the years 1296-1316. His failure was, however, more of a society than an individual, of a society the members of which, with all their

personal virtues, had not the political sagacity to combine and defeat the designs of a power which was swallowing up piecemeal the whole of independent India. And this we can say of practically every great Rajput who fell defending his patrimony against Alauddin, the greatest and perhaps the most ruthless imperialist that the Sultanate produced."

Padmini: A Note

Perhaps no other heroine of Rajasthan has attracted greater attention of poets and writers, Rajasthanis and non-Rajasthanis as well, than the far-famed queen Padmini of Chittor. The story has assumed various forms; and writers have not been unanimous about the names they assign to her father, to the land of her birth, and even to her husband. Yet the central figure of these accounts has always been the same, the brave, beautiful and indomitable Padmini, who could befool a lustful tyrant and also fearlessly—almost joyfully one might say—consign her body to the fires of *janitor* when honour so demanded.

Did this queen of poets' hearts actually exist? Or is she merely a figment of their imagination? Professor Kalika Ranjan Qanungo, who delivered the R.P. Nopany Lectures in 1959, analysed the entire evidence critically and concluded that looking out for her was nothing more than a wild goose chase, a chase as likely to be fruitless as 'a search by Sanskritists for Chandragupta Maurya's mother, Mura, born thirteen centuries after in the commentary of Dundiraj. Let us see whether it is really so.

Here are some of Prof. Qanungo's *obiter dicta* with our comments on them:—

(a) Padmini was purely a poetic creation of Jaisi whose literary genius practised a bluff on credulous chroniclers and the Bhats of Mewar of later times. (*Studies in Rajput History*, p. 4)

Comments

Padmini could not have been Jaisi's creation, as she is mentioned as Queen of Chittor and an objective of Alauddin's

lust in an earlier work, the *Chhitai-charita*, composed at the court of the Tomar ruler, Salahdi in V. 1583/1526 A.D. As to the story of Padmini known to Rajasthan, it has to be pointed out that it comes from a recension markedly different from that used or made current by Jaisi. In its earliest form, it was a poem in *kavittas* by Kavimalla Hetamdan, Hem Ratan who wrote his '*Gora Badal Padmini Katha Chaupai*' in V. 1646/1589 A.D. utilized this work. He inserted one of Malla's *kavittas* as verse No. 151 of his work. Another writer, Labdhodaya, used the same *kavitta* as No. 1 of his *chaupai*. In *Gora Badal Kavitta*, the number of the *Kavitta* is 22. *Kundalia* 162 of Hem Ratan, which appears as No. 26 of the *Gora Badal Kavitta*, has similarly been borrowed from Kavimalla's poem, the style and language of which has inclined not only myself but also Muni Jinavijava to regard its composition as earlier than that of jayasi's *Padmarat*. Many of Malla's other *kavittas* too can be traced in the three Rajasthani poems referred to above, each of which tried to give the truth as known to it. Abul Fazi, who knew Rajasthan thoroughly, followed the same tradition. He speaks not of having used *Padmarat* which must have been a comparatively new work for him, but 'ancient chronicles' recording that "Alauddin Khilji, king of Delhi had heard that Rawal Ratansen, prince of Mewar, possessed a most beautiful wife."

(b) Amir Khusrau, who was present with the besieging army of Ala-ud-din at Chittor, wrote two *bona fide* histories of Ala-ud-din's reign,—the *Tarikh-i-Alai* and the *Khazain-ul-Futuh*, the latter of which is supposed by Professor Muhammad Habib to contain a covert reference to Padmini when it speaks of Hudhud, the legendary bird which carried the news of Balquis, the queen of Sheba, to Solomon. Prof. Habib's view can be rejected. It differs from the opinion of many others, like Prof. Wahid Mirza who saw no veiled hint to Padmini in Amir Khusrau's account. (*Studies in Rajput History*, pp. 5-6 and footnote 1, p. 6.)

Comments

With regard to these remarks it need hardly be pointed out to students of Medieval history of India that *Tarikh-i-Alai* and the *Khazain-ul-Futuh* supposed by Professor Qanungo to be

two different works are actually one. As for the reference to *Hudhud* in the poem of Amir Khusarau, which makes one think of the Queen of Sheba and thereby, according to Professor Habib, of her Chittor counterpart Queen Padmini, we may reproduce it as below, after removing some of the poet's flights of fancy:

"On Monday, 11 Muharram, A.H. 703, the Solomon of the Age, seated on his aerial throne, went into the fort. The servant (Amir Khusrau), who is the bird of this Solomon, was also with him. They cried, "*Hudhud! Hudhud!*" repeatedly. But I would not return; for I feared Sultan's wrath in case he enquired, 'How is it I see not Hudhud, or is he one of the absentees?' And what would be my excuse for absence, if he asked, 'Bring me a clear plea?' If the Emperor says in his anger, 'I will chastise him,' how can the poor bird have strength enough to bear it?"

Here the Solomon of the Age is Alauddin. Amir Khusrau calls himself his bird *Hudhud*. The significance of this can be appreciated only if we assume that he was expected to perform a mission similar to that of the Quranic *Hudhud* who had brought to Solomon the news of Balquis, the beautiful Queen of Sheba. And if the *Hudhud* had been absent from his master's side, this absence was well accounted for. He had a clear plea. But as the beautiful Padmini, on the other hand, was no more than a heap of ashes when Alauddin reached Chittor, Amir Khusrau, the *Hudhud* of the Solomon of the Age, could have no clear plea to offer.

It is hardly possible to say anything more categorical on this point, either this or that way. Amir Khusrau may have known of Padmini, though the verbiage of the poet's phraseology prevent one from drawing any clear conclusions.

(c) Zia-ud-din Barani and Isami do not make any reference to Padmini, even though neither of them had any earthly motive in hiding such a sensational topic. (*Studies in Rajput History*, p. 6).

Comments

Professor Quanungo makes much of the negative evidence

of Ziauddin Barani and Isami. But, logically, arguing from silence is one of the worst though popular ways of ascertaining truth. There are so many other facts that they have not mentioned, either deliberately or through ignorance. But that does not prevent facts from being what they are. Barani devotes barely three lines to Alauddin's conquest of Chittor. Isami's account is shorter still. So is it any wonder that they should not mention Padmini?

(d) The Rai who according to Amir Khusrau fled and afterwards surrendered himself could not have been Ratansen, "the alleged husband of the non-existent Padmini." (*Studies in Rajput History*, p. 7).

Comments

There is not much weight also in Prof. Qanungo's view that the Rai who surrendered himself could not have been Ratansen, the husband of Padmini, for an inscription of V. 1359/1302 A.D., incised barely four days before Alauddin's march to Chittor proves that Ratansen was at the time ruling at Chittor. Creating hypothetical Ratansens, just because one is out to demolish the view that Chittor had a queen named Padmini, does not strike us as a historically sound method.

(e) Abul Fazl knew of no Padmini, but only of a woman of Padmini class belonging to Ratansi of Chittor. The story seems to have been taken from the Rajput Bhats who had it from Jayasi.

We come across more than one woman of 'Padmini' category in *geets* and *khyats*, but none bearing a personal name of Padmini. So where is Padmini? (*Studies in Rajput History*, p. 7)

Comments

Abul Fazl no doubt, knew of a 'lady of the Padmini class' as the queen of Chittor. But such a remark does not go against her having borne also the proper name Padmini.

Nor is it easy to agree with his sweeping remark that no woman bore the personal name of Padmini, even though we come across women of the Padmini category in *geets* and *khyats*.

If this statement be correct, he has every right to ask challengingly "Where is Padmini?" In reply we might tell him that Padmini is known as a personal name both to epigraphy and literature. Bauka was a son of Kakka Pratihara and Maharajni Padmini of the Bhatti clan. (Bauka's Jodhpur Inscription, V. 894, verse 26). The celebrated Jain poet Svayambhu's mother was also Padmini. If necessary, one can find other Padminis too, though we are not sure of their being Padmini-darad, i.e. of the Padmini category too.

(f) Nizamuddin Ahmad does not refer to Ratansi and Padmini. (*Studies in Rajput History*, p. 8).

Comments

Nizamuddin does not, doubtless, refer to Padmini. How could he, one might enquire, when he dismisses the entire event of the capture of Chittor with one sentence?

(g) Ferishta, a younger contemporary of Abul Fazil, seems to have visited Raiputana where he picked up confused stories about Alauddin's siege of Chittor. He speaks of the rescue of Raja Ratansen of Chittor by his daughter, whose unique beauty had led Alauddin to ask for her in return for her father's freedom from the Khalji prison. After release, the Raja created so much havoc that Alauddin handed over Chittor to the Raja's nephew (*Studies in Rajput History*, pp. 8-9). Most of his story is taken from the *Padmavat*. But its additions and digressions are due to the influence of either sources. It appears that by the time of Ferishta, the Rajput tradition took the beginning of the legend of Padmini from *Hammir Raso*, its middle portion of doli story from *Padmavat*, and the concluding from some *khyat* about Ajayasi (*Studies in Rajput History*, pp. 10-12).

Comments

Prof Qanungo obviously makes much of Ferishta's story, specially of the portions where it differs from other accounts. The story, he thinks, had been growing by the appropriation of details from other sources 'in which history had been smothered by fictitious details.' Actually there is no proof of Ferishta's supposed visit to Rajputana. So if he has given a

confused account different from that of Abul Fazi and others who had better opportunities of seeing and knowing these things, it is Ferishta's account that deserves being rejected. He was in this case writing regarding persons about whom he knew very little. And that by the time of Ferishta, the Rajput tradition had not taken the form assigned to it by Prof. Qanungo can be seen from the Rajasthan works of Hemratan (A.D. 1588), Labdhodaya (A.D. 1650) and Daulatvijaya (A.D. 1710-1733). None of them was earlier than Ferishta.

(h) Tod made Padmini the wife of Bhim Singh, uncle of Lakshman Singh Sisodia (*Studies in Rajput History*, p. 1).

Comments

Tod's account can, no doubt, be used to prove discrepancy in Padmini's story. But Tod received his story from bards who did not know that Bhad Lakhamsi never ruled over Mewar. They were ignorant also of the fact that Bhima Simha was Bhad Lakhamsi's grandfather. It is no wonder that these ignorant custodians of tradition made Bhimasimha a contemporary of Alauddin and husband of Padmini.

(i) Of Ratansens four had to deal with Alauddin; Ratan Singh, son of Rawal Samar Singh, known to us from the Kumbhalgarh inscription; Chitrasen's son. Ratansen, known to us from the *Padmavati* Ratnasen, a son of Khem of the Dhundhar tribe; Ratnasen, son of Hammira Chauhan of Ranthambhor who received refuge with Bhad Lakhamsi of Chittor. This provision of refuge was, according to the Vansabhaskar, the real cause of Alauddin's attack on Chittor. (*Studies in Rajput History*, pp. 12-13).

Comments

Not content with discrediting the story of Padmini, Prof. Qanungo has tried to consign even her husband Ratansen to eternal oblivion by creating some other Ratansens. But as already stated in the comments on section (d) there is little reason to doubt the existence of Raja Rantasena of Chittor as Alauddin's enemy. He succeeded Maharawal Samarasimha. Jayasi's mistake in making him a son of Chitrasena does not discredit his

historicity. As to the third Ratnasena, a son of Khema of the Dhundhar tribe, he is Professor Qanungo's creation. The inscription supposed to refer to him speaks actually of Rama, son of one Kshema of the Tanterada caste. He was a *talara* of Chittor in the reign of Maharawal Tejasimha (A.D. 1261-1285), and was probably dead and gone before the Khalji's captured the throne of Delhi. Similarly, the fourth Ratnasen did not exist. None but Suryamalla Misrana, a poet of the nineteenth century speaks of him as Hammira's son.

(j) According to Nainsi and Suryamalla Misrana, Ratansi, son of Ajayasi and brother of Bhad Lakhamsi, died in the affairs of Padmavati (*Studies in Rajput History*, p. 13). This Ratansi should actually be regarded as Hammir Chauhan's son (*Ibid.*, p. 14).

Comments

With regard to the identity of this supposed Ratansen we need not say anything further. It is no use pitting the authority of the nineteenth century Surajmal against that of a contemporary epigraph and saying on the basis of the *Vamsabhaskar* that it was on account of the refuge given to the Chauhan Ratansen that Chittor was attacked by Alauddin.

(k) Shri Ramachandra Shukla regarded the story of the *Padmavat* 'from the Brahman traitor Raghav's arrival at Delhi down to Fadmini's self-immolation as historical facts.' His view being based on unreliable sources has to be treated as unreliable.

Comments

Dr. Qanungo's criticism of Shri Ramachandra Shukla may be partly justified. But it cannot be denied that there is a good deal of historicity in the latter portion of the *Padmavat*. Raghavachetan who is said to have egged on the Sultan to attack Chittor is known from various sources as a historical person. He is referred to in the '*Sangadhara-padhati*, 'the *Kangra-prasasti* of Sansarachandra, the *Chhitai-charita*, the *Bitddhivilasa* and the *Vrdhhacharya-prabandavali* of the fifteenth or sixteenth century. The siege of Chittor is a historical fact. Further, the historicity of Sarja (who is described in the *Padmavat* at

Alauddin's envoy to Ratansen and later as slaying Gora) stands established. According to Isami, Sirja was given the title of Khusrau Khan and put in charge of Chittor before Allauddin returned to Delhi (Rizvi, *Khiljikalīn Bharat*, p. 201). Later on Sarja had probably a hand in the defeat of Rudradeva of Warangal (*Padmavat*, verse 635). The capture of the Chittor ruler by Alauddin is also a fact fairly well-attested, for it is mentioned not only in Muslim chronicles but also in the *Nabhinandana-jinoddhara-grantha*, a work composed in 1336 A.D., i.e. barely twenty years after Alauddin's death. We find also references to a number of historical events in the speeches of the *Padmavat*'s characters. Ratansen refers to the *Jauhar* of Ranthambhor by Hammira (verse 92). Sarja mentions the capture of Udayagiri and Chhitai by Alauddin (v. 492). Other verses show that the latter's capture was effected by deceit (vv. 492 and 500). Gora speaks of emulating Jaja and Jagadeva (verse 634), both of them well-known Rajput heroes. So Jayasi was far from being indifferent to historical facts. He made additions when necessary. But generally he kept to the familiar current of history, to facts known to have occurred actually.

In itself Padmini's story is simple. She was the daughter of some Rajput chief, of Sigauli perhaps according to Dr. G.H. Ojha. Muni Jinavijaya thinks that she was by clan a Sindhal. Her husband must have been Maharana Ratan Singh who was on the throne of Chittor in 1302 A.D. when Alauddin besieged Chittor. The seige lasted eight months and its capture was not easy by any means. According to Amir Khusrau, it was attacked unsuccessfully for two months from two sides by the Imperial army. The soldiers reached only up to the middle of the hill. After that Alauddin put up his tent on the Chittori hill and directed operations from there. On August 26, 1303 he is said to have entered the fort. Its ruler sprang out of the gate like fire from stone. The Sultan is said to have forgiven him, but slaughtered 30,000 Hindus in a single day.

Two conclusions can be drawn from the account of the *Khazain-ul-Futuh*. The ruler escaped corporal injury, either because he had been arrested or because he surrendered himself, though this was done much against the wishes of his people who had to pay for their obduracy with their lives. Nor did the ruler fare as well as he might have expected; for it is known

from all sources that the Chittor Chief was subjected to various indignities, the objective of which—according to traditional stories including the *Padmavat*—was to induce the people of Chittor to surrender their queen in return for the Maharawal. The contemporary *Nabhinandanajinoddhara-grantha* also speaks of the ruler being made to move from one village to another, after being deprived of his wealth (3rd *prastava*, verse 4).

Traditional accounts would have us believe that the Rajputs continued to resist even after the Maharawal had been captured by Alauddin, and the Kumbhalgarh inscription states that after he (Ratnasimha) had gone (died or perhaps deserted the defenders) Laksmasimha of the family of Khummana defended that excellent fort, (for even though the established traditions of the family be forsaken by cowards, those who are valorous and, steady do not give up their pursuit of it. Having thus destroyed his enemies in battle, he (Laksmasimha) died purified by weapons while defending Chitrakuta. His seven sons died with him.

But what about Ratnasimha? There is nothing heroic about his conduct. He may even have been one of the *Kaparusas* of the inscription who, in their time of distress and strain, had given the go by to conduct becoming their high family. But there were some who felt for him; and his rescue either while he was being led from place to place or was in the camp at the foot of the Chittor hill was not impossible, though difficult.

Amir Khusrau's account of the events, though valuable, is distressingly vague. First he speaks of Alauddin's entry into Chittor. Then follows the description of the Raja springing out of the gate and running through flowing water to Alauddin's camp and surrendering himself. We are told also that though he spared the life of the Raja, he slaughtered 30,000 Hindus. Actually the order of the event should be as follows:

- (1) Raja's exit from the fort.
- (2) Reaching the camp at the foot of the hill and surrender.
- (3) Alauddin's attack on the fort.
- (4) Stubborn resistance of the Rajputs resulting in heavy losses on both the sides.
- (5) Slaughter of the large number of Hindus mentioned above.

In between events 2 and 3 could have been the rescue of the Raja by the Rajput guerrilla leaders, Cora and Badal. Such rescues are not unknown to history ancient, medieval and modern.

The last scene of this intensely moving human drama was provided by the *jauhar* of Chittor. Ratna Singh, though he was never in command after his surrender or capture by the Muslims died fighting for Chittor. But the real heroes of this fight perhaps were Badal and the Sisodiya Chief Laksmasimha with his sons. Gora had already died at the hands of Alauddin's general Sirja. Badal fell in the last fight, near the gate of Chittor. Laksmasimha and his brothers probably rushed out, clad in saffron robes and died fighting against the enemy. Padmini was no more, when Alauddin reached there. As the *Padmavat* says in one of its last verses, "By the time the *sahaganan* was over, the Emperor had surrounded the fort. He took up a handful of Padmini's ashes, and blew them up, saying, "This earth holds no reality." His entire army dug up earth and filling up the hollows near the fort built a bridge. Then followed the attack and a fierce struggle. Badal died fighting near the gate. Women committed *jauhar*. Men fought. The Emperor stormed the fort and Chittor became an Islamic possession." There is a ring of truth about this description.

In the end, let me bring to your notice also the fact that the verse on the basis of which the story of Padmini had been so far dismissed as a mere allegory is now regarded as a fake, an interpolation by some later writer. It has no place in the scientifically edited texts of the poem by Dr. Mata Prasad Gupta and Yasudeva Saran Agrawal. We who are out to have the genuine stuff should first be sure about the genuineness of the evidence we use.

Appendix-1

The difference between the two recessions, one used by Jayasi and the other by Rajasthan poets, can briefly be given as follows:

Jayasi makes Padmavati a daughter of Gandharvasena of Simhala. She falls in love with Ratnasen of Chittor through the agency of her parrot, HIRAMAN, who tells the ruler of Padmini's beauty and later returning to Ceylon gives the Princess the news of Ratnasen's deep love for her. Ratnasen who breaks into Padmini's palace at night, is captured by her guards but married to her on being recognized. He returns home with Padmavati, on receiving a message from his queen Nagamari, after he had been in Ceylon for one year.

In Rajasthan poems on the other hand Ratnasen Guhilot of Chittor has a queen named Prabhavati. It was her tart remark, that the Raja should look out for a Padmini to prepare his food and serve it if he did not like her cooking which made him leave Mewar in search of such a lady. The *siddhi* of a *Sadhu* whom he met on the southern sea-shore took him to Ceylon where he defeated Padmini's brother in a chess match and thus secured Padmini as his wife. After staying there for five or six days he started on the return march for Mewar.

In these stories there is no HIRAMAN parrot. In the *Padmavat*, there is no chess match. Nor is the ruler aided in the *Padmavat* by any *yogi* in crossing the sea. Thus no two events are wholly alike, as they should be in wholesale borrowing, specially when the alleged borrowers claim that they have been faithful to an earlier model.

The same dissimilarity persists in the events occurring after Ratansen's return to his capital. In the *Padmavat* Raghochetan is banished by the ruler, because he is shown to be a cheat. Rajasthani poems ascribe the banishment to his having interfered with the royal couple's privacy.

When Raghochetan of the *Padmavat* reaches Delhi he instigates Alauddin to invade Chittor by describing Padmini's unique loveliness. The Sultan sent even a messenger demanding Padmini. When the message was not honoured, he invaded Chittor with a huge army. Even a siege of eight years did not effect the reduction of the fort.

The story is given differently in the Rajasthani poems. Raghochetan prompts Alauddin to secure a Padmini. But it is only after his failure to secure one from Ceylon that he is told of the existence of Padmini of Chittor. The invasion of Mewar followed. But there is nothing in the Rajasthani poems to suggest that the siege lasted for years.

Both the sources are agreed on the point that Alauddin captured Ratansen by deceit. But other details differ. In the Rajasthani poems the Sultan retires to his camp near Chittor fort and from there asks the people in Chittor to surrender Padmini. Thus alone could their Raja be released. Nagmati's son Virabhan, urges the nobles to agree to the proposal. In the *Padmavat* Alauddin is represented as having taken the Raja to Delhi where he gave him the worst of treatment. It was during this period of Ratnasen's captivity that Devapala of Kumbhalgarh tried to seduce Padmini. The Sultan sent also a courtesan disguised as a *yogini* with the same objective. These episodes find no place in Rajasthani poems.

The rescue of the Raja by Gora and Badal finds a place in both the recensions. In the *Padmavat* Delhi forms the scene of rescue. In the Rajasthani poems, the rescue is from Alauddin's camp near Chittor, and the ruler escapes in a palanquin. Everything considered, the latter account appears nearer the truth.

There is nothing in the Rajasthani poems about the Raja's attack on Devapala of Kumbhalgarh. In fact, no Kumbhalgarh existed at the time.

Some differences among the Rajasthani sources themselves can also be noted, though these are not many. Hemratna, who

wrote in V. 1645/1588 A.D., forty-eight years after Jayasi, has relied mainly on Kavimalla, who probably preceded Jayasi as a writer on the Padmini theme and might have been the author of one of the ancient records mentioned by Abul Fazl. Labdhodaya mostly paraphrases or amplifies Hemratna's narrative; but when he comes to the quotations from Malla, he reproduces them in the original, thus according to them higher regard than to Hemaratna's *Chaupai*. His work was composed in V. 1707-1650 A.D.

In the anonymous *Gora Badal Kavitta*, the story is a bit different:

- (a) Raghochetan is banished as a result of his quarrel with Ratansen in a game of chess.
- (b) He gets honoured at Alauddin's court as a result of his having foretold the Sultan, (who had gone to him disguised as a dervesh), that he would be the ruler of Delhi. But this work too gives the story of his attempt to conquer Simhala so that he might get a Padmini from there.

Appendix-2

Invasions of Jaisalmer by Muslims

Among the other clans of Rajasthan who fought against the Muslims we have to mention also the Bhatias of Jaisalmer. In spite of Sir Wolseley Haig's assertion to the contrary, it can be proved from epigraphic evidence that Jaisalmer was captured by the Muslims during the reign of Duda Bhati and recovered by his successor Ghatasimha. We have recently come across also four inscriptions in the Bhatika year 685/A.D. 130 which commemorate the death of a number of Rajputs in the defence of cows and women. The Kharparas who were responsible for this depredation were most probably the Khaljis. Nainsi, as is well-known, gives a detailed account of the capture of Jaisalmer by Kamaluddin who has to be identified, I think, with Kamaluddin Gurg. Alauddin's invasion has thus to be placed in 1308 A.D. Duda's reign period is 1309 to 1331 A.D.; Ghatasimha's reign lasted up to 1361 A.D.

10

Tod's Survey of Rajasthan

I

The author of the *Annals and Antiquities of Raiasthan* was the son of an indigo-planter of Mirzapur (U.P.) and his maternal uncles were officers in the East India Company's service. Born in 1782, James Tod entered the Company's Army as a cadet in 1798. In 1805 he was attached to the retinue of Graeme Mercer who represented the Company in the court of Daulat Rao Sindhia. Probably Mercer's influence attracted Tod's attention to the "predatory" policy of the Marathas in Rajputana. It was during the period of his connection with Sindhia's court that Tod began to take an active interest in political and historical matters. Between 1812 and 1817 he collected important data about the geography of Central India and Rajputana, which were utilised by the Company's Army during the Pindari War and the Third Anglo-Maratha War.

In 1813 Tod became Second Assistant to the Political Agent in Sindhia's court. At the end of the Third Anglo-Maratha War he was appointed Political Agent for the Western Rajput States. He retired in 1822, ostensibly on grounds of health, but really on account of the disapproval in high quarters of his pro-Rajput sentiments. Bishop Heber wrote in 1824:

"His misfortune was that, in consequence of his favouring the native princes so much, the Government of Calcutta were led to suspect him of corruption, and consequently to narrow his powers and associate other officers with him in his trust till he was disgusted and resigned his place. They are now, I believe, well satisfied that their suspicions were groundless. Captain Tod (sic) is strenuously vindicated from the charge by all the officers with whom I have conversed, and some of whom had abundant means of knowing what the natives themselves thought of him."

Whatever the reasons might be, Tod's official career had an unpleasant end. Presumably uninterrupted residence in India for 24 years affected his health. He had to face more than one attempt at assassination. He was promoted Lieutenant in 1800, Captain in 1813, Major in 1824 and Lieutenant-Colonel in 1826. He died in 1835.

It was after his retirement that Tod arranged the historical materials collected by him during his official career and put them in a literary shape. The two volumes of his *Annals and Antiquities* were published in London in 1829-32. The first volume was dedicated to King George IV. In the dedication (June 20, 1829) Tod expressed the hope that "the sighs of this ancient and interesting [Rajput] race for the restoration of their former independence, which it would suit our wisest policy to grant, may be deemed not undeserving of Your Majesty's regard." In dedicating the second volume to King William IV Tod observed: "...it has been my endeavour to draw a faithful picture of States, the ruling principle of which is the paternity of the sovereign. That this patriarchal form is the best suited to the genius of the people may be presumed from its durability, which war, famine, and anarchy have failed to destroy...My prayer is, that...neither the love of conquest, nor false views of policy, may tempt us to subvert the independence of these States ..." These words indicate, in substance, Tod's general views on the Rajput political system and the Company's policy towards the Rajput States.

Tod's little known work, *Travels in Western India*, was published in 1839, after his death.

Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan is a voluminous work, covering 1835 pages in Crooke's three-volume edition. It deals with many matters which usually find no place in any historical work. It is an encyclopaedia on Rajasthan and the Rajputs. The traditional chivalry and generosity of the Rajputs captured Tod's imagination; their sufferings, caused by the "predatory" raids of the Marathas, moved him. His real purpose was to introduce the Rajputs to the Western readers. Pure political history can never reveal the national characteristics of a people and give foreign readers a clear picture of their society and polity, their strength and weakness. To understand a people one must know something about the geography of their homeland, their economic resources and political system, their social organization as also religious ideas and practices, their cultural traditions and heritage. Tod took up his pen with a view to presenting the Rajputs to his countrymen against such a comprehensive background. He worked hard from 1812 to 1822 for collection of materials of different types from different sources. He made careful investigations in different parts of Rajputana and Central India with the assistance of local scholars. To travel in the mountains and desert of Rajasthan was no pleasant or easy task in those days. Tod covered a wide ground at the cost of much personal discomfort. Readers of his "*Personal Narrative*" and "*Sketch of the Indian Desert*" (which are parts of *Annals and Antiquities*) and *Travels in Western India* cannot but be impressed by his earnestness for collecting useful data through personal observation and investigation.

Let us refer, first, to the geography of Rajasthan. Tod did not deal with this important subject systematically; repetitions are too frequent in his scattered narrative. The chapter on "Geography of Rajasthan or Rajputana" gives an interesting account of the preparation of the first complete map of Rajasthan. The ignorance of the Company's Government about the geography of Rajasthan would be clear from Tod's observation: "In the maps prior to 1806 nearly all the Western and Central States of Rajasthan will be found wanting." The geographical horizon of the British officers of those days did not extend much beyond the western border of Central India. It was due primarily to Tod's careful and laborious investigations that "in

1815, for the first time, the geography of Rajasthan was put into combined form and presented to the Marquess of Hastings." To be sure, this "combined form" left much to be desired so far as accuracy and completeness were concerned. But Tod is entitled to credit as the pioneer of geographical explorations in Rajasthan.

The twenty-one chapters of Tod's "*Personal Narrative*" give us a miscellaneous collection of geographical, historical, sociological and religious data. It is a pleasant and instructive travel diary.

The two chapters of Tod's "*Sketch of the Indian Desert*" contain a detailed account of a little known region of India. Though primarily of geographical interest, the "Sketch" throws some light on historical and sociological developments in that wild tract.

Apart from these general geographical accounts, Tod added geographical notes to his historical sketches of different Rajput States. His description of Marwar, Bikaner, Jaisalmer and Amber gives the uninitiated reader a rough but useful picture of the geographical background of Rathor, Bhatti and Kachchhwa history. The scientific study of geography had not yet begun, and Tod was not a trained geographer. But he displayed unusual interest and commendable discrimination in the collection and presentation of geographical data. It was not only to meet con-temporary political and military requirements that Tod took so much trouble for geographical excursions. He was aware of the close connection between geography and history; he did not lose sight of the geographical background of historical developments.

Tod was deeply interested in the economic resources of Rajasthan. The nature and productivity of land, agricultural and industrial products, rainfall, commercial commodities, trade routes these are some of the subjects to which Tod refers again and again in different chapters. His discussion is not comprehensive, but it is factual. Here he did not depend on "opium-eaters" tales. He collected his data from official records as also from personal observation. Rajasthan is not a fertile, well watered, prosperous tract of productive land. Agricultural production demands hard and persistent struggle against Nature.

Hills and desert cover a large part of Rajasthan; cultivable land is naturally scarce. So the heroes of Rajasthan—as well as the cultivators—prized their *bapota* (ancestral land) over all earthly possessions, and no adventure or crime was too big a prize for acquisition of land. Trade and commerce were monopolised by a particular class constituting a small section of the population; the armoured knight would not condescend to play the role of a *bania*. These peculiarities of the socio-economic system of Rajasthan did not escape Tod's notice. But his attention was concentrated merely on the collection of facts; he never tried to establish the co-relation between apparently isolated facts and the evolution of Rajput society and polity. Of course, this fundamental defect must be excused in the case of a non-professional historian like Tod, writing in an age which knew nothing of economic history. Grant Duff and Cunningham did not consider it necessary to deal with the economic resources of the Marathas and the Sikhs respectively. We should be grateful to Tod for the facts—however incomplete or haphazardly arranged—which he has left on record for use by later writers.

The social and religious conditions, in Rajputana also attracted Tod's attention. In his "Sketch of a Feudal System in Rajasthan" he discusses the relations between the "feudal" chiefs and the cultivators and deals with the different categories of slavery. There are scattered references to the influence of social classification on economic activities, e.g. agriculture, industry, trade and commerce. In course of his descriptive surveys of different Rajput States he gives statistical information on the numerical strength, comparative importance, etc. of different classes of the population. He was interested in the origin of the terrible ceremony of *Jauhar*, the burning of widows and infanticide. He noticed how infanticide was connected with some peculiar social prejudices. On the place of women in Rajput society he observes:

"...there are few of the lowest chieftains whose daughters are not instructed both to read and write...But of their intellect, and knowledge of mankind, whoever has had to converse with a Rajputari guardian of her son's right, must draw a very different conclusion. Thought excluded by the Salic law of India from governing, they are declared to be fit regents

during minority; and the history of India is filled with anecdotes of the able and valiant females in this capacity."

Even the neglected hill tribes of Rajasthan—the Bhils, the Mers, the Minas—did not escape Tod's sympathetic attention. His narrative contains much information about them, although his observations are scattered and incidental.

Tod devoted four long chapters to a descriptive survey of religion in Rajputana. He collected interesting details about the comparative influence of different gods and goddesses, gift of land to Brahmins in the name of religion, Brahmanical influence on society and government, religious practices and festivals, etc.

Jainism was a flourishing faith in Rajasthan. The Jain community occupied a prominent place in trade, commerce and administration, judges who professed Jainism were opposed to capital punishment. Tod says:

"The officers of the State and revenue are chiefly of the Jain laity, as are the majority of the bankers, from Lahore to the ocean. The chief magistrate and assessors of justice, in Udaipur and most of the towns of Rajasthan, are of this sect; and as their voluntary duties are confined to civil cases, they are as competent in these as they are the reverse in criminal cases, from their tenets forbidding the shedding of blood."

Although Rajasthan was the classic land of orthodoxy and religious zeal the Rajput mind did not succumb to the communal frenzy. A mosque built during the reign of Aurangzeb at Merta in Marwar was found by Tod in well-preserved condition. The thirty years' war of the Rathors against the intolerant policy of the Emperor did not affect the safety of the mosque. Tod says: "Such is Hindu toleration, that a marble is placed, inscribed both in Hindi and Persian, to protect the mosque from violence."

In spite of their apparently all-consuming interest in fighting and the stern qualities associated with chivalry, the Rajputs did not lose interest in the softer side of life. Art, music, poetry and philosophy attracted them and added grace to their character. Referring to a Rathor prince of Marwar Tod says: "He was versed in philosophical theology, astronomy and the history of his country; and in every branch of poesy, from the sacred canticles of Jayadeva to the couplets of the modern bard,

he was an adept. He composed and improvised with facility, and his residence was the rendezvous for every bard of fame."

Tod did not look upon the Rajput as a mere warrior; he viewed Rajput life as a whole. While he appreciated the heroism of the Rajput cavalier he did not shut his eyes to the demoralising effect of addiction to opium upon the Rajput character. He knew how the depredations of the Marathas had affected the cultural traditions and political institutions of Rajasthan.

But his critical far-sight did not extend to the basic defects of the socio-economic and political systems of the Rajputs. That the "Patriarchal" Monarchy to which he paid his tribute (in his dedication of the second volume of his great work) was a weak and politically imperfect framework for the Rajput State, he did not realise. He was almost blind to the injustice and human suffering associated with a rigid social system dominated by tradition. He attributed the breakdown of Rajasthan's economic structure to the "predatory" raids of the Marathas only, overlooking altogether the effects of the scarcity of cultivable land and the traditional caste monopoly of trade and commerce.

Still we must remember that Tod was the only British historical writer of those days who did not confine his attention to princely battles and oligarchical squabbles. He tried to put his facts in the wider perspective of history, although he was often unaware of the cause-and-effect relation of the data collected by him. He failed to make a critical analysis of the deep-rooted reasons behind Rajasthan's loss of independence despite the reckless courage of the Rajput "feudal" class. He never asked himself why the Rajputs could not build an empire as the Marathas did. The fierce light of the Rajput knight's self-sacrifice—the glitter of his shining sword—dazzled Tod's eyes and almost benumbed his judgment. No wonder the modern student of Rajput history respect him as a collector of facts but does not recognize him as a critical historian or a discriminating judge of Rajput character.

Perhaps Tod himself was conscious that he was not fulfilling the rigorous demands of history. He called his book *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan*; he did not call it *History of Rajasthan*.

There is a clear distinction between the work of Tod and the works of Grant Duff and Cunningham although the three writers deal with three Indian groups linked together by some common historical peculiarities. Tod's canvas was larger even if his utilisation of sources was less critical. But the writing of annals is an art which serves the cause of history and cannot, therefore, be ignored by the most discerning and fastidious historian.

The strictly historical portion of Tod's work begins with a discussion of the problem of the origin of the Rajputs. Naturally, this discussion—and the conclusion which it led to—could not be based on critical analysis of scientifically acceptable data. Epigraphic evidence was not yet available, nor could the traditions connected with the ruling dynasties of Tod's days be scrutinised in the light of the traditions relating to those dynasties which had been swallowed up by Turkish invasions. He connected current traditions with some social and religious peculiarities of the Rajputs and came to the conclusion that they were of "Scythian" origin. Though this hypothesis is not historically correct, it has a clear historical significance. Tod did not accept the traditional claim of the Rajputs to Aryan or Kshatriya descent. He labelled them as descendants of foreign invading races grouped together under the misleading term "Scythian". Although the problem remains more or less unsolved even to this day, the foreign origin of at least a section of the Rajputs is a generally accepted proposition. Thus Tod may be said to have anticipated the result of later researches although he had to work on the basis of palpably incomplete data.

Of all the Rajput States Tod had special affection for Mewar. Although Mewar was not the leading State of Rajasthan in his days he devoted much more space to the glories of the Guhilots than to those of any other clan. In Crooke's edition the Annals of Mewar (exclusive of the survey of religion, society, economic conditions, etc.) cover 341 pages; the Annals of Marwar cover 193 pages and those of Amber cover 113 pages. Although the history of Mewar runs to much earlier days than the history of the Rathors and the Kachchhwas, no political observer in the early 19th century would have overlooked the patent fact that, politically speaking, Marwar and Jaipur were the premier States of Rajasthan and were entitled to the historian's attention

in a greater measure than Mewar. While the Rathors and the Kachchhwas had prospered under the generous shadow of Mughal patronage the Ranas of Mewar deliberately kept themselves isolated from the favours of the Imperial court. Tod, however, was much more interested in the Rajasthan of pre-Mughal days—days of independence and unfettered chivalry—than in the devastated, miserable, politically crippled Rajasthan of his own time. His affection for Rajput character was repelled by the vices prevalent in contemporary Rajasthan and he discovered imaginary idols in the annals of the past. To his hungry imagination pre-Mughal Rajasthan was a reality and Mewar—the typical symbol of vanished glory—was an object worthy of adoration. The epic portion of Tod's narrative relates to Mewar; the story of Jaipur is a mere epilogue which was written for current political purposes.

Tod's historical survey is prefaced by a discussion of the sources used by him. He had to rely mainly on the "heroic poems" composed by Rajput bards. He was not unaware of the defects of these legendary verses. He says:

"...there is a sort of compact or understanding between the bard and the prince, a barter of 'solid pudding against empty praise; whereby the fidelity of the poetic chronicle is somewhat impaired."

"A material drawback upon the value of these bardic histories is, that they are confined almost exclusively to the martial exploits of their heroes, and to the *rang-ran-bhum*, or 'field of slaughter.' Writing for the amusement of a warlike race, the authors disregard civil matters and the arts and pursuits of peaceful life; love and war are their favourite themes."

"Again: the bard...enters too deeply into the intrigues, as well as the levities, of the court, to be qualified to pronounce a sober judgment upon its acts."

The care and love of historical truth shown by Tod in his frank criticism of the bardic poems deserve imitation today by students of medieval Rajput history. The question may be asked:

Why did Tod construct his narrative on the basis of such untrustworthy materials? Two answers are readily available. First, no better materials were available in Tod's days. Presumably Tod did not venture to call his work History because he had to depend mainly on defective annals. Secondly, he could not ignore the qualities of the "heroic poems" because, as he himself says, "the works of the native bard afford many valuable data, in facts, incidents, religious opinions, and traits of manners; many of which, being carelessly introduced, are thence to be regarded as the least suspicious kind of historical evidence."

Apart from the "heroic poems" available in Tod's days—others have come to light since then—Tod utilised materials of different kinds which he described as follows:

"Raesas or poetical legends of princes ... local Puranas, religious comments, and traditionary couplets: with authorities of a less dubious character, namely, inscriptions, 'cut on the rock,' coins, copper-plate grants, containing charters of immunities, and expressing many singular features of civil government."

Although Tod refers to inscriptions, coins and copper-plate grants, the number collected and utilised by him must have been quite small. During the period of his residence in Central India and Rajasthan the prevailing political conditions were not at all favourable to search for and collection of such historical materials. Again, the scientific study of epigraphic and numismatic sources had not yet begun and proper utilisation of such sources, even when these were available, was not possible. Tod himself knew little of the difficult art of deciphering and inter-pretng inscriptions and coins, nor could he expect expert guidance in such studies. Naturally, he took greater interest in the collection of literary materials (which could be easily inter-preted by local scholars and bards), including official records, than in the search for epigraphic and numismatic data. He says: "For a period of ten years I was employed, with the aid of a learned Jain, in ransacking every work which could contribute any facts or incidents to the history of the Rajputs, or diffuse any light upon their manners and character."

Tod's historical narrative has lost much of its value for the modern students simply because it is not based on authentic epigraphic and numismatic sources. This defect is noticeable particularly in the case of the early history of the Rajput dynasties. For example, epigraphic sources provide the most reliable information about the history of Mewar till the days of Rana Kumbha. But Tod was unable to utilise these sources, and necessity compelled him to depend primarily on "heroic poems" which are no better than 'opium-eaters' tales" so far at least as this period is concerned. Consequently, Tod's chapters on the early history of Mewar are almost useless.

From the 13th century onwards the Persian chronicles made references to the affairs of the Rajput States in connection with the gradual Turkish penetration into Rajasthan. Tod did not use these chronicles and naturally he fell into curious errors in dealing with the relations between the Rajputs and the rulers of Delhi. For example, he could have left for us a realistic account of Ala-ud-din Khalji's sack of Chittor if he had been familiar with Amir Khusrau's *Khazain-ul-Futuh*; the 16th century romance *Padmavat* composed by Malik Muhammad Jyasi would not have coloured his imagination and made the highly exaggerated, if not altogether baseless legend of Padmini the centre of his narrative. Similarly, acquaintance with Abul Fazl's *Akbar-Nama* would enabled him to give a more accurate and complete account of Rana Pratap Singh's struggle against Akbar. Had he studied the Persian sources relating to Jahangir's reign he might have been revised his condemnation of Amar Singh and placed the treaty of 1615 in its proper perspective. If he knew the correct dates of the death of Syed brothers he would not have connected them with the murder of Ajit Singh of Marwar. A thorough study of Persian historical literature is indispensable for every student of medieval Indian history, including the history of the Rajputs specially during the Mughal period. Here Tod's equipment was extremely unsatisfactory.

In the 18th century the Rajputs came into contact—hostile contact—with the Marathas. In the history of Rajasthan the sponsors of Hindu *pad Padshahi* are mere plunderers, not liberators or passionate builders of a Hindu empire on Mughal ruins. Tod was bitter about the Marathas: he exceeded the

limits of balanced historical judgment in his condemnation of their "predatory" raids in Rajasthan. The reasons are not far to seek. It was not easy for the average British officer to judge the Marathas in those days except in the light of their hostility towards the Company's flag. For a friend of the Rajputs the Marathas were open to double condemnation. Tod shared fully the jealousy and hatred which the Rajputs felt for the "Deccani spoliators". Moreover, Tod's lack of familiarity with Marathi news-letters made it impossible for him to look at the affairs of Rajasthan from the Maratha point of view. Official records relating to Rajput-Maratha relations must have been available in the archives of the Rajput States in Tod's days, but there is no indication that he desired or tried to get access to them. For this reason his chapters on political developments in the Rajput States in the 18th century lack in completeness and accuracy. These have been corrected and supplemented by Sir J.N. Sarkar in his *Fall of the Mughal Empire*.

For obvious reasons Tod did not discuss in detail the political transactions between the Rajput States and the East India Company. He had personal knowledge of some of these transactions. He had access to official records. He might have, if he had so desired, left for us a complete and authentic account of the establishment of British suzerainty over the principalities of Rajasthan. But, unlike Grant Duff and Cunningham, he preferred silence, although he did not hesitate to give occasional indication of his disapproval of official policy which appeared to him to be unkind to the gallant Rajputs. As we have seen, in the dedication of the second volume he expressed himself against the subversion of the independence of the Rajput States. Elsewhere he protested more directly against the Company's interpretation of its treaties with the Rajput princes:

"There is a perpetual variation between the spirit and the letter of every treaty; and while the internal independence of every State is the groundwork, it is frittered away and nullified by successive stipulations, and these positive and negative qualities continue mutually repelling each other, until it is apparent that independence cannot exist under such conditions ... Our anomalous and inconsistent inter-

ference in some cases, and our non-interference in others, operate alike to augment the dislocation induced by long predatory oppression in the various orders of society, instead of restoring that harmony and continuity which had previously existed."

Tod was not in favour of British interference in the internal affairs of the Rajput States, nor could he approve the imposition of heavy tribute which impoverished their exchequers. He wanted to reconcile the Company's supremacy with the age-old political institutions and social arrangements of the Rajputs. But he could not realise that those institutions had lost their vitality and those arrangements had become anachronistic. The spirit of the age and the basic features of foreign rule were altogether inconsistent with the full survival of the old order in Rajasthan. Friendly sympathy clouded Tod's historical judgment and political vision.

II

1. Geography

Tod defines 'Rajasthan' as 'the collective and classical denomination of that portion of India' which is 'the abode of (Rajput) princes.' He mentions two other names: 'Rajwara' (in the familiar dialect of the region) and 'Raethana', corrupted to Rajputana, the common designation amongst the British to denote the 'Rajput principalities'. Linguistically, 'Raethana' is a corrupt form of 'Rajasthan'; it is not connected with 'Rajputana'.

Tod does not explain why, in choosing the title for his great work, he preferred 'Rajasthan' to 'Rajwara' and 'Rajputana'. He is wrong in saying that 'Rajasthan' was the 'classical denomination' of the region. As a matter of fact this name does not occur in classical literature or old inscriptions. It is mentioned for the first time 'as a compact land of the princes with territorial divisions, plains and mountains' in an inscription of 1708.¹ In any case Tod's choice seems to indicate that it had gained wide currency in his days.

The name 'Rajwara' found not patron either in Tod, although he made frequent use of it in his narrative, nor in the British

Government which adopted 'Rajputana' as the collective name of its dependencies in that region. When the East India Company's system of alliances took its final shape 'Rajputana' included 18 Princely States (Alwar, Banswara, Bharatpur, Bikaner, Bundi, Dholpur, Dungarpur, Jaipur or Amber, Jaisalmer, Jhalawar, Jodhpur or Marwar, Karuali, Kishangarh, Kotah, Partabgarh, Sirohi, Tonk, Udaipur or Mewar), two chiefships (Shahpura, Lawa), and the British district of Ajmer-Merwara. The 'common designation' applied to these territories with diverse geographical features and historical antecedents was one of the important results of the Company's paramountcy. The British official term remained in use till its replacement by 'Rajasthan' in the Constitution of 1949. Free India gave Tod's choice a permanent place in the political geography of the Indian Union.

All the three names were misleading in so far as they implied the numerical predominance of the Rajputs in the population. Tod estimated that in his days they formed two-eighths of the population of Marwar and much less than one-fourth of the population of Bikaner; in Jaipur they bore but a small ratio to the rest of the population. According to him, the Jats constituted five-eighths of the population of Marwar, and in Bikaner they were the most wealthy as also the most numerous section (three-fourths) of the community. In Banswara the Bhils constituted 63 per cent of the population. As even tolerably accurate statistics relating to the early years of the nineteenth century are not available, we must accept Tod's conjectures for what they are worth. Census Reports of the later years of the century confirm the general trends of Tod's statements. For instance, in or about 1879 the Rajputs constituted one-eighth of the Hindu population of Jaipur, and in 1901, they constituted only one-eleventh of the population of Mewar. On the whole, the Bhils, the Mahajans, the Brahmins and the Jats constituted substantial sections of the total population of Rajasthan.

Tod speaks of the Bhils in different connections, and gives an interesting account of the Bhils of the desert. He records legends indicating that the Rajputs, warriors claiming to be Kshatriyas, seized lands from the original inhabitants—*vanaputras*

or 'children of the forest'—and founded their kingdoms. Edur, with its woods and mountains, was given to Goha by the *vanaputras*; and it was 'one of the young savages' who, 'cutting his finger, applied the blood as the *teeka* of sovereignty to his forehead'. The principality of the Kachhwas was 'an assemblage of communities, the territories of which have been wrested from *the aboriginal* tribes, or from independent chieftains.' The Mers, a branch of the *ab original* Minas, gave their name to the tract of land which they inhabited, *viz.*, 'a portion of the Aravalli chain, between Kamalmir and Ajmer, a space about ninety miles in length and varying in breadth from six to twenty.

There are scattered references in historical records to struggles between the Rajputs who were either descendants of foreign immigrants or interlopers from adjoining regions, and *ab original* tribes who had been settled in Rajas than from time immemorial; but not attempt has been made by modern scholars to show how the original tillers of the soil reacted to the new-conditions in administration and economy. That they were not absorbed in the ruling community is clear enough; they retained to a large extent the distinctive features of their traditional socio-economic organization. If they were borrowers in certain respects, it is fairly safe to assume that the Rajputs who put themselves on the top by force of arms did not completely escape from the influence of tribal ideas and practices. In such cases a simple one-way traffic is very rare indeed.

The inter-mixture of diverse elements flowing from the two groups—*Rajputras* and *vanaputras*—would be a fascinating subject for historical and sociological study. References may be made to a peculiar custom prevailing in Rajasthan as also in Central India. Captain Brookes wrote in 1859: 'In each Rajput family and even in each *Bheel Pal*, especially in case of incompetency in the head, there is a *Bajgurree* who is consulted in all important transactions, and without whose advice nothing is undertaken'.² From the family this practice seems to have migrated to the State. Mewar had her *Bajgurree* and the position was by custom the hereditary privilege of the head of the Chundawats. In Central India, where there was a projection of Rajput ascendancy in society and politics, a noble who, without occupying any

distinct office, served as the ruler's councillor was known as *Bajgurra*. In these cases we have an example of political extension of a socio-economic custom. It would be interesting to inquire whether the *Bajgurra* originated among the Bhils and migrated to the Rajput society and State. It is not quite unlikely that the *vanaputras* not only provided land for the settlement of the *Rajputras* but also made many-sided contributions to the development of their socio-political organization.

The geographical position of Rajasthan dragged it into the expansionist schemes of all imperial rulers of India. Whenever the Muslim rulers of Delhi wanted to advance into Gujarat, one of the most flourishing provinces in medieval times, and to the Deccan, their route lay through eastern and south-western Rajasthan. Without establishing their political control over at least this part of Rajasthan and north-western Malwa it was difficult to conquer Gujarat and the Deccan. The advancing army not only required a safe passage through Rajput territory; it would have been unsafe to leave in the rear hostile Rajput princes who might create trouble while the campaigns in the west and in the south were in progress. In the eighteenth century the Marathas, proceeding from the south to the north, found it necessary to bring the principal Rajput States under their political control. As Lord Wellesley's imperial schemes required the subjugation of the Marathas, his net was extended to Rajasthan. The new system of alliances was extended to Jaipur and Jodhpur. Both Laswari, where Sindhia suffered a severe defeat, and the Mukund Dara Pass, the theatre of Monson's humiliating retreat, lay in Rajput territory.

After Lord Wellesley's retirement the policy of expansion was replaced by the policy of non-intervention. The ground won in Rajasthan through the treaties with Jaipur and Jodhpur was given up. But the strategic importance of Rajasthan, revealed during the war, was not lost sight of. In 1809 Seton, the Company Resident in Delhi, urged upon the Supreme government the political expediency of entering into alliances with the Rajput princes and the Muslim ruler of Bahawalpur so that 'a barrier might be formed against invasion.' At that time the dread of a French invasion through land—across Persia, Afghanistan

and Baluchistan—haunted the imagination of Anglo-Indian statesmen. That danger vanished, but Rajasthan retained its strategic importance as a base of operations against the Pindaris and the Maratha powers. So the policy of non-intervention was renounced, and Rajasthan was brought under the Company's protective umbrella.

As Rajasthan was unfamiliar ground for the British officers, Tod undertook 'laborious research' into its geography in 1806 when he was attached to the staff of the British Resident at Sindhia's court. In the maps prior to 1806 'nearly all the western and central States of Rajasthan' were 'found wanting'. It had been imagined that the rivers had a southerly course into the Narmada; but this mistaken notion was corrected by 'the father of Indian geography, the distinguished Rennell'. Tod filled up the blank in the map as regards Central and Western India. 'In 1815, for the first time, the geography of Rajasthan was put into combined form and presented to the Marquis of Hastings, on the eve of a general war, when the labour of ten years was amply rewarded by its becoming in part the foundation of that illustrious commander's plans of the campaign'. When the war broke out in 1817, copies of Tod's map on a reduced scale were sent to all the divisions of the armies in the field, and transcripts were despatched to Europe.

Tod took meticulous care to make his map as accurate as possible. He adopted as the basis of his enterprise a previous survey, prepared by Dr. W. Hunter, of a part of the route from Agra, through the southern frontier of Jaipur to Udaipur. To this survey had been added 'points laid down from celestial observation'. Mercer, the Resident at Sindhia's court, had in his possession a 'valuable sketch of the route of Colonel Palmer's embassy in 1791, as laid down by Dr. Hunter.' It embraced all the extreme points of Central India including Agra, Jhansi, Bhopal, Sarangpur, Ujjain, Kotah, Bundi and Rampura. 'The position of all these places was more or less accurately fixed according to the time which could be bestowed, by astronomical observation.'

At Rampura Hunter ceased to be Tod's guide. From this point commenced his new survey to Udaipur where he arrived in June 1806. From Udaipur he moved, through Chittor and the centre of Malwa, to the Bundelkhand frontier, 'crossing in

detail all the grand stream flowing from the Vindhya'. In 1807, he 'pushed through untrodden fields, by the banks of the Betwa to Chanderi, and in its latitude proceeded in a westernly direction towards Kotah, traced the course once more of all these streams from the south and the points of junction of the most importance (the Kali Sindhu, the Parbati and the Bans) with the Chambal.' He was often obliged to strike his tents and march at midnight and became more than once 'the object of plunder'. The next stage was a journey of more than one thousand miles: Agra, Jaipur, Tonk, Indargarh, Raghugarh, Saugar. As Sindhia's court was 'ambulatory' Tod moved everywhere within the region, 'constantly employed in surveying till 1812.'

In that year Sindhia's court became stationary and Tod, deprived of opportunities of personal observation, began to collect information through others. In 1810-11 he had despatched two parties, one to the Indus, the other to the desert south of the Sutlej. The first party, under Sheikh Abul Barkat, covered Gujarat, Saurashtra, Cutch, Sind, Jaisalmer, Marwar and Jaipur. 'His journals contained many hints and directions for future research in the geography, statistics, and manners of the various races amongst whom he travelled'. The other party, led by Madari Lal, traversed 'every district of consequence in the wide space' assigned to it for exploration. 'From these remote regions the best informed native inhabitants were, by persuasion and recompense', brought to Tod's camp to supply information about their respective areas.

Different parties played a complementary role. Information secured through one party was made 'a basis for the instruction of another, who went over the same ground, built with additional views and advantages, and with the aid of the natives brought successively by each'. To the data collected through this patient and laborious process Tod applied trigonometrical tests. Between 1817 and 1822 Tod made further surveys and journeys, including one to Jodhpur across the Aravalli.

It is interesting to note that Tod originally intended his book on Rajasthan to be 'essentially geographical', but 'circumstances ... rendered it impossible to execute the intended details, or even to make the map so perfect as the superabundant

material at the command of the author might have enabled him to do'. Even then he declares: 'The basis of this work is the geography of the country, the historical and statistical portions being consequent and subordinate thereto'. This statement is quite misleading, for the *Annals* contains no systematic account of the geography of Rajasthan even though important geographical details are scattered through its pages.

II. Feudal System in Rajasthan

Tod considered it 'more than doubtful whether any code of civil or criminal jurisprudence ever existed' in any of the Rajput principalities; but he found in existence 'a martial system peculiar to these Rajput States, so extensive in its operation as to embrace every object of society'. He thought it was 'so analogous to the ancient feudal system of Europe' that a comparison between the two was relevant. He had in view that period when the European feudal system 'was yet imperfect'. What exactly he means is not clear. He did not wish to press the comparison too far: he 'sought only general resemblances and lineaments'. His knowledge of the European 'feudal system' was drawn from the works of Montesquieu, Hume, Millar, Gibbon, and Hallam, an 'eloquent writer' who 'has drawn aside the veil of mystery which covered the subject, owing to its being till then but imperfectly understood'. As Hallam's book⁴ was published in 1816, it not likely that Tod read it after his return to England on retirement, but the alleged analogy had struck him 'long before any connection existed' between the Rajput States and the British Government. Probably a nebulous idea took a definite shape when the 'finished picture' drawn by Hallam became available.

Of the 'feudal system in Rajasthan' Tod found 'little written evidence'. But 'curiosity originally, and subsequently a sense of public duty', led him to make himself 'fully acquainted with the minutiae of this traditional theory of government'. It had been 'greatly obscured', he says, by 'Maratha cunning, engrafted on Mohammedan intolerance'. This view is partial and incomplete for it takes note only of external forces and ignores internal factors which must have contributed to socio-political changes. It would be absurd to presume that Rajput Society,

if left to itself, would have been completely static and that it moved only when external compulsion came into play. Then again, a distinction must be made between the two external forces mentioned by him, *viz.*, Mughal supremacy and Maratha invasions. The former initiated vital changes such as increase in royal authority and alteration in the balance of power due to the eclipse of Mewar and prominence of Marwar and Amber, but the latter represented an undiluted process of destruction. By maintaining internal peace and controlling succession the Great Mughals ensured political stability and facilitated the functioning of indigenous institutions in the Rajput States. The Marathas, on the other hand, rudely disturbed political stability by provoking struggles for succession and threw the indigenous institutions out of gear by their ravages and demands for tribute. Tod's unqualified condemnation of the 'predatory' incursions of the Marathas was a faithful echo of Rajasthan's agony.

Tod's purpose was to study Rajput institutions in their original form as far as possible. So he turned mainly to those States which were the least affected by (Muslim) conquest, for there the indigenous system 'remained freer from innovation'. Although he spoke in general terms of the 'feudal system in Rajasthan', his examples were taken chiefly from Mewar 'as its internal rule was less influenced' by foreign (*i.e.*, Mughal) suzerainty.

Tod's starting premise is that the form of government in the Rajput States 'is truly patriarchal...the greater portion of the vassal chiefs, from the highest of the sixteen peers (in Mewar)⁵ to the holders of a *charsa*⁶ of land, claim affinity in blood to the sovereign'. In the dedication of the second volume of the *Annals* to William IV he says that 'the ruling principle' of Rajput States is 'the paternity of the sovereign', Tod's fundamental mistake was his failure to realise that this principle was really the necessary consequence of the clan system and had no 'feudal' implication. This may be illustrated by a reference to the system of distribution of land. According to Hallam, the greater portion of the 'fiscal lands', *i.e.*, 'lands reserved to the crown, partly for the support of its dignity and partly for the exercise of its munificence', was granted out to favoured subjects, most frequently to 'professed courtiers', under the name of

'benefices', subsequently called 'fiefs'. The ordinary duration of the benefices was at least the life of the possessor, after which they reverted to the 'fise'; but they soon became hereditary, this process being accelerated by the weakness of the crown. According to Maitland, in theory 'at some past time all lands were the king's to do what he like with. For instance, he might give land to one of his great barons and his heirs in return for certain services'.⁷ As we shall see below, the ruler of a Rajput State had no such freedom. The land belonged to his clan-members and blood-brothers; he could not exercise his 'munificence' by distributing it among his 'professed courtiers'.

Tod himself recognizes the special position of the 'vassal' in a Rajput State; his obligations, he says, 'involve all the duties of kindred in addition to obedience'. He served the ruler in a dual capacity. Tod says: 'To attend the court of his chief; never to absent himself without leave; to ride with him a hunting; to attend him at the court of his sovereign or to war, and even give himself as a hostage for his release; these are some of the duties of a vassal'. The 'vassal', however, never forgot that he was the ruler's kinsman, some 'expatriated chiefs' of Marwar wrote in their letter of complaint against their Raja, Man Singh, to the British Political Agent: Sri Maharaja and ourselves are of one stock, all Rathors. He is our head, we his servants... When our services are acceptable, then he is our lord: when not, we are again his brothers and kindred, claimants and laying claim to the land'. Land was the joint patrimony of the clan, not of the ruler alone; he was head of the State because he was head of the clan.

Looked at from the point of view of kinship which was determining the relations between a Rajput prince and his 'vassals', Tod's elaborate description of the feudal system in Rajasthan, becomes a superficial account of certain political and administrative practices which developed in response to regional requirements. What he calls 'sub-infeudation' was really a corollary to the clan system. In large estates the chiefs generally allotted villages for the maintenance of their brothers and sons. It was their customary duty to do so according to their means and the number of immediate descendants. This system weakened the chiefs and was sometimes 'ruinous to the

protection and general welfare of the country'. It was also occasionally detrimental to the interests of the State. 'It is pursued', says Tod, 'in some parts till there is actually nothing left sufficiently large to share, or to furnish subsistence for one individual; consequently a great deprivation of services to the States ensues'. This system was, however, prevalent more in the 'isolated tributary Thakurats' or lordships scattered over the country—especially in Gujarat, Kathiawar and Cutch—than in the large principalities. In Mewar the chiefs were careful not to let this practice become too common; 'they send the extra numbers to seek their fortunes abroad'.

The sub-division of ancestral property among members of the family is a general principle of Hindu law. No analogy can be drawn between such sharing of estates and the process of creating new tenancies which feudal custom in Europe called sub-infeudation. There, as Maitland says, Z (a great baron) gives part of his land (receiving from the King) to Y, Y to X, and so on, until we come to the lowest tenant, to A who now has the right to enjoy the land and take the fruits thereof.⁸ In this chain of transfers every giver acts voluntarily to further his own interest; no one is bound by law or custom to sub-let a part of his land. In the Rajput States it was practically a social duty to make provision for members of the family even at the cost of the solvency of the estate.

The nature and strength of the Rajput political organization were determined by two important factors: the reciprocal duties of prince and chiefs, and those of the chiefs and their 'sub-vassals'. The principle behind these two sets of duties was the same. The 'sub-vassal' of Deogarh, 'one of the largest fiefs of Rajasthan', made a remonstrance against their chief and wrote: When Deogarh was established, at the same time were our allotments; as is his patrimony, so is our partimony... Our rights and privileges in his family are the same as his in the family of the Presence (*i.e.*, the Raja). Tod says: 'Here are the precise sentiments embodied in the remonstrances of the great feudal chiefs of Marwar to their chief.

If the 'sub-vassals' had their rights, they had their duties too. They were bound to follow the standard of their lord (*i.e.*, the chief) even against their sovereign. Tod says: 'If the questions

were put to a Rajput to whom his service is due, whether to his chief or to his sovereign, the reply would...imply that his own immediate chief is the only authority he regards.' Many instances could be given of whole sub-clans devoting themselves to the cause of the chief against their sovereign.' Those 'sub-vassals' could perform any service to the prince except through his own immediate superior. No Rajput prince was wise or strong enough to impose an oath (like the Oath of Salisbury imposed by William the Conqueror in England) on subjects whose service was available to the State only under these dangerous restrictions.

The looseness of the link between the prince and the 'sub-vassals' was an obvious source of weakness, not only to the political structure of the Rajput State, but also to its military organization. Originally, there was no standing army in any Rajput State; the prince had to depend on such forces as the chiefs could collect in an emergency. Naturally the loyalty of the chiefs, and the readiness of the 'sub-vassals' to render military service, were decisive factors. The system broke down completely in the eighteenth century under the pressure of the political and military chaos of that age of transition. Mewar had to create the nucleus of a standing army by enlisting some mercenaries from Sind. The principal motive was probably to deal with internal troubles caused by over-mighty subjects.¹⁰ Tod has left for us an English version of a grant from Raja Ari Singh to a Sindhi chief named Abdul Rahim Beg (dated 1770). It is significant to note that this chief of Muslim mercenaries was granted rank and privileges similar to those enjoyed by the Rawat of Salumbar, 'the first of home-chieftains', and it was stated specifically that his children and children's children 'shall continue to enjoy' the benefits of this extraordinary grant.

Tod makes an elaborate attempt to compare the 'more general obligations' of the Rajput 'vassals' with the 'feudal incidents' of medieval Europe. He adopts Hallam's list: (1) reliefs; (2) fines upon alienation; (3) escheats; (4) aids; (5) wardship; and (6) marriage.

The practice of realising 'relief'—a sum of money due from every one of full age taking a fief by descent—was widely prevalent in the Rajput States. In Mewar, custom required 'the

bona fide surrender of the fief and renewal thereof.' During the troubled period preceding the establishment of British paramountcy some of the chiefs in different States took advantage of the weakness of the princes and obtained renunciation of the fine of relief which was tantamount to making a grant in perpetuity and annulling 'the most overt sign of paramount sovereignty'.

'Alienation' required the sanction of the 'lord paramount' only in cases of 'donations for pious uses'. In this respect feudal custom in Europe was different: the assent of the lord to his vassal's alienation of his fief was essential. Hallam says: 'He had received his fief, it was supposed, for reasons peculiar to himself or his family; at least his heart and arm were bound to his superior; and his service was not to be exchanged for that of a stranger, who might be unwilling or unable to render it'. This principle was not applicable to the 'vassals' in Rajasthan. They derived their right to land, not from the prince's favour, but from their membership of the clan. The prince, who was virtually little more than the biggest co-sharer in the common patrimony of the clan, could not exercise any rigid control over alienation of their lands by other co-sharers.

'Escheats' and forfeitures were well known in Rajasthan. Hereditary 'fiefs' reverted to the crown on failure of heirs, as these could not be bequeathed by will. Forfeitures for crimes were 'partial or entire, according to the delinquency'.

'Aids', implying 'free gifts' or 'benevolences', were realised by the Rajput princes from their chiefs, as also by the latter from their 'sub-vassals'. A 'benevolence' or contribution was always levied on the marriage of the prince's daughter. Special levies, like the *barar* (war-tax) in Mewar, were imposed 'in periods of emergency or danger'. Hallam says that 'aids' were called for in certain prescribed circumstances which depended a great deal upon local custom.

'Wardship, says Tod, 'does exist, to foster the infant vassal during minority, but often terminating, as in the system of Europe, in the nefarious act of defrauding a helpless infant, to the pecuniary benefit of some court favourite'. The guardianship of infant chiefs was generally vested in their mothers, occasionally in the head of the sub-clan concerned.

Sometimes the prince himself undertook this responsibility.

The right of the lord to provide husbands for his female wards while under age was recognized in Norman and English feudal laws. This was afterwards extended to male wards and, according to Hallam, 'became a very lucrative source of extortion to the crown as well as to mesne lords'. No such right, says Tod, was claimed by the princes of Rajasthan.

"Thus", concludes Tod, 'setting aside marriage (which even in Europe was partial and local) and alienation, four of the six incidents marking the feudal system are in force in Rajasthan, viz., relief, escheats, aids, and wardship'. But the analogy is somewhat misleading. According to Hallam, 'reliefs', 'fines upon alienation and 'escheats' were 'natural reservations in the lord's bounty to his vassal'; and 'aids' marked 'the beginnings of taxation, of which for a long time they in a great measure answered the purpose. In Rajasthan, there was no question of 'the lord's bounty to his vassal', for the vassal owned land by virtue of his membership of the clan. Here all the four feudal incidents really served the general purpose of taxation: the 'vassals' contributed to the maintenance of the clan-State. Hallam found in 'wardship' something 'very conformable to the feudal spirit, since none was so fit as the lord to train up his vassal to arms, and none could put in so good a claim to enjoy the fief, while the military service for which it had been granted was suspended'. This remark is not applicable to the general Rajput custom of vesting the guardianship of infant chiefs in their mothers—a custom which followed logically from the clan system.

It would appear therefore, that Tod took a superficial view of Hallam's account of the feudal system of Europe in his search for similarities between it and the political system in Rajasthan. Whatever the origin and early character of the Rajput institutions might be, these were in a melting pot when Tod studied them, first as an inquirer in the fields of geography and history, and then as a British official devoted to friendly treatment of their maladies. His understanding was incomplete and generally incorrect. This was pointed out in the first edition of the *Rajputana Gazetteer*¹¹ published in 1879:

'In fact, the system upon which land is distributed among

the branch families and other great hereditary landholders, is the basis of the political constitution of the Rajput State and forms its characteristic distinction. And this system is not, speaking accurately, feudal, though it has grown in certain States into something very like feudalism. The tenure of the great clansmen involves military service and payment of financial aids, but its source is to be found in the original clan-occupation of the lands, and in the principles of kinship and a purity of descent from the original occupants or conquerors'.

Had Tod fully realised the significance of 'the original clan-occupation of the lands', he would probably have found it unnecessary the use Hallam's brush to paint the political institutions of Rajasthan. The historian of today no longer accepts Hallam as a guide in his study of European feudalism which is now being analysed on the basis of fuller data and from different point of view. Tod followed the best available authorities of his own day; what he failed to see was that they were concerned with a situation which was entirely different from that prevailing in Rajasthan.

Whether any substantial element of the European type of feudalism developed generally throughout Rajasthan, or in some particular Rajput States, it is difficult to say. The term 'feudalism' implies infinite varieties: to search for uniformity is an unprofitable academic adventure. The concept is 'so large and vague that it is quite possible to maintain that of all countries England was the most, or for the matter of that the least, feudalized; that William the conqueror introduced, or for the matter of that suppressed, the feudal system'. These words were used by the great English constitutional historian, F.W. Maitland.¹² A State possessing characteristics usually associated with 'feudalism' may be, says Maitland, 'a powerful, compact centralized kingdom; it may be hardly more than a loose confederation of principalities'. In normal times no Rajput State belonged to either of these two extreme categories. There was no approximation to a 'compact centralized' monarchical polity because the powers of the prince were circumscribed by the privileges of chiefs. At the same time their estates were not so autonomous as to be termed 'principalities' or units of a

'loose federation'. Maitland describes feudalism as 'a state of society in which all or a great part of public rights and duties are inextricably interwoven with the tenure of land, in which the whole governmental system—financial, military, judicial—is part of law of private property'¹². Then he adds a note of warning: 'I do not mean that feudalism so complete is ever found'. Even with our imperfect knowledge of conditions prevailing in Rajasthan we may be quite certain that 'feudalism so complete' never existed there.

III. Clan System

Tradition ascribes the foundation of the principal Rajput principalities to 'clan-occupation of lands' which were held previously by *ab original* communities. Mewar was the State of the Guhilots, Marwar and Bikaner of the Rathors, and Amber of the Kachhwahs. Generally speaking, every Rajput State was considered as the patrimony of a particular clan; its organization developed under the pressure of historical circumstances and economic forces which were not clearly remembered in Tod's days. 'In every State', says a modern writer, 'the ruling class belongs to one particular clan...The humblest members of the clan consider themselves along with the ruler as the sons of the same father enjoying their patrimony by the same right as the ruler himself. The latter was thus nothing but a *primus inter pares*...The State in fact did not belong to the ruler—it belonged to the clan as a whole.'¹³

This identification of the clan with the State had ceased to be an active force in the Rajput polity of the eighteenth century. Ambitious princes anxious to imitate the Mughal pattern of autocracy tried to undermine the authority of the clan as represented by the chiefs. It was with the consequences of this policy that Tod had to deal in his *Annals*. He found in the power of the prince the key-stone of the Rajput political arch. He says: '...on the personal character of the chief of a feudal government everything depends.' This interpretation of Rajput polity was not consistent with the spirit of the clan system; but Tod knew that system when it was in a process of dissolution.

One of the methods adopted by the medieval Rajput princes

to weaken the clan system, and to escape to some extent from the restraints imposed by it, was to introduce within their respective State some nobles who were 'foreign in country and blood.' Tod says: 'Chiefs of Rathor, Chauhan, Paramara, Solanki, and Bhatti tribes were intermingled.' The epithet *kala patta* or 'black grant' was applied to all grants of land to 'foreign' chiefs. This was an expression of public disapproval of deviation from old custom and violation of the prescriptive monopoly of the clan. As grants of this category were 'virtually resumable,' the position of the 'foreign' grantees was less secure than that of the chiefs of the indigenous clan, and the prince could place greater reliance on outsiders having no root in the soil and dependent on his favour.

Of the eighteen principal chiefs of Mewar mentioned by Tod as many as nine were 'foreign in country and blood.' From the important estate of Ghanerao, says Tod, 'the Rana could command four thousand Rathors holding lands on the tenure of service.' It was held by a Rathor chief of the Mertia sub-clan. Bijolia, one of the principal 'fiefs' in Mewar, was held by a Paramara. The chief of Rupnagar, an important member of the second grade of the chiefs of Mewar, was a Solanki. A Bhatti held the important estate of Khejurla in Mewar.¹⁴

The composition of the nobility in Mewar was very complex. Writing in 1859, a British officer having first-hand experience of conditions in Mewar observed: 'None of the principal chiefs of Mewar are the descendants of those who received estates in the country on its conquest by Bappa Rawal. Of the existing chiefs, some are of tribes differing from the Oodeypoor family, while the greater number are collateral descendants of comparatively recent Ranas, the oldest and most important being separated from the reigning princes by eighteen generations, or about 480 years. They latter regard themselves as a brotherhood, and are called Home chieftains, in contradistinction to chiefs who have emigrated from other countries, and acquired estates and titles in Mewar, and who are called *Foreign* chieftains.¹⁵

The most important of all the nobles of Mewar, indigenous as well as foreign, was the Rawat of Salumbar, the head of the Chundawat sub-clan, and the direct descendant of Chunda, the eldest son of Rana Lakha, who surrendered his right to

the throne to his younger brother Mokal in the fifteenth century. In renouncing his right to the throne Chunda retained for his descendants the right to advise the Rana on all important affairs of State and the principal place in the Rana's council. The peculiar position of the Rawat of Salumbar raised difficult problems in Mewar.

Next in importance to the Chundawats were the Saktawats, the descendants of Rana Pratap's brother Sakta Singh. These two powerful families were hostile to each other, and the Ranas, usually supported the Saktawats in order to balance the power of the Chundawats. During the long reign of Bhim Singh (1777-1828) the bitter feud between the Chundawats and the Saktawats created confusion and anarchy in Mewar and made it easier for the Marathas to continue their depredations in that unhappy State.

In general, the prince was never absolutely free to dispose of any substantial portion of the patrimony of the clan in favour of 'foreign' chiefs. According to Tod, though there was a mixture of 'foreign' Rajputs, 'yet the blood of the chief predominates.' The clan system could be weakened, but it could not be broken. This statement applies with particular force to Marwar. The ratio between Rathor and non-Rathor nobles was 50 : 1 in the time of Jaswant Singh. Of 24 chiefs (first and second class) mentioned by Tod only 2 were 'foreigners'. This was due probably to the stronger position of the indigenous chiefs in Marwar than in other States. The position was quite different in Jaipur. Of the 20 principal chiefs mentioned by Tod no less than 10 were 'foreigners'.

Despite partial dissolution the clan system did not lose its vitality even in loci's days. Its worst feature survived the imposition of British paramountcy. The jealous rivalry between the Rathors and the Kachhwas was, says Sir J.N. Sarkar, the dominating factor of Rajput society even under British rule.¹⁷ Such rivalry was by no means an accidental political development; it was deeply rooted in the clan system.

Submission to a common superior was absolutely ruled out by the deep-rooted conception of the State as the common property of a particular clan. One clan, one State: this was the tradition which shaped the Rajput political system. As one State could not accommodate several clans, there could be no political

unity for the Rajputs of different clans who had settled in different parts of Rajasthan. Pride in clan traditions crystallized themselves into clan feuds which fostered a peculiar form of inter-State rivalry. This is one of the most sordid features of Rajput history.

The Sultanate of Delhi never made serious efforts to impose its control over the Rajput princes, although from time to time there were pockets of Muslim rule in Rajasthan, such as Ajmer, Nagor, Jalor and Chittor. Nor did any of the Rajput princes succeed in imposing his suzerainty over any considerable part of the region. Rana Sangram Singh of Mewar found at Khanua (1527) that the Rajput clans could not serve under a common banner even against a common foe. This point was prominent enough to attract Babur's attention.¹⁸ The 'Hindupat' of the Rajput chroniclers failed to impose on the Rajputs a new type of unity which could not be fitted into their traditional political and socio-economic patterns.

Even under the Mughals, who established a vigorous imperial regime, each Rajput principality retained its distinct individuality in name as also in administrative organization. Unity imposed from outside was imperfect and superficial; there was no 'common denomination' for the Rajput principalities even though there was a general uniformity in the methods of imperial control. This was consistent not only with the traditions of the clan system but also with the requirements of imperial policy. The Mughals were not required to deliberately adopt the policy of *divide et impera*; they found complete absence of political unity among the Rajput princes and were too wise to seek a change. In Tod's days the East India Company followed the Mughal precedent; the provisions of the treaties with the Rajput princes were so framed as to keep them perpetually separate.

In the eighteenth century the Marathas organized themselves, under the leadership of the Peshwas, into a confederacy of autonomous units. Even in their worst days the office of the Peshwa provided a central authority which symbolised their political aspirations and to which at least lip homage was paid by powerful regional rulers like Sindhia and Holkar. The autonomous Sikh *Mists* of the second half of the eighteenth century evolved a common forum for deliberation

in an assembly called the *Sarbat Khalsa*. Never in the long history of the Rajputs did they succeed in evolving any central authority like the Peshwa or even a deliberative gathering like the *Sarbat Khalsa*. Recognition of one clan's ascendancy over another was a political experiment repugnant to Rajput tradition and sentiment; it could not grow from within as a natural product of Rajput genius. Sawai Jai Singh's dream of *asvamedha* meant in practical terms nothing more than a craving for casting his net over Bundi and the Shekhawat domains.

The clan system produced a socio-political hierarchy which was generally parochial in outlook. The lessons of the Mughal system with which the Rajputs had intimate acquaintance, were not taken to heart. The Timurids brought the Rajputs into contact with the vast and varied world from the snow-clad mountains of Central Asia to the swamps of Bengal and the jungles of Assam, from the wild hills on the north-west frontier to the rolling black-soil plain of the Deccan. A very big and complicated administrative-cum-military organization was exposed to their view. But the Rajput mind—gripped by the tradition of isolation, weakened by petty strife, and inflated by family pride—reacted impassively to this impressive demonstration of unity on a vast scale. Instead of thanking in terms of big political projects and utilising the unprecedented opportunities offered by the dissolution of the Mughal Empire, the Rajput princes played the old game of feuds with a new zest, fighting for patrimony and encroaching upon neighbours' territories. In the eighteenth century the inheritance of the Great Mughals fell to the Marathas, to the Sikhs, as also to Muslim adventurers like the Nizam and the Nawabs of Oudh and Bengal. The Rajputs spent themselves in civil wars and clan rivalries.

The history of the Rajputs was thus a tragic story of lost opportunities. They could not rise above the parochialism on which the clan system was based. They carried the Mughal banner to the north-west, the north-east, and the south; but they could not think of their own expansion beyond the frontiers of their hills and desert, nor could they place themselves in the wide perspective of Indian history. Deeply rooted in the past, stagnant in ideas as well as in methods, they lost those glittering prizes which history offers to rulers and peoples who

can plunge boldly into the unknown in pursuit of great visions.

If the clan system made it impossible for the Rajputs to win spectacular triumphs on the stage of Indian history, it also created a political system which made internal conflicts inevitable. As the nobles owed their position and property to heredity and not to the prince's favour, they did not easily submit to his control. In every Rajput State the central authority was almost perpetually weak. A strong-willed warrior-prince might be able to maintain a semblance of order and discipline; but if circumstances raised minors or weaklings or imbeciles to the *gudi*, the inevitable results were strife and chaos. The history of the second half of the eighteenth century provides several illustrations of this basic defect of the Rajput political system. Zalim Singh's amazing career shows how an overmighty minister's policy could lead to the carving out of a principality for his family even in the era of British paramountcy. There is no analogy between the selfish and greedy nobles of the Mughal Court in the age of the later Timurids and the Rajput chiefs, who, like the Chundawats and the Saktawats of Mewar or Sawai Jai Singh of Pokaran, defied their rulers with impunity. While the former were adventurers without roots in the soil and dependent on uncertain imperial favour or the fleeting support of mercenary troops, the latter were hereditary lords of estates with customary rights; they had 'sub-vassals' bound by the tie of allegiance, and devoted adherents. No top-ranking Rajput chief could be liquidated in the way in which the all powerful Syed brothers were swept away from the political stage. They left no one to avenge their fall; but the murder of Devi Singh of Pokaran left a trail of blood which pursued the rulers of Marwar for many years.

The clan system vitally affected the military organization of the Rajputs. No standing army could be maintained because the military and social traditions of the Rajputs were inconsistent with such concentration of military power in the hands of the prince. Moreover, it was a violation of the privilege of the 'vassals' in respect of military service to the head of the clan. There were important economic reasons too. There was no money in the prince's exchequer to pay the soldiers; assignments on lands could not be given because all lands except the *Khalsa* belonged to the 'vassals'. The prince had to depend, therefore,

on the armed followers of the 'vassals'. To what extent they disliked military reforms likely to weaken their position, is clear from the tragic fate of Rana Vikramaditya of Mewar. Such rigid adherence to the traditional military system not only made the prince almost a helpless instrument in the hands of selfish and short-sighted chiefs. It permanently weakened Rajput military organization. Blind to the changing techniques of fighting, the Rajputs continued to rely upon ancestral dogmas and personal valour. Even at the end of the eighteenth century their arms and method of fighting were out of date. Meanwhile, in the all-round confusion of that age of disintegration non-Rajput mercenaries had begun to be employed. This departure from the clan system did not add much to the defensive capacity of the Rajput States against their Maratha oppressors. The mercenaries, instead of substantially strengthening the princes' hands, embittered the mutual relations between them and their 'vassals' and became a drag on the scanty financial resources of the States.

The social and economic organizations of the Rajputs were based on the clan system. Clan rivalry and family pride were the determining forces of social life, and various evils, such as infanticide, were connected with them. A man's place in the social hierarchy was determined by two factors—birth, and the area of land owned by him. These two factors were usually interconnected, for ownership of land was in most cases regulated by birth. Land was sacred, for its possession indicated the owner's place in his clan as well as his economic competence. It embodied the basic principles of social cohesion. It enshrined traditions handed down from generation to generation. The sanctity attached to patrimony led to many crimes, just as the idealisation of clan customs generated many social evils. 'There was no crime', says Sir J.N. Sarkar, 'which a Rajput would not commit for the sake of land. Father killed son and son murdered father. Women of the noblest rank gave poison to their trusting kinsmen. Kings took the lives of loyal ministers'.¹⁹ Here, as elsewhere, economic forces sharpened the edge of sentiment and tradition. The ruling class in every Rajput State depended primarily on income from land trade and commerce—repugnant to their martial traditions—were in the hands of the non-Rajput section of the population. The sterile soil of Rajasthan could

not give them princely incomes. Hence land grabbing became a common vice.

Although Tod was not unaware of the ramifications of the clan system, he did not understand fully its far-reaching effects on different aspects of Rajput life. He connected those effects in most cases with his idea of 'feudalism'. He did not realise that there was some inner inconsistency between 'feudalism' of the European type and the 'patriarchal' pattern of political organization prevailing in Rajasthan. In Europe military tenure was, roughly speaking, the essence of 'feudalism'; it did not originate in 'affinity' in blood to the 'sovereign' which was the essence of the political organization in Rajasthan. Tod found in the paternity of the sovereign the 'ruling principle of the Rajput State.' This was not the ruling principle of the 'feudal' State in medieval Europe. Throughout Tod's narrative the lines between 'patriarchal' and 'feudal' systems have been blurred.

IV. The Chiefs and the State

Tod's account of the rights and obligations of the chiefs was based on his view of the 'feudal system in Rajasthan'.

Next to the prince in rank and power was the chief holding his estate directly from the crown. The origin of the 'fiefs' might be traced to various factors. Some of them consisted of lands occupied by collateral branches of the ruling family with or without the assistance of the prince. Instances were provided by the estates of Bika, a younger member of the Rathor ruling family, as also by the estates constituting the Shekhawat federation in Amber. Some of the 'fiefs', again, arose out of circumstances similar to those which led to the growth of 'marches' or 'marks' in medieval Europe. Mewar, for instance, was bounded on three sides—the south, east and west—by 'marauding barbarous tribes of Bhils, Mers, and Minas.' For the protection of the border areas against their raids 'the circumference of the circle was sub-divided into estates for the chiefs, while the *Khalsa*, or fiscal land, the best and richest, was in the heart of the country, and consequently well protected. Thus some of chiefs were originally wardens of the marches, defending the heart of the principality, *i.e.*, the *Khalsa* lands, against the frontier tribes. The holders of these two classes of

'fiefs' were in all cases Rajputs, and in most cases they belonged to the prince's own clan.

A different class of 'fiefs' may be called 'official fiefs'. Tod says: 'Titles are granted, and even fiefs of office, to ministers and civil servants not Rajputs; they are, however, but official, and never confer hereditary right. These official fiefs may have arisen, here and in Europe, from the same cause: the want of a circulating medium to pay the offices.' The mantris of Mewar preferred estates to pecuniary stipend, 'which gives more consequences in every point of view.' In this State the prince's architect, painter, physician, bard, genealogist, heralds, and 'all the generation of foster-brothers' held lands.

Finally, the weakness of the prince sometimes led to the creation of new 'fiefs', just as in Lancastrian England the 'over-mighty' nobles unscrupulously seized the lands of the crown. Tod says: 'Many estates were obtained, during periods of the external commotion, by threats, combination, or the avarice of the prince—his short-sighted policy, or that of his ministers.'

The chiefs were divided into different grades according to their income and status in the prince's court. In Mewar there were four grades. "The honours and privileges", says Tod, 'and the gradations of rank, amongst the vassals of the Rana's house, exhibit a highly artificial and refined state of society. Each of the superior rank is entitled to a banner, kettle drums preceded by heralds and silver maces, with peculiar gifts and personal honours, in commemoration of some exploit of their ancestors.' Some powerful and wealthy chiefs lived in a semi-royal style. Tod says: 'The court and the household economy of a great chieftain is a miniature representation of the sovereign's... He must have his *shish-mahal*, his *bari-mahal*, and his *mandir* like his prince.'

One of the most important duties of the chiefs was to attend the prince's court. 'For state and show, says Tod, 'a portion of the greater vassals reside at the capital for some months, when they have permission to retire to their estates, and are relieved by another portion. On the grand military festival the whole attend for a given time; and when the prince took the field, the whole assembled....'

'On all grand occasions', says Tod, 'where the general peace

or tranquility of the Government is threatened, the chiefs form the council of the sovereign.' To be excluded from the council of the prince was to be in utter disgrace. But the chiefs had no concern with the promulgation of laws. In 'feudal' England the baronial assembly had a crucial role in law-making. This is an important point of difference between the 'feudal system' in Europe and the political system in Rajasthan, but Tod did not recognize its implication.

In regard to the administration of justice in the 'fiefs' and their internal economy the chiefs practically enjoyed uncontrolled authority. The prince's *chabutras* or 'terraces of justice' could not ordinarily be established 'within the bounds of a chief.' This was the general rule in regard to civil matters; but 'the self-constituted tribunals, the *panchayats*', sat in judgment in all cases where property was concerned. In criminal cases the chiefs were not entitled to exercise jurisdiction without the special sanction of the prince.

The general relations between the prince and the chiefs were determined to a large extent by different circumstances prevailing in different States. There was a general uniformity of pattern throughout Rajasthan, but historical forces introduced significant variations.

Tod says: 'The aristocracy in Marwar has always possessed more power than in any of the sister principalities around.' He attributes this special feature of Marwar's polity to three factors: the circumstances connected with the first settlement of the Rathors 'in the desert'; the 'protracted struggle for the rights of the minor Ajit (Singh) against the despotism of the (Mughal) empire;' 'the laws of adoption' (by which he seems to mean the laws of succession to the *gadi*).

As the Rathors multiplied in number and wandered in pursuit of land, conflicts followed, not only with the Muslims, who had occupied important posts like Nagor, but also with Rajput clans like the Parihars of Mandor, the Bhattis of Jaisalmer, and the Chauhans of Jalor, as well as *ab original* tribes like the Bhils. The struggle for land was not always conducted by the head of the clan, *i.e.*, the ruler of the new-born Rathor State of Mandor. The Rathor chiefs, especially the enterprising members of the collateral branches of the ruling family, fought

in many cases for themselves and their personal adherents. Naturally they looked upon as their personal possession any estate which they might conquer by their own military efforts. In such cases the allegiance to the head of the ruling family was more or less nominal; the chiefs treated the prince as *primus inter pares*, not as a sovereign exercising *de facto* authority over them. The most striking illustration of such developments is provided by the history of Bikaner.

Another factor contributed to the weakness of the royal power. The principle of primogeniture did not regulate succession to the headship of the Rathor State. The most capable and successful member of the ruling family secured the *gadi* and sometimes the chiefs intervened. The headship of Rao Jodha (1446-89) was acquiesced in by his elder brother Akheraj. Rao Ganga (1515-32) superseded his elder brother Vikram with the chiefs' support. The decisive role which the chiefs arrogated to themselves in the matter of succession was expressed through the proverb *Rinhmalan Thapia Tika Raja*, i.e., 'only he can become the ruler whom the *sardars* and descendants of Rinmal (ruler of the Rathor State, 1428-38) place on the throne.'²⁰ Maldeo (1532-62) was succeeded by his third son Chandra Sen. His brothers' opposition to him prepared the ground for Marwar's submission to Akbar. Henceforth the Mughal Emperor became the final arbiter of all questions of succession. Jaswant Singh, the second son of Gaj Singh, succeeded his father in 1638 at the age of eleven in supersession of the claim of his elder brother Amar Singh. This violation of primogeniture was due to the Emperor's approval of the recommendation made by Gaj Singh on his death bed. The chiefs accepted the imperial decision which adhered to the old tradition of selection of a member of the ruling family. That tradition was violated by Aurangzeb after Jaswant Singh's death. The protest of the Rathor chiefs led to a protracted war which materially injured the interests of the Mughal Empire as also of Marwar. The Rathor cause emerged successful from the struggle; but Ajit Singh's long minority, his unsteady relations with the Mughal Empire, and its slow decline helped the chiefs of Marwar to strengthen their position *vis-a-vis* their prince. In the second half of the eighteenth century Marwar was torn by civil war and devastated by the Marathas; the princes could not keep the chiefs in check. So

the chief of Marwar were able to retain their historic position in the affairs of the State.

In the sixteenth century Maldev made serious attempts to strengthen the central authority at the expense of the chiefs. At his accession the authority of the ruler of Jodhpur was limited practically to the districts of Jodhpur and Sojhat. Collateral branches, of the ruling family controlled the districts of Bikaner, Phalodi, Merta and Mallani, over which the paramountcy of the head of State was hardly recognized. Maldev temporarily succeeded in imposing his authority on the overmighty chiefs; but the suspicion provoked by his policy in their minds was largely responsible for his failure in the struggle against Sher Shah. 'He could not bring about any fundamental change in the basic framework of the system of *bhai-bant* (distribution of land among the members of the ruling clan). A change came after Marwar's submission to Mughal rule. In the time of Sur Singh (1595-1619) the Rathor chiefs became holders of *pattas* (land revenue assignments) and subject to well defined obligations in respect of military service. There was a real change in their relations with the head of the State: the old arrangement based on the concept of *bhai-bant* was replaced by a new system based upon hierarchy of ranks. This was one of the most important results of Mughal suzerainty.²¹

Tod supposes that it was Udai Singh (1583-95) who, 'with the aid of his imperial brother-in-law ...greatly diminished the power of the feudal aristocracy, and clipped the wings of almost all the greater vassals.' The process does not appear to have been the result of a deliberate policy. As an imperial *mansabdar* the Rathor prince had to provide fixed contingents for Mughal service according to the *mansab* held by him. This obligation had to be shared by the chiefs (*pattadars*). A change in the old system was needed to enable the head of the State to meet his new liabilities flowing from submission to an external authority. But if the new system meant for the chiefs an encroachment upon their traditional privileges, they found fresh openings through their direct enrolment in Mughal service. They were granted *jagirs* in Marwar by the Mughal Government. The establishment of a direct link between the chiefs and the Mughal Government weakened the head of the State and increased his dependence upon his suzerain.

V. System of Government

Tod's account of the system of government in Rajas than relates to the early years of the nineteenth century. His emphasis on the 'paternity of the sovereign', indicates his view of the place of the ruling prince in the system of government. 'Throughout Rajasthan,' he says, 'the character and welfare of the State depend on that of the sovereign: he is the main spring of the system...'

The 'main spring' could not function without the advice and assistance of auxiliary springs. According to Tod, the 'Premier' was usually a Rajput, a court favourite who owed his exalted office to his 'talents, character on intrigue.' He was known in different States by different titles: *Bhanjgarh* in Mewar, *Pradhan* in Marwar, *Musahib* in Jaipur, *Dewan* and *Musahib* in Bundi, *Kiladar* or *Dewan* in Kotah. He was 'the military minister, with the political government of the fiefs.' He had 'unbounded authority over the military classes' and 'unlimited power over the inferior officers of the State.' He had 'a powerful body of retainers always at his command.'

The office was sometimes hereditary. In Mewar it was hereditary in the Chundawat family of Salumbar. In Marwar it was hereditary in the house of Awa; it was later transferred to the house of Asop. Tod says: 'In truth, these *Pradhans* of Marwar have always been mill-stones round the necks of their princes: an evil interwoven in their system when the partition of estates took place amongst the sons of Jodha in the infancy of this State. It was, no doubt, then deemed politic to unite to the interests of the crown so powerful a branch, which when combined could always control the rest; but this gave too much equality.' In Kotah Zalim Singh was the all-powerful minister, and in Jaisalmer Salim Singh held a similar position. In these two States the princes were, says Tod, 'like those of the Merovingian race,...puppets of royalty.'

In the Rajput State a distinction was generally drawn between the civil and military counsellors of the prince. Mewar had a 'civil premier' called *Pradhan* who belonged to a 'non-militant' (i.e., non-Rajput) tribe. The whole of the 'territorial and financial arrangements' was vested in him. He was assisted by a *Bakhshi* who also belonged to a non-militant tribe, and

one different from the *Pradhan*. He took the musters, paid the soldiers and issued patents as well as letters of sequestration of feudal lands. In his case the general rule of separating civil functions from military duties was not observed. Two other grand officers were the *Susatnama* (the auditor and recorder of all the household expenditure and establishments) and the *Sahai* ('secretary both for home and foreign correspondence'). In Bundi there were four ministers: the *Dewan Musahib* who had the 'entire management of the territory and finances;' the *Faujdar* or *Kiladar* who was the governor of the castle and the head of the 'feudal quotas or mercenaries;' the *Bakhshi* who controlled accounts; the *Risala* who controlled the accounts of the house-hold expenditure.

The tendency to exclude the Rajputs from high administrative posts seems to have been universal in the Rajput world. Malcolm's remarks on the Rajput States of Central India may be quoted in this connection:

'The Rajput chiefs employ their own tribe in the army, but seldom, if ever, in civil stations ... When a noble is raised by his favour to power, but without distinct office, he is termed a counsellor or mediator; such person being generally deemed a channel of intercourse between the prince and his subjects. The reason for not employing Rajputs in the civil offices of these petty-governments is, in the first place, their unfitness from want of education; and in the second, their insubordinate and ambitious spirit. These stations (but particularly that of *Kamdar* or minister) are generally filled by Brahmins, Banias (merchants), or persons of the *Kaith*, or writer tribe.'²²

There was little scope for legislation in States dominated by age-old customs. Customs varied from State to State and not infrequently in the different parts of a single State. In some cases tradition had handed down to later generations the circumstances explaining the origin of particular customs; but, generally speaking, such information was not available. Tod was particularly interested in the inscriptions which lay scattered

all over Rajasthan. He also found valuable records in the archives of the princes. Moreover, there were many books of grants to the chiefs as also the grand rent-roll of the State. 'From all these,' says Tod, 'a sufficiency of customary rules could easily be found to form the written law of fiefs in Rajasthan.' He makes some illustrative references to sumptuary laws, commercial regulations, etc.

It seems that the legislation of the Rajput States dealt with civil matters only; criminal cases were presumably decided according to custom. Whether Muslim law and Mughal practice exercised any influence on the Rajputs in this matter, is uncertain.

In normal times the Rana of Mewar 'promulgated all the legislative enactments in which the general rights and wants of the community were involved.' In this he was assisted by 'his civil council, the four ministers of the crown and their deputies;' the chiefs had no concern with law-making.

Tod does not give a consistent account of the judicial system of the Rajput States. It may be presumed that the prince was not only the formal fountain of justice but also the actual judge of some of the more important cases.

In Mewar 'the resident ruler of the district' was also a judicial functionary. There was also a special officer of the Government in each 'frontier *thana* or garrison post' who, in addition to other duties, administered justice with the aid of the. This peculiar court consisted of the *chauthias* or 'assessors of justice' who were elected by their fellow-citizens. It represented a democratic element in the administration of justice. It was clearly distinguished from the general *Panchayat* which was formed from 'the respectable population at large.'

In every big town there was a hereditary *Nagar Seth* or chief magistrate who administered justice with the aid of the local *chauthia*.

The regular administration of justice was often impeded by the privileges and obstinacy of the chiefs. The *chabutras*, or terraces of justice, were always established in the *Khalsa* areas. It was deemed a humiliating intrusion if they sat within the bounds of a chief. Rajasthan produced no Henry II who could expand royal justice at the cost of baronial courts. The system of *rozina* was a crude method for the enforcement of justice

on a chief or his dependent. When a chief refused or delayed compliance, an officer of the prince was deputed with a party of soldiers to his 'fief;' they had to be provided with free quarters and food till the prince's orders relating to justice were carried out.

In Marwar, as also in Jaipur, confined criminals were maintained by individual charity, for the grants made by the State for their maintenance were usually misappropriated by the agents of the Government. Tod says: 'When once confined, the criminals are little thought of, and neglect answers all the ends of cruelty.' Prisoners were released on special occasions like a solar or lunar eclipse, the birth of a son to the prince, the beginning of a new reign, etc.

In Marwar the *Panchayats* arbitrated in civil cases. In theory there was a right of appeal to the prince, but the conditions attached to appeal checked litigation. If the *Panchayat* failed, trial by ordeal (*sagum*) was sometimes resorted to. In such cases not only the selection but also the appeal to any of the three customary tests (by fire, by water, and by washing the hands in boiling oil) was the voluntary act of the litigants.

The criminal law of Rajasthan was not sanguinary, except in respect to political crimes. In cases of ordinary murder justice was usually satisfied with fine, corporal punishment, imprisonment, confiscation, or banishment. 'Inferior crimes, such as larcenies, were punished by fine and imprisonment, and when practicable, restitution; or, in the case of inability to pay, corporal punishment and confinement.' The nature of punishment often depended on the temperament of the judge. Bijay Singh of Marwar (1753-93) never confirmed a sentence of death. Stories of his clemency were current in Rajasthan in Tod's days.

The financial resources of the Rajput States were limited. The land-tax in the *Khalsa* was the chief source of supply. According to Tod's estimate, it was doubtful whether the *Khalsa* lands in Mewar amounted even ■ one-fourth of those distributed in grant to the chiefs. Moreover, land was not granted to the chiefs alone; the temples, the priests, the Brahmins, the bards, and the genealogists received a substantial share. Tod says: here is scarcely a State in Rajputana in which one-fifth of the soil is not assigned for the support of the temples, their ministers,

the secular Brahmins, bards, and genealogists. But the evil was not always so extensive; the abuse is of modern growth. In addition to the land-tax in the *Khalsa* and the income drawn from the chiefs, the princes derived considerable revenues from different types of taxes and miscellaneous sources. In Mewar there were transit duties on commerce and trade, duties realised from large towns and commercial marts, duties on mines and marble quarries, war tax, house tax, plough tax, marriage tax, *nazrana* on confirmation of estates, fines (on renewal of estates and also in composition of offences), *kharlakar* (wood and forage for the supply of the prince's army), duties on the sale of spirits, opium and tobacco, etc., and quit-rent of the *Bhumia* chiefs. The lead and zinc mines at Jawar (Tod's 'tin mines' of Jawaral) were worked till the great famine of 1812-13. The revenue drawn from the mines enabled the Ranas to maintain their independence against the Mughals till the reconquest of the plains.²³ They are said to have yielded up to 1766 a net annual revenue of about two lakhs.²⁴ Another source of income was the mint, for coining was a royal monopoly. It will be noted that almost all the sources of revenue, except the commercial taxes, were inelastic. Commerce could not prosper during the period of Maratha depredations. Generally speaking, the Rajput princes were reduced to acute financial stringency in the second half of the eighteenth century. This necessitated the imposition of novel and vexatious taxes.

In Marwar there were following taxes: *anga* (poll tax), *ghasmali* (cattle tax), *kewari* (door tax), *sair* (imposts, including those on grain, 'whether of foreign importation, or the home-grown, in transit, from one district to another), and *hasil* (miscellaneous taxes). The amount of *anga* was one rupee on adults of either sex. *Ghasmali* was a graduated tax on the right of pasture. *Kwari* was 'considered peculiarly oppressive,' but the rates were fixed according to the paying capacity of the owner of the house. The salt lakes were a lucrative source of wealth.' This 'productive branch of industry' was in the hands of the *Banjaras*.

In Bikaner, there were following taxes: *dhuan* (hearth tax), *malba*, *sain paseti* (tax on ploughs), *malba* (special land-tax paid by the Jats), *datoi* (a terminal tax of five rupees levied on each plough). *Dhuan* amounted to one rupee on each house or family.

Align 'embraced quadrupeds as well as bipeds of every sex and age'; it was thus heavier in Bikaner than in Marwar. *Sair* was considerably reduced by interruption to trade through political uncertainties; the only certain item was the duty on grain. *Paseti* amounted to five rupee's on every plough used in agriculture. *Malba* amounted to two rupees on each hundred *bighas* cultivated by the Jats. There were, in addition to the levy of these taxes, many arbitrary methods of increasing the prince's income in Surat Singh's rime; 'a train of dependent harpies, preyed upon the peasantry and the traders; *dand* (compulsory contribution) and *Khush-hali* (benevolence) were almost normal items of demand.

In Jaisalmer the transit duties, which were formerly 'the most certain and most prolific branch of the fiscal income', had dwindled on account of maladministration and the 'general decrease of commerce'. *Dhuan* and *dand* were realised, as in Bikaner.

In Kotah Zalim Singh's taxation was so rigid that 'nothing escaped it'. *Lattha*, a tax on corn exported from the State, was, according to Tod, 'worse than even the infamous *gabelle*'. There was a 'broom-tax'. Widows who remarried had to pay a heavy tax. Even the gourd of the mendicant paid a tithe (*tumba barar*), and the ascetic in his cell had a domiciliary visit to ascertain the gains of mendacity, in order that a portion should go to the exigencies of the State.

In Mewar the 'fiscal revenues', i.e., the Rana's income from the spring harvest of the *Khalsa* lands, in 1818 amounted only to Rs. 40,000; but the amount rose to Rs. 10,18,478 in 1821 under the 'superintendence of the British Agent'. The commercial duties, which yielded a 'nominal' amount in 1818, amounted to Rs. 2,20,000 in 1821.

In Marwar 'the entire amount of the personal revenue of the prince did not exceed ten *lakhs* in the early years of Man Singh's rule (1803-43) though in the time of his predecessor Bijay Singh the income of the State amounted to 16 *lakhs*, one-half of which came from the salt lakes alone. The aggregate revenue of the feudal land's was approximately 50 *lakhs*, but in Tod's days hardly half of this amount was produced.

In 1802-03 the 'revenues, fiscal, feudal, commercial and

tributary', of Jaipur were estimated to exceed 80 *lakhs*, half of which came from the *Khalsa* lands.

In Bikaner the revenue of the *Khalsa* lands did not exceed one *lakh* of rupees in Tod's days. This was due to the fact that the lands assigned to the chiefs were proportionately more extensive than those in any other State. This abnormal distribution was the result, says Tod, of the 'original settlement, when the Bidawats and Khandhalots, whose joint acquisitions exceeded those of Bika, would not admit him to hold lands in their territory and made but a slight pecuniary acknowledgment of his supremacy'.

In Jaisalmer, from one-fifth to one-seventh of the gross produce of the land was set aside as the tax of the crown. The total income of the prince from land exceeded one *lakh*.

VI. Economic Conditions

Some broad facts about the agrarian system in different Rajput States might be collected from Tod's narrative. In Mewar the cultivator was the proprietor of the soil which he called his *bapota*, 'the most emphatic, the most ancient, the most cherished and the most significant phrase his language commands for patrimonial inheritance'. He had the right of alienation, of 'entire conveyance by sale, or temporary by mortgage'. The *Patel*, who was originally the elected representative or 'constituted attorney of the commune', serving as 'the medium between the cultivator and the Government', became, during the disturbed years of Maratha incursions, 'the master of his fellow-citizens'. His encroachments on the traditional rights of the cultivators could not be effectively restrained even by Tod, for 'all interference was by treaty strictly, and most justly prohibited'.

In Mewar there was two methods of levying the revenues of the crown on every description of corn: *kankut* and *batai*. The former was 'a conjectural assessment of the standing crop, by the united judgement of the officers of Government, the *Patel*, the *Patwari* or Registrar, and the owner of the field'. If the owner deemed the estimate over-rated, he could insist on *batai* or division of the corn after it was thrashed. In either case, *kankut* or *batai*, when the shares were appropriated, those

of the crown might be commuted to a money payment at the average rate of the market. The *kankut* system was the most liable to corruption; the cultivator could bribe the officers to underrate the crop, and the crown might be defrauded of half its dues. A *barar* or tax was introduced to make up for such deficiency; it was in proportion to the quantity cultivated, and its amount was 'at the mercy of the officers'. Thus, says Tod, 'the *ryot* went to work with a mill-stone round his neck'. Instead of working hard to increase production, which, he knew, would contribute only to the 'advantage of these harpies', he 'contented himself with raising a scanty subsistence in a slovenly and indolent manner, by which he forfeited the ancient reputation of the Jat cultivator of Mewar'.

Neither *kankut* nor *batai* was applicable to land producing sugarcane, poppy, oil, hemp, tobacco, cotton, indigo, and garden stuffs. A money payment was fixed, varying from two to six rupees per *bigha*.

In Marwar the revenues were collected from the *ryots* in kind. The *batai* system was followed; the produce was divided equally between the prince and the husbandman. Besides this, the cultivator had to pay the expense of guarding the crops, and also those who attended the process of division. The *ryots* of the *Pattawats* or 'feudal chiefs' were 'much better off than those of the *Khalsa*, for they had to offer only two-fifths of the produce, and in lieu of all other taxes and charges they had to pay a land-tax of Rs. 12 on every hundred *bighas* of cultivated land. The cultivators', says Tod, 'repay this mild assessment by attachment to the chiefs'.

In Jaipur the lands were farmed to the highest bidder, and the mode of farming was 'most pernicious to the interests of the State, and the cultivating classes, both of whom it must eventually impoverish'. The farmer-generals were the wealthy bankers and merchants, who made their offers for entire districts. These they sublet in *tappas*, or sub-divisions, the holders of which again sub-divided them into single villages or even shares of a village. 'With the profits of all these persons, the expenses attending collections, quartering of *barkandazes* or armed police, are the poor *Bhumias* and *ryots* saddled'. It was 'far from uncommon for three different renters to come upon the same district in one season, or even the crop of one season, for five

or ten thousand rupees, annulling the existing engagement, no matter how far advanced'.

In Jaisalmer, from one-fifth to one-seventh of the gross produce was set aside as the 'tax of the crown'. It was paid in kind, which was purchased on the spot by the Paliwal Brahmins or the Banias, and the value remitted to the treasury.

Tod describes in detail the revenue system of Zalim Singh of Kotah. The first important measure was the three-fold classification of land according to soil and fertility (*piwal* or irrigated; *gorma*, good soil, but dependent on rains; *mormi*, including pasturage and mountain-tracts). The time-honoured *batai* system was abolished and a fixed money-rent was prescribed on the basis of an average calculated from the accounts of many years. This system was preceded by a *chakbandi* or measurement of lands of each township. The assessment was heavy; to add to the cultivator's burden, it was declared that 'no account of the season' would alter or reduce the dues of the State, and the uncultivated lands would be confiscated. At the same time the Patel's legitimate dues were fixed and a rigid system of control was established. On the whole, the *ryot* 'hoped for better days'; 'he saw the limit of exaction, and that the door was closed to all subordinate oppression'.

In 1811 Zalim Singh abolished the *patel* system and became the farmer-general. In 1784 he possessed only 200 or 300 ploughs; in 1820-21 he had no less than 4,000 ploughs. Tod says: 'The fields, which had descended from father to son through the lapse of ages, the unalienable right of the peasant, were seized, in spite of law, custom, or tradition, on every defalcation; and it is oven affirmed that he sought pretexts 'o obtain such lands as from their continuity or fertility lie coveted, and that hundreds were thus deprived of their inheritance'. Although this cruel system ruined many peasants, it increased the area under cultivation. Tod says: "There is not a nook or patch in Haravati where grain can be produced which his ploughs do not visit. Forests have disappeared; even the barren rocks have been recovered with exotic soil, and the mountain's side, inaccessible to the plough, is turned up with a spud, and compelled to yield a crop". To the wealth extracted by such methods from her soil Kotah owed 'her preservation from the ruin which

befell the States around her during the convulsions...when one after another sank into decay'.

Like other parts of India, Rajasthan was inhabited by a people primarily agricultural in their occupation. The following figures show the proportion of the population dependent on pasture and agriculture in certain States in 1901: Mewar, 56½ per cent; Dungarpur, nearly 59 per cent; Banswara, nearly 68 per cent; Pertabgarh, more than 52 per cent; Jaisalmer, 45 per cent; Sirohi, nearly 38 per cent; Bikaner, nearly 72 per cent; Marwar, 62½ per cent. In Sirohi the country is rocky and hilly; the cultivated area was too small to provide livelihood even to 50 per cent of the population. In Jaisalmer the desert prevented the extension of cultivation. Throughout Rajasthan water supply was scarce and rainfall was scanty and uncertain. Moreover, a substantial portion of the country is covered by hills and forests. Such a country yields crop sparingly and only to the hardy tiller. There were frequent famines. Mewar was visited by a famine in 1764. Marwar suffered the same fate in 1794 and 1804. A large part of Rajasthan suffered terribly in the great famine of 1812-13. Not more than three seers of grain were available for a rupee, and water was scarce.

Rajasthan was not rich in mineral resources. Mewar was comparatively fortunate in her mineral and metallic products, and to the latter have been attributed the resources which enabled the Ranas to struggle for so long against the superior power of the Mughals. There were lead and zinc mines at Jawar. The lead mines at Potlan and Dariha had been closed for a long time. Mining of copper was formerly practised in Mewar on a large scale. Throughout the range of hills on the east and north east there ran 'an endless vein of hematite of iron'; but the mines were 'not worked to any great extent' in Tod's days. The only precious stones were garnets which occurred in the Aravalli schists at several places in the Bhilwara district. In Dungarpur the only useful metals were iron and copper ores, extensively worked in the past. In Jaisalmer and Marwar the only important mineral was salt. Marble and sandstone were available in Marwar and Jaipur.

The manufactures of Rajasthan were not of great commercial importance in Tod's days. In Marwar coarse cotton cloths and blankets were manufactured for local use from local cotton and

wool. Matchlocks, swords and other warlike implements were made at Jodhpur and at Pali, and at the latter place were also made excellent boxes of iron, resembling the tin boxes of Europe. Iron platters for culinary purposes were in great demand. In Bikaner the wool of the sheep pastured in the desert was the staple commodity of manufacture as also of trade. It was worked into every article of dress, and worn by all, male and female, rich and poor. Bikaner was also famous for blacksmiths who manufactured excellent swordblades, matchlocks, daggers, iron lances, etc. There were also expert artists in ivory who specialised in the construction of bracelets for women. Coarse cotton cloths were made in considerable quantities for internal consumption. There was little scope for the ingenuity of the mechanic in the desert of Jaisalmer. Coarse cotton cloth was made for local use, and good blankets, scarfs, petticoats, turbans, etc., were manufactured from the wool of the sheep pastured in the desert. There were ivory workers and blacksmiths too. Cups and platters were made from a mineral called *abur*, 'a calcareous substance, of a dark chocolate ground, with light brown vermiculated stripes'. Jaipur produced excellent cotton and indigo as also other dyes common to India.

Rajasthan enjoyed considerable commercial importance before the disintegration of the Mughal Empire ushered in the age of political turmoil and 'predatory warfare'. The establishment of British paramountcy restored the confidence of the mercantile classes and revived to some extent the commercial prosperity of the Rajput States. This happened particularly in Mewar as a result of measures adopted by Tod.

During the Mughal period Marwar had considerable trade, for the State had, 'from remote times', formed the geographical link between the sea-coast and North India. The chief mart was Pali which, says Tod, might make pretensions to the title of emporium of Rajasthan. Commercial houses established at Muskat, Mandavi, Surat, and Navanagar transmitted the products of Persia, Arabia, Africa, and Europe, receiving those of India and Tibet. To enumerate various articles of import: From the coast came elephant's teeth, rhinoceros' hides, copper, tin, pewter, dates dried and moist of which there was an 'immense consumption in these regions'; gum-arabic, borax, coconuts, broadcloths, stripped silks, called *patang*; various dyes,

particularly the *kermes* or crimson; drug, especially the oxides of arsenic and quick-silver; spices, sandalwood, camphor, tea, *momial* or mummy, which was much sought after in medicine, and green glass (*kanch*). From Bahawalpur came soda (*saji*), the dyes called *al* and *majith*, matchlocks, dried fruits, asafoetida, Multani chintzes, and wood for household furniture. From Kotah and Malwa were brought opium and chintzes. From Jaipur came various cloths and sugars; and from Bhuj swords and horses. The exports of home production were the two staple articles of salt and woollens, to which might be added coarse cotton cloths and paper made at Pali.

Another important commercial centre in Marwar was the village of Ramdeora, 6 miles to the north of Pokaran. Here merchants from Karachi, Thatta, Multan, Shikarpur and Cutch exchanged the produce of various countries. The famine of 1812-13, the anarchy of Man Singh's reign (1803-43), and the interminable feuds between the Rathors and Bhattis of Jaisalmer ruined the commercial prosperity of this village. In spite of the unfavourable commercial situation the sturdy sons of Marwar knew how to earn money. Even in those days nine-tenths of the bankers and commercial men of India were Marwaris, according to Tod, and most of them were Jains.

The route of the caravans passing through Marwar ran through Sanchor, Bhinmal and Jalor to Pali. Sanchor and Bhinmal were inhabited by very wealthy merchants; but, says Tod, 'insecurity both within and without has much injured these cities'. The caravans were guarded by the bards (*charans*) whose character was held sacred by the Rajputs. Tod says: "The most desperate outlaw seldom dared to commit any outrage upon caravans under the safeguard of these men. If not strong enough to defend their convoy with sword and shield, they would threaten the robbers with the *chandi*, or self-immolation; and proceed by degrees from a gash in the flesh to a death wound, or if one victim was insufficient, a whole body of women and children were sacrificed...for whose blood the marauder was declared responsible hereafter'.

Rajgarh and Churu were the most important commercial marts of Bikaner. The former was the point of rendezvous from caravans from all directions. The produce of the Punjab and Kashmir came direct by Hansi-Hissar; that of the 'eastern

countries', consisting of silk, fine cloths, indigo, sugar, iron, tobacco, etc., came *via* Delhi, Rewari, Dadri, etc. From Haravati and Malwa came opium 'which supplied all the Rajput States'. During the period 1784-1801 the market price of the crude opium from the cultivator varied between 16 to 21 *Salim Shahi* rupees per *durri* (i.e., 5 *pucca* seers). In 1820 it stood at 38 or 39 rupees.²⁵ From Sind *via* Jaisalmer, and by caravans from Multan and Shikarpur, came date, wheat, rice, *lungis* (silk vestments for women), fruits, etc. From Pali came the imports from maritime countries, such as spices, tin, drugs, coconuts, elephants' teeth, etc. 'Much of this was for internal consumption, but the greater part a mere transit trade which yielded considerable revenue'.

The town of Jaisalmer was a commercial mart of some importance, from its position on the direct route between the valley of the Indus on the west and the Punjab and the Gangetic valley to the north and east respectively. The indigo of the Doab, the opium of Kotah and Malwa, 'the famed sugar-candy of Bikaner,' iron implements from Jaipur, were exported to Shikarpur and lower Sind, 'whence elephants' teeth (from Africa), dates, coconuts, drugs and *chundus* are imported, with pistachios and dried fruits from Bahawalpur'.

Malpura was the principal commercial mart in Jaipur. Jhalrapatan, the town of Zalim Singh, was 'the grand commercial mart of Upper Malwa'. Salt drawn from the lakes of western Rajasthan passes through it on its way to the South-East. But it was merely an entrepot, having no staple article of trade of its own.

Some of the important commercial marts of Rajasthan enjoyed special political privileges. Bhilwara and Pali had each a currency of its own. These two towns, as also Jhalrapatan and some others belonging to the same class, had the right of electing their own magistrates, both for municipal administration and the arbitration of all matters connected with commercial pursuits.²⁶

VII. Army

The unsettled conditions of the eighteenth century made it necessary for every Rajput State to create a standing army.

This was a serious symptom of the breakdown of the 'patriarchal' system.

Mewar had a force composed of Sindhi mercenaries; even the Rana's palace was guarded by them.

'In Mewar,' says Tod, 'the feud compact was too strong to tolerate it (*i.e.*, a standing army) till Pathan predatory bands, prowling amidst the ruins of Mughal despotism, were called in to partake in each family broil; the consequence was the weakening of all, and opening the door to a power stronger than any to be the arbiter of their fate'. The State's military resources naturally fluctuated with its revenues; but the princes maintained, in Tod's days, a 'foreign mercenary force' upon their 'fiscal revenues' (*i.e.*, income from the *Khalsa* lands) to 'overawe their own turbulent vassalage'. This force consisted chiefly of Rohilla and Afgan infantry, armed with muskets and matchlocks; and 'having cannon and sufficient discipline to act in a body', they were 'formidable to the Rajput cavaliers'. Raja Man Singh had a corps of 3,500 foot and 1,500 horse, with 25 guns, commanded by Hindal Khan, who was familiarly addressed as 'uncle'. In addition to the Muslim mercenaries there was in Marwar a brigade of 'monastic militants' or fighting *Sannyasis*, the *Bishanswamis*, consisting of 700 foot, 300 horse, and an establishment of rockets (*bhan*). The commanders of the mercenaries were not satisfied with monthly pay alone; 'lands to a considerable amount' were granted to them, as in Mewar. At one time the Raja of Jodhpur maintained a mercenary force consisting of 11,000 men. Apart from the financial strain imposed by these 'overgrown establishments' on the prince's 'fiscal revenues', the employment of Muslim mercenaries offended the Rajputs and widened the breach between the ruler and the ruled. The 'feudal contingents' were estimated at 5,000 horse, besides foot.

Jaipur adopted the practice of employing mercenaries to a greater extent. In 1803 the 'foreign' army of Jaipur was 13,000 strong, consisting of ten battalions of infantry with guns, a legion of 4,000 Nagas, a corps of *Aligols* (irregular infantry)²⁷ for police duties, and 700 cavalry. In addition, there was the regular contingent of 'feudal levies', numbering about 4,000 efficient horse. In spite of its numerical strength the standing

army of Jaipur was 'an ill paid band, neither respected at home nor feared abroad'.

In Bikaner the unpopularity of the ruler, Surat Singh, made it impossible for him to collect even one-half of the normal 'feudal levies'. The 'household troops' consisted of a battalion of 'foreign' infantry and three squadrons of horse, 'all under foreign leaders'. Of four such leaders one was a Muslim and one was a Sikh. The total strength of this force amounted to 1,700 foot and 679 horse, with 31 guns. There was a separate garrison at the capital under a Rajput commander.

In Jaisalmer there were *Sihbandis* or mercenaries in the fort, numbering about 1,000 and costing Rs. 75,000 annually.

Zalim Singh of Kotah also maintained 'foreign troops' under 'foreign leaders'. Dalil Khan and Mihrab Khan were his military advisers. The former built fortifications while the latter kept the infantry in 'a state of admirable discipline and efficiency'. Zalim Singh kept their pay in arrears presumably to prevent their defection.

Tod was aware of the historical importance of this vital change in the military system of the Rajput States. In former times the Rajput princes had not depended exclusively on the forces of their own 'feudal clans'; they took 'foreign Rajputs', *i.e.*, Rajputs belonging to other clans, in their pay, but 'still on the same tenure, holding lands for service'. The employment of soldiers on monthly pay was an innovation. These hired bands were entirely composed of infantry, having a slight knowledge of European tactics, the superiority of which, even over their high-minded cavaliers, they had so severely experienced in their encounters with the Marathas'. To this innovation, 'more than to the universal demoralisation which followed the breaking up of the (Mughal) empire', Tod attributes the 'rapid decay of feudal principles' throughout Rajasthan. The Purbia Rajputs, Sindhis, Religious endowments covered a large portion of the cultivable land. Practically in every State one-fifth of the soil was assigned for the support of the temples, the priests, the secular Brahmans, bards and genealogists. The Brahmans did not hesitate even to forge charters in order to increase the resources of their shrines. According to Tod, 'the grand charter of Nathdwara was a forgery, in which the prince's butler was bribed to aid'. In Kotah, says Tod, everything

'appertains to Kanhaiya (Krishna). "The prince has but the usufruct of the palace', for which a large amount was annually transmitted to the shrine.

VIII. Society

The Brahmins constituted a substantial section of the population of Mewar; in 1901 their number slightly exceeded that of the Rajputs. As indicated above, they enjoyed large grants of land; the princes as also the chiefs were generous towards them. They also received petty tithes from the agriculturists, and a small duty from the traders, corresponding with the scale of the village temple. In the eighteenth century the territorial assignments to the Brahmins sometimes included the prerogative of dispensing justice and of levying transit duties. Those Brahmins who did not exercise priestly functions could hold lands as 'vassals' like the Rajput chiefs, and they were entitled to hold political and administrative appointments. Nor were they wanting in energy or courage; 'the sword was as familiar to them as the *mala* (chaplet)'. The prince, says Tod, 'is often surrounded by lay Brahmins as confidential servants, in the capacities of butler, keeper of the wardrobe, or seneschal, besides the *Guru* or domestic chaplain, who to the duty of ghostly comforter sometimes joins that of astrologer and physician'. These *Gurus* and *Purohits*, having the education of the children, 'acquired immense influence'. A remarkable instance of the political influence of the Brahmins is found in the history of the reign of Man Singh of Marwar. He went mad, says Tod, 'from the murder of the high priest of Jalandhara, the epithet given to Kanhaiya in the State'.

Although the Jains were not numerically strong in any Rajput State, they occupied a very important place in commercial and political life. In Mewar the officers of the State and of revenue were chiefly of the Jain laity. To the same community belonged the majority of the bankers 'from Lahore to the ocean'. The chief magistrate and assessor of justice at Udaipur and most of the towns of Rajasthan were of this sect. 'As their voluntary duties are confined to civil cases, they are as competent in these as they are reverse in criminal cases, from their tenets forbidding the shedding of blood'.

Rajput women have always been respected and praised for their courage, but we know very little about their accomplishments. Although social custom condemned them to seclusion they were not altogether shut from the light and warmth of life. The itinerant bards were eloquent about their 'accomplishments' and 'personal perfections'. Tod says: Though invisible themselves, they can see...Placed behind screens, they see the youths of all countries, and there are occasions when permanent impressions are made, during tournaments and other martial exercises'. Tod knew that the position of Rajput women did not amount to a 'state of captivity'. He had sufficient knowledge of 'the' freedom, the respect, the happiness which Rajput women enjoy'.

Female immolation was one of the worst features of Rajput society. For *Sati*, or the burning of the wife on the funeral pyre of her husband, the authority of Hindu scriptures could be cited; but religion did not authorise infanticide. According to Tod, the laws which regulated marriage amongst the Rajputs powerfully promoted this horrible custom. Not only was intermarriage prohibited between families of the same sub-clan (*khamp*), but between those of the same tribe (*got*). Tod says: "... though centuries may have intervened since their separation and branches thus transplanted may have lost their original patronymic, they can never be redrafted on the original stem...: Every tribe has, therefore, to look abroad to a race distinct from its own, for suitors to the females'. Naturally the demand for dowry went on increasing till many Rajputs found it impossible to provide as much as was required in marrying their daughters to their equals in family status. They escaped social stigma by killing their infant daughters.

Even before Lord William Bentinck's reforms some enlightened and humane Rajput princes had tried to eradicate female infanticide; but the Rajputs were never 'sufficiently enamoured of despotism' to submit to State control over their private affairs. Sawai Jai Singh of Jaipur submitted to the ruler of every Rajput State a decree providing that the *daeja* (dower) and other expenses of marriage should not exceed one year's income of the girl's guardian. In Mewar this plan was frustrated by the vanity of the Salumbar chief, 'who expended on the marriage of his daughter a sum even greater than his sovereign

could have afforded, and to have his name blazoned by the bards and genealogists, he sacrificed the beneficent views of one of the wisest of the Rajput race'. Those who could create public opinion against lavish expenditure on marriages—*mangtas* (mendicants), bards, minstrels, jugglers, Brahmins—found their interest in stimulating the old practice, for they profited from liberality on these occasions. After the establishment of British paramountcy the views of the prince and the chiefs on infanticide became more humane than before; but even in 1859 a British officer wrote:...the expenses of marriage are as great as ever. Till these are reduced, we may expect that female infanticide will continue.³¹

The practice of *Sati* was common in Rajasthan. Rana Bhim Singh of Mewar, who died in 1828, was followed on the pyre by four wives and four concubines. Rana Sardar Singh (1838-42) was followed by one concubine. On the death of Rana Sarup Singh (1842-61) all his wives refused to burn themselves; at last a concubine was persuaded to follow the ancient custom. This is the last recorded case of *Sati* in Mewar.³² Raja Bishan Singh of Bundi, who died in 1821, ordered before his death that his wives should not follow him on the pyre.

Widow marriage was not unknown in Rajasthan although the Rajputs did not favour it. Zalim Singh of Kotah imposed a heavy tax on those widows who remarried. The Mers, an *ab original* tribe of the Ajmer region, practised widow marriage on a large scale. The facilities for separation were as simple as the marriage rites. Divorce was practised also by Gujars, Ahirs, Mallis and other Sudra tribes.³³

Addiction to opium was one of the most demoralising features of Rajput society. 'This pernicious plant', says Tod, 'has robbed the Rajput of half his virtues; and while it obscures these, it heightens his vices, giving to his natural bravery a character of insane ferocity, and to the countenance, which would, otherwise beam with intelligence, an air of imbecility'. To the Rajput opium was more necessary than food. A suggestion to the Rana of Mewar to tax it highly was most unpopular. But Tod, that gallant friend of the Rajputs, exacted promises from the rising generation that they would resist initiation on this vice, and many grew up in happy ignorance of the taste of opium.

Love of music played an important role in the social life of the Rajputs. Tod says: 'While the Maratha delights in the dissonant *drupad* which required a rapidity of utterance quite surprising, the Rajput reposes in his *tappa*, which conjoined with his opium, creates a paradise'.³⁴ Every Rajput chief had his band, vocal and instrumental. Rana Bhim Singh of Mewar was a great patron of music; but his resources were crippled, for Daulat Rao Sindhia carried away the most popular vocalists of Mewar.

Among the rulers and chiefs of Rajasthan there were persons interested in literary and scholarly pursuits. Rana Bhim Singh of Mewar had 'unlimited command of his pen', and his letters were admirable. Tod says: The prince who in Europe could quote Hesiod and Homer with the freedom that the Rana does on all occasions Vyasa and Valmiki, would be accounted a prodigy; and there is not a divine who would make application of the Ordinances of Moses with more facility than the Rana of those of their great law-giver Manu'. Zalim Singh, son of Raja Bijay Singh of Marwar, was deprived of his inheritance by domestic quarrels. He settled in Mewar; an estate was assigned to him by the Rana, his relative on the maternal side. Tod eulogises his devotion to the 'cultivation of letters' and says: 'He was versed in philosophical theology, astronomy, and the history of his country; and in every branch of poesy, from the sacred canticles of Jayadeva to the couplets of the modern bard, he was an adept. He composed and improvised with facility, and his residence was the rendezvous for every bard of fame'. On the whole, however, 'the cultivation of the mind, and the arts of polished life' declined as Rajasthan lost its prosperity. There was no patron like Sawai Jai Singh to whom the astronomer could look for reward. All those who could patronise bards and scholars lay prostrate under the heels of the Maratha invaders and the Pathan raiders.

III

Note on Tod's 'Annals'

The author of the *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan* was the son of an indigo-planter of Mirzapur (U.P.) and his maternal

uncles were officers in the East India Company's service. Born in 1782, James Tod entered the Company's Army as a cadet in 1798. In 1805 he was attached to the retinue of Graeme Mercer who represented the Company in the court of Daulat Rao Sindhia. Probably Mercer's influence attracted Tod's attention to the 'predatory' policy of the Marathas in Rajasthan. It was during the period of his connection with Sindhia's court that Tod began to take an active interest in political and historical matters. Between 1812 and 1817 he collected important data about the geography of Central India and Rajasthan, which were utilised by the Company's Army during the Pindari War and the Third Anglo Maratha War.

In 1813 Tod became Second Assistant to the Political Agent in Sindhia's court. At the end of the Third Anglo-Maratha War he was appointed Political Agent for the Western Rajput States. He retired in 1822, ostensibly on grounds of health, but really on account of the disapproval in high quarters of his pro-Rajput sentiments.³⁵

Whatever the reasons might be, Tod's official career had an unpleasant end. Presumably uninterrupted residence in India for 24 years affected his health. He had to face more than one attempt at assassination. He was promoted Lieutenant in 1800, Captain in 1813, Major in 1824 and Lieutenant-Colonel in 1826. He died in 1835.

It was after his retirement that Tod arranged the historical materials collected by him during his official career and put them in a literary shape. The two volumes of his *Annals and Antiquities* were published in London in 1829-32. The first volume was dedicated to King George IV in the dedication [20 June, 1829]. Tod expressed the hope that 'the signs of this ancient and interesting (Rajput) race for the restoration of their former independence, which it would suit our wisest policy to grant may be deemed not undeserving of Your Majesty's regard. In dedicating the second volume of King William IV Tod observed...it has been my endeavour to draw a faithful picture of states. the ruling principle of which is the paternity of the sovereign. That this patriarchal form is the best suited to the genius of the people may be presumed from its durability, which war, famine, and anarchy have failed to destroy...My prayer is, that neither the love of conquest, nor

false view of policy, may tempt us to subvert the independence of these States...These words indicate, in substance, Tod's general views on the Rajput political system and his comment on the Company's policy towards the Rajput States.

Tod's little known work, *Travels in Western India*, was published in 1839, after his death.

Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan is a voluminous work, covering 1835 pages in Crooke's three-volume edition. It deals with many matters which usually find no place in any historical work. It is an encyclopaedia on Rajasthan and the Rajputs. The traditional chivalry and generosity of the Rajputs captured Tod's imagination their sufferings, caused by the predatory raids of the Marathas, moved him. His real purpose was to introduce the Rajputs to the Western readers. Pure political history can never reveal the national characteristics of a people and give foreign readers a clear picture of their society and polity, their strength and weakness. To understand a people one must know something about the geography of their homeland, their economic resources and political system, their social organization as also religious ideas and practices, their cultural traditions and heritage. Tod took up his pen with a view to presenting the Rajputs to his countrymen against such a comprehensive background. He worked hard from 1812 to 1822 for collection of materials from different sources. He made careful investigations in different parts of Rajasthan and Central India with the assistance of local scholars. To travel in the mountains and desert of Rajasthan was no pleasant or easy task in those days. Tod's covered a wide ground at the cost of much personal discomfort. Readers of his *Personal Narrative*³⁶ and *Sketch of the Indian Desert*³⁷ (which are parts of *Annals and Antiquities*) and *Travels in Western India* cannot but be impressed by his earnestness for collecting useful data through personal observation and investigation.

Let us refer, first, to the geography of Rajasthan. Tod did not deal with this important subject systematically; repetitions are too frequent in his scattered narrative. The chapter on *Geography of Rajasthan or Rajputana*³⁸ gives an interesting account of the preparation of the first complete map of Rajasthan. The ignorance of the Company's Government about the geography of Rajasthan would be clear from Tod's observation. In the

maps prior to 1806 nearly all the Western and Central States of Rajasthan will be found wanting.' The geographical horizon of the British officers of those days did not extend much beyond the western border of Central India. It was due primarily to Tod's careful and laborious investigations that 'in 1815, for the first time, the geography of Rajasthan was put into combined form and presented to the Marquess of Hastings.' To be sure, this 'combined form' left much to be desired so far as accuracy and completeness were concerned. But Tod is entitled to credit as the pioneer of geographical explorations in Rajasthan.

The twenty-one chapters of Tod's *Personal Narrative* give us a miscellaneous collection of geographical, historical, sociological and religious data. It is a pleasant and instructive travel diary.

The two chapters of Tod's *Sketch of the Indian Desert* contain a detailed account of a little known region of India. Though primarily of geographical interest, the *Sketch* throws some light on historical and sociological development in that wild tract.

Apart from these general geographical accounts, Tod added geographical notes to historical sketches of different Rajput States. His description of Mewar, Bikaner, Jaisalmer and Amber give the uninitiated reader a rough but useful picture of the geo-graphical background of Rathor, Bhatti and Kachhwa history. The scientific study of geography had not yet begun, and Tod was not a trained geographer. But he displayed unusual interest and commendable discrimination in the collection and presentation of geographical data. It was not only to meet contemporary political and military requirements that Tod took so much trouble for geographical excursions. He was aware of the close connection between geography and history; he did not lose sight of the geographical background of historical developments.

Tod was deeply interested in the economic resources of Rajasthan.³⁹ The nature and productivity of land, agricultural and industrial products, rainfall, commercial commodities, trade routes; these are some of the subjects to which Tod refers again and again in different chapters. His discussion is not comprehensive, but it is factual. Here he did not depend on "opium-eaters' tales". He collected his data from official records as also from personal observation. Rajasthan is not a fertile, well watered, prosperous tract of productive land. Agricultural

production demands hard and persistent struggle against nature. Hills and desert cover a large part of Rajasthan; cultivable land is naturally limited. So the heroes of Rajasthan — as well as the cultivators — prized their *bapota* (ancestral land) over all earthly possessions, and no adventure or crime was too big a risk for acquisition of land. Trade and commerce were monopolised by a particular class constituting a small section of the population; the armoured knight would not condescend to play the role of a *bania*. These peculiarities of the socio-economic system of Rajasthan did not escape Tod's notice. But his attention was concentrated merely on the collection of facts; he never tried to establish the correlation between apparently isolated facts and the evolution of Rajput society and polity. Of course, this fundamental defect must be excused in the case of a non-professional historian like Tod, writing in an age which knew nothing of economic history. Grant Duff and Cunningham did not consider it necessary to deal with the economic resources of the Marathas and the Sikhs respectively. We should be grateful to Tod for the facts—however incomplete or haphazardly arranged—which he has left on record for use by later writers.⁴⁰

The social and religious conditions in Rajasthan also attracted Tod's attention. In his *Sketch of a Feudal System in Rajasthan*⁴¹ he discusses the relations between the 'feudal' chiefs and the ruler of the State and deals with the different categories of slavery. There are scattered references to the influence of social classification on economic activities, e.g., agriculture, industry, trade and commerce. In course of his descriptive surveys of different Rajput States he gives statistical information on the numerical strength, comparative importance etc. of different classes of the population.⁴² He was interested in the origin of the terrible ceremony of *Jauhar*, the burning of widows and infanticide. He noticed how infanticide was connected with some peculiar social prejudices.⁴³ On the place of women in Rajput society he observes:

"... there are few of the lowest chieftains whose daughters are not instructed both to read and write ... but of their intellect, and knowledge of mankind, whoever has had to converse with a Rajputani guardian of her son's right, must

draw a very different conclusion. Though excluded by the Salic law of India from governing, they are declared to be fit regents during minority; and the history of India is filled with anecdotes of the able and valiant females in this capacity."

Even, the neglected hill tribes of Rajasthan—the Bhils, Mers, and Minas—did not escape Tod's sympathetic attention. His narrative contains much information about them although his observations are scattered and incidental.*

Tod devoted four long chapters to a descriptive survey of religion in Rajputana.⁴⁵ He collected interesting details about the comparative influence of different gods and goddesses, gift of land to Brahmins in the name of religion, Brahminical influence on society and government, religious practices and festivals etc.

Jainism was flourishing faith in Rajasthan. The Jain community occupied a prominent place in trade, commerce and administration. Judges who professed Jainism were opposed to capital punishment.

Although Rajasthan was the classic land of orthodoxy and religious zeal, the Rajput mind did not succumb to the communal frenzy. A mosque built during the reign of Aurangzeb at Merta in Marwar was found by Tod in well-preserved condition. The thirty years war of the Rathors against the intolerant policy of the Emperor did not affect the safety of the mosque. Tod says: 'Such is Hindu toleration, that a marble is placed, inscribed both in Hindi and Persian, to protect the mosque from violence.'⁴⁶

In spite of their apparently all-consuming interest in fighting and the stern qualities associated with chivalry, the Rajputs did not lose interest in the softer side of life. Art, music, poetry and philosophy attracted them and added grace to their character. Referring to Rathor prince of Marwar Tod says: 'He was versed in philosophical theology, astronomy and the history of his country; and in every branch of poesy, from the sacred canticles of the modern bard, he was an adept. He composed and improvised with facility, and his residence was the rendezvous for every bard of fame.'

Tod did not look upon the Rajput as a mere warrior; he viewed Rajput life as a whole. While he appreciated the heroism

of the Rajput cavalier he did not shut his eyes to the demora-lising effect of addiction to opium upon the Rajput character.⁴⁷ He knew how the depredations of the Marathas had affected the cultural traditions and political institutions of Rajasthan.

His critical far-sight did not extend to the basic defects of the socio-economic and political system of the Rajputs. That the 'patriarchal' monarchy to which he paid his tribute (in his dedication of the second volume of his great work) was a weak and politically imperfect framework for the Rajput State, he did not realise. He was almost blind to the injustice and human suffering associated with a rigid social system dominated by tradition. He attributed the breakdown of Rajasthan's economic structure to the 'predatory' raids of the Marathas only, over-looking altogether the effects of the scarcity of cultivable land and the traditional caste monopoly of trade and commerce.

Still we must remember that Tod was the only British historical writer of those days who did not confine his attention to princely battles and oligarchical squabbles. He tried to put his facts in the wider perspective of history, although he was often unaware of the cause-and-effect relation of the data collected by him. He failed to make a critical analysis of the deep-rooted reasons behind Rajasthan's loss of independence despite the reckless courage of the Rajput 'feudal' class. He never asked himself why the Rajputs could not build an empire as the Marathas did. The fierce light of the Rajput knight's self-sacrifice the glitter of his shining sword dazzled Tod's eyes and almost benumbed his judgment. No wonder the modern student of Rajput history respect him as a collector of facts but does not recognize him as a critical historian or a discriminating judge of Rajput character. Perhaps Tod himself was conscious that he was not fulfilling the rigorous demands of history. He called his book *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan*—not *History of Rajasthan*. There is a clear distinction between the work of Tod and the works of Grant Duff and Cunningham although the three writers deal with three Indian groups linked together by some common historical peculiarities. Tod's canvas was larger even if his utilisation of sources was less critical. But the writing of annals is an art which serves the cause of history and cannot,

therefore, be ignored by the most discerning and fastidious historian.

The strictly historical portion of Tod's work begins with a discussion of the problem of the origin of the Rajputs.⁴⁰ Naturally, the discussion and the conclusion which it led to could not be based on critical analysis of scientifically acceptable data. Epigraphic evidence was not yet available, nor could the traditions connected with the ruling dynasties of Tod's days be scrutinised in the light of the traditions relating to those dynasties which had been swallowed up by Turkish invasions. He connected current traditions with some social and religious peculiarities of the Rajputs and came to the conclusion that they were of 'Scythian' origin. Though this hypothesis is not historically correct, it has a clear historical significance. Tod did not accept the traditional claim of the Rajputs to Aryan or Kshatriya descent. He labelled them as descendants of foreign invading races grouped together under the misleading term 'Scythian'. Although the problem remains more or less unsolved even to this day, the foreign origin of at least a section of the Rajputs is a generally accepted proposition. Thus Tod may be said to have anticipated the result of later researches although he had to work on the basis of palpably incomplete data.

Of all the Rajput States Tod had special affection for Mewar. Although Mewar was not the leading State of Rajasthan in his days he devoted much more space to the glories of Guhilots than to those of any other clan. In Crooke's edition the Annals of Mewar (exclusive of the survey of religion society, economic conditions, etc.) cover 341 pages; the Annals of Marwar cover 193 pages and those of Amber cover 113 pages. Although the history of Mewar runs to much earlier days than the history of the Rathors and the Kachhwas, no political observer in the early nineteenth century would have overlooked the patent fact that, politically speaking, Marwar and Jaipur were the premier States of Rajasthan and were entitled to the historian's attention in a greater measure than Mewar. While the Rathors and the Kachhwas had prospered under the generous shadow of Mughal patronage the Ranas of Mewar deliberately kept themselves isolated from the favours of the Imperial Court. Tod, however, was much more interested in the Rajasthan of pre-Mughal days—days of independence and of unfettered chivalry—than in the

devastated, miserable politically crippled Rajasthan of his own time. His affection for Rajput character was repelled by the vices prevalent in contemporary Rajasthan and he discovered imaginary idols in the annals of the past. To his hungry imagination pre-Mughal Rajasthan was a reality and Mewar—the typical symbol of vanished glory—was an object worthy of adoration. The epic portion of Tod's narrative relates to Mewar; the story of Jaipur is a mere epilogue which was written for current political purposes.

Tod's historical survey is prefaced by a discussion of the sources used by him.⁴⁹ He had to rely mainly on the 'heroic poems' composed by Rajput bards. He was not unaware of the defects of these poetical annals. He says, "... there is a sort of compact or understanding between the bards and the princes, a barter of solid pudding against empty praise, whereby the fidelity of the poetic chronicle is somewhat impaired." He continues: "A material drawback upon, the value of *these baric* histories is, that they are confined almost exclusively to the material exploits of their heroes, and to the *rang-ran-bhum*, or 'field of slaughter'. Writing for the amusement of a warlike race, the authors disregard civil matters and the arts and pursuits of peaceful life; love and war are their favourite themes." He points out another defect: "...the bard ... enters too deeply into the intrigues, as well as the laxities, of the court, to be qualified to pronounce a sober judgment upon its acts'.

The care and love of historical truth shown by Tod in his frank criticism of the bardic poems deserve attention today by students of medieval Rajput history. The question may be asked: Why did Tod construct his narrative on the basis of such untrustworthy materials? Two answers are readily available. First, no better materials were available in Tod's days. Presumably Tod did not venture to call his work *History* because he had to depend mainly on defective annals. Secondly, he could not ignore the qualities of the 'heroic' poems because, as he himself says 'the works of the native bards afford many valuable data, in facts, incidents, religious opinions, and traits of manners; many of which, being carelessly introduced, are thence to be regarded as the least suspicious kind of historical evidence.'

Apart from the 'heroic poems' available in Tod's days—

others have come to light since then—Tod utilised materials of different kinds which he describes as follows:

“Raesas or poetical legends of princes ..., local Puranas, religious comments, and traditionary couplets; with authorities of a less dubious character, namely, inscriptions, ‘cut on the rock,’ coins, copper-plate grants, containing characters of immunities, and expressing many singular features of civil government.”

Although Tod refers to inscriptions, coins and copper-plate grants, the number collected and utilised by him must have been quite small. During the period of his residence in Central India and Rajasthan the prevailing political conditions were not at all favourable to search for and collection of such historical materials. Again, the scientific study of epigraphic and numismatic sources had not yet begun and proper utilisation of such sources, even when these were available, was not possible. Tod himself knew little of the difficult art of deciphering and interpreting inscriptions and coins, nor could he expert guidance in such studies. Naturally he took greater interest in the collection of literary materials (which could be easily interpreted by local scholars and bards), including official records, than in the search for epigraphic and numismatic data. He says: ‘For a period of ten years I was employed, with the aid of a learned Jain, in ransacking every work which could contribute any facts or incidents to the history of the Rajputs, or diffuse any light upon their manners and character.’

Tod's historical narrative has lost much of its value for the modern student simply because it is not based on authentic epigraphic and numismatic sources. This defect is noticeable particularly in the case of early history of the Rajput dynasties. For example, epigraphic sources provide the most reliable information about the history of Mewar till the days of Rana Kumbha. But Tod was unable to utilise these sources, and necessity compelled him to depend primarily on ‘heroic poems’ which are no better than “opium-eaters’ tales” so far at least as this period is concerned. Consequently, Tod's chapters on the early history of Mewar are almost useless.

From the thirteenth century onwards the Persian chronicles

made references to the affairs to the Rajput States in connection with the gradual Turkish penetration into Rajasthan. Tod did not use these chronicles and naturally he fell into curious errors in dealing with the relations between the Rajputs and the rulers of Delhi. For example, he could have left for us a realistic account of Ala-ud-din Khalji's sack of Chittor if he had been familiar with Amir Khusrau's *Khazaim-ul-Futuh*; the sixteenth century romance *Padmavat*, composed by Malik Muhammad Jaysi would not have coloured his imagination and made the highly exaggerated, if not altogether baseless, legend of Padmini the centre of his narrative. Similarly, acquaintance with Abul Fazl's *Akbar-Nama* would have enabled him to give a more accurate and complete account of Rana Pratap Singh's struggle against Akbar. Had he studied the Persian source relating to Jahangir's reign he might have revised his condemnation of Amar Singh and placed the treaty of 1615 in its proper perspective. If he knew the correct dates of the death of the Syed brothers he would not have connected them with the murder of Ajit Singh of Marwar. A thorough study of Persian historical literature is indispensable for every student of medieval Indian history, including the history of the Rajputs specially during the Mughal period. Here Tod's equipment was extremely unsatisfactory.

In the eighteenth century the Rajputs came into contact—hostile contact—with the Marathas. In the history of Rajasthan the sponsors of *Hindu pad Padshahi* are mere plunderers, not liberators or builders of a Hindu empire on Mughal ruins. Tod was bitter about the Marathas; he exceeded the limits of balanced historical judgement in his condemnation of their 'predatory' raids in Rajasthan. The reasons are not far to seek. It was not easy for the average British officer to judge the Marathas in those days except in the light of their hostility towards the Company flag. For a friend of the Rajputs the Marathas were open to double condemnation. Tod shared fully the jealousy and hatred which the Rajput felt for the 'Deccani spoliators'. Moreover, Tod's lack of familiarity with Marathi news-letters made it impossible for him to look at the affairs of Rajasthan from the Maratha point of view. Official records relating to Rajput-Maratha relations must have been available in the archives of the Rajput States in Tod's days, but there is no

indication that he desired or tried to get access to them. For this reason his chapters on political developments in the Rajput States in the eighteenth century lack in completeness and accuracy. These have been corrected and supplemented by Sir J.N. Sarkar in his *Fall of the Mughal Empire*.

For political reasons Tod did not discuss in detail the political transactions between the Rajput States and the East India Company. He had personal knowledge of some of these transactions. He had access to official records. He might have, if he had so desired, left for us a complete and authentic account of the establishment of British suzerainty over the principalities of Rajasthan. But, unlike Grant Duff and Cunnigham, he preferred silence, although he did not hesitate to give occasional indication of his disapproval of official policy which appeared to him to be unkind to the gallant Rajputs. As we have seen, in the dedication of the second volume he expressed himself against the subversion of the independence of the Rajput States. Elsewhere he protested more directly against the Company's interpretation of its treaties with the Rajput princes. He spoke of 'a perpetual variation between the spirit and the letter of every treaty,' and regretted 'our anomalous and inconsistent interference in some cases, our non-interference in others.'

Tod was not in favour of British interference in the internal affairs of the Rajput States, nor could he approve the imposition of heavy tribute which impoverished their exchequers. He wanted to reconcile the Company's supremacy with the age-old political institutions and social arrangements of the Rajputs. But he could not realise that those institutions had lost their vitality and those arrangements had become anachronistic. The spirit of the age and the basic features of foreign rule were altogether inconsistent with the full survival of the old order in Rajasthan. Friendly sympathy clouded Tod's historical judgement and political vision.

Notes and References

1. G.N Sharma, *Social Life in Medieval Rajasthan*, p. 1.
2. Brookes, *History of Mewar*, pp. 54-55.
3. Political Consultations, 5 Aug 1809, No. 1. (abbreviated in the

- following pages as P.C.).
4. *The State of Europe during the Middle Ages.*
 5. Chiefs of Sadri, Bedia, Kothana, Salumbar, Ghanerao, Bijolia Deograh, Begun, Delwara, Amet, Gogunda, Kanor, Bhindar Bednore, Bansi, Parsoli, Bhainsror, Kurabar. The chiefs of Bansi and Parsoli had lost their influence and those of Bhainsror and Kurabar 'took rank' on their 'depression'.
 6. A plot of land which one man could water and one plough could cultivate.
 7. Maitland, *Constitutional History of England*, p. 24.
 8. *Ibid.*
 9. See the account of the death of the Chief of Nimaj in *Annals of Marwar* and the description of the Sheogarh feud in *Tod's Personal Narrative*.
 10. See the story of Bhindir in *Tod's Personal Narrative*.
 11. Vol I, pp.59-60.
 12. Maitland, *op. cit.*, pp. 23-24, 143-44.
 13. Subimal Chandra Dutt, 'Rajput Polity', *The Guardian* (Calcutta), 22 August 1931.
 14. *Tod's Personal Narrative*.
 15. Brookes, *op. cit.*, p. 54.
 16. G.D. Sharma, 'Rajput Polity', p. 293.
 17. J.N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. I, p. 130.
 18. Beveridge, *Memoir of Babur*, Section III, pp. 561-67.
 19. J.N. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 131.
 20. G.D. Sharma, *op. cit.*, p. 9.
 21. See G.D. Sharma, *op. cit.*, specially Chapter 5.
 22. Malcolm, *Memoir of Central India*, Vol. I, pp. 549-50.
 23. Brookes, *op. cit.*, p. 3.
 24. Erskine, *Rajputana Gazetteer*, Vol. IIA, p. 53.
 25. *Tod's Personal Narrative*.
 26. *Ibid.*
 27. See W. Irwine, *Army of the Indian Moghuls*, p. 164.
 28. This may be an indication of the Brahmin origin of the ruling family of Mewar.
 29. He wrote a commentary called *Rasikpriya* on the well known Vaishnava lyric *Gita Gobindam* by the Bengali poet Jaidev.
 30. The Ranas of Mewar claimed descent from Rama, the hero of the *Ramayana*, who belonged to the solar dynasty.
 31. Brookes, *op. at.*, p. 97.
 32. Erskine, *op. cit.*, pp. 26-27.
 33. *Tod's Personal Narrative*.
 34. *Ibid*

35. *Proceedings of Indian Historical Records Commission, Udaipur session.*
36. Crooke, Vol. II, pp. 760-914; Vol. III, pp. 1621-1827.
37. Crooke, Vol. III, pp. 1257-1325.
38. Crooke, Vol. I, pp. 1-22.
39. Crooke, Vol. III, pp. 1104,1145-47,1248; III, pp. 1428-31.
40. Crooke, Vol. III, pp. 1106-12,1150-56,1246-49; Vol. III, pp. 1430-31.
41. Crooke, Vol. I, pp. 153-254.
42. Crooke, Vol. II, pp. 1104-06, 1146-49, 1243-49, 1242-43, 1252-56; Vol. III, pp. 1428-30.
43. Crooke, Vol. II, p. 741.
44. Crooke, Vol. II, pp. 789-97.
45. Crooke, Vol. II, pp. 589-706.
46. Crooke, Vol. II, p. 855.
47. Crooke, Vol. II, pp. 749-50.
48. Crooke, Vol. I, pp. 23-96.
49. Crooke, Vol. I, pp. Ivii-bxiii.

11

Mewar

1. Political Decline

During the reign of Rana Sangram Singh¹ Mewar became the most powerful Hindu principality in western India. In Rajput tradition he is described as *Hindupat* (chief of the Hindus). His greatest Muslim antagonist, Babur, places him next only to the ruler of Vijaynagar among the Hindu princes of India and speaks of him as a 'pagan' fighting against 'Islam-guarded soldiers'. His power was recognized by the neighbouring rulers; we read in Babur's *Memoirs* that 'not' one of all the exalted sovereigns of this wide such as the Sultan of Delhi, the Sultan of Gujarat and the Sultan of Mandu could cope with this evil-dispositioned one, without the help of other pagans; one and all they cajoled him and temporized with him'. Within Rajasthan his ascendancy was almost complete. Tod says: "The princes of Marwar and Amber did him homage, and the Raos of Gwalior, Ajmer, Sikh, Raising, Kalpi, Chanderi, Bundi, Gagrun, Rampura and Abu served him as tributaries or held of him in chief. It is difficult to verify this statement, but Babur's list of Hindu chiefs killed at Khanua included Chandrabhan Chauhan, Bhupat Rao of Chanderi, Manik Chauhan, Dilpat Rao, Cangu Shah and Daukusi, each of whom was 'a splendid and magnificent chieftain'.

Among the causes of Sangram Singh's defeat at Khanua

(1527) his ascendancy over other Rajput principalities was by no means the least important. Normally it should have been a source of strength; but it became a source of weakness because it wounded the clan sentiment of the average Rajput. No Rajput chief could wholeheartedly accept the hegemony of a ruler who belonged to a different clan. As Babur says: '... the rajas and *rais* of high degree, who obeyed him in this battle, and the governors and commanders who were amongst his followers in this conflict, had not obeyed him in any earlier fight, or, out of their own dignity, had been friendly with him.' He was trying to impose on the Rajputs a new type of political unity which was basically inconsistent with their traditional political-cum-social system. There was no cohesion in his large army which, according to Babur, consisted of more than two *lakhs* of men but was no more than a 'rabble'. He was usually followed into the field, says Tod, by 'eighty thousand horse, seven Rajas of the highest rank, nine Raos, and one hundred and four chieftains bearing the titles of Rawal and Rawat, with five hundred war elephants'. With such numerical strength behind him he suffered a decisive defeat at Khanua although Babur's 'reliable kernel of fighting strength cannot but have been numerically insignificant, compared with the Rajput host'.

Sangaram Singh's plan to continue the struggle against Babur irritated his ministers. Unwilling to continue the apparently hopeless resistance to the Mughals, they administered poison to him. His death left Mewar weaker than he had found her at his accession. The political vicissitudes through which Mewar passed during the next three decades were due to two factors: dissensions in the ruling family and the aggressions of the Muslim rulers. After the consolidation of the Mughal power in the early years of Akbar the tradition initiated by Sangram Singh—resistance to the new imperial power—was revived by Udai Singh and continued for three generations. It was an unequal struggle between a powerful empire and a petty principality, and it could have only one end. That the end was delayed was due to the persistence of Udai Singh, Pratap Singh and Amar Singh; but the rulers alone could not have achieved such success without the willing co-operation of the people upon whom fell the pressure of Mughal military efforts for half a century.

Mewar's refusal to submit to Mughal supremacy cut it off from the other Rajput principalities which found security under the Mughal banner. But this obstinate isolation had its reward in the terms which Jahangir offered to Amar Singh in 1615. Although the Rana recognized the Emperor's suzerainty and promised to supply a contingent of 1,000 horse for imperial service, he was granted some special concessions. The entire territory seized by the Mughals since the days of Akbar was restored to him; but the fort of Chittor was not to be strengthened or even repaired. The Rana would not be required like other vassal Rajput princes to enter into matrimonial relations with the imperial family. He would not be required like other vassal princes to attend the imperial court in person; he would be represented by his eldest son who would become a Mughal *mansabdar*. Jahangir's generosity in respect of presents offered to Karan Singh, Amar Singh's eldest son, created an impression in the mind of Sir Thomas Roe, the British envoy, that 'the peace was bought rather than won'.

Henceforth Mewar occupied a special position within the Mughal imperial structure. This arrangement affected the position of its rulers in several directions. It was during the Mughal period that Mewar lost its old pre-eminence among the Rajput States. Amber and Jodhpur rose to prominence under the Mughals, for their rulers rendered conspicuous services to the empire for more than a century and a half. But the Ranas of Mewar kept themselves at a distance from the splendour and politics of Delhi and Agra even after the treaty with Jahangir, and thereby lost the advantage which fell to successful Rajput generals and courtiers. 'The Maharana of Udaipur, in spite of his pre-eminent descent, was a negligible factor of the Hindu population of the Mughal world, as he hid himself among his mountain fastnesses and never appeared in the Mughal court or camp'.³ A heavy price had to be paid for this proud isolation. In the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries we find the princes of Amber and Marwar playing an important role in the imperial court while the Rana of Mewar was deliberately pushing himself into the background.

This loss of prestige could not but affect the Rana's power and influence in his own State. There were other factors also

which contributed to his weakness. In pre-Mughal times it was the custom to change the estates (called 'fiefs' by Tod) of the nobles after a few years, so that none of them might acquire strong local influence. They attended the Rana's court and tried to satisfy him by loyal service, for it was to him—and to him alone—that they had to look for preferment. During the long struggle against the Mughal Empire this custom was changed in a way favourable to the nobles. The Ranas were on numerous occasions driven away from the plains and compelled to take refuge in the hills. During these periods of confusion they could not transfer the nobles from one 'fief' to another, for most of the 'fiefs' were virtually under the control of the Mughal garrisons scattered throughout the State. On the conclusion of permanent peace with the Mughal Government in 1615 most of the nobles found themselves in possession of fixed States from which the Ranas could no longer dislodge or transfer them. Thus cells of consolidated local influence grew up and the ruler's overall control over his territory was weakened. Moreover, the loyalty and self-sacrifice of the nobles during the long struggle against the Mughals induced the Ranas to load them with honours and to increase their estates. Thus in the seventeenth century the position of the nobility became stronger than ever before.

As a curious by-product of the treaty with Jahangir there was a significant promotion of the nobles in their rank in the Rana's court. Captain Brookes wrote in 1859: 'In the Durbar, they (*i.e.*, the nobles) take rank above the heir-apparent, a custom unprecedented in India, and granted in consequence of the heir-apparent having attended the Emperor's Court. When a chief enters the presence, the entire court, including the prince, rises to receive him, and the whole ceremonial is ... intricate...'³ The submission to the Mughals was considered to be a stigma, and its effect as a psychological irritant was felt in internal institutions.

Despite such accession of strength to the nobility, the personal ability and character of a ruling prince were crucial factors in determining the balance of power within the State. Tod draws a contrast between Raj Singh (1652-80), who was able to 'infuse by his talent and energy patriotic sentiments

into all his subordinates', and his son successor Jai Singh (1680-98), who 'lowered her (i.e., Mewar) to a stage of contempt from which no talent could subsequently raise her'.

Apart from the personal ability' of the ruling prince which was an incalculable factor, there was another factor which proved to be an effective restriction on the power of the nobles in Mewar. It was their large financial liability. They had to provide food, clothing and opium for all their needy relations, even those most remotely connected with them. The size of an estate was no real criterion of its owner's affluence, for the owner of a larger estate might be encumbered with more than the average number of dependants. The situation took a favourable turn for the nobles in the eighteenth century, when the weakness of the Ranas and the confusion created by the inroads of the Marathas enabled many of them to encroach upon the crown estates and thereby increase their own income. The system of spoliation was sometimes carried to absurd length. It is said that the Chief of Lawah plundered even the covering of the Rana's sole elephant.⁴

The old tradition of resistance to the Mughals was revived towards the close of Raj Singh's reign; it was a reaction against Aurangzeb's short-sighted policy towards Marwar after the death of Jaswant Singh. The struggle was neither long nor decisive; Jai Singh concluded a hasty peace. Instead of trying to improve the administration and economy of the State he passed his days in voluptuous indolence. His eldest son, Amar Singh, supported by a section of the nobility, rose in rebellion; but a compromise was arranged when the Rathors threatened to occupy Godwar. The quarrel between father and son 'much impaired the moral strength of the country', for it involved the nobles, and 'counteracted the advantages which might have resulted from the decline of the Mughal power' in the reigns of Amar Singh II (1698-1710) and his successor, Sangram Singh II (1710-34). While the rulers of Marwar and Jaipur extended their possessions, 'Mewar confined her ambition to the control of her ancient feudatories of Abu, Idar, and the petty States which grew out of her, Dungarpur and Banswara'. The Rana 'fell back into complete isolation and obscurity'. Although 'his unrivalled social status and the mythical glamour of his blood

remained', in the political field the primacy among the Rajputs was contested between the Kachhwah and the Rathor.⁵

Tod ascribes the political decline of Mewar during this period to two causes. First, 'she dreaded amalgamating with the imperial court, and preferred political inferiority to the of principle'. Secondly, the 'internal feuds' of her 'two great clans'—the Saktawats and the Chundawats—'also operated against her aggrandizement'. The rulers of Mewar had not the foresight to understand the traditional 'dread' of 'amalgamating with the imperial court' had lost much of its old meaning in the context of the obvious decline of the empire after the death of Aurangzeb (1707). Nor were they strong enough to suppress the 'internal feuds' of the 'two great clans' which sometimes rose to the level of a civil war.

In 1710 Aurangzeb's successor, Bahadur Shah, alarmed by a Sikh rising under Banda in the Punjab, concluded peace with the Rajput princes who, he knew, would not be very troublesome if they were left in quiet possession of their territories. 'In the succeeding years the rise of the Maratha power in the south and its projection into Malwa exposed the Rajput States to a new and grave danger. Henceforth it was the hostility of the aggressive Marathas—not of the declining Mughals—which was to be feared. Rana Sangram Singh II was, according to Tod, a patriarchal ruler, wise, just and inflexible, steady in his application to business, regulating public and private expenditure, and even the sumptuary laws'. But he completely failed to grasp the implications of the Maratha advance into Malwa which began in the closing years of his reign.

With a very convenient starting point in Malwa, the Marathas began their raids in Rajasthan, with Bundi as their first target, in 1734. In 1736 Peshwa Baji Rao personally appeared on the southern frontier of Mewar. The terrified Rana, Jagat Singh (1734-51), welcomed him at Udaipur. A treaty followed, stipulating an annual tribute of 160,000 rupees. This amount was divided into three equal shares assigned to Holkar, Sindhia and Puar; the management was entrusted to Holkar, and subsequently to Sindhia. Thus these two Maratha chiefs secured a grip over Mewar. To cover the tribute the *Banhada pargana* was ceded.

This warning should have been taken seriously and the limited resources of Mewar should have been mobilised for defence against further Maratha aggression. But Jagat Singh involved himself in the war of succession in Jaipur which followed the death of Sawai Jai Singh in 1743. No territorial or other interest of Mewar was involved; the Rana fought in support of one of the contestants, Madho Singh, whose mother was a Mewar princess. The Sisodias, says Tod, "did not evince in the battle of Rajmahal (1747) that gallantry which must have its source in moral strength; they were defeated and tied. The Rana vented his indignation in a galling sarcasm; he gave the sword of State to a common courtesan to carry in procession, 'it was a woman's weapon in these degenerate times': a remark the degrading severity of which made a lasting impression in the decline of Mewar". The flourishing commercial mart of Bhilwara was plundered. The whole of Rajasthan was then suffering from a terrible famine. Men could not get water even for washing their faces. The Rana decided to leave Udaipur and go to the bank of the Dhebar lake.⁷ Unable to continue the war, he concluded a humiliating peace.

During the reign of Pratap Singh II (1754-6V) the repeated depredations of the Marathas so exhausted this country that the Rana was compelled to ask pecuniary aid from the Brahman collector of the tribute, to enable him to marry the Rathor chieftain's daughter'. His successor, Raj Singh II, was a minor at the time of his succession, and he died before attaining majority. This naturally aggravated the internal chaos in Mewar and made the State a defenceless prey to the Marathas. In 1757 Raghunath Rao took a ransom of one lakh from Jawad and plundered Ranikheda. In 1758 Jankoji Sindhia imposed an extra contribution on the Rana. In 1759 the Peshwa directed Malhar Rao Holkar to put pressure on the Rana for prompt payment.⁸

The Maratha disaster at Panipat (January 1761) was followed by Jaipur's half-hearted attempts to rid Rajasthan of the Maratha terror. Mewar, distracted by minority rule and internal feuds, impoverished by the heavy contributions imposed by the Marathas, failed to utilise this opportunity. The Marathas did not take long to recover their lost prestige. Within a few months of the battle of Panipat Malhar Rao Holkar took upon himself the task of restoring Maratha authority in Malwa and Rajasthan.

During the first four years of the reign of Ari Singh II (1761-73) Mewar was not troubled by the Marathas. In 1765 Mahadji Sindhia realised five lakhs from him. Next year he had to promise payment of rupees 26,30,221 in four years.⁹

Ari Singh's 'ungovernable temper' and 'insolent demeanour' alienated the majority of the nobles and caused a disastrous war of succession which offered the Marathas a fresh opportunity of squeezing money out of impoverished Mewar. The disaffected nobles set up a 'youth' named Ratan Singh, declared to be the posthumous son of Raj Singh II, as a rival claimant for the throne. Although there were strong grounds to question the legitimacy of this pretender, his cause was supported by Bijay Singh of Jodhpur and Prithvi Singh of Jaipur.¹⁰ Only five out of the sixteen great chiefs of Mewar stood by Ari Singh.

In 1769 Mahadji Sindhia and Tukoji Holkar appeared near Udaipur to put the pretender on the throne of Mewar.¹¹ But differences soon arose between these two Maratha chiefs, as a result of which Tukoji Holkar left Mewar. Mahadji Sindhia thought it better to give up the cause of Ratan Singh, who had no money, and to support Ari Singh, who was prepared to pay 64 lakhs of rupees. Of this amount, 33 lakhs had to be paid immediately; for the balance, the districts of Jawad Jiran, Nimach and Morwan were set aside, to be administered jointly by Rajput and Maratha officers. This arrangement continued till 1774 when Sindhia dismissed the Rana's officers and took these districts under his sole management. Later on Morwan was made over to Holkar, who seized Nimbahera as well. The attempt to take 64 lakhs of rupees in cash from the Kingdom of Mewar in its then condition was as hopeful of success as a plan to draw blood out of stone. It only left a sore perpetually open between the Maharana and the house of Sindhia.¹²

Apart from the virtual cession of a large tract to the Marathas, Mewar passed through a further stage of territorial disintegration in Ari Singh's troubled reign: Bijay Singh of Jodhpur seized the 'rich province of Godwar'.¹³ The next Rana, Hamir Singh II (1773-78), was a minor. His mother supported by the Saktawats assumed control of affairs of State; she was opposed by the Chundawats whose chief had been murdered by Ari Singh. The mercenary Sindhi troops, whose services had

been utilised by Ari Singh against his rival Ratan Singh, joined the feud. Tod says, '...the demoralization of Mewar was complete: her fields were deluged with blood, and her soil was the prey of every paltry marauder'. The rebellion of one of the Chundawat chieftains in 1774 compelled the queen-mother to invoke the assistance of Sindhia, who recovered the crownlands usurped by the refractory noble and imposed on him a fine of twelve lakhs of rupees. But Mewar had to pay a high price for this service, some valuable districts fell under the occupation of Sindhia and Holkar. Besides territorial sequestration, large contributions were realised from Mewar by the Marathas during Hamir's reign.

Hamir died 'before he had attained even Rajput majority' and his younger brother, Bhim Singh (1773-1828), succeeded to 'the little enviable title of Rana'. Tod knew him well and left for us a shrewd estimate of his character. Ascending the throne when he was but eight years of age, he remained under his mother's tutelage long after his minority had expired. This subjection fixed his character; naturally defective in energy, and impaired by long misfortune, he continued to be swayed by faction and intrigue'. Elsewhere Tod refers to his 'numerous weak points'. He was interested in 'vain shows, frivolous amusements and an ill-regulated liberality'; the task of restoring order and 'his proper authority' was left to others. He had 'little steadiness of purpose' and was unwilling to disturb himself 'by inviting the turmoils of business'. His judgment was good, but he seldom followed its dictates; in short, he was an adept in theory, and a novice in practice. Ochterlony spoke of his 'imbecility, profusion, unfeelingness, inconsideration and 'wanton cruelty.'¹⁴

At the time of Mahadji Sindhia's first invasion of Jaipur (1786) after his assumption of the Regency of Delhi the Rana's minister, Somchand Gandhi, tried to organize an anti-Maratha coalition of the Rajput States. After Sindhia's discomfiture at Lalsot (1787) the united forces of Mewar and Kotah occupied Nimbahera, Nakump, Jiran and Jawad; at the same time Rampura and Singoli were also recovered. The occupation of Nimbahera 'drew upon them the energetic Ahalya Bai, the regent queen of the Holkar State, who ... coalesced with Sindhia's

partisans to check this reaction of the Rajputs'. Early in 1788, the troops of Mewar were 'defeated with great slaughter'. The Marathas soon recovered their recently lost possessions.

After this military disaster the internal feuds in Mewar broke out again the fresh ferocity. In October 1789 Somchand Gandhi, the loyal and able minister, was murdered by the Chundawat chief, Arjun Singh of Kurawad, almost in the Rana's presence. The Rana was unable to punish the 'insolent chief; but he appointed Sheodas and Satidas, the murdered minister's brothers, to succeed him. The new ministers, supported by the Saktawats, declared open war against the Chundawats. The Rana remained a helpless spectator. The result could not but be disastrous to the State. The agriculturist, says Tod, 'abandoned his fields, and at length his country'. Commerce was 'at the mercy of unlicensed spoliation'. In a very few years 'Mewar lost half her population, her land waste, her mines were unworked and her looms which formerly supplied all around, forsaken'.

The economic ruin of the territory affected the relations between the Rana and his subjects. 'Instead of protecting, he required protection; the bonds which united him with his subjects were snapped, and each individual or petty community provided for itself that defence which he could not give'. This led to the adoption of the *Rakhuwali* system, which had to a certain degree existed before, on a large scale. Every cultivator sought out a patron and entered into engagements as a price of protection. 'Personal service at stated periods, to aid in the agricultural economy of the protector, was sometimes stipulated, when the husbandman was to find implements and cattle, and to attend whenever ordered'.¹⁵ 'Every Rajput, who had a horse and lance, had his clients; and not a camel-load of merchandise could pass the abode of one of these cavaliers without paying fees'.

While Mewar was collapsing into dissolution Mahadji Sindhia recovered his prestige in Rajasthan by his resounding victories in the battle of Merta and Patan (1790). Acting upon the advice of Zalim Singh of Kotah, who was anxious to secure for himself dominant influence in Mewar, the Rana and his advisers decided to call in Sindhia to expel the rebellious

Chundawats from their stronghold at Chittor. At a meeting between Zalim Singh and the Rana's ministers on the one hand and Sindhia on the other, held at Pushkar in March 1791, it was decided that a fine of 64 lakhs was to be imposed on the Chundawats, out of which three-fourths would go to Sindhia and one-fourth to the Rana. Sindhia's plan was to consolidate his power in Rajasthan. A contingent of his army under Ambaji Ingle accompanied Zalim Singh to Mewar and captured Hamirgarh from the Chundawats. In June 1791 Mahadji himself came to Mewar. Chittor was surrendered by the Chundawats in November 1791. The shrewd Maratha chief now found that it was not enough to crush the Chundawat rebellion; it was necessary to make some permanent arrangement for the administration of the State in view of the Rana's evident incapacity to govern his territory. It was settled that Ambaji Ingle would administer the State in the Rana's name, but as Sindhia's representative, with full civil and military power. He was to be supported by ten thousand Deccani cavalry and four battalions of trained infantry. Zalim Singh was to act as his adviser. Thus Mewar virtually came under Maratha administration.

Ambaji Ingle governed Mewar for eight years (1791-99) and Tod has left for us a not wholly unfavourable impression about his administration. He 'accumulated £ 2,000,000 sterling from her soil, exacting one-half of the produce of agricultural industry'; but 'the suppression of feuds and exterior aggressions gave to Mewar a degree of tranquility and happiness to which she had long been a stranger'. Malcolm's testimony is not different. He 'oppressed the princes and chiefs', says Malcolm, but he was 'kind and considerate to the inhabitants'. It was on his departure that the scene of devastation commenced'.¹⁶

It would be a mistake, however, to think that Ambaji restored normalcy in Mewar. 'So completely were the resources of the country diverted from their honest use', says Tod, that the Rana was 'obliged to borrow £ 50,000 from the Maratha commander' to meet the expenses of his sister's marriage with the prince of Jaipur. Ambaji's lieutenant, Ganesh Pant, was a rapacious partisan of the Rana's ministers. The Chundawats, many of whose 'fiefs' were confiscated, scoured the country

'in conjunction with lawless Sindhis'. Soon, however, they were able to purchase Ambaji's support, and their leader—the Salumbar chief—'again took lead at court'. Agarji Mehta, the Rana's new minister, supported the Chundawats. Ten lakhs of rupees were raised from the Saktawat estates and paid to Ambaji. Moreover, two 'fiefs of note'—Hinthia and Semari—were confiscated. Instead of healing the old wounds the Maratha administrator used the traditional feud between the Chundawats and the Saktawats to serve his own purposes.

Mahadji Sindhia died in February 1794. His successor, Daulat Rao Sindhia, was then a boy of fifteen. His right to the *gadi* was challenged by Mahadji's widows who were supported by the Shenwi Brahmins. In the so-called 'Bais War' which followed Ambaji remained loyal to Daulat Rao Sindhia; but Lakhwa Dada, who had become Sindhia's viceroy in Hindustan in 1794, supported the widows. Emboldened by Daulat Rao Sindhia's troubles, Rana Bhim Singh made an attack on those possessions in the Ajmer region which he had been forced to cede to Mahadji Sindhia. Already the British Resident with Sindhia had reported to the Governor-General that the rulers of Mewar, Marwar and Jaipur had 'resolved to bear the yoke of the Marathas no longer and agreed to compel the forces of Ambaji to quit the territories wrested from them by the late Mahadji Sindhia'. But early in 1799 the Rana's troops were defeated 'after a sharp conflict' by Ambaji's forces and some new levies raised by Gulabji Kadam, an officer in the latter's service. Lakhwa Dada then sent reinforcement to the Rana, and in April 1799 the Rajputs defeated Gulabji 'with great slaughter'.¹⁷ Soon afterwards Lakhwa Dada himself came to Mewar, and, in Tod's words, 'Mewar now became the arena on which the rival satraps Ambaji and Lakhwa contested the exalted office of Sindhia's lieutenancy in Hindustan'. This contest lasted for several months and ended in Ambaji's defeat. In October 1799 Lakhwa Dada was restored to favour in Daulat Rao Sindhia's court and publicly proclaimed as his supreme agent in North India. Ambaji had to relinquish charge of Mewar. George Thomas, whom he had hired for operations in Mewar, was discharged in November 1799.¹⁸

With Ambaji removed from the field, Lakhwa Dada had no longer any softness for the distracted Rana. Early in 1800

he reduced the strong fortress of Jahazpur belonging to the chief of Shahpura in Mewar. He squeezed five lakhs from the Rana. In April 1800 he defeated the Jaipur forces at Malpura. But Sindhia's court was a battle ground for conflicting personalities and interests. In May 1800 Lakhwa Dada, knowing that his arrest was contemplated, fled from Jaipur towards Mewar, where he stayed for about three months for collecting money. Ambaji Ingle once again became Sindhia's viceroy in Hindustan. In October 1800 Lakhwa Dada again came to Mewar and extracted two lakhs from the Rana. The 'Bais War' had broken out afresh. After a desperate effort to defeat Daulat Rao Sindhia's forces in North India Lakhwa Dada took shelter in Mewar and died there in February 1802.¹⁹ Meanwhile war had broken out between Daulat Rao Sindhia and Jaswant Rao Holkar. The latter took to a roving life after his defeat at Indore in October 1801. In January he appeared in Mewar and plundered the celebrated shrine of Nathdwara. He was so hotly pursued by Ambaji's brother, Bala Rao, that he could not visit Udaipur. The Rana was thus temporarily saved from his exactions; but Holkar's pursuers came to Udaipur and realised three lakhs of rupees which the Rana had to 'raise by the sale of household effects and the jewels of the females of his family'. Moreover, Bala Rao, acting in co-operation with Zalim Singh, fostered the ancient feud between the Chundawats and the Saktawats. When Holkar came again 40 lakhs were demanded. 'The palace was denuded of everything which could be converted into gold; the females were deprived of every article of luxury and comfort by which, with contributions levied on the city, twelve lakhs were obtained while hostages from the household of the Rana and chief citizens were delivered as security for the remainder, and immured in the Maratha camp'. At this stage the fortunes of Mewar became entangled in the vicissitudes of the second Anglo-Maratha war.

II. Second Anglo-Maratha War

The beginning of the Second Anglo-Maratha War in August 1803 vitally affected the fortunes of the Rajput States. The military operations of the Company's troops under General Arthur Wellesley were directed towards the destruction of Daulat

Rao Sindhia's power beyond the Narmada; those under the Commander-in-chief, Lord Lake, seized his territories in Hindustan. Both Bhonsle and Sindhia, the two Maratha rulers involved in the first phase of the war, concluded peace in December 1803. By the treaty of Surji Anjangaon (30 December, 1803)²⁰ Daulat Rao Sindhia ceded to the East India Company his territories between the Jumna and the Ganges and all territories situated to the northward of the Jaipur, Jodhpur and Gohad principalities; but the territories lying between Jaipur and Jodhpur, and to the southward of the former place, were reserved. Thus, although this treaty curbed to a great extent Sindhia's power in North India, it did not liberate Mewar from his grip. By confirming the engagements already concluded by the Company with Alwar and Jaipur the treaty made them independent of Sindhia's authority; Mewar was excluded from this arrangement as no engagement had been concluded with it.

Jaswant Rao Holkar was so suspicious of Daulat Rao Sindhia that during the progress of hostilities in 1803 he remained a passive spectator, utilising the latter's preoccupation to raise large contributions in Malwa. After the treaty of Surji Anjangaon he challenged the British and threatened to over-run the Company's territory with his troops whom he compared with the 'waves of the sea'. Lord Wellesley replied to Holkar's indiscreet threats by declaration of war in April 1804. For several months Sindhia offered lukewarm support to the British Government; his commander, Bapu Sindhia, was sent to co-operate with Lord Lake with a body of 10,000 horse. The rise to power in Sindhia's court of his father-in-law, Sharza Rao Ghatge, whom Broughton describes as the most unprincipled, sanguinary and darine; public man that has for many years figured in Hindustan prepared the way for an open breach with the British Government. In April 1805 Sindhia threw off the mask and openly joined Holkar.

During this period of troubles and uncertainties the British Government occasionally toyed with the idea of liberating Mewar from Sindhia's yoke. The Holkar-Sindhia co-operation seemed to necessitate reconsideration of those provisions of the treaty of Surji Anjangaon which stood in the way of the Company's co-operation and allegiance with Mewar. On 13 May, 1804,

Webbe, Resident with Sindhia, wrote to Lord Lake that it would be inexpedient at that time to demand from Sindhia relinquishment of his right to the tribute of Mewar. The war with Holkar had just begun, and Bapu Sindhia had just been sent to assist Lord Lake; it was certainly the 'most unfavourable' moment to ask Sindhia to recognize the independence of a State with which the British Government had no direct concern. A month later (18 June, 1804) Webbe informed Colonel Murray, commanding British troops in Gujarat and Malwa, that Sindhia would 'entertain great jealousy of any communication' which he (i.e., Colonel Murray) 'might be induced to open directly' with the Rana of Mewar.²²

As the military operations proceeded, both Sindhia and Holkar, says Tod, became 'anxious to shelter their families and valuables in the strongholds of Mewar'. On 19 June, 1805 Captain Sturrock, British Resident at Jaipur, wrote to Malcolm that Sindhia had asked the Rana 'to deliver up the fort of Kamalmir to him and Holkar to put their families in'. An attempt was made to induce the rulers of Jaipur, Marwar and Mewar 'to form a combination against the British Government'. Captain Sturrock suspected that the Rajput princes were willing to form an anti-British coalition 'from an ill-grounded apprehension that they have more to dread from its (i.e., British Government's) encroachments than from the Maratha chiefs whose views were principally directed to the collection of tribute'.²³

Captain Sturrock's apprehensions were probably not altogether groundless. Ambaji Ingle, who had betrayed his master in 1803,²⁴ was restored to favour in July 1805, and he dominated Sindhia's council till March 1806. Tod says: 'His rancour to the Rana was implacable, from the support given in self-defence to his political antagonist, Lakhwa, and he agitated the partition of Mewar amongst the great Maratha leaders'. But his plan was frustrated by the intervention of Holkar. The Chundawats and the Saktawats 'stifled their animosities on this occasion', and at their request Holkar persuaded Sindhia to preserve the integrity of Mewar. Tod says that Baiza Bai, Sindhia's wife and Ghatge's daughter, also exercised her influence in favour of Mewar. Holkar's motive was probably two-fold. His jealousy had been excited by the growth of Sindhia's power in Mewar, and he feared that any

scheme of partition would throw the lion's share into his rival's hands. Secondly, he was aware of the strategic value of Mewar's strongholds which he did not want to fall under Sindhia's control.

The Rana was shrewd enough not to put his trust in the Marathas. Convinced that their demands for money would be repeated at the next favourable opportunity, he sent a *vakil* named Bhairon Baksh to Lord Lake who was then at Mathura (June 1805). In his letter to the Commander-in-Chief he referred to 'the distress which this Government has suffered from the invasion of that race from the south who for the last 35 years have made repeated incursions'. He added that he had refused to surrender Kamalmir to Sindhia 'from regard for the kindness of the English Company'. Sindhia, 'being angry in his heart' at this refusal, was preparing his troops for plundering Mewar. Under the circumstances, the Rana stated, he was prepared to co-operate with the English Company'.²⁵

Lord Lake welcomed this offer of co-operation from Mewar. He thought that 'considerable advantages' might be expected from 'granting aid and encouragement to the Rana' in case of open war with Sindhia. He considered 'this direct overture at a moment when the British troops are at such a distance and those of the Marathas so near his territories, as a complete proof of the Rana's sense of the strength of the British power'. But the Governor-General was less enthusiastic than the Commander-in-Chief. Under Lord Wellesley's orders the Rana was informed that the British Government 'had no intention of proceeding to hostilities against Daulat Rao Sindhia or of acting in any manner contrary to the treaty of peace unless the chieftain's measures preclude the possibility of maintaining peace with him'.²⁶ As Sindhia had already joined Holkar (April 1805) this hesitation on the part of Lord Wellesley (July 1805) is difficult to understand except in the context of the 'Home' authorities' disapproval of his policy of involvement. Metcalfe thought that his administration was 'marked by an indecision and weakness' in the early months of the year 1805 as a result of 'his dread of people at home'.²⁷

As a matter of fact Wellesley resigned (30 July, 1805) within less than a month of the rejection of the Rana's proposal. His

successor, Lord Cornwallis (July-October 1805), reversed his policy. The policy of non-intervention in Rajasthan followed from his primary objective of terminating the war with the Marathas. Mewar was left to the tender mercy of Sindhia's troops. A contribution of 16 lakhs was levied.

III. Krishnakumari

We now turn to the tragic story of Krishnakumari which illustrates the political helplessness of Mewar in the years following the Second Anglo-Maratha War. Tod's romantic story is fairly well known, but it is not possible for the historian to accept it in toto.²⁸

Krishnakumari, one of the numerous daughters of Rana Bhim Singh, was reputed to be extremely beautiful.²⁹ She was first betrothed to Raja Bhim Singh of Jodhpur. After the latter's death in 1803 she was betrothed again to his successor, Man Singh. Man Singh offended the Kana by depriving his relative Kishwar Singh to his appange of Khalirao. The Rana thereupon offered his daughter's hands to Raja Jagat Singh of Jaipur; and apprehending trouble from Jodhpur, he asked for military aid from him. Raichand, the ambitious *Dewan* of Jaipur, wanted to utilise this matrimonial alliance for the extension of his master's political influence over Mewar.³⁰ It was also likely to enhance the social prestige of the Kachhwahs. Malcolm says that the Sisodiya princes 'enjoyed the highest rank' among the rulers of Rajasthan and an alliance with them was the greatest honour' to which a Rajput prince could 'aspire'.³¹ In his eagerness to confirm the proposal Raichand sent a contingent of troops under Khush-hal Singh to Udaipur (July 1805). Another large detachment under Sambhu Singh proceeded towards Udaipur three months later (September 1805). Jagat Singh informed the British Resident at Jaipur (October 1805) that the Rana's daughter was betrothed to him.

Daulat Rao Sindhia was engaged in Mewar collecting tribute from Mewar and anxious to strengthen his grip over Rajasthan. He could not ignore the appearance of Jaipur troops in Mewar. He asked the British Government either to secure, through intercession with the Jaipur Raja, the withdrawal of his troops from the Rana's territory, or to allow him (Sindhia) to proceed against the Raja as an enemy (October 1805).

Lord Lake considered Sindhia's request as reasonable. Under his instructions Captain Sturrock told Jagat Singh that the treaty relations between the British Government and Sindhia did not allow the former or any of its allies to offer assistance to the Rana or any of Sindhia's tributaries. It was, therefore, not proper for Jaipur to send military aid to Mewar. Another point, important from the British point of view, was the advance of Holkar through Rajasthan with the intention of invading the British territories. Captain Sturrock was able to persuade Jagat Singh to recall Sambhu Singh's troops (October 1805) and also to co-operate with the British army in the campaign against Holkar.³²

Hoping that his compliance with Lord Lake's wishes would induce the Commander-in-chief to support his marriage project, Jagat Singh asked for his intercession with Sindhia to withdraw his opposition (November 1805). Lord Lake requested Sindhia to allow the marriage to take place, warning Jagat Singh at the same time against adoption of any measure against Sindhia and interference in the internal affairs of Mewar. Jagat Singh agreed to act according to this advice. Sindhia then granted permission to both Jagat Singh and the Rana to make engagements for the marriage. Sambhu Singh was ordered by Jagat Singh to proceed to Udaipur with a small escort to settle matters relating to the ceremony, and it was arranged that the Raja himself would start for Mewar later in the same month (January 1806).³³

At this stage Raja Man Singh of Marwar insisted upon his claim based on the second betrothal of Krishnakumari. His purpose was to prevent an alliance between the Rana and his hereditary rival, the Raja of Jaipur. The old rivalry between the Rathors and the Kachhwahs flared up in a new form. Man Singh's emissaries went to Jaipur to make 'remonstrances' against Jagat Singh's marriage with Krishnakumari on the ground that it would bring disgrace upon the Rathor Raja to whom she had been previously betrothed. Mobilisation of Rathor forces was ordered (January 1806).³⁴

In view of this new development Jagat Singh recalled Sambhu Singh and postponed his own journey to Udaipur. Captain Sturrock advised him to make an amicable settlement

with Man Singh or to submit the dispute to the British Government under the terms of his treaty of 1803 with the Company (which had not yet been cancelled by Sir George Barlow). But both parties—Jagat Singh and Man Singh—adopted a stiff attitude, and early in February 1806 Captain Sturrock reported that they were 'preparing for hostilities in the event of their not being able to settle the point in dispute to their mutual satisfaction'. Man Singh sent his *vakils* to Lord Lake, but he refused to intervene on the ground that the dispute was of a private and family nature. Jagat Singh's *vakil* met Malcolm in Delhi (February 1806) and sought his intervention, with a dark hint that the British Government's non-interference might open the door for interference by other parties. Malcolm added nothing to Lord Lake's reply. At Jaipur Captain Sturrock told the Raja (February 1806) that in case of hostilities against Man Singh he could not expect any British assistance.³⁵ The Company's policy was one of non-involvement, and this was steadily pursued even though it was clear that there was a serious threat to peace in Rajasthan.

Unable to secure any assurance of British support, Man Singh appealed to Sindhia who was then in Mewar. The Maratha chief naturally welcomed this opportunity of interfering in the rivalry of the two principal Rajput States. It appears from Captain Sturrock's report (April 18(16) that he 'used every endeavour to bring this matter to a settlement' by proposing that Jagat Singh and Man Singh should marry one of the Rana's daughters, 'or that they should both give up their pretensions for the present, or, finally, that they should consent to an arbitration of the neighbouring Rajas on the subject'. All these proposals though reasonable in themselves were 'rendered nugatory' by the presence of Jaipur troops at Udaipur 'who held the Rana in control'. Sindhia promised that he would retire from Mewar and 'leave the parties concerned to settle the dispute between themselves' if the Jaipur troops were withdrawn.³⁶ The Rajas of Jaipur and Jodhpur agreed that neither of them would marry Krishnakumari, nor would they allow the Rana to select her husband without their approval. Moreover, Man Singh would marry Jagat Singh's sister and Jagat Singh would marry Man Singh's daughter. This engagement (April 1806) was not sincerely meant; Jagat Singh did not withdraw his troops from Mewar.³⁷

Sindhia naturally took offence and sent two detachments under Jagu Bapu and Jaswant Rao Bhau to invade Mewar from two directions (April 1806). The Jaipur troops remained inactive at Udaipur and the Rana's troops offered 'a feeble opposition'. Mewar's capital lay prostrate at Sindhia's feet.³⁸

The situation was a grave one. Mercer, British Resident at Sindhia's court, apprehended that the military discomfiture of the Rana would throw into Daulat Rao's hands the 'entire control' over the affairs of Mewar. Sindhia declared to the Resident that 'his ultimate object is the dismissal of the Jaipur troops and that, on this being effected, he will leave the Rana in the quiet possession of his country and relinquish any further interference in the dispute between the Jaipur and Jodhpur Rajas'. But Mercer shrewdly suspected that Sindhia's conduct towards Mewar would be 'regulated more by the measures he may deem it expedient to pursue in regard to Jaswant Rao Holkar than by any predetermined resolution on the subject'. Holkar claimed half the Udaipur tribute, and Mercer thought it was hardly likely that he would 'without a contest leave the whole of the authority and resources of that State in the hands of Sindhia'. Although at that moment Sindhia was 'anxious to avoid an immediate rupture with Holkar', yet it did not seem likely to the Resident that Daulat Rao 'will gratuitously relinquish the complete ascendancy which he has now nearly attained over the Udaipur State'.³⁹

Mercer was right. The helpless Rana offered 'entire submission' to Sindhia's wishes, met him in two friendly interviews (May 1806), and dismissed 'the greater part of Jaipur troops'. Sindhia took advantage of the situation and made an offensive demand which united the Chundawat and Saktawat clans in defence of Mewar's honour.⁴⁰ He wanted to marry Krishnakumari, forgetting in his triumph that the proud Rana of Mewar could not be expected to tolerate idea of entering into matrimonial relations with one whom he regarded as a low-born Maratha. Realising the impracticability of the proposal Sindhia soon gave it up.

Meanwhile the British Government had 'dissolved its alliance with Jaipur (March 1806); henceforth it would have no special connection with that State, apart from general

friendship and goodwill. The Governor-General's policy was to avoid giving umbrage to Sindhia; even limited interference in the Jaipur-Jodhpur dispute was ruled out.⁴¹ Jaswant Rao Holkar's appearance on the scene was a new complication which affected Mewar and indirectly saved it. He was plundering Jaipur territory and demanding tribute from Mewar. The approach of Sindhia's rival encouraged the Rana and compelled Sindhia to withdraw the marriage proposal. Sindhia agreed to withdraw from Udaipur at the request of the Jaipur *wakils* who promised to pay him four lakhs and also to recall the Jaipur troops from Udaipur. The Jodhpur *wakils* offered a larger sum provided Sindhia would force the withdrawal of the Jaipur troops from Udaipur. Sindhia accepted the second offer and retreated from Udaipur towards the end of May 1806, the Rana having agreed to send the Jaipur troops back to their own territory. But Jagu Bapu and Madhuji Huzure were left behind with their troops to realise the contributions from Mewar and also to await the departure of the Jaipur troops. Unable to collect money, these zealous lieutenants of Sindhia seized some Mewar chiefs and carried them off to the Maratha camp.⁴²

Even in this changing situation Jagat Singh did not give up his plan to marry Krishnakumari. He sent a large sum of money to the Rana, and his crafty *Dewan* hoped that Jaipur's ascendancy in Mewar could be completed through the successful implementation of the marriage plan. The marriage issue was linked up with the dispute between Man Singh and Dhonkal Singh for the gadi of Marwar in which Jagat Singh had taken up the pretender's cause.

The internal condition of Mewar was growing worse year after year. The troops of Sindhia and the Pindari followers of Holkar and Amir Khan, the unscrupulous Pathan adventurer, indiscriminately ravaged the Rana's territory. Bhim Singh remained a helpless spectator. In October 1806 Mercer reported to the Governor-General that Sharza Rao Ghatge had plundered Bhilwara and 'subsisted his people by exactions' from villages near Chittor. Gradually he established great influence in the Rana's council and in accordance with his advice the Rana applied for military assistance to the British Resident in Delhi. His letters on this subject were intercepted by Holkar who

communicated the information to Sindhia. Sindhia demanded an explanation from the British Resident at his court. Mercer assured him that the British Government would not interfere in the affairs of those States 'to which it was not bound defensive alliance'. In 1808 Holkar's irregular troops plundered two *parganas* near Udaipur. Influential chiefs like Sangram Singh of Lawa, Gokuldas of Deogarh and Padam Singh of Salumbar disturbed internal peace by their rivalry for power. The Rana received some assistance from Zalim Singh and Ambaji Ingle, but his difficulties went on increasing. In 1809 he became so helpless that he had to take a daily allowance of 500 rupees from Sindhia's viceroy in Mewar for the maintenance of his family.⁴³

During the years 1807-10 Amir Khan gradually made himself the most powerful man in Central India. In 1807 he brought Man Singh of Jodhpur under his control. In 1810 he took advantage of Jaswant Rao Holkar's insanity and became the *de facto* ruler of the Holkar State. His influence almost eclipsed that of Sindhia. His first objective after these successes was the realisation of tribute from Jaipur and Mewar.

In May 1810 Amir Khan appeared in Mewar at the head of a large army for the collection of tribute. His progress was checked for a few weeks by internal troubles within his camp, but everybody knew that it was absolutely impossible for the Rana to resist him. The Resident in Delhi, writing in July 1810, expressed the fear that Amir Khan would 'succeed in getting possession of Udaipur and thereby putting an end to the sovereignty of the most ancient and the most venerated of the Rajput chiefs'. Possession of Mewar would add enormously to Amir Khan's strength, for the country was 'so strong and so easily defended that, if once the Pathans were in possession of the strongholds and passes, it would be next to impossible to dislodge them, and in its productiveness they would find immense resources'. It would also 'insure and facilitate' Amir Khan's conquest of Jaipur where the danger was realised and the 'greatest alarm' prevailed.⁴⁴ It was not a pleasant prospect from the British point of view; but the Governor-General, Lord Minto, could not deviate from the policy of non-intervention imposed upon him by the 'Home' authorities.

On his arrival near Udaipur Amir Khan informed the Rana that he was prepared to recover for him the important fortress of Kumbhalgarh from Sindhia's general, Jaswant Rao Bhau, on payment of 12 lakhs of rupees as tribute. He also suggested that a body of his own troops should be entertained by the Rana in his service. Bhim Singh refused to accept these proposals. Amir Khan then wanted an interview with the Rana who, however, declined either to admit the 'perfidious Pathan' into Udaipur or to visit him in his camp. But Amir Khan was not the man to take a refusal. He forced his way into Udaipur and dictated his terms to the helpless Rana. Bhim Singh agreed to engage in his service a body of Amir Khan's troops and to satisfy the pecuniary demands of the Pathan Chief, including an assignment of one-fourth of his revenues.⁴⁵

Not content with this local settlement, Amir Khan decided to revive the issue of Krishnakumari's marriage in view of its likely repercussions on inter-State political relations in Rajasthan. Malcolm indicates that his purpose was to promote reconciliation between Jaipur and Jodhpur. But he 'favoured the pretensions' of Man Singh and asked the Rana to celebrate his daughter's marriage with him. This 'embarrassed' the Rana because, according to the British Resident in Delhi, his 'ward was first pledged' to the Raja of Jaipur. According to Tod, Amir Khan then gave the Rana a choice between two evils: 'either the princess should wed Raja Man, or by her death seal the peace of Rajwara'. Tod's story is in substantial agreement with Amir Khan's own version of the affair. Bhushan Lal, the author of *Amir Nama*, says that the Rana agreed to contrive to get rid of his daughter, provided Amir Khan undertook to wrest Khalirao from Man Singh. The nobles of Mewar held a conference and decided that disgrace to the royal family and the State could be avoided only by administering poison to Krishnakumari. The princess, then a girl of sixteen, took four cups of poison on 21 July, 1810.⁴⁶

It has been argued, on the basis of Bhushan Lal's statement, that the Rana's crime was 'the result of a sordid bargain' and it was 'not excused by any sensitive regard for family pride that marked the high-mettled Rajputs of old.'⁴⁷ But it is difficult to believe that the Rana was really in a position to 'bargain'

with Amir Khan. According to an official letter of the British Resident in Delhi (4 August, 1810) the decision to murder the princess was taken by the nobles of Mewar and carried into effect 'with the concurrence of the unhappy father'. The restoration of Khalirao might have been put up by Amir Khan as a bait for the Rana, but it was not a material factor in the tragedy. The Rana, as Tod says, 'was made to see no choice between consigning his beloved child to the Rathor prince, or witnessing the effects of a more extended dishonour from the vengeance of the Pathan, and the storm of his palace by his licentious adherents'. The evidence of the British Resident in Delhi, supported by Tod, is decisive.

Although the Rana humiliated himself so much, he received no protection from Amir Khan. In August 1811 Bapu Sindhia appeared at Udaipur and took up his residence in the city. The Rana found himself obliged to receive him with an appearance of friendship, 'in opposition, no doubt, to the real state of his feelings'. The inevitable demand for money followed. Another object of the Maratha general was the suppression of the Pindaris, for Daulat Rao Sindhia was afraid of their rising power.⁴⁸

IV. Submission to the Company

While Amir Khan and Sindhia were swallowing the diminishing resources of Mewar the British Government, committed to the policy of non-intervention, remained a silent but not entirely disinterested spectator. Although Lord Minto found himself obliged from time to time to abandon the strictest interpretation of the Home authorities' *Laissez faire* policy,⁴⁹ there was no deviation from it in the case of the Rajput States. All applications for British protection from the Rajput princes invariably received the reply that the Company was not prepared to enter into entangling alliances. The successive British Residents in Delhi, Seton Metcalfe, were in favour of taking the Rajput State's under the Company's protection, but they knew they could not change the determination of the higher authorities. Perhaps Lord Minto himself felt that a change of policy was necessary, but he wanted to carry his superiors with him. Malcolm observes: 'The Government of Lord Minto had no result more important than the impression it conveyed to the

authorities at home, of the utter impracticability of perseverance in the neutral policy they had desired to pursue'. Thus Lord Minto prepared the ground for the bold and comprehensive plan adopted by his successor, Lord Hastings.

Meanwhile the policy of non-intervention worked havoc in the Rajput States, a common prey to the Marathas and the Pindaris. The atrocities committed by them are thus described by a contemporary British writer: '...every one whose appearance indicated the probability of possessing money was immediately put to the most horrid torture, till he either pointed out his hoard, or died under the infliction. Nothing was safe from the pursuit of Pindaree lust or avarice; it was their common practice to burn and destroy what could not be carried away; and, in the wantonness of barbarity, to ravish and murder women and children, under the eyes of their husbands and parents.. .'.⁵⁰ Mewar, says Tod, 'was rapidly approaching dissolution, and every sign of civilisation fast disappearing; fields laid waste, cities in ruins, inhabitants exiled, chieftains demoralized, the prince and his family destitute of common comforts'.

It was only when Lord Hastings decided to crush the Pindaris that he found it necessary to take all Rajput States under British protection. These 'predatory' hordes were to be rooted out of their haunts which lay in Malwa; and to accomplish this, it was necessary to surround them on all sides—'on the north and east, from Bengal, on the south from the Deccan and on the west from Gujarat—and to keep the native States in check'. Naturally the attitude of the Rajput States would be a very important factor in determining the nature of the operations against the Pindaris. But it was not difficult to anticipate that they would gladly co-operate with British Government in the extermination of their oppressors.

The Rana had already sent 'a direct application for the protection of the British Government with an offer of a fourth of the estimated revenue of the country'. In October 1817 Metcalfe was instructed to conclude an engagement with Udaipur. The instructions contained two important points. In the first place, it was 'desirable to obtain as large a portion of the revenue of Udaipur as might be practicable on account of subsidy'. Secondly, the question of tribute due by the Rana

to Sindhia and Holkar was 'to be treated as one between the British Government and the two later powers exclusively, so that all direct inter-course and connection between the Rajput States and Marathas should cease.'⁵¹

Metcalf began negotiations with the Rana's *wakils* of whom the principal was the chief minister, Thakur Ajit Singh, in November 1817.⁵² The treaty⁵³ was signed in Delhi on 13 January, 1818, and ratified by Lord Hastings on 22 January, 1818.

Article 1 provided for 'perpetual friendship, alliance and unity of interests between the two States from generation to generation'. By Article 2 the British Government engaged 'to protect the principality and territory of Udaipur'. By Article 3 the Rana promised to 'act in subordinate co-operation with the British Government and acknowledge its supremacy' and not to have 'any connection with other Chiefs of States'. Metcalfe had anticipated some objection to this Article due to the 'high pretensions' of the Rana. The Ranas of Udaipur, he wrote to the Supreme Government, 'have always boasted of never having acknowledged the sovereignty of the Mahomedan dynasty of India'. This was, of course, not historically correct; two centuries earlier the sovereignty of the Mughal Emperor had been acknowledged by Rana Amar Singh. Another factor to which Metcalfe attached importance was the high social rank of the ruling family of Udaipur; the Krishnakumari episode was 'a recent proof of the honour attached to a close connection with this family'. On these grounds Metcalfe was prepared to make concessions to the Rana in regard to the recognition of British supremacy, but the Rana's *wakils* offered no objection to the original draft of the Article. One of them proposed in the course of discussions the insertion of an Article providing that 'the mission of an envoy to Delhi and the submission of the Rana to the Company should not be drawn into a precedent for his allegiance to the Mahomedan dynasty, and that the British should not make him over at any time to any other power'. Metcalfe gave an assurance that 'though not expressed in the treaty the spirit of the proposal would remain in force'.

By Article 4 the Rana promised not to 'enter into any negotiation with any Chief or State without the knowledge and sanction of the British Government'. Article 5 provided that all

disputes between Mewar and other States would be submitted to the arbitration and award of the British Government. These provisions were natural corollaries of the Rana's acknowledgment of British sovereignty. It has been suggested that Thakur Ajit Singh was probably 'not disinterested enough in the execution of his duty', for he did not insist upon 'better terms for his State which Metcalfe was prepared to concede.'⁵⁴

Article 6 provided that the tribute from Mewar would amount to one-fourth of her revenue for the first five years, and to three-eighths 'after that term, in perpetuity'. The *vakils* presented to Metcalfe a memorandum on the Rana's claim for restoration of territories which had 'fallen by improper means into the possession of others'—Sindhia, Holkar, Amir Khan, and the rulers of Jodhpur and Kotah. The restoration of the Rana's sovereignty over the small principalities of Banswara, Partabgarh and Dungarpur was also claimed. On the second point Metcalfe made no concession, for it had been decided to recognize the independence of those petty States. But on the first, a special provision was inserted in Article 7. As the British Government was not in possession of 'accurate information' it was 'not able to enter into any positive engagement on the subject'; but it would 'always keep in view the renovation of the prosperity of the State of Udaipur, and after ascertaining the nature of each case, will use its best exertions for the accomplishment of the object on every occasion on which it may be proper to do so'. Whatever places might thus be restored to the Rana by the aid of the British Government, three-eighths of their revenues should be paid 'in perpetuity' to the British Government.

In fixing the amount of Mewar's tribute Metcalfe was guided by two considerations: the then distracted condition of Mewar, and its prosperity in normal times. 'It is understood', he wrote, that the country of Udaipur is a most productive country, that the soil is fertile in the greatest degree, and that the inhabitants are uncommonly industrious and devoted to agriculture'. Although the 'power and revenue' of the State had been reduced to a wretched extreme, it was expected that the revenue would 'revive with astonishing capacity' after the restoration of security. On account of the actual poverty of the State at that time it

was impossible to procure the payment of an adequate tribute in a fixed sum. The arrangement made by Metcalfe was expected to 'produce little' at the beginning; but he was hopeful that 'eventually' the tribute would be 'considerable'. He had the 'satisfaction', as he wrote, 'of knowing that every increase of the tribute..., so far from being burdensome to the tributary, must be attended in greater degree with an augmentation of the wealth and resources of Udaipur, so that our advantage will advance hand in hand with the prosperity, security and happiness of a fine country under our protection'.

In addition to the tribute, the Rana agreed (by Article 8) that his troops should be furnished according to his means 'at the requisition of the British Government'. Article 9 provided that the Rana should always remain 'absolute ruler of his own country', and that British jurisdiction should not be introduced to his principality.

When the terms of the treaty were finalised, Thakur Ajit Singh asked for a provision guaranteeing the office of chief-minister (*bhanjgarh*) for the chief of Salumbar. Such an arrangement would have been consistent with the prevailing practice in Mewar. But Metcalfe apparently considered it inadvisable to impose a binding restriction on the Rana's choice of his principal adviser. He decided the issue by giving a vague—and practically meaningless—assurance that 'the good conduct of the minister would ensure His Lordship's (*i.e.*, Governor-General's) approbation'.

Metcalfe's diplomacy in Mewar met with the full approval of the Governor-General. Adam, Secretary to the Supreme Government, wrote to say that the arrangement about the tribute was 'extremely judicious', for it secured to the Company 'a fair and just proportion of the resources of the State' which was 'henceforward to be protected and supported by its power'. The provision relating to the 'alienated territories' of Mewar, he added, was 'characterised by ... judgement and discretion'. The 'wish ... to repair the dilapidated resources, and degraded condition of the ancient' State of Udaipur, as also 'the direct interest of the British Government in the return to prosperity and wealth of that distracted and impoverished country' would 'prompt the Governor-General to employ the power and

influence of this Government in recovering for the Rana such of his alienated territories as can be resumed without injustice to the powers into whose possession they may have come.'⁵⁵

V. Tod in Mewar

In February 1818 Tod was deputed to the court of Udaipur 'to superintend and maintain the newly formed relations with the Rana of Mewar'. At the same time he was to act as the 'channel of communication' with Kotah and Bundi. He arrived at Udaipur on 8 March, 1818. During the campaign of 1817-18 he had been placed as 'the point of communication to the various divisions of the northern army'. He had at the same time been entrusted with the negotiations with Holkar (before the rupture of British relations with him) as also with those of Kotah and Bundi. He had concluded the treaty with Bundi *en route* to Udaipur. In both these States the problem for the British Government was, in his view, similar: 'there were only the benefits of moral and political existence to confer'. A British contingent had preceded him to Mewar 'to compel the surrender of such territory as was unjustly held by the lawless partisans of Sindhia and to reduce to obedience the refractory nobles, to whom anarchy was endeared from long familiarity'. The strongholds on the plains, such as Raipur and Rajnagar, soon surrendered; and the payment of the arrears of the garrison of Kumbhalmer put this important fortress in British possession.

What Tod saw during his journey to Udaipur revealed to him the pitiable condition of Mewar. From Jahajpur to Kumbhalmer, 'a space of 140 miles', he found 'only two thinly-peopled towns...which acknowledged the Rana's authority'. 'All was desolate; even the traces of the footsteps of man were effaced'. Bhilwara, the 'commercial *entrepot* of Rajputana', which Tod had found 'comparatively flourishing' in 1806, was now 'entirely deserted'. No living being was found in the streets 'except a solitary dog that fled in dismay from his lurking-place in the temple, scared at the unaccustomed sight of man'

The ground for Tod's 'joyful reception' at Udaipur was paved by the acquisition of Kumbhalmer for the Rana. After a preliminary reception at Nathdwara he was conducted to the capital by the Rana's heir-apparent, Jawan Singh. In the streets

the enthusiastic cry 'Jai: Jai: Farangi Ka Raj' resounded from every tongue. The Rana's 'hearty and sincere' congratulations has as their background 'the miseries he had experienced, the fallen condition of his State, and the gratitude he felt to the British Government which had interposed between him and destruction....'

Tod passed some weeks in 'silent observation, and in the acquisition of materials for action'. He took up his assignment 'enthusiastically filled with the idea of raising Mewar from the depressed condition into which she had sunk, of reconstructing her Government on its old footing, and of raising her court to the splendour it had enjoyed in the time of Sangram Singh.⁵⁶ But the hurdles to be crossed were too high. Tod found the 'institutions (of Mewar) a dead letter, the prince's authority despised, the nobles demoralized and rebellious, internal commerce abandoned, and the peasantry destroyed by the combined operation of war, pestilence, and exile'. All that remained to the Rana out of the ten thousand townships' of Mewar was the Valley of the capital'; and though Chittor and Mandalgarh were maintained by the fidelity of his servants, their precarious revenues scarcely sufficed to maintain their garrisons. The Rana mainly depended upon Zalim Singh of Kotah for the means of subsistence, for 'in the struggle for existence his chiefs thought only of themselves, of defending their own estates, or buying off their foes; while those who had succumbed took to horse, scoured the country, and plundered without distinction'. Inferior clans declared themselves independent of their superiors who, in their turn, usurped the crown domain. 'The crown-tenants purchased of these chiefs the protection (*rakhwali*) which the Rana could not grant, and made alienations of the crown taxes, besides private rights of the community'. Feuds multiplied. Castles were assaulted and their inmates, as at Sheogarh and Lawa, put to the sword. The Mers and the Bhils, descending from their hills or emerging from their forests, carried on depredations in the plains. Travellers and merchants fell into their ambuscades; marriage-processions were attacked. "The Rajput, whose moral energies were blunted, scrupled not to associate and to divide the spoils with these lawless tribes..." Even the capital city of Udaipur,

which formerly reckoned 50,000 houses within the walls, had not now 3,000 occupied; 'the rest were in ruin, the rafters being taken for fire-wood'. The realisation of the spring harvest of 1818, from the crown domain, was about £ 4,000. Grain sold for seven seers the rupee, though thrice the quantity was procurable within the distance of eighty miles. Insurance from Udaipur to Nathdwara (25 miles) was eight per cent. The Rana had not 50 horse to attend him.

Such, in Tod's own words, was 'the chaos from which order was to be evoked'; but he could expect little assistance from the Rana and his advisers. Bhim Singh was, according to Tod, 'naturally defective in energy' and 'swayed by faction and intrigue'. Among the aspirants for high offices 'there appeared no talent, no influence, no honesty'. The only man about the court 'at once of integrity and efficiency was Kishandas' whose services, however, were soon cut off by death. Agarji Mehta was nominated the chief civil minister (*Pradhan*), but in Tod's opinion he was in 'every way unequal' to that important office. The nobles had lost that patriotism and courage which had distinguished their predecessors in the long struggle against the Muslims.

These difficulties did not discourage Tod. 'Notwithstanding the entire disorganization of society he found that 'external commerce was not stagnant'. In the midst of rapine the produce of Europe and Kashmir passed each other in transit through Mewar. There was, of course, 'a multiplicity of exactions', but those who scorned all law considered themselves bound by 'the point of honour which they were paid for preserving'. The elements of prosperity, 'though scattered, were not wanting'. A greater asset was the fact that 'recollections of the past (were) deeply engraved in the national mind'. These, Tod thought, were 'available to reanimate' their moral and physical existence', provided there was an agency for 'exertion of moral interference'.

The presence of a new external force—the British power—contributed largely to 'relay the foundations of order and prosperity'. The Rajput was impressed by 'the moral spectacle of a Peshwa marched into exile with all the quietude of pilgrimage'; it was much more impressive than a display of 20,000 bayonets. The lawless freebooter, and even the savage Bhil' attributed to the British an 'invisible power—that of magic'.

The belief was current that 'a single individual could carry an army in his pocket, and that our power could animate slips of paper cut into the figures of armed men....

Tod approached his task with a sympathy—an emotional involvement in the fortunes of a decadent people—which is without parallel in the history of foreign rule in India. 'I look upon Mewar', he wrote, 'as the land of adoption, and linked with all the associations of my early hopes and their actual realisation'. He felt inclined to exclaim with reference to her unmanageable children: 'Mewar, with all they faults, I love thee still.'⁵⁷ According to Ochterlony, he was 'too much of a Rajput himself to deal with Rajputs'. Ochterlony's estimate of Rajput character was entirely different from Tod's. He regarded a Rajput rather as sanguinary than courageous'; even if that feature of Rajput character was admitted to be courage, 'its excitement depends so much on opium and adventitious circumstances that till the moment of action it would not be easy to decide whether they would do credit to their former name, or fly at the first onset.'⁵⁸ Naturally this difference in views was reflected their respective policies, and a conflict ensued, leading to Tod's discomfiture and resignation.

At the initial stage Tod enjoyed considerable freedom in the performance of his duties. Metcalfe, Resident in Delhi, was vested with 'a general authority over the affairs of Kotah, Bundi and even Mewar', but in practice he did not choose to exercise it. In March 1818 Sir David Ochterlony was appointed 'Resident in Rajputana and Commissioner General with the Rajput States', and the States to which he was accredited included Udaipur, Jodhpur, Kotah, Bundi and Karauli. The list would extend to Jaipur and its dependencies as also Kishangarh if these principalities acceded to the British alliance. A special arrangement, however, was made for the conduct of affairs relating to Udaipur. The distance of the city of Udaipur from the head-quarters of 'the officer charged with the chief political authority in Rajputana', the 'deplorable condition' of the State, and the great consequence of its restoration to prosperity in the financial interests of the Company called for the establishment of a separate 'Agency' which, however, was to 'act on the spot under the authority of the Resident'. Tod was already holding this office. He was 'singularly well qualified'

for it by the 'peculiar attention' bestowed by him 'during many years on the affairs of Raiputana and of Mewar in particular' as also by 'his knowledge of the history, resources, and present state of that country and his familiarity with the manners of the people'. He was required to act under Ochterlony's 'general authority'. The Governor-General hoped that he would receive from Ochterlony 'that confidence which his character and qualifications so largely merit and obtained for him from the Governor-General while he had acted immediately under His Lordship's orders'.⁵⁹

A few months later (January 1819) Ochterlony took charge of the Residency of Delhi in succession to Metcalfe. His relations with Tod now became uncertain. The Supreme Government gave him liberty ... to instruct Captain Tod in addition to his present duties' to conduct British relations with Jodhpur. Moreover, if Ochterlony 'judged it expedient' he might 'direct' Tod 'to correspond directly with Government on all points connected with the affairs of States to which he will stand accredited'. In February 1819 Tod was appointed 'Political Agent with the Western Rajput States'. The charge of Jodhpur was added to that of Udaipur, Kotah and Bundi, and he was empowered to correspond directly with the Supreme Government. In October 1821 Ochterlony was appointed to succeed Sir John Malcolm as Resident in Malwa and Rajputana; 'all the local Agents' in Malwa and Rajputana were placed under his 'more immediate orders and control' and required to address their correspondence through him 'instead of their communicating as formerly with the Government'. Tod was henceforth to be designated simply 'Agent at Udaipur'. His differences with Ochterlony now began to take a serious shape and finally led to his resignation. But even in May 1822 Ochterlony wrote to the Supreme Government that Tod had 'established a wholesome and salutary influence (in Mewar) which I should hope will be continued for the interest of the people, the prosperity of the State and the advantage of our Government'.⁶⁰

Tod's purpose was 'to bring back matters (in Mewar) to a correspondence with an era of their history, when the rights of the prince, the vassals, and the cultivator, were alike well defined—that of Amar Singh'. In other words, he aimed at

restoring the institutions of the State to their normal condition so that its prosperity could be revived under the fostering care of the British Government'. His respect for Mewar's past was to be reconciled with the remedies which the virtual dissolution of the old political system called for. It was not possible to bring about renovation through the indigenous agencies without pushing them forward in a manner which would be consistent with the letter and spirit of the treaty. The Supreme Government recognized 'the strong objections that exist to any thing like systematic interference in the affairs of the Rana's Government'; it was 'equally precluded by the treaty and by general considerations of policy'. But 'in the actual state of the Court of Udaipur, some more active interposition' would not only be excusable but actually indispensable for the success of the measures in view. This, however, did not mean a blank cheque for Tod. He was told that interference, if needed, must be exercised 'with the utmost moderation, caution, and discretion, and in the form of private advice, not of authority'.⁶¹

Tod's reading of Rajput institutions had convinced him that it was the authority of the ruler which secured the integration of the different elements in the State. 'Throughout Rajasthan', he wrote, 'the character and welfare of the States depend on that of the sovereign; he is the main spring of the system—the active power to set and keep in motion all these discordant materials; if he relax, each part separates, and moves in a narrow sphere of its own'.⁶² In the case of Mewar, Tod's 'first point' was 'to effect the recognition of the prince's authority by his nobles'. The 'surest sign' of such 'recognition' was the presence of the nobles at the capital 'where some had never been, and others only when it suited their convenience or their views'. Under Tod's influence, 'in a few weeks the Rana saw himself surrounded by a court such as had not been known for half a century...the whole feudal association of Mewar was embodied in the capital'.

To 'recall the exiled population was a measure simultaneous with the assembling of the nobles; but this was a work requiring time'. The exiles 'had formed ties, and incurred obligations to the societies which had sheltered them, which could not at once be disengaged or annulled'. Proclamations were widely circulated and there was very satisfactory response, showing that 'neither

oppression from without, nor tyranny within, could expel the feeling for the *bapota*, the land of their fathers'. Within eight months of the conclusion of the treaty more than 300 towns and villages were 'simultaneously re-inhabited'.

Measures were taken for the promotion of trade and commerce. Foreign merchants and bankers had abandoned Mewar. Money was scarce, and want of faith and credit had increased the rate of interest to a ruinous extent, so that even the Rana borrowed at 36 per cent. With a view to attracting foreign merchants and bankers to Mewar the Rana issued proclamations; and 'as in the days of demoralization little faith was placed in the words of princes', similar proclamations were issued by Tod, guaranteeing their stipulations. The result was satisfactory; branch banks were established, and mercantile agents started operations in every town. The shackles which bound external commerce were removed. The chain of stations for collection of transit duties was abolished; such collection was henceforth confined to the frontiers. The scale of duties was reduced by 30 to 50 per cent. Bhilwara rapidly rose from ruin. By 1822 this hitherto deserted commercial mart contained nearly 3,000 dwellings, inhabited chiefly by merchants, bankers or artisans. A 'charter of privileges and immunities' was issued.

It was comparatively easy to deal with the agricultural and commercial classes; they required only 'protection and stimulus' and could be repaid for their industry by reduction of taxation. It was difficult to deal with the 'feudal lords' who could not be offered any such equivalent 'for the sacrifices many had to make for the re-establishment of society'. Those who were 'well inclined' towards the changes resulting from the British alliance had 'everything to gain and nothing left to surrender'; but 'those who, like the lords of Deogarh, Sahumbar or Bednore, had preserved their power by foreign aid, intrigue, or prowess, dreaded the high price they might be called upon to pay for the benefit of security which the (British) alliance conferred'. There was a general dread of the word 'restitution' and there was uneasiness over 'the audit of half a century's political accounts'; but such changes were essential to the reconstruction of the political 'edifice which anarchy and oppression had dismantled'. Feuds had to be 'appeased, but it was not easy to persuade the Chundawat and Saktawat to labour in concert

for the welfare of the prince and the country'. The 'usurpations' by the nobles, both on the crown and on each other, had to be redeemed. The nobles themselves regarded the task as hopeless, and one of them exclaimed that even the Almighty could not reform Mewar. The Political Agent, an optimist in the face of enormous difficulties, 'judged better of them than they did of each other'.

After 'harassing, painful and protracted discussions' Tod secured the conclusion of an agreement (*Kaulnama*)⁶³ which was ratified at a general assembly of the Rana and the nobles on 4-5 May, 1818. This was 'finally accomplished without a shot being fired or the exhibition of a single British soldier in the country nor, indeed, within one hundred miles of Udaipur'. The Rana conducted himself with 'judgement and firmness' although in some cases he had to revoke his own grants. In the case of the nobles, whatever the reason behind particular usurpations', 'no distinction could be made in the mode of settlement, viz., unconditional surrender'. The sacrifices demanded from the nobles were, in some cases, enormous. For instance, the chief of Deogarh had to 'relinquish the levy of transit duties in the most important outlet of the country, asserted to have been held during seven generations', and the chief of Bhindar had to surrender 43 towns and villages held in addition to his grant. The whole arrangement was completed in six months.

The most important clause in the *Kaulnama* provided for the restoration 'all *Khalsa* villages seized by the Chiefs in times of trouble and commotion'. The chiefs also promised to perform personal service at Udaipur with the quota of troops with which they were by ancient custom bound to serve, to restore all customs and other duties seized from the Rana's administration, and not to harbour thieves and robbers in their *Pattas*. The Rana, on his part, promised to respect the ancient rights and privileges of the nobles. These arrangements put the Rana's establishment on a basis of financial security, and their general effect was to enhance his prestige and authority throughout his territory. Captain Brookes attributes 'the accomplishment of this unpalatable measure to Tod's 'great personal influence...and the authority our attitude, and the presence of our armies in Central India, gave at the time to

all our officers employed at Foreign Courts.'⁶⁴ Tod says: 'The Rajputs, in fact, did not require the demonstration of our physical strength; its influence had reached far beyond Mewar'.

Tod found many 'drawbacks to the prosperity of the country in an impoverished court, avaricious and corrupt officers, discontented *Patels*, and bad seasons'; yet satisfactory changes were recorded between February 1818 and May 1822. Large areas were added to the *Khalsa*. Kumbhalmer, Raipur, Rajnagar and Sadri-Kanera were recovered from the Marathas, and Jahajpur from Kotah. The 'usurpations of the nobles were resumed, together with the estates of the females of the Rana's family. By the subjugation of the mountain districts of Merwara a thousand towns and villages were acquired. The 'fiscal revenues' rose from Rs. 40,000 in 1818 to Rs. 10,18,478, in 1821; next year the amount fell to Rs. 9,35,640 'the active superintendence of the British Agent being almost entirely withdrawn'.

The commercial duties, increasing from a nominal amount in 1818 to Rs. 2,17,000 in 1822, provided a considerable income for the Rana. In this sector the prospect was so bright that these were farmed for three years from 1822 for Rs. 7,50,000 which was assigned by the Rana for the liquidation of tribute fallen in arrear. The total of 'fiscal revenues' and commercial duties amounted to Rs. 1,20,000 in 1818 and Rs. 8,77,634 in 1821.⁶⁵ There were 'sources of wealth in Mewar yet untouched', such as the tin mines of Jawara and Dariba, which yielded above three lakhs annually half a century ago, as also rich copper mines in various parts. But the miners were dead and the mines filled with water; an attempt to work them proved unprofitable.

The progress of prosperity was reflected in the growth of urban population. The number of houses in Udaipur rose from 3,500 in 1818 to 10,000 in 1822. Similar increase was noted in some other towns: Pur, from 200 to 1,200; Mandal, from 80 to 400; Gogunda, from 60 to 350. The most spectacular case was that of Bnilwara; it had not a single house in 1818, but by 1822 no less than 2,700 houses had sprung up.

The feudal lands, which were then double the fiscal, did not exhibit the like improvement, for the merchants and cultivators in these areas did not 'have the same certainty of

reaping the fruits of their own industry'. The nobles had not relaxed their grip on their people; and although they controlled between two and three thousand towns, villages, and hamlets, no share of the tribute due to the British government could be collected from them, the entire burden thus falling on the 'fiscal lands'. The 'feudal lands' were 'burdened with service and formed the army of the State. Mewar was thus divided into two distinct sectors. The merchants and cultivators in the 'feudal lands' desired to have the 'same measure of justice and protection as the fiscal tenants enjoyed'; but this needed the Political Agent's assistance which 'could not be tendered without danger'. On the whole, the Rana's authority was only partially restored; the old balance between the ruler and the nobles, and the customary obligations of the latter to the cultivators and merchants in their estates, had been shattered by the political vicissitudes of the previous century. The spirit of the age and the impact of foreign suzerainty were altogether inconsistent with the full survival of the old order in Rajasthan. The Political Agent's control began to be relaxed in 1821 under instructions from the Supreme Government; and the 'feudal chiefs', finding that the British 'system did not extend to perpetual control, returned to their old habits of oppression'. The Rana no longer possessed the power needed to keep them under control. Tod retired from Mewar with the expression of the pious wish that 'they should rely upon themselves if they desired to retain a shadow of independence'.

Tod's premature retirement in 1822 was due to his differences with Ochterlony.⁶⁶ The latter expressed his disapproval of Tod's allowing his name to be coupled with that of the Rana in the appeal to the 'exiled' inhabitants of Mewar to return to their own country. His view was that too much publicity should not be given to British interference which should be 'only exercised with discretion at the closet'. The Supreme Government, however, took a different view. It felt that Tod could not have refused to comply with the Rana's request in this matter 'without checking the Rana's disposition to seek his counsel and assistance on other occasions, a habit which it is so essential to encourage by every proper means'.

There were other matters which estranged the relations between the two men. Ochterlony challenged the propriety of

Tod's addressing a letter to Amir Khan in a matter connected with Kotah. Here, again, the Supreme Government supported Tod's 'deviation from the regular course' on the ground of urgency. Secondly, Tod's proceedings in disputes between Mewar and Marwar in regard to the possession of certain villages were regarded by Ochterlony as a violation of decorum, propriety and justice. Ochterlony's irritation expressed itself in different ways. At last, on 18 February, 1822 Tod tendered his resignation, complaining of 'supersession' of his 'hitherto independent political control' which 'could not but impress the rulers around with the idea that my Government was dissatisfied with my services—an impression which cannot fail to cripple the effect of my authority'. The immediate occasion was a matter relating to Kotah. Ochterlony took an extremely unfavourable view of Tod's letter which he described as a document containing pages of inanity, the effusions of wounded vanity and self-sufficiency. There was no possibility of reconciliation. Tod, placed by the Supreme Government under Ochterlony's orders, defied him by sending his despatches directly to that Government, transmitting copies to Ochterlony. The latter retaliated by sending to Udaipur as his representative a person named Ganesh Narayan with a letter from the Governor-General announcing Ochterlony's superiority over Tod. This representative, as also an agent engaged by him, intrigued at Udaipur against Tod and Captain Waugh who was holding temporary charge of the 'Agency'. In vain Tod asked for the punishment of these intriguers. Tod left India with bitterness in his heart after twenty-three years of service under the Company. Ochterlony won the last battle, but his career in India ended in greater humiliation.

Tod's final discomfiture was due to an exaggerated view of his procedural lapses which the Supreme Government took at the last stage, apparently under Ochterlony's continuous pressure. But even Ochterlony recognized the value of the work done by him. Writing to the Supreme Government on 2 August, 1822 he observed: 'It would be no slight praise to any person to have produced from the chaos of anarchy, contusion, poverty, disorder, and disaffection in which he (Tod) found the State (Mewar), anything that had the semblance of a system, and had a tendency to repress or ameliorate existing evils'. He

added that Tod 'has carried with him the resentments of a great mass of the population of Udaipur, and so far as he is capable of feeling them, similar sentiments in the Rana, though often subjected to the invidious and hateful task of imposing restraints on an extravagance which knew no reasonable bounds, and to check a facility of disposition which, without his intervention would have led to a renewal of his own distress'. Tod, of course, had no opportunity of reading these words of praise.

Bishop Heber wrote that 'in consequence of his (Tod's) favouring the native princes so much, the Government of Calcutta were led to suspect him of corruption, and consequently to narrow his powers and associate other officers with him in his trust till he was disgusted and resigned his place.⁶⁷ There is no indication of such suspicion in the official records, but Tod's pronounced sympathy with the Rajputs might have been misunderstood in some quarters. In any case, the Bishop found that he was 'strenuously vindicated from the charge by all the officers with whom I have conversed, and some of whom had abundant means of knowing what the natives thought of him'.

Tod's effort to restore the prosperity of Mewar were frustrated largely by the opposition of those for whom he laboured hard. The Rana was not only inefficient and averse to business. Tod says: 'Vain shows, frivolous amusements, and an ill-regulated liberality alone occupied him... He had little steadiness of purpose, and was particularly obnoxious to female influence'. There may be some truth in the following statement of Brookes: 'It is probable that the very state of dependence in which the Rana was placed, chafed his spirit, and induced many of those evils of which the Agent complained⁶⁸. The administration of Jahajpur (restored from Kotah through Tod's negotiations in February 1819) was put under the direct management of the Political Agent. In 1819-20 British troops suppressed a rebellion in Merwara which, though nominally subject to Mewar and Marwar, paid no revenue to either of these two States. In 1823, after Tod's departure, Ochterlony compelled the Rana to transfer his share in Merwara to British management; he was threatened that in case of non-compliance his officers in the district would be forcibly expelled. The mode of transfer 'was 'totally at variance with the instructions, the

wishes, and the views of (the Supreme) Government'; but it was an indication of the Rana's actual position in the new political system.

Ochterlony's reference to Tod's invidious and hateful task of imposing restraints on the Rana's extravagance' indicated one of Tod's serious difficulties. From the increasing revenue of the *Khalsa* lands and the expanding commercial duties, says Tod, an income was derived 'sufficient for the comforts, and even the dignities of the prince and his court, and promising an annual increase in the ratio of good government; but profusion scattered all that industry and ingenuity could collect; the artificial wants of the prince perpetuated the real necessities of the peasant. . .'. The Rana's daily allowance of household expenses amounted to Rs. 1,000. This amount was paid by a banker who was guaranteed the payment of the sum with 18 per cent interest, by the Political Agent. 'With the prodigality usual in a Native Prince', the Rana tried to 'burden the State accounts with items which ought to have been defrayed out of the liberal income furnished to him'. He sent to the districts which had been set apart for the payment of the tribute, 'extra establishments, as a means of providing for needy dependents and followers'. To make up the deficiency in the tribute other parganas had to be assigned.⁶⁹ Even when the Rana agreed to measures suggested by Tod, they were thwarted by the ladies in his household. 'Every man in the city', Tod noted with regret, 'from the pettiest cloth-seller to the Rana, discusses public affairs, and every person from the *Pradhan* to the *Passwan* who drives away the flies, assumes the privilege of giving advice'.

VI. After Tod

After Tod's departure the Political Agent's guarantee to the banker in regard to the payment of the Rana's daily allowance was withdrawn. The banker stopped payment. The Rana had to pawn his jewels and silver sticks. His horses and elephants seldom got their rations more than twice per week. The Rana believed that the cancellation of the arrangement with the banker was due to the intrigue of his minister, Shah Shewlal, who exercised considerable influence over Tod's temporary successor, Captain Waugh. He dismissed the minister, but he had to be

restored at the insistence of Captain Waugh and Ochterlony. Although Article 9 of the Treaty recognized the Rana as the 'absolute ruler of his own country', he was not free to dismiss a minister whom he did not like.

Captain Cobbe worked as Political Agent in Mewar for a fairly long period (April 1823-January 1831). On his arrival at Udaipur he found confusion all around. The Rana's interference in the administration of the State and the collection of taxes had disorganized everything. The arrears of the tribute due to the British Government amounted to Rs. 7,40,747, besides the amount payable for the year 1822-23. Ochterlony believed that the 'heavy debt' formed the least object of the Rana's thought.⁷⁰ In Cobbe's view, he 'regarded his debt as a mere nominal obligation, and the exaction of tribute, a hardship'. The Government, he wrote, 'is a tissue of cheating and oppression: from the prince to the peasant, all are robbers'. The remedial measure adopted to meet the difficulties was the assumption by the new Political Agent of complete control over the internal administration of the State. He required the 'Feudatory Chiefs' to contribute towards the maintenance of an effective police for preserving peace in the interior of the State. His success in conciliating their good will and gaining their confidence was expected, in the opinion of the Supreme Government, to 'work an extensively beneficial influence on the habits, conduct and character of that rude and turbulent class'. The interest of the cultivators was kept in view. In the *Khalsa* lands the demand for one-half of the produce as the fixed revenue of the State was considered excessive, and Cobbe was vested with discretionary authority to revert to the system of levying one-third of the produce. But the tax called *barar*, by which artisans, manufacturers and people other than cultivators were formerly made to contribute to the support of the State, was to be restored. The repair and construction of public works calculated to extend and improve cultivation were to be properly looked after. For the regular payment of the tribute and for the liquidation of the arrears certain *parganas* were reserved. Cobbe paid frequent visits to the interior, and the affairs of the reserved *parganas* were managed under his personal inspection and control.⁷¹ All these arrangements improved Mewar's financial position.

In 1826, during Cobbe's absence on leave, the officiating Political Agent, Captain Sutherland, proposed that the tribute payable to the Company should be a fixed amount, and not a fluctuating sum dependent on the realisation of the revenues, for the system of enquiry which the current system necessitated was injurious to the dignity and interests of Mewar. He also suggested that the districts reserved for payment of the tribute should be restored to the Rana. These proposals were approved by Sir Charles Metcalfe, Resident in Delhi, who expressed the hope that 'eight or nine years of our protection will at least have operated so far beneficially, as to enable us to permit the Rana to rule his own dominions'.

About this time Metcalfe visited Udaipur. The Rana presented to him a memorandum of 10 Articles. The first Article expressed the Rana's desire that the tribute should be converted into a fixed sum. Metcalfe recommended to the Supreme Government that the tribute should be fixed at three lakhs per year. He was aware that the British Government would lose largely if Mewar ever acquired the wealth which its soil was capable of producing; but he thought it was desirable to put an end to the vexatious system of scrutiny and interference. The second Article asked for a reduction from the arrears of tribute. Metcalfe disapproved this demand and suggested that the arrears might be paid in instalments, or the Rana might raise a loan for this purpose under British guarantee. The Rana's third request was that his administrative authority should be restored. Metcalfe recognized that this was his 'undoubted right', but he had not been allowed to exercise it. 'A part of the country', Metcalfe wrote, 'has been under the management of our Agent, together with the whole of the revenue from customs, as pledges for the payment of our tribute. Throughout the remainder of the country, *chuprassies* have been stationed in every village, bearing the badges of the British Agent, badges also of the insignificance and subjection of the nominal sovereign'. In November 1826 Sutherland recommended the withdrawal of these *chuprassies* with badges. The Raja's fourth request related to the exorbitant interest charged by the banker who provided the allowance for his household expenses. A new banker was found, who did not charge more than 6 per cent.

The remaining Articles referred to the Bhil country, Merwara, restoration of the lost portions of the ancient territories of Mewar, etc. Metcalte made no decision on any of these points although he complied with the Rana's request (Article 10) that an Agent representing Mewar might be posted at the Delhi Residency. On the whole, Metcalfe was quite satisfied with his visit and formed a good opinion about the heir-apparent, Jawan Singh, whom he described as a prince bearing a 'high character' and 'managing his own affairs well'.⁷²

For some years after the conclusion of the treaty the British officers had no clear idea about the relations of the Bhils with the Rajput *Thakurs* and the Rana of Mewar. The Bhils realised, by prescriptive right rather than by legal authority conferred by the Rana, certain taxes from their neighbours: (1) *bolai* or tax levied on the transit of commodities and travellers, for whose safety the Bhils assumed responsibility-; (2) *rakhali* or 'blackmail', paid by villagers to neighbouring Bhil communities as a protection against plunder. Those Rajput chiefs who had received grants of Bhil villages were entitled to a share (*bishwah*) of the *bolai*. Soon after his arrival at Udaipur Tod, with the purpose of increasing the Rana's revenues and encouraging trade, tried to resume these taxes. The Bhils naturally refused to surrender their income and prescriptive right, and they were screened by the Rajput *Thakurs* who were simultaneously threatened with the loss of their share of the *bishwah*. The Rana punished these *Thakurs* by confiscating their estates, but it was difficult to control the plundering Bhils who were responsible for many robberies and local disturbances. In 1823, British troops were employed against the Bhils, but permanent peace could not be established. The Court of Directors laid down a cautious policy: '... before our own troops are employed in reducing the refractory subjects of princes in alliance with us, the circumstances under which application is made for their interference should be clearly investigated.'⁷³ Two years later (January 1827) Metcalfe wrote to the Political Agent in Mewar: To engage in the suppression, by force, of disturbances which have been excited by oppression or misrule, is a most unsatisfactory proceeding'. But the policy of sending British troops against the refractory Bhils was continued for several

years. The formation of the Mewar Bhil corps in 1841 marked the beginning of a new order in the Bhil country.

Returning from leave in December 1826, Cobbe gave effect to the policy of Sutherland and Metcalfe. The interference of the Political Agent in the internal affairs of the State was 'completely and finally withdrawn'. The reserved *parganas* were made over to the Rana. The immediate results were not satisfactory; neither the Rana nor his ministers and officers could make proper use of the liberty suddenly contended upon them. Shah Shewlal was dismissed in 1824, reinstated in 1826, and dismissed again in 1827. The Political Agent send reports to the Resident in Delhi on the oppressions committed by the *Kamdars* of the minister, by the revival of obsolete or repudated claims, and the renewal of old causes, civil and criminal formerly investigated. The Rana's orders were not obeyed by the *Kamdars*, who considered themselves as the servants of the minister. Robberies were 'of almost endless occurrence two or three cases occurred daily in the city of Udaipur.'⁷⁴

Rana Bhim Singh died on 31 March 1828. His successor, Jawan Singh, who had impressed Metcalfe favourably in 1826, sank into debauchery and intoxication. The expenses of his court soon doubled those of his father and did not fall short of Rs. 50,000 a month. From the effects of bad government, the land revenue rapidly declined.⁷⁵ He died on 30 August 1838.

Such was the condition of Mewar after its submission to the East India Company. The misery of the State was due largely to the vicissitudes through which it had passed in the eighteenth century, and its rulers were obviously unworthy successors of their great ancestors. But a close study of contemporary British official records seems to make it clear that the new political system which it entered in 1818 was to some extent responsible for its distress. The Rana was assured of protection against external invasions and internal rebellions; but he could not choose his own ministers, the British Government's *chuprassies* realised revenues in his territories and he had to depend upon the Political Agent's favour for the supply of his household expenses. Such conditions do not strengthen the character and sharpen the sense of responsibility of rulers of men. Nor did the restrictions imposed upon the

nobles of Mewar by zealous Political Agents make them better guardians of the interests of the state. A medieval political organization dominated by 'feudal' ideas and practices could not be transformed into a modern benevolent Administration in course of a few years by the half-hearted application of *ad hoc* remedies. The old institutions had lost their vitality under the pressure of 'Maratha cunning, engrafted on Mahomedan intolerance'. Tod, who used these harsh words, did not realise the utter impossibility of bringing those institutions back to life under the shadow of the British umbrella.

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3. Brookes, *History of Meywar*, pp. 55-56.
4. *Ibid.*, p.19.
5. J.N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. I, p. 130.
6. Irvine, *Later Mughals*, Vol. I, pp. 72-73.
7. *Selections from Peshwa Daftar*, Vol. XXI, letter No. 19.
8. J.N. Sarkar, *op. at.*, Vol. II, p. 139.
9. Tod's statements on these transactions (Crooke, Vol. 1, p. 497) are contradicted by contemporary Marathi sources and must be rejected.
10. *Selections from Peshwa Daftar*, Vol. XXXVIII, letter No. 185.
11. Tod's stories of Zalim Singh's intrigue and the 'battle at the Sipra' (Crooke, Vol. 1, pp. 499-500) have been rejected as unhistorical by J.N. Sarkar, *op. at.*, Vol. II, pp. 518-519.
12. J.N. Sarkar, *op. at.*, Vol. II, p. 382.
13. *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. VIII, p. 14. (Abbreviation in the following pages: P.R.C.).
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16. Malcolm, *Memoir of Central India*, Vol. I, p. 129.
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 25. S.C., 4 July 1805, No. 22.
 26. *Ibid.*, Nos. 20, 22. For a reference to the Rana's difficulty, see P.R.C., Vol. XI, p. 208.
 27. Kaye, *Life of Metcalfe*, Vol. I, p. 112.
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 33. S.C., 16 Jan., 1806, Nos. 42, 43; 30 Jan., 1806, Nos. 114, 116; 27 Feb., 1806, Nos. 13, 46.
 34. S.C., 27 Feb., 1806, Nos. 41, 42.
 35. S.C., 13 March, 1806, Nos. 15-17, 25-26.
 36. P.R.C., Vol. XI, No. 162.
 37. S.C., 1 May, 1806, No. 98; 8 May, 1806, Nos. 30, 96, 97.
 38. S.C., 22 May, 1806, No. 23.
 39. *Ibid.*
 40. S.C., 29 May, 1806, No. 20; 5 June, 1806, No. 55; 19 June, 1806, No. 34.
 41. P.R.C., Vol. XI, No. 164.
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 52. S.C., 14 Nov., 1817, No. 50; 19 Dec., 1817, No. 112; 6 Feb., 1818, No. 107; 20 Feb., 1818, Nos. 29, 67.
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 54. M.S. Mehta, *Lord Hastings and the Indian States*, p. 135.

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57. Personal Narratives.
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65. *Ibid*, p. 28.
66. P.C., 17 July, 1818, No. 41; 31 July, 1818, No. 33; 26 Dec., 1818, No. 49-16 April 1822, No. 11; 10 May, 1822, No. 19; 13 July, 1822, No. 12; 2 Aug, 1822, No. 5.
67. K. Heber, *Narrative of a Journey through the Upper Provinces...* 1824-27 Vol. II, p. 54.
68. Brookes, *op. cit.*, p. 27.
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70. Y .C.. 2 Nov., 1822, No. 7.
71. P.C. 29 April, 1825, No. 12.
72. Metcalfe to Secretary to Supreme Government, 26 Dec., 1826.
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12

Jaipur

I. Mughals and Marathas

The history of the Amber or Jaipur State provides the best illustration of the impact of Mughal suzerainty on Rajasthan. The first among the Rajput princes to seek Mughal protection and to enter into matrimonial relations with the Imperial family, Bharmal opened for his small principality who had varied opportunities for acquiring prominence and power under the Mughal banner. 'The once 'third-rate and obscure house of Amber', says Sir J.N. Sarkar, 'had risen in the cones of a century and a half to the front rank by the most brilliant and valued service to the empire in far apart fields, than to the signal capacity for war and diplomacy displayed by found generations of its chieftains ... Bhagwan Das and Man Singh, under Akbar Mirza Rajah Jai Singh under Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb and Sawai Jai Singh under the later Mughals'.

Tod gives us a brief account of the relationship between the Rajput States and the Mughal Empire. "The emperor of Delhi" he says, "in the zenith of their power best used the epithet 'zemindar, upon the Hindu tributary severeighs not out of disrespect, but in the true application of their own term *Bhumia Raj*', expressive of their tenacity to the soil..." This explanation of the term 'zamindar', which was used in the Besian records of the Mughal period, is not correct. It was

applied, for instance, to the Hindu tributary princes in Bengal, such as the Raja of Cooch Behar, to whom the epithet '*Bhumia Raj*' in its Rajasthani sense was not applicable. In the Mughal system the term 'zamindar' was used in respect of tributary princes and landholders of different categories with different rights and obligations; it had no precise or uniform connotation.

A clear picture of the position on the Rajput States in the Mughal Empire is found in Abul Fazl's *Ain-i-Akbari*. From the point of view of revenue administration these tributary principalities were included within the *Subahs* of the Empire. Of the *Subah* of Ajmer only two *sarkars* (Ajmer and Nagor) were administered directly by imperial officials; the rest consisted of the Rajput principalities. Each of them it seems, contributed to the imperial treasury a fixed round sum for the revenue figures are generally given in even thousands. It was for the head of the State concerned to realise the revenue from the ryots and to raise the local militia; the Mughal Government had no direct concern with these matters. The Mughal *Subahdar* of Ajmer realised the tribute from the Rajput princes within his jurisdiction. Sirohi, Jalor, Dungarpur and Banswara were included within the *Subah* of Ajmer for revenue purposes, but politically they were attached to the *Subah* of Ahmedabad. The *Subahdar* closely watched the activities of the tributary princes within his jurisdiction and stationed *Fauhdars* and *Qiladars* in important forts like Ranthambhor. He had, however, no authority to interfere in the internal affairs of the States. The princes had full internal powers and dealt directly with the imperial Government. The Emperor had, in theory, full control over succession. From every new prince he exacted homage and offering before his formal installation on his ancestral *gadi*. Every Rajput State was treated, for official purposes, as a *jagir* which the Emperor conferred on his nominee. The chief obligations of the princes were the regular payment of the tribute and the regular supply of contingents for the imperial army. The chief restriction on their power was the obligation to use Mughal coins in their territories. No Rajput prince was allowed to mint coins in his own name till the middle of the eighteenth century and even then the Emperor's name had to be inscribed on the Rajput coins in recognition of his suzerainty.

It has been suggested by a modern writer that the autocracies of the Mughal Emperors exerted an indirect influence on the political organization of the Rajputs. 'The autocracy at the imperial capital', he says, 'supplied the incentive to the (Rajput) prince to play the autocrat in his more limited sphere of arms. It was the example of the Mughal court, we are told which transformed the leader of the clan into 'the irresponsible bureaucrat of the eighteenth century'. This view is not waste substance; but it was the altered position of the prince's Mughal supremacy, rather than the abstract influence of Mughal court, which made him 'the main spring of the state. The position of a Rajput prince who remained steadfast as loyalty of the Emperor was so secure that he could defy the nobles under him and set aside traditional restraint of his own power. As he could count upon imperial support of suppression of internal rebellion, he could assume absolute power far more easily than his predecessors who could afford to alienate the nobility. Thus the balanced polity of medieval times tilted in favour of the prince during the that period. Mewar was an exception; indeed, one of the important consequences of its struggle against the court followed by deliberate isolation from the imperial accession of strength to the nobility.

Another factor which contributed to the increase of prince's power during the Mughal period was the acquisition through imperial grant--of new territories as *tankhwah*....*ijara*. The *watan* area of Amber was small, about 3,000 sq. miles; but extensive additions were made in the days of Raja Jai Singh, Ram Singh and Sawai Jai Singh. Tod says that Singh's power as the King's (*i.e.*, Mughal Emperor's) lieutenant of Agra gave him ample opportunity to enlarge and consolidated his territory'.

Sawai Jai Singh (1699-1743), the last of the great Kacchwah rulers, was a remarkable man. Tod says: 'As a statutory legislator, and man of science, the character of Sawai Jai Singh worthy of an ample delineation, which would correct the opinion of the genius and capacity of the princes of Rajput kings whom we are apt to form too low an estimate'. But this ruler lacked some of the essential qualities of a Rajput chief of reputation as a soldier', says Tod, 'would never have bring down his name with honour to posterity; on the contrary, his courage had none of the fire which is requisite to make

a Raiput hero, though his talents for civil government and court intrigue, in which he was the Machiavelli of his day, were at that period far more notable auxiliaries'.

As Mughal *Subahdar* of Malwa in the reign of Muhammad Shah, Sawai Jai Singh was probably guilty of collusion with the Marathas who were at that time penetrating into the imperial *Subahs* of Malwa and Gujarat. If the Emperor's cause against the Marathas had been served, says Sir J.N. Sarkar, 'with the courage, enterprise and fidelity of ... Mirza Rajah Jai Singh, instead of Sawai Jai Singh's love of sensual ease, misappropriation of the imperial chest of military defence, and treacherous subserviency to the enemies of the country, the Marathas would have been successfully kept out of Northern India, and Rajputana would have been spared the horrors of Maratha domination'. This severe verdict on Sawai Jai Singh's career can hardly be challenged although it should be remembered that the political situation had changed radically since the days of the Mirza Raja and Shivaji. Sawai Jai Singh could not have saved the Mughal Empire, nor could he have kept the Marathas out of Northern India for an indefinite period. But he could have kept them out of Rajasthan, and probably out of Malwa, during his life time.

Not content with extending his patrimony by the acquisition of extensive areas from imperial territory, Sawai Jai Singh, as Tod says, 'tried to compel the services of the chieftains who served under his banner as lieutenant of the King'. The first victim of this policy of aggression was Budh Singh of Bundi. He was dethroned by Sawai Jai Singh in 1729; the *gadi* of Bundi was transferred to Dalil Singh on condition of his acknowledging the Raja of Jaipur as his overlord. For about twenty years (1729-49) Budh Singh and his son, Ummed Singh, continued the struggle against Jaipur. Ummed Singh finally succeeded in occupying his father's *gadi*. Sawai Jai Singh also intervened in a dispute between Jodhpur and Bikaner and suffered a serious reverse in the battle of Gangwana in 1741.

Maratha intervention in Rajasthan began in Sawai Jai Singh's life time; it became persistently aggressive after his death in 1743, and his own State became its immediate victim. He was succeeded by his eldest son, Ishwari Singh (1743-50), whose

claim was disputed by Madho Singh (Sawai Singh's son by a Mewar Princess) in accordance with the terms of a treaty concluded between Mewar and Amber in 1708. Rana Jagat Singh of Mewar supported Madho Singh, but he was not strong enough to place his nephew on the *gadi* of Jaipur. The peculiar tragedy of this fratricidal struggle lay in the fact that both sides invoked, and secured at heavy prices, the armed assistance of Marathas. The Marathas, led by Malhar Rao Holkar, entered Jaipur territory in 1748, and again in 1750, ostensibly to support Madho Singh but really to levy contributions. Ishwari Singh, a half-witted prince guided by a barber and an elephant-driver, escaped their rising pressure by committing suicide (December 1750). The Marathas occupied the city of Jaipur and placed Madho Singh on the *gadi*. In addition to money they demanded that one-fourth of the territory of Jaipur should be made over to them. Madho Singh boldly resolved to free himself from his exacting patrons. He tried to poison the Maratha chiefs, but failed. Then the citizens of Jaipur took the matter into their own hands. A riot broke out in the city; about 1,500 Marathas were killed and about 1,000 wounded. Madho Singh disclaimed all previous knowledge or share in this massacre and conciliated the Marathas by promises of money. Early in 1751 the Marathas left Jaipur.

No Rajput prince ever paid money to the Marathas except under military pressure. As the Marathas were otherwise engaged for about three years after their departure from Jaipur, Madho Singh became a defaulter. A large Maratha army under Raghunath Rao and Malhar Rao Holkar appeared in Jaipur towards the close of 1753. Madho Singh averted the desolation of his territory by promising payment of 16.5 lakhs of rupees. More than ten lakhs were paid in 1755; the remaining amount was left unpaid. Madho Singh joined Bijay Singh of Marwar and made a serious attempt to expel the Marathas from Rajasthan. A Jaipur army suffered a severe defeat in October 1755, and the allied princes made peace with the Marathas in February 1756. In 1757 Raghunath Rao again came to Jaipur, asked for 40 to 50 lakhs in cash, and demanded the cession of an important slice of Madho Singh's territory. He refused to submit to these exorbitant demands and made excellent

preparations for military resistance. Raghunath Rao then lowered his demand to 11 lakhs, six lakhs to be paid immediately. In 1758 Janoji Sindhia compelled Madho Singh to promise payment of 36 lakhs in four years. In 1759 Malhar Rao Holkar came to realise money from Jaipur, but the news of Ahmad Shah Abdali's arrival in the Punjab compelled him to leave Rajasthan and proceed towards Delhi in January 1760.

After the third battle of Panipat (January 1761) Madho Singh made a systematic attempt to dislodge the Marathas from Rajasthan. 'Jaipur was now the strongest power in Rajputana, and its master, safely sheltered within his strongly fortified capital, could laugh an invasion to scorn'. Most of the villages of Jaipur had protective walls and a martial population. With a view to organizing an anti-Maratha coalition Madho Singh invited the co-operation of Ahmad Shah Abdali, Shah Alam II, Najib-ud-daula and the Rajput princes. Although there was no effective response from the Muslim rulers, many Rajput promised to join him. But in November 1761 a large Jaipur army was defeated by Malhar Rao Holkar in the battle of Mangrol. It was a decisive step towards the recovery of Maratha power in North India. It shattered Madho Singh's dream of permanent relief from the Maratha menace.

Madho Singh's failure to take full advantage of the difficulties of the Marathas was due to his 'lack of character, quarrels with his feudal barons, and above all chronic antagonism with Bijay Singh of Mar war, the only Rajput Prince that counted for anything'. Another factor, to which Tod draws our attention, was the rise of the Jats under Suraj Mal who was a vassal of Jaipur but kept himself aloof in fear of treachery from Madho Singh. Suraj Mal's successor, Jawahir Singh, invaded Jaipur territory in 1765. Madho Singh invoked the assistance of the Marathas, and the arrival of a Sindhia contingent compelled the Jat Raja to retreat. Another Jat invasion followed in December 1767, and Jawahir Singh won a 'Pyrrhic victory' in the battle of Maonda. Madho Singh then invaded the Jat territory and defeated the Jats (February 1768); but he had to retreat when a large Sikh force arrived for Jawahir Singh's rescue. The assassination of Jawahir Singh in July 1768 weakened the Jat through internal dissensions, and the intervention of the

Marathas completed the ruin of the State created by Suraj Mal's genius. But the antagonism with the Jat compelled Madho Singh to adopt a pro-Maratha policy.

Madho Singh's death (March 1768) was followed by prolonged anarchy and turmoil in Jaipur. He was succeeded by his minor son, Prithvi Singh (1768-78), a boy of five. The regency was held by his step-mother who was guided chiefly by four persons: her father, Jaswant Singh Chundawat, the chief of Deogarh (in Mewar); an able Brahmin minister named Khushhali Ram Bohra who was initially a porter of Ganges water in Madho Singh's time; a common soldier named Ram Singh; and a Muslim elephant-driver named Firuz who, according to Tod, was her 'paramour'. It was an incongruous team. The chief nobles of the State resented their exclusion from power and intrigued for the overthrow of the queen-mother's authority. These internal dissensions were utilised by Pratap Singh Naruka, the ambitious chief of Macheri. He ousted Jaswant Singh from the administration, arrested Firuz, and confined Khushhali Ram. But towards the second half of the year 1777 the hostile feelings of the citizens of Jaipur compelled him to leave that city, Khushhali Ram now became the chief minister of the State. Pratap Singh Naruka took advantage of the decline of the Jat power, added Alwar and Lachhmangarh to Macheri, and laid the foundation of a new principality which came to be known as Alwar.

Prithvi Singh's premature death in 1778 was followed by the accession of his brother, Sawai Pratap Singh (1778-1803), a boy of thirteen. In 1779 Khushhali Ram was thrown into prison on the charge of embezzlement; but he was released and vested with full authority in October 1780 when Jaipur had to face two Mughal officers despatched by Mirza Nazaf Khan, Regent of the Mughal Empire, to invade Jaipur territory for realisation of tribute due to the Emperor (Shah Alam II). The invasion failed. The Mughal troops could not capture the Jaipur fort which was then considered impregnable. The craven Raja shut himself up in his capital, leaving all his realm outside open to Mughal spoliation'. Early in 1781 Mirza Nazaf Khan's troops, irregularly paid, returned to Delhi. Once again Khushhali Ram, who had served the State well against Pratap Singh Naruka

and Mirza Nazaf Khan, was thrown into prison. Restored to power in 1789, he was dismissed within a year. As his life was constantly in danger, he sought refuge with Mahadji Sindhia.

The troubles of Jaipur were due primarily to the character of the reigning prince. According to Sir J.N. Barkar, 'Sawai Pratap Singh had no brains...his folly burst out in capricious violence'. Like the later 'decadent Nawabs of Oudh, he used to dress himself like a female, tie bells to his ankles and dance within the harem'. Sometimes 'he would sally forth at night with the ruffianly companions of his wine-cup, raid the houses of the bankers and jewellers, beat them and snatch away their money'. Such a ruler could neither rule nor command respect. 'In addition to his unkindly and unmanly vices, his reckless speech and violent temper alienated the proud Rajput nobility and they left his capital for their seats in shame and disgust'. A contemporary British officer described his character as 'a compound of pride, meanness, cunning and avarice'. Tod, however, refers to him as 'a gallant prince, and not deficient in judgement'.

Internal as well as external factors brought the State to the brink of dissolution. The administration was inefficient and corrupt. Attempts were made to dethrone Pratap Singh and to put on the *gadi* a minor son of Prithvi Singh. This prince, named Man Singh, lived at Brindaban where he enjoyed a *jagir* granted by Mahadji Sindhia. Pratap Singh Naruka continued to pursue his aggressive and disloyal policy.

In 1785 Mahadji Sindhia, then the *Mir Bakhshi* of the Mughal empire, invaded Jaipur territory for realising the tribute due to Shah Alam II and to the Marathas. Khushhali Ram averted immediate danger by promising to pay 63 lakhs; but Sawai Pratap Singh stopped payment after Sindhia's departure and sent a confidential agent to Lucknow to arrange hiring an English contingent for use against the Marathas. Khushhali Ram, dismissed in January 1787, found shelter in Sindhia's camp. Sawai Pratap Singh concluded a defensive alliance with the Raja of Jodhpur, Bijay Singh, and openly prepared for war. Mahadji Sindhia realised that nothing but the annexation of a part of Jaipur territory would enable him to secure payment

of tribute from the obstinate Raja. He again invaded Jaipur territory (March 1787) and fought an indecisive pitched battle at Tunga (also called Lalsot) in July 1787. The Rajputs claimed it as a great victory, and Tod tells us that the Jaipur Raja spent 24 lakhs in charity to celebrate it. But they were not able to expel the Marathas from the field, and their casualty list was much heavier than that of their enemy. On the other hand, Sindhia was not able to crush the Rajputs or to accomplish the purpose for which he had undertaken the offensive campaign. Within a few days he retreated from the Jaipur territory.

In 1778-79 Mahadji Sindhia triumphed over his two rivals imperial politics, Ismail Beg and Ghulam Qadir, and made himself the protector of the blind Emperor Shah Alam II, as also the *de facto* ruler of Delhi. Ismail Beg and Bijay Singh of Jodhpur had assisted Pratap Singh of Jaipur in the battle of Tunga. These three allies again joined their forces and challenged Sindhia, but De Boigne's battalions crushed them in the battle of Patan (20 June, 1790). This defeat was followed by the disruption of the alliance between Jaipur and Jodhpur, and Rajasthan was left at the mercy of De Boigne's triumphant brigades. The Shekhawat territory was ravaged and brought under Sindhia's control. In 1791 Tukoji Holkar invaded Jaipur, says Tod, and 'extorted an annual tribute, which was afterwards transferred to Amir Khan, and continued a permanent incumbrance on the resources of Jaipur'.

At this stage the intensification of the old rivalry between Mahadji Sindhia and Tukoji Holkar introduced further complications in the political situation in North India. The creation of De Boigne's army, his victory at Patan, and the decisive blow which he struck against Jodhpur in the battle of Merta (September 1790) disturbed the balance of power in Hindustan. Holkar was expelled from all share in the territories north of Jaipur State was still recognized. He realised his danger and strengthened himself by raising a disciplined corps under the command of a Frenchman named Dudrenec. The Sindhia-Holkar rivalry reached its climax in the battle of Lakheri (June 1793). Holkar's defeat decided the political issue in favour of Sindhia.

'For about ten years (February 1792-October 1801) no Sindhia

was present in Hindustan in person'. Mahadji died in the South; his successor, Daulat Rao, 'lingered on for years in Maharashtra, pursuing the vain dream of controlling the Peshwa's Government'. The interests of the Sindhia family in Hindustan were left to the care of agents whose personal rivalry complicated the political situation. But the tribute due from the Rajput States continued to be realised by the French corps commanded successively by Do Boigne and Perron.

In 1799 the Marathas, assisted by George Thomas, the notorious adventurer of Haryana, invaded Jaipur territory and defeated the Rajputs in the battle of Fatehpur. A year later Lakhwa Dad a, Daulat Rao Sindhia's viceroy in Hindustan, invaded Jaipur territory for realising the arrears of tribute. Sawai Pratap Singh made elaborate preparations to resist him. A powerful Jaipur army was joined at Sanganer by 10,000 Rathor cavalry from Jodhpur; but the Jaipur Raja's attempt to win over George Thomas proved unsuccessful. A decisive battle fought at Malpura in April 1800. Although the Rathors cut the Maratha cavalry to pieces, the slaughter in the ranks of the Jaipur army was terrible. Moreover, 74 out of 80 pieces of cannon brought into the field were lost, together with the entire camp, baggage and warlike stores. Pratap Singh realised the futility of further resistance. He made peace on payment of 25 lakhs (May 1800). Compton says: 'Pratap Singh never recovered from the blow to his power and prestige which was dealt him on this eventful day.'

II. Treaty of 1803

Despite youthful follies and grave defects of character, Sawai Pratap Singh deserves credit for his persistent resistance to Maratha spoliation of his territory. He was shrewd enough to realise that British aid would be of great use for him in his unequal struggle against Sindhia. He was the first among the Rajput princes to have a dim perception of the role which the new foreign power might play in the political conflicts which were breaking Rajasthan into pieces.

As stated above, he tried to establish contact with the British in 1786. The British point of view was reflected in the opinion of James Andersen, Resident with Sindhia, which he

communicated to the acting Governor-General John Macpherson. As the Company was yet unconnected with the Raja of Jaipur, it would not be expedient to support him against Mahadji Sindhia. At the same time it would be undesirable to give Sindhia such indirect aid as he would derive from any positive British declaration of forbearance in his invasion of Jaipur territory. This form of non-intervention was the necessary consequence of the prohibition of treaty relations with the 'country powers' in India which had been incorporated in Pitt's India Act (1784). Moreover, the First Anglo-Maratha War had been 'particularly prejudicial to the financial system' of the Company, and a fresh involvement against Sindhia was not to be contemplated.

There was no possibility of any change of policy during the administration of Lord Cornwallis who remained loyal to the spirit of Pitt's India Act unless vital British interests were considered to be at stake. He wrote in 1788: 'Whilst England is at peace in Europe, and whilst the powers of this country abstain from offering injury to us or to our allies, this Government is not at liberty to take any step which might lead to hostilities with any of our neighbours'. This statement of policy explains his refusal to consider proposals from Bijay Singh of Jodhpur and Pratap Singh Naruka of Alwar for the establishment of friendly relations with the Company. At the same time he refused to support Mahadji Sindhia against the Rajputs.

The next Governor-General, Sir John Shore, was prevented from modifying his predecessor's policy by three factors: caution natural to a civil servant, the directive in Pitt's India Act, and the financial difficulties of the Company. Mahadji Sindhia's death in 1794 did not lift the Maratha terror from Rajasthan. J. Pillet, a French military adventurer in the service of Sawai Pratap Singh, described the condition of Jaipur territory in 1794 as follows: The country had been devastated and depopulated by the Maratha armies which 'eat up the produce, although immense', and all the branches of commerce which made it flourish had been destroyed; the people had to 'make their subsistence only with what escapes the activity of these armies'.

This enterprising well-wisher of Jaipur wrote a letter to

Colonel John Murray, Military Auditor-General in Bengal, proposing a protective alliance between his patron and the British Government (June 1794). Nothing else, he observed, could 'avert the deluge ready to descend on the Rajah's head already preceded by a frightful tempest'. The Jaipur Raja required a defensive and offensive treaty with the Company, residence of one of the Company representatives at his court, supply of arms and ammunition, uniforms necessary for a corps of cavalry, and permission to raise or recruit troops either in the Company's territories or in the dominions of the Nawab of Oudh. Pillet assured Colonel Murray that the acceptance of these terms by the British authorities would enable the Raja of Jaipur to support them with 50,000 cavalry, besides the resources of his territory, without asking for any return save a firm protection on the part of the Company and full liberty to enjoy his dominions in peace'.

Colonel Murray's view was that the 'remote situation' of the Rajput Rajas made the British authorities 'less uneasy about their subjugation by the Marathas than we ought to be'; but they should be held up in their independence of the Marathas as a counterpoise. This object, however, was 'chiefly to be effected by the Rajas, through their own wisdom, by uniting to resist encroachments and by resolution to guarantee each other in their respective dominions'. Writing to the Governor-General in July 1794 he suggested the desirability of sending a Resident to the court of Jaipur. He hoped that the mere presence of the Company's Agent, 'without any ties whatever, would serve to encourage them ('the Northern Rajas') to unite and coalesce among themselves, by showing that the English wish them well, and have not any particular exclusive partiality for the Marathas'. Moreover, the Marathas would understand that the British Government did not wish the Rajput Rajas to be crushed. In such a situation there would be 'some chance' of the consolidation of the latter's power so as 'to enable them to resist the depredations of the Marathas'. But Sir John Shore was not prepared to assume new responsibilities.

The victory of the Marathas over the Nizam in the battle of Kharda (1795) increased the apprehension of the Rajput princes. Under the impression that this success would 'afford

leisure and ability for a design long meditated to extirpate their Government entirely' the rulers of Jaipur and Kotah sent express messengers to Major Palmer, British Resident with Sindhia, for the purpose of soliciting the Governor-General's intervention to 'avert the impending danger', and intimating their 'readiness to enter into engagements of mutual defence' with the British Government. Palmer's reply was unfavourable. The Governor-General, he observed, was 'so connected with the Maratha State by alliance, and by the ties of mutual friendship and good offices', that he could not 'with any regard to public faith, or private sentiment, interfere in their proceedings with other States, unless they infringed the rights or security of the Company or its allies'.

The question of establishing political relations with the Rajput princes came up for consideration in connection with Zaman Shah's threat of invasion in the closing years of the century. Lord Wellesley, who succeeded Sir John Shore in May 1798 considered it possible that their bitterness against Sindhia might drive them into co-operation with the Afghan invader. Between the territories of the Sikhs and those of the Company's ally, the Nawab of Oudh, lay Sindhia's dominions in the Delhi-Agra region; these were the only territorial barrier against an invader from the north-west. Zaman Shah sent letters to the Rajas of Jaipur and Bikaner to ascertain whether they would join him. He also asked Lord Wellesley to join him against the Marathas and threatened, in case of non-compliance, to treat the Company as his enemy. In this complicated situation the Governor-General could not ignore the Rajput princes; they might be included as a general defensive alliance with the powers of Hindustan which would provide the best security against Zaman Shah's threat. But any alliance with the Rajputs had to be arranged through Sindhia; apart from the political necessity of retaining the existing ties of friendship with him, military co-operation with the Rajput States was possible only with his concurrence because his territories lay between Rajasthan and the Company's dominions. Lord Wellesley thought that the difficulty might be solved by giving the Rajput princes 'general encouragement ... advice and amicable communication' and 'by the appearance of our army in the

field; 'any regular treaty' was ruled out. The situation was radically altered in January 1799 by Zaman Shah's retreat from Lahore and his subsequent fall from power and imprisonment (1800).

The court of Jaipur came into direct contact with the British Government in 1799 in connection with the surrender of Wazir Ali, ex-Nawab of Oudh. After murdering Cherry, British Resident at Benares, and some other Europeans he collected an army of several thousand men and made a desperate attempt to establish himself in Oudh; but the strong opposition of a British detachment compelled him to take refuge in Jaipur territory (June 1799). The Jaipur Government prevented him from pursuing his journey towards Kabul and confined him in the fortress of Amber. At the instance of the Governor-General the Resident with Sindhia, Colonel Collins, went to Jaipur and requested Sawai Pratap Singh to surrender the 'assassin'. The Raja agreed, but he demanded—and received—from Collins a written guarantee that Wazir Ali's life would be spared and he would be condemned to perpetual imprisonment without chains. In course of his talks with the Resident the Raja described with much feeling the oppressions and injuries that his subjects daily sustained from the rapacity and injustice of the Maratha Chieftains, and concluded his speech with affirming that it was the earnest desire of himself, and several other Rajput Sardars, to form an alliance with the Company. Collins replied that he was not authorised by the Governor-General 'to enter upon any subject of importance which involved matters foreign to the object of his present mission.' Wazir Ali was surrendered (December 1799) and sent off to Calcutta. Tod regrets that the British Government forced the Raja of Jaipur to violate the privilege of *saran* or 'Sanctuary': 'we had no right to demand his surrender.'

Pratap Singh did not 'altogether relinquish his ill-founded hopes of obtaining either protection or assistance' from the British Government. He carried on negotiations with Collins in July-August 1800, February-March 1801, and May 1802. His minister, Dinaram Bohra, met Collins on 31 May, 1802, and from his 'discourse' the British Resident discovered ... that he possessed no authority whatever, even to enter into any discussion of the kind.'

Pratap Singh died in 1803. His successor, Sawai Jagat Singh, has been described by Tod as 'the most dissolute prince of his race or of his age.' His infatuation with an 'Islamite concubine' called 'Kas Kafur,' created an unprecedented situation. She was 'formally installed' as queen of half his dominions, and to her was 'conveyed ... in gift a moiety of the personality to the crown, even the invaluable library of the illustrious Jai Singh, which was despoiled, and its treasures distributed amongst her base relations.' The Raja not only rode with her on the same elephant but demanded from his nobles those forms of reverence towards her which were paid only to his legitimate queens. Heavy fines were imposed on those nobles who refused to respect her as a queen. Coins were struck in her name. The end of this powerful mistress was pathetic. The Raja listened to 'a report injurious to the fair fame of his Aspasia' and ordered her confinement at Nahargarh, 'the castle allotted for criminals.' The nobles 'held both his authority and his person in utter contempt' and thought seriously of deposing him. The condition of the country was miserable. Tod says: 'The lofty walls which surrounded the beautiful city of Jai Singh were insulted by every marauder; commerce was interrupted and agriculture rapidly declined, partly from insecurity, but still more from the perpetual exactions of his minions.' Such was the prince who 'continued to dishonour the *gadi* of Jai Singh' until his death in December 1818.

Tod speaks enthusiastically of 'the enlarged and prophetic views of Marquess Wellesley, which suggested the policy of uniting all the regular Governments in a league against the predatory powers.' The 'predatory powers' were, of course, the Marathas, specially Sindhia and Holkar, whose relations with the Pindaris were well known. The 'league' of 'regular Governments' was, naturally, to be organized and led by the Company's Government. This virtually meant the imposition of the system usually described as 'Subsidiary Alliance' on the 'regular Governments'.

In December 1802 Peshwa Baji Rao II accepted the treaty of Bassein, sacrificing his independence as the price of protection. The other Maratha rulers—Sindhia, Bhonsle, Holkar—refused to follow him and tried to organize a general confederacy against

the Company. Both sides prepared for war and hostilities actually broke out in August 1803. A few weeks earlier Lord Wellesley communicated to his brother, General Arthur Wellesley, his decision to draw the Rajput princes to the British camp. Emissaries were to be despatched to them and 'every endeavour' was to be made 'to excite those powers against Sindhia'. The Governor-General was now prepared 'to engage to guarantee their independence and to secure to them any other reasonable advantages which they may require.' The independence of Rajput States, he felt, 'would constitute a power which would form the best security to our north-western frontier in Hindustan.'

The negotiations with the Rajput princes were entrusted to the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Lake. Although anxious to escape the continuous ravages by the troops of Sindhia and Holkar, they were initially hesitant to accept the British proposal. The presence of 'the considerable army' of the Marathas in Hindustan alarmed them. Moreover, they had their own internal dissensions to reckon with. The death of Sawai Pratap Singh as also of Bhim Singh of Marwar interrupted the negotiations. The Marathas appealed to the religious sentiments of the Rajputs: the Raja of Jaipur was 'entreated as a Hindu to reflect on the fatal consequences that might result to the religion should the British become masters.' Lake also found that the negotiators were so dilatory by nature and had so little energy that the negotiations might be delayed further if fear did not operate most forcibly. The success of the British armies against the Marathas was an important factor in the success of the Commander-in-Chief's diplomacy. Grant Duff says: 'The rapidity of the conquests and the speedy termination of the war surprised all India.' Bhonsle and Sindhia acknowledged defeat and concluded treaties in December 1803.

The treaty with Jaipur was 'settled' by Lord Lake, signed by him on 12 December, 1803, and ratified by Lord Wellesley on 15 January, 1804. It was stipulated that 'the friends and enemies of one of the parties shall be considered the friends and enemies of both.' Thus Jaipur was entangled in the Anglo-Maratha struggle. The company promised not to interfere in the internal administration of Jaipur, and no tribute was to be demanded from the Raja. If 'any enemy'—obviously the reference

was to the Marathas—'evinced a disposition to invade the Company's territory in Hindustan, the Raja would 'send the whole of his forces to the assistance of the Company's army, and ... exert himself to the utmost of his power in repelling the enemy.' Military co-operation was hardly to be distinguished from subordination, for the Raja consented to 'act, during the time of war, or prospect of action, agreeably to the advice and opinion of the Commander of the English army ... employed with his troops.' He would not 'entertain in his sendee, or in any manner give admission to, any English or French subject or any other person among the inhabitants of Europe, without consent of the Company's Government.' All disputes between Jaipur and any other State were to be submitted to the British Government. If the British Government failed to settle the dispute owing to the obstinacy of the opposite party,' the Company would provide military assistance for Jaipur, but in such a case the Raja would meet the expense of such aid, at the same rate as has been settled with the other Chieftains of Hindustan. In exchange of these concessions, the Raja received the Company's guarantee of 'the security of this country against external enemies.'

The conclusion of this treaty was the first important political event of Jagat Singh's reign. Difficulties cropped up when Jaswant Rao Holkar started hostilities against the Company (April 1804). His movements placed the Jaipur Government in a very difficult situation. When he began to plunder Jaipur territory (April 1804) Lord Lake advanced against him, sending Monson with a vanguard and directing Colonel Murray to proceed from Gujarat to Malwa. The British Government could not allow Holkar to augment his financial resources by plundering the rich city of Jaipur. Confronted by British opposition, Holkar retreated to Kotah and then pursued Monson's retreating troops across Kotah and Jaipur. At this stage Jagat Singh made no attempt to oppose him. This was, according to General Lake, a direct violation of the treaty (Article 4). He accused the Raja of having allowed Holkar to draw supplies from his territory, and went so far as to allege that there was a 'secret understanding between his court and Holkar.

Early in 1805, Major-General Jones was stationed at Tonk-Rampura with his troops to prevent Holkar's advance in that

direction. Captain Sturrock, the acting British Resident at Jaipur, complained that although the presence of (ones contributed to the defence of Jaipur, he found it very difficult to procure supplies, and the servants of the Jaipur Government behaved insolently towards him and his men. The Raja's ministers denied the charge and complained that Jones' men frequently behaved in an irregular manner.

In June 1805 Holkar threatened that 'as the Raja (of Jaipur) did not join him in endeavouring to reduce the British power within its limits ... he would destroy his country.' This letter was shown to Captain Sturrock in order to convince him that the Jaipur Government did not 'hold any improper correspondence with the enemy.' But the Resident was not convinced. He reported to the Governor-General that the rulers of Jaipur, Jodhpur and Udaipur were willing to form an anti-British coalition; they apprehended that they had more to dread from British encroachments than from submission to the Maratha Chiefs whose interests were limited principally to the collection of tribute.'

This suspicion was strengthened a few months later (October 1805) when Jagat Singh hesitated, on various pretexts, to send his troops to join a British detachment. Captain Sturrock told him plainly that 'his professions, contradicted by his actions, would not obtain credit with the British Government, which had experienced his insincerity and the little reliance that could be placed on his assertions.' The Raja was also accused of allowing Holkar to draw supplies from his territory. This charge he 'denied with much earnestness', but in vain. The Resident concluded not a very pleasant interview with the Raja by declaring that 'if he pursued a different line of conduct in future, to that which good faith and a regard to his own interests required,' the British Government would 'abandon an alliance which from its own nature must prove either very useful or very burdensome.' A few days later the Raja was assured that 'although the treaty would be dissolved by any delay or evasion on his part in performing the condition of it, Government entertained no intention of attacking him, or deviating in any manner from the general friendship which has long subsisted between the two States.'

One of the excuses on which Jagat Singh evaded his treaty obligation of sending military assistance to the Company was the despatch of Jaipur troops to Udaipur in connection with his plan to marry princess Krishnakumari. As these troops 'held the Rana in control,' Daulat Rao Sindhia found it difficult to realise his tribute from Mewar. Sindhia then called upon the British Government to compel its ally, the Raja of Jaipur, to withdraw his troops from Mewar, or, in the alternative, to allow him to 'act against the Raja of Jaipur as an enemy.' Lake thought that there were 'just grounds for the appeal made' by Sindhia and instructed Captain Sturrock to bring the matter to Jagat Singh's notice. The Resident explained to the Raja the implications of the British Government's treaty with Sindhia: neither the British Government nor any of its allies could offer any assistance to the Raja of Udaipur or any of Sindhia's tributaries. Jagat Singh agreed to recall his troops from Udaipur. This promise was speedily fulfilled and 'a considerable force' from Jaipur was sent to join the Bombay army under the command of Major-General Jones. These troops rendered satisfactory service and returned to Jaipur in December 1805.

In November 1805 Jagat Singh proposed that Lord Lake should request Sindhia to agree to his (Jagat Singh's) marriage with Krishnakumari. He was 'particularly anxious' that the 'intended marriage' should take place before the commencement of the next rainy season. Captain Sturrock expressed the opinion that no diversion of energy should take place during the war. He advised the Raja to delay his preparations for marriage 'until a more favourable time appeared for its accomplishment.' But Jagat Singh's repeated request could not be evaded. Lord Lake wrote a letter to Sindhia warning Jagat Singh at the same time against 'the adoption of any measures . . . which include the smallest risk of creating any dispute, either with Sindhia or with the Chiefs of the Rana of Udaipur'.

In January 1806 Raja Man Singh of Jodhpur, who was one of the suitors for the hand of Krishnakumari, sent some *vakils* to Jaipur 'to renew his remonstrances' and ordered mobilisation of his troops. Captain Sturrock found Jagat Singh determined to push his claim. He advised the Raja to come to an amicable settlement with his rival or to submit the dispute to the British

Government in accordance with Article 5 of the treaty. This advice was followed by the usual threat that 'if he did not adhere to the conditions of the treaty ... he could not expect to benefit from its protection.' But the negotiations opened by the Jaipur *vakils* proved abortive, and Captain Sturrock reported in February 1806: 'Both patties are preparing for hostilities in the event of their not being able to settle the point in dispute to their mutual satisfaction and an appeal to arms becoming necessary.'

While matters were heading towards a crisis Lord Lake decided that neither Jagat Singh nor Man Singh, who had applied for permission to send a *vakil*, should be given 'a hope that the British Government will consent to arbitrate their present difference.' This policy was strictly adhered to by Captain Sturrock who plainly told the Jaipur *vakils* that the dispute between the rulers of Jaipur and Jodhpur being of a private and family nature, the British Government would 'avoid interfering in it as much as possible.' Even after this Jagat Singh sent a *vakil* to Delhi who pressed John Malcolm for intervention, throwing a dark hint that the non-interference of the British Government would lead to an appeal to others, who would instantly come forward from interested motives.' Malcolm merely repeated Lord Lake's formula. In an interview with Captain Sturrock in February 1806 Jagat Singh referred to Article 5 of the treaty which provided for British mediation and assistance in case of dispute with any other State. The Resident replied that the Article 'could not be fairly construed to mean that the British Government was to go to aid him in the accomplishment of an object of a private and family nature.' The steady refusal of the British Government to interfere in the dispute probably induced the rulers of Jaipur and Jodhpur to conclude an agreement in April 1806. It was decided that neither Jagat Singh nor Man Singh would marry Krishnakumari nor would they allow the Rana of Udaipur to select her husband without their approval. Further, the union between the two States (Jaipur and Jodhpur) would be cemented by the marriage of Man Singh with Jagat Singh's sister and the marriage of Jagat Singh with Man Singh's daughter. This agreement did not prevent Sindhia from invading Mewar immediately afterwards (April-

May 1806). Although the crisis seemed to be averted by the *rapprochement* between Jaipur and Jodhpur and the retreat of Sindhia from Mewar in May 1809, there were troublesome persons who did not want peace, and within a few months they succeeded in reviving the dispute between Jaipur and Jodhpur.

Meanwhile the British Government had repudiated the treaty with Jaipur. It was part of 'the timid, temporising policy of Lord Cornwallis',—to quote Tod's words—to withdraw the Company's protection from the trans-Chambal States. He could discover nothing but weakness, says Tod, in the extension of British influence resulting from 'the enlarged and prophetic views' of Lord Wellesley. But the 'Home' Government's instructions required immediate reversal of the policy of hostility towards the Marathas, and this meant severance of the political ties with the Rajput princes who had obligations to Sindhia and Holkar. The plan recommended by Lord Cornwallis to the Court of Directors was to adopt the Jumna as the boundary of the Company's dominions to the northward of Bundelkhand. This would not only reduce the Company's political and military responsibilities but also keep Sindhia in check in an indirect manner. The struggle between Sindhia and the Rajput princes would continue, and it would compel him to keep his eyes off the Doab where British interests were to be consolidated. Lord Lake, however, anticipated other results from the proposed arrangement. The small principalities left exposed to the depredations of the Marathas would be seared, 'first quarrel with each other, would then call in the different native powers in the vicinity to their respective aid; and large armies of irregulars would be contending upon the frontier of... (the Company's) most fertile provinces; against whose eventual excesses there would be no well-grounded security, but a military force in a state of constant preparation'. His views were supported by Malcolm and Tod.

Before a final decision could be reached Lord Cornwallis died (October 1805) and Sir George Barlow assumed charge as temporary Governor-General. The policy of recognizing the Jumna as the boundary of the British possessions north of Bundelkhand was adhered to. Treaties were concluded with

Sindhia in November 1805 and with Holkar in December 1805. The British Government restored peace with the Maratha and promised not to extend protection to the Rajput States which were left fully exposed to Maratha inroads. The alliance with Jaipur was not directly affected by these arrangements, but Barlow desired the complete withdrawal of the British power from Rajasthan. Once again Lord Lake stated his objections to the restoration of Maratha influence and pointed out that dissolution of the alliance with Jaipur would produce an impression among the ether States of India which would be highly detrogatory to the British Government. Barlow protected Jaipur against Holkar's claim to tribute (January 1806) but he decided to dissolve the alliance on the ground of the Raja's violation of engagements...(and) the manifest insecurity of any dependence upon the Raja's fidelity and exertions at a season of future exigency.'

Early in March 1806 Captain Sturrock communicated to Jagat Singh the Governor-General's decision to dissolve the alliance because he had failed to fulfil his engagements. Four specific charges were mentioned: recall of Jaipur troops from Monson's detachment during its retreat, failure to send Jaipur troops to participate in the siege of Bharatpur, despatch of troops of Udaipur instead of sending them to join the British pursuit of Holkar into the Punjab, and failure to cut-off Holkar's supplies as also to oppose his march through Jaipur territory to the Punjab. The Raja denied the charges, offering his explanation on each specific point, and argued that the dissolution of the alliance without mutual discussion was not justifiable. He had been loyal to the British Government, he added, and rejected the proposals of the Southern Chiefs who had sought an alliance with him. As regards prompt co-operation with the British armies, he pointed out that he was handicapped by the necessity of collecting troops from his *Thakurs*, his Government having no standing army of its own. In the case of Bharatpur he had not received any communication from the Commander-in-Chief requiring the assistance of his troops; he had been asked merely to station his troops on the frontier and 'in the event of an attempt on the part of the enemy to pass through Jaipur territory, to appear and arrest his progress.'

As Holkar did not proceed towards Jaipur, the Jaipur troops stationed on the frontier could do nothing. This could not be construed as intentional delay and neglect. When Holkar came to Rajasthan, after some delay, the Jaipur Court remained inactive in accordance with the advice of Major-General Jones. This 'political connivance' was later considered in a wrong light, by the Commander-in-Chief. As regards the supply of provisions, Jaipur officers had been stationed at different posts to furnish supplies, whenever they were procurable, for the British troops. Jagat Singh regretted that the British Government should have dissolved the alliance after utilising his services during the war; if he had violated the treaty, the dissolution should have taken place as soon as his alleged lapses occurred.

The Raja's arguments failed to shake the Governor-General's 'inflexible policy ... to abstain from interference.' The Court of Directors stated: '... although the Raja failed in the performance of his engagements during the war with Holkar, yet he had furnished assistance towards its conclusion at the instance of Lord Lake, and under an expectation held out by His Lordship that the protection of the British Government would be continued to him ...' That 'expectation' was not fulfilled and the Jaipur *vakil* complained that the British Government made 'its faith subservient to its convenience.' Malcolm stated: 'This is the first measure of the kind that the English have ever taken in India, and I trust in God it will be the last.' Tod wrote: 'The Jaipur Court retained a lively, but no grateful remembrance, of the solemn obligations we contracted with her in 1803, and the facility with which we extricated ourselves from them when expediency demanded, whilst we vainly attempted to throw the blame of violating the treaty upon our ally.'

The alliance was broken up in July 1806, and 'the principal States of India were 'apprized of the grounds' on which the decision of the Governor-General was based. This somewhat unusual procedure was really a confession that the policy-adopted towards Jaipur was a political deal which required explanation. The Court of Directors considered it necessary to enjoin the Government of India to take care, in all its transactions with the native princes, to preserve its character for fidelity to its allies from falling into disrepute, and to evince a strict

regard in the prosecution of its political views, to the principles of justice and generosity.

III. Lord Minto's Policy

The abrupt termination of Barlow's Governor-Generalship and the assumption of charge by Lord Minto (July 1807) marked no change in the Company's policy towards the Rajput States. The old policy of non-intervention had to be continued; the Napoleonic War as also the difficulties of the Company ruled out 'a forward move' in India.

Meanwhile Jagat Singh had entangled his State in a war against Man Singh of Jodhpur. The troops of Amir Khan and Sharza Rao Ghatge ravaged Jaipur territory. In August 1807 Sheolal, who commanded the Jaipur troops, was defeated by Amir Khan. Instead of continuing the operations he took shelter in the city of Jaipur in order to partake of its festivities.' Amir Khan marched rapidly to Jaipur and the capital was 'dismayed by the presence of the victor at her gates.' Jagat Singh, who was besieging Jodhpur, made a 'signally ignominious' retreat. Although he offered large sums of money to Sindhia's officers and Amir Khan to facilitate his flight he suffered a defeat by the Jodhpur troops near the frontier of Marwar. However, he readied his capital in October 1807. Unable to resist the rising power of Amir Khan, he appealed for assistance to Jaswant Kao Holkar. But the powerful antagonist of the Company had already sunk to the position of a weak adventurer and his army consisted merely of seven battalions of infantry and two thousand infantry in February 1808. Towards the end of 1808 he became insane. Sindhia naturally resented Jagat Singh's overtures to Holkar. During the years 1808-9 his troops ravaged Jaipur territory, the pretext being the non-fulfilment of the Raja's alleged promise to pay ten lakhs of rupees for aid in the war against Jodhpur. Broughton gives a pathetic picture of several Jaipur districts: 'Crops all laid waste, the beams and that of the houses carried away, the doors and door-posts broken down, and villages smoking in ruins.' In May 1807 Jagat Singh promised to pay 15 lakhs to Sindhia and two and a half lakhs to his ministers; in return Sindhia's troops were to be withdrawn from his territory.

Jaipur's helplessness was due to three factors: the dissolution of the alliance, the unwise involvement in the war of succession in the Jodhpur State, and the political dislocation in Central India caused by the virtual collapse of Holkar's Government and the growing ascendancy of Amir Khan. The Pathan leader carried on depredations in Jaipur territory and tried to 'obtain the military and political management of Holkar's affairs.' The situation was beyond Jagat Singh's control; he was 'totally devoid of energy and destitute of good advisers.' In his distress he turned once again to the British Government. In August 1808 the Resident of Delhi, Seton, received a visit from Bakhshi Bal Mukund who was on his way to Calcutta in the double capacity of *vakil* on the part of Holkar and the Raja of Jaipur. The *vakil* spoke of the Jaipur Raja's distress owing to the 'wanton and unprovoked invasion' of his territories by Sindhia's troops and suggested renewal of the defensive treaty which had been dissolved 'unfortunately for both sides'. Seton told him that 'the former treaty had been annulled in consequence of its not having been found to produce the expected advantages, and that it was not easy to assign a good reason for renewing an arrangement which upon trial had proved altogether useless.' One of Bal Mukund's statements sounds almost as if it fell from the lips of Lord Wellesley: 'As the actual power as well as the dignity of the ancient sovereigns of India were now possessed by the British Government, the weaker States, when oppressed, had a sort of right to look up to it for protection.' Seton replied that 'the British Government did not pretend or wish to be considered as the arbiter of the differences between independent States'; its military preparations were intended merely to repel aggression, if attempted by others, with promptitude. Bal Mukund realised that no positive assistance could be expected; so he limited his request to 'the mediation of the British Government to produce a fair and amicable adjustment of the difference' between the Jaipur Raja and Sindhia. Seton replied that 'even the exercise of mediation interference would be a deviation from the system of the British Government.' The Supreme Government's subsequent approval of Seton's replies indicated the broad features of Lord Minto's policy.

Despite this rebuff Jagat Singh continued to pray for British assistance. In July 1809 Seton reported that the *vakils* of Jaipur

and Jodhpur were continually pressing him to secure a treaty of alliance from the Governor-General. He was favourably inclined towards their proposal, for he felt that the inactivity of the British Government, while the Marathas were ravaging countries contiguous to its territories, 'would not only be a matter of painful regret but might also be considered discreditable to our Government in a political point of view.' In July 1809 he stressed 'the political advantage of conciliating the Chief of the Rajput States to the westward of the British possessions, more especially those situated towards the Indus.' A 'barrier' against invasion from the west might be formed if 'the powerful Rajas of Jaipur, Jodhpur and Udaipur—supposing the government of the latter country to be once more organized—and the petty Chiefs of Bikaner and Jaisalmer and the ruler of Bahawalpur were cordially attached to us.' Broughton wrote a month later that 'a confederation of the Rajput States under the permanent control of the British Government' would be 'the best calculated (measure) to ensure the permanent security of the whole continent of India by at once connecting the eastern and western limits of our empire.' This, he stated, would 'present a formidable barrier quite across the head of the peninsula to any invader from the north and circumscribing the Marathas within their natural limits.'

Both Seton and Broughton were thinking of the possibilities of a Franco-Persian invasion as also of keeping the Marathas within their natural limits. A year later the Supreme Government asked the Resident in Delhi to inform the Raja of Jaisalmer, who had offered his co-operation in averting the danger of inversion from the west, that the French were not likely to prosecute their hostile projects 'against the territories of India' after the success gained over them in Europe by Britain and her allies and the renewal by the Shah of Persia of his alliance with the British power. Lord Minto felt that it was for the 'Home' authorities—not for the Company's Government in India—to decide whether British protection should be offered to those 'weak and defenceless States' which asked for it 'amidst these scenes of disorder and outrage which were passing under our eyes in the north of Hindustan.'

By the middle of the year 1810 Amir Khan made himself the *de facto* ruler of Holkar's territories. Jaswant Rao Holkar

was now completely insane, and his ministers were unable to resist the Pathan Chief. That adventure had already established his authority in Jodhpur as well as in Bhopal. He now became the most powerful man in Central India, even Daulat Rao Sindhia was overshadowed. As Holkar's deputy he demanded tribute from Mewar and Jaipur. His *vakil* at Jaipur used 'some very strong expressions with respect to the tribute due from that State.' Once again the helpless Rajas of Jaipur and Jodhpur tried to avert disaster by mutual reconciliation. They agreed 'to relinquish all thoughts' of marrying Krishnakumari and to cement their friendship by matrimonial relations. Even then they were anxious to secure the protection of the Company. In June 1810 their *vakils* told the Resident in Delhi that the countries of Jaipur, and Jodhpur would never be secure from invasion until they were taken under the protection of the British Government. Seton merely repeated the old reply. Both Jagat Singh and Amir Khan tried to secure the direct or indirect countenance of the British Government for their respective causes, but Seton turned a deaf ear to their requests.

After the submission of the Rana of Mewar and the murder of Krishnakumari (July 1810) Amir Khan came to Jaipur, exacted from Jagat Singh a promise to pay 10 or 16 lakhs of rupees, and left his territory (June 1811). During his stay in the vicinity of the city of Jaipur he was exposed to 'the severest insult and oppression' by his own soldiers. 'He was', wrote Metcalfe, Seton's successor as Resident in Delhi, 'sometimes deprived of his food, sometimes of his tent, and he was almost daily exposed for hours to the violent heat of the sun. It was, he added, 'a very striking proof of the weakness of the Jaipur Government when an army in such a state could make it tremble for its existence. But the condition of the Jaipur army was not better. No wonder Jagat Singh continued his applications 'for a connection with the British Government'. Such an arrangement, Metcalfe argued, 'would be attended with great advantages.' He wrote: 'It would connect the Bengal and Bombay territories by a country that might then be considered for all political and military purposes our own ... It would deprive the vagabond armies of India of their principal resource for ravage and plunder.' Moreover, the intervention of the Rajputs under British influence would

'prevent any cooperation between those Northern and Southern powers that we have reason to suppose ill affected towards us. In case of a fresh war between the Company and the Marathas the British frontiers would be secured by the territories of the Rajput princes, and they would be able to collect an army sufficient, especially in cavalry, for all requisite purposes. The situation would be different if they were left out of the Company's protection. It was preferable to have as neighbors such 'princes (as were) by nature and habit contented with their own countries, free from the spirit of aggression and encroachment, and delighting in the arts of peace and agriculture.

Metcalfe was not 'insensible of the difficulties' involved in the project. The Rajput States could not be brought under British protection without setting aside 'existing treaties' with the Maratha powers. Perhaps 'the undertaking . . . could not be accomplished without military operations of a very extensive nature, involving probably the complete establishment of British control over every part of India.' Lord Minto did not feel that a total reversal of the existing policy was either necessary or possible. 'No consideration of advantage, however, alluring, could, in the opinion of the Supreme Government, tempt it to depart from 'a scrupulous adherence to the obligations of its engagements.' But it was recognized that acceptance of Metcalfe's project might be necessary if events compelled the British Government to take up arms against the Pathans or the destructive evils of contiguous and widespread anarchy. Such a situation arose a few years later, and Lord Minto's successor responded to it in the manner anticipated by him.

In July 1811 Khushhali Ram Bohra once again became the chief minister of Jaipur in place of Megh Singh. The latter was completely overawed by Amir Khan; consequently he urged compliance in full with the Pathan Chiefs demands, Metcalfe reported on 23 July, 1811: Amir Khan regards the departure of Megh Singh from the councils of Jaipur as equivalent to the loss of a partisan, and in consequence deems it necessary to prepare to gain some of his objects in Jaipur by more formidable measures than those which he has hitherto pursued.' Jagat Singh was still continuing through several *vakils*, who acted inde-pendently of each other, his efforts to secure British

protection. One of the *vakils* suggested that the British Government should mediate a treaty between Jaipur and the Marathas, by which the Raja of Jaipur would agree to pay an annual tribute to the Marathas, and they should bind themselves never to enter Jaipur territory under any pretext. Another *vakil* proposed that Jaipur should cut-off all connections with the Marathas and pay tribute to the Company. Another *vakil* said that 'a declaration of the British Government taking Jaipur under its protection would not only be sufficient to drive away the Marathas and the Pathans, but would actually impart to Jaipur itself, without any further assistance, such a degree of strength as would enable it to do wonders against all its enemies. Metcalfe reported these suggestions to the Supreme Government because he was convinced that the destruction of Jaipur by the Marathas, or by the Pathans, or by both, was sure to affect the interests of the British Government. He was informed in reply that, although the Governor-General was 'far from Insensible of the actual and prospective evils resulting from... the state of affairs in the north-western quarters of Hindustan', he was not prepared to enter upon the extensive and complicated field of military and political operations necessarily involved in the adoption of the policy of intervention.

The able management of Khushhali Ram Bohra rapidly restored order in the internal affairs of Jaipur. As there was no prospect of British assistance, he tried to make a definite settlement about the contribution demanded by Amir Khan and threatened to fight in case the Pathan Chief refused to agree to a final arrangement. The vassals of Jaipur placed so much confidence in him that they were prepared to co-operate with his plans. Amir Khan at first agreed to accept 15 lakhs to be paid in three installments; but later he raised his demand to 20 lakhs to be paid in two installments. Khushhali Ram refused to be bullied and began hostilities (August 1811). But although he had 'acknowledged talents' and might have saved the 'tottering State' of Jaipur, Jagat Singh—himself improvident and totally devoid of energy—'was not prepared to tolerate a powerful man'. Towards the close of the year 1811 the disappointed minister left the capital, 'according to his own desire, as manager of affairs in the Shekhawati country.'

After the dismissal of Khushhali Ram Bohra the Raja found

it difficult to resist Amir Khan. The negotiations with Metcalfe were renewed. Jagat Singh's *vakils* offered to pay to the British Government the sums which Sindhia and Holkar extorted from him. The money, it was suggested, might be paid in 'annual tribute or territorial cession. Metcalfe could not openly encourage such proposals, but he wrote to the Supreme Government in January 1812:... from the ruinous state of affairs at Jaipur and from the apparently utter impossibility of retrieving them except by our aid, there is a good reason to conclude that an advantageous treaty might now be made with the court of Jaipur ..

As the Supreme Government made no response, Jaipur suffered. The country was a prey to the Pindaris. The city was continually infested by robbers. Megh Singh was trying to recover his office with the help of the Pindaris. There was 'an appearance of the apathy of despair' in the Raja's proceedings. The Rao Raja of Macheri, who had entered into a fresh engagement with the British Government in July 1811, occupied some Jaipur forts and villages. Both Metcalfe and the Supreme Government took a serious view of this aggression; they forced the Rao Raja to restore the Jaipur possessions. The prevalence of disorder in the Jaipur State could not be overlooked by the British Government. In December 1812 Metcalfe reported that the military tribes of the Shekhawati country had repeatedly plundered the frontier of Haryana. On the other hand, some allies of the Company, like the Raja of Bharatpur, were anxious to aggrandize themselves at the cost of Jaipur, and nothing but the strong remonstrance of the Resident in Delhi restrained them. 'The Jaipur Government,' Metcalfe wrote, 'bore many years of distress and devastation without being so reduced as to become an object of contempt to comparatively petty States and to its own subjects. It preserved a certain deference and respect, longer perhaps, than might have been expected under such circumstances, and it has been only lately that, worn out, at length, by a protracted series of miseries, it has fallen into a condition of extreme degradation ...'

Early in 1814 Jagat Singh concluded a 'regular engagement' with Amir Khan. On receipt of 'a small fixed sum' the Pathan Chief undertook to withdraw his military posts from that portion

of Jaipur territory which he had occupied. Very soon, however, trouble came from a different quarter. Bapu Sindhia advanced from Mewar into Jaipur and 'began to plunder the districts and levy collections from the forts.' Jagat Singh reported the matter to the Governor-General and solicited his 'advice'. In reply he was informed that there were some 'obstacles to a more intimate union of interests between the British Government and the State of Jaipur.' Sometime later Bapu Sindhia returned to Mewar, but Amir Khan renewed his depredations. Metcalfe wrote on 15 October, 1815 that three armies of Amir Khan were 'plundering and taking possession of different districts in the Jaipur country' and the chief who had assembled at the capital for the defence of the State increased its distress by 'violent dissensions.' Unable to meet this crisis, Jagat Singh proposed renewal of the alliance in December 1815, and again in March 1816. His *vakil* told Metcalfe that 'there were no terms to which his master was not willing to accede.' He offered either tribute, or cession of territory, or even 'the entire management of the country, the appointment of ministers, and the complete obedience and subserviency of the court in every way.' But the time was not yet ripe, and Jaipur had to wait.

IV. Policy of Lord Hastings

Meanwhile Lord Minto had been succeeded (October 1813) by Lord Moira, better known as Lord Hastings. Formerly a sharp critic of Lord Wellesley's expansionist policy, the new Governor-General found within a few months of his arrival in India 'the elements of a war more general than any which we have hitherto encountered in India.' He realised at once that a revision of policy was required. On 6 February, 1814 he wrote: 'Our object ought to be to render the British Government paramount in effect, if not declared so. We should hold the other States as vassals, in substance though not in name.' They were to be allowed to enjoy 'internal sovereignty' and be 'only bound to repay the guarantee and protection of their possessions by the British Government with the pledge of the two great feudal duties': 'support ... with all their forces on any call,' and submission of their mutual difference to 'the head of the confederacy' (*i.e.*, the British Government) without attacking

each other's territories. This was to be supplemented by a few subordinate stipulations on our part, with immunities secured in return to the other side (especially with regard to succession).

Thus within four months of his assumption of Governor-Generalship Lord Hastings proposed complete rejection of the policy of non-intervention and the establishment of a confederacy of the Indian States under the paramountcy of the Company. This was what Metcalfe had proposed in 1811 in regard to the Rajput States. The Governor-General's plan was far more comprehensive, for it covered all States.

The conversion of the 'Home' Government took a longer time. 'The government of Lord Minto', wrote Malcolm, 'had no result more important than the impression it conveyed to the authorities at home of the utter impracticability' of perseverance in that neutral policy which they had desired to pursue.' Malcolm's account of the circumstances leading to the conclusion and dissolution of the treaty of 1803 with Jaipur, contained in his *Political History of India* published in 1811, 'produced a revolution in the sentiments of those entrusted with the home administration . . .' In 1814 the 'Home' authorities not only regretted the manner in which some of the Rajput States had been thrown oft but also desired that Jaipur should be brought under British protection. But it was not till 1817 that they authorized Lord Hastings to dislodge the Pindaris from their haunts in Mahva and Saugor and to enter into political engagement with the Chiefs in the neighbourhood, or those who had lost territories to the Pindaries, with a view to securing the British Government against the re-establishment of these predatory hordes in that part of India.

Although Lord Hastings might have extended the Company's protection to Jaipur in 1814, as desired by the 'Home' authorities, he preferred not to adopt a new policy towards a single Rajput State while all Rajput States—'mercilessly wasted' by Sindhia, Holkar, Amir Khan and the Pindaris—were 'assailing' him 'with repeated petitions to take them under protection as feudatories of the British Government.' Moreover, the Gurkha War made it altogether inexpedient for the British Government to antagonize the Marathas: Sindhia, at least, would oppose a British alliance with Jaipur. The Governor-General's cautious policy was approved by the 'Home' authorities.

The situation changed after the successful termination of the Gurkha War in March 1816. The strength of the Pindaris was increasing; their depredations were being pushed well within the British territories even in South India. The 'Home' authorities were reluctant to approve measures for reduction of the Pindaris lest these should embroil the Company with Daulat Rao Sindhia whose connection with the 'predatory' bands was notorious. Lord Hastings considered it 'humiliating' that "the fear of giving Maratha Chief should restrain the British Government from adopting measures 'which ordinary policy would dictate,' but considered himself bound to obey his employers."

Early in 1816 Lord Hastings decided that the general situation of the Company's affairs 'appeared to be favourable for carrying into effect the previous instructions of the 'Home' authorities regarding the conclusion of a treaty of alliance with Jaipur. 'Sindhia', he thought, 'would not oppose our protection, when our force is at liberty, when it is in the most efficient condition, and when its quality is displaced in a light so impressive to the native sovereigns, by its having trodden under foot the hitherto invincible Gorkhas.' He viewed the problem of Jaipur in close relation with his contemplated anti-Pindari operations. It would be a 'first rate' advantage for the Company to acquire the right of stationing a force within Jaipur territory. It would be undesirable to allow Amir Khan to make himself 'sovereign' of Jaipur, for in that capacity he would 'add to the native strength of Jaipur an army better composed, higher disciplined and more fashioned to service than is possessed by any other chieftain in India.' He feared that 'the very structure of this army, and all its circumstances, make our opulent provinces the object.' It would be injudicious to expect that the mutual jealousy so long subsisting between Amir Khan and Sindhia would prevent their co-operation against the Company. 'The conferences which took place between Amir Khan and Bapu Sindhia early in the Gurkha War were sufficient indications of their good understanding.'

The Governor-General's proposal to authorise Metcalfe, the Resident in Delhi, to conclude a treaty with Jaipur immediately was opposed by two Members of the Council. Edmonstone

drew a distinction between the 'organized troops of the Pathan leaders' and the Pindaris. The former consisted chiefly of infantry and artillery 'regularly formed and disciplined,' to which was added cavalry 'such as is usually found in the ranks of native armies.' These troops had been 'employed in over throwing . . . the States of Udaipur, Jodhpur and Jaipur and, especially in the dominions of the latter, have spread into the interior of the country, exacting contributions and practicing those outrages which are systematic among native troops . . . They could, in this sense, be 'justly termed predatory troops;' but 'they are not, as the Pindaris are, mounted robbers without organization or discipline; nor do they go forth, as the Pindaris do, in bands to distant quarters for the purpose of committing robbery and plunder indiscriminately in all the territories accessible to their incursions,' it was clear, therefore, that the weakening of Amir Khan's 'organized troops' was 'not a necessary step in the immediate expedition against the Pindaris.'

Secondly, the plan of overthrowing Amir Khan's hold on Jaipur was a part of the Governor-General's comprehensive programme for 'the general settlement of Central India.' Edmonstone was convinced that the conclusion of an alliance with Jaipur 'must of necessity lead, by an uninterrupted and unavoidable gradation of procedure and events, to that extended system of paramount sway' which the Governor-General wanted and the 'Home' authorities prohibited. The Secret Committee of the Court of Directors had observed in a dispatch (29 September, 1813) relating to the question of revising the system of alliances: 'We are chiefly desirous that by prudent management our affairs should be maintained in the same relative State under which our possession ha'e now for ten years continued in a state of tranquility.' Edmonstone pointed out that 'the continued exclusion of the State of Jaipur from the range of our political alliance is essential to the maintenance of that system to which the Committee refers.'

Another Member, Dowdeswell, opposed the conclusion of an alliance with Jaipur on similar grounds. The proposed measure, he wrote, was 'likely to lead to consequence entirely at variance with that moderate and pacific course of policy which they (*i.e.*, the 'Home' authorities) obviously wish should

be pursued in the conduct of the affairs of this Government.' It would involve the company in hostilities with Amir Khan and cause a rupture with Sindhia. The maintenance of the peace of India, and a reduction of the public burdens, should be the great object of Government...

Seton, a former Resident in Delhi and now a Member of the Supreme Council, recorded his view in favour of the Governor-General's proposal. An alliance with Jaipur should be concluded, he wrote, 'with the least practicable delay ... in consideration of the present critical state of that country.' The principal grounds in favour of this 'decided opinion' were explained by him. First, an alliance with Jaipur would prevent the occupation of that country by Amir Khan. It was 'by no means a mere negative advantage', for Jaipur could in no case remain neutral; 'if its resources are not with us they must be employed against us. It not thrown into our scale of influences, they must be thrown into that of our enemies. There is no medium.' Second, as a protected State Jaipur would virtually become an advanced British military cantonment in Western India, 'forming a species of connecting link between the western frontier of the Presidency of Bengal and the province of Gujarat.' Third, 'by the exercise of well-directed influence' British officers might 'restore the once flourishing country of Jaipur to its former state of prosperity and happiness.' The renewal of the alliance would remove 'the somewhat unfavourable impression which attached to our dissolution of the treaty.'

Seton replied to three principal objections raised against the proposed measure. It was considered unwise to offend so powerful a military chief as Amir Khan; but Seton thought that sooner or later the Company must check his 'restless ambition,' and it was better that he should be checked before he succeed in securing absolute control over Jaipur. Another point was the possibility that Amir Khan would plead Holkar's right to tribute from Jaipur. Seton suggested that the British Government might recognize the validity of this claim and provide for regular payment of the amount decided upon. The *vakils* of the Raja of Jaipur, who held talks with Seton in Delhi during the period of his Residency, 'did not absolutely deny the right of Sindhia and of Holkar to a pecuniary payment, as a species of tribute'

and it was hinted that 'the Raja would be happy if the stipulated sum could be paid through the medium of the British Government.' As regards Edmonstone's reference to the prohibitory order of the Secret Committee, Seton argued that the proposed revival of the alliance with Jaipur was not directly covered by it. The Secret Committee's acquiescence in the postponement of negotiations with Jaipur during the Gurkha War was a concession to the Supreme Government in India. When that Government, in changed circumstances, entertained different sentiment and considered the measure 'advisable' the Committee 'would not object to its adoption.'

After deliberations in the Supreme Council it was decided that an alliance should be immediately formed with Jaipur, and Mectalfe was entrusted with the delicate task of carrying the negotiations to a successful end. It was apprehended that Sindhia would not 'regard without dissatisfaction the conclusion of an alliance between the British Government and Jaipur' and that he would 'willingly throw every impediment in his power in the way of it.' But the Governor-General hoped that he would not proceed to extremities: 'it must be an object affecting him very near that would rouse him with active hostilities against the British Government.' Close, who was at that time Resident with Sindhia, was instructed to 'meet any enquiry on the matter. 'He was asked to tell Sindhia that the British Government could not refuse to respond to the Raja's repeated 'supplications' for protection because the Company and the Raja were 'equally at liberty to make what arrangement they might deem consistent with their respective interest as long as their view did not extend to any measure calculated to invade the interest of, or otherwise give umbrage to any other State.' The Maratha States, he was to add, had no claim on Jaipur. The eighth article of the British Government's treaty with Sindhia (1805) bound the Company not to enter into treaty with Sindhia's tributary chiefs in Malwa, Mewar or Marwar; it did not extend to Jaipur. The provisions of that treaty had been observed 'religiously' by the British Government.

V. Treaty of 1818

Metcafe was fully aware of, and in full sympathy with, the

new policy initiated by Lord Hastings. The instructions issued to him on 20 April, 1816 were bold as well as precise. The recently renewed 'solicitations' of the Court of Jaipur would form 'the most convenient as well as the most natural basis of the proposed negotiations.' These were to be 'conducted in such a manner as to render evident to the Raja that it is his interest and not that of the British Government that is principally concerned in their success, that we are yielding to his solicitations and not seeking our own advantage. 'He was to be solemnly warned that 'to deserve the benefits of our alliance' he must 'enter into it with a firm resolution to adhere in all events to the British Government.'

The price demanded by Lord Hastings for the alliance was heavy: 'the establishment of a British force in the country, the whole or a large proportion of the expenses of which is to be borne by the Raja; a control over the conduct of the exterior relations of that Government; exclusion from Jaipur territory of all foreign influence and power; and the disposal of the military power and resources of Jaipur for all purposes connected with the alliance and the general welfare of the two States.' The British Government must have the right 'to introduce into Jaipur territory at all times number of troops it may deem requisite for the furtherance of the common interests of the two States.' It was, however, to be 'declared' that the Raja would not be subjected to any additional charge on this account 'except when the troops are augmented at his express solicitation or for objects exclusively his own'. The amount of subsidy was to be fixed with reference to the financial condition of the Jaipur State; 'it was not to be fixed at such rate as would render the punctual discharge of it a matter of difficulty. In addition to the subsidiary force the Raja should be asked to maintain a body of troops 'to be at the disposal of the British Government for purposes of common interest.' With regard to the control of external relations, the British Government must regulate the payment of tribute, if any, by Jaipur to Sindhia or Holkar. Lord Hastings thought, however, that neither Sindhia nor Holkar could justly demand tribute from Jaipur, for they had relinquished all claims on the allies of the British Government. The British Government, on its part, would defend the Raja

of Jaipur against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and guarantee the integrity and 'independence' of his territory.

The Governor-General expected that Metcalfe would be able to conclude the alliance without involving the British Government in actual hostilities with Amir Khan and his confederate Chiefs. But precautionary measures were necessary. Two detachments of troops, 18,000 effective fighting men, were posted at Rewari and Mathura under the command of Major General Ochterlony. A corps of reserve waited at Cawnpore. Measures were also taken for the protection of the British frontier against the sudden movement of the 'predatory hordes.' If the conclusion of alliance was followed by any trouble created or encouraged by Amir Khan, war would be declared against him. In such an event his retreat from Jaipur would no longer be sufficient, and operations against him would be continued until he should be deprived of all his possessions.

Daulat Rao Sindhia was naturally anxious to keep both Amir Khan and the British Government away from Rajasthan. As soon as he heard that Metcalfe would open negotiations with Jaipur he ordered Bapu Sindhia 'to conciliate the Rajputs by every means in his power, and not to discourage them by any conduct which may interrupt . . . harmony . . . with them.' At the same time reinforcements were sent to Bapu Sindhia. Close thought that Amir Khan was not strong enough to secure 'the double object of subduing the Jaipur Government . . . and of resisting the army under Bapu Sindhia.' He was, therefore, likely to leave the field open to Sindhia who would then be 'at liberty to regulate his proceedings according to the disposition which he finds prevalent in the Jaipur *Durbar*'. The Resident thought that the precautionary military measures taken by the British Government would 'discourage' Sindhia from actually commencing hostilities even though he might not 'altogether abstain from movements of a menacing appearance.'

As soon as the intention of the British Government became public, Amir Khan began to press Jaipur more closely than before and brought reinforcements to invest the capital. Bapu Sindhia failed to conciliate the Rajputs. The Jaipur *vakiis* in Sindhia's camp complained of 'the inadequacy and futility of the exertions made by him in their favour. Close suspected that

Sindhia really wished to effect his purpose by intimidation rather than by force.' Amir Khan opened secret negotiations with Sindhia and apparently succeeded in convincing him that they should act jointly for securing their common purpose—the exclusion of British influence from Jaipur. Sindhia calculated that his acquiescence in Amir Khan's policy towards Jaipur would 'frighten the Raja and deter him from putting his seal irrevocably to any treaty' with the British Government. As a result of Sindhia's hesitation Amir Khan increased the vigour of his operations against Jaipur. The position of Jaipur became very critical, for no assistance was available from Bapu Sindhia. In June 1816 operations took place between Amir Khan's forces and Jaipur troops; the Pathan Chief failed to achieve decisive results and retreated from Jaipur.

In the meantime Metcalfe had opened negotiations with Jaipur. These were disturbed (June 1816) by alarming rumours originating from unknown sources regarding the impending march of British troops upon Jaipur from Mathura and Rewari. At first Jagat Singh was rather lukewarm about Metcalfe's proposal, for he expected relief from Sindhia. On 26 May, 1816 Metcalfe wrote to Close that the conduct of the court of Jaipur did not 'correspond with its former eagerness in pressing its own overtures.' Towards the close of June 1816 the change in Sindhia's attitude and the intensification of Amir Khan's pressure restored the former eagerness of the Jaipur *vakils*. The terms were settled and the draft of the treaty was ready for signature. All of a sudden, however, the Jaipur *vakils* adopted an uncompromising attitude and the work done so far was undone. This sudden change was due to Amir Khan's retreat from Jaipur. Metcalfe wrote on 3 July, 1816: 'What he is to receive does not appear, and there is some reason to suppose that his necessities made him retreat.' In spite of this unexpected disappointment Metcalfe did not despair; he derived comfort from the fact that 'the distress of the Jaipur Government is of a permanent nature and the only permanent relief is in our protection.' A few days later the negotiations were resumed, but they were suddenly interrupted again by 'a most preposterous proposition'—the claim of the Jaipur *vakils* that Tonk and Rampura should be restored to their Government.

Matcalfe wanted to keep these places for the Company. 'The fort of Rampura,' he wrote, 'is a post of which we know the value by experience, and the district yields four or five lakhs of annual revenue.' When his report was placed before the Supreme Government it was decided that the 'delusive character' of the Raja of Jaipur 'entitled him to no consideration.' Metcalfe was instructed (July 1816) to inform him that if he had not 'immediately recover the false step he had taken and conclude the alliance on the terms already proposed, he must consider the negotiations at an end and abide by the consequences of this decision in the ruin and devastation of his country without an effort on the part of the British to save him.'

In a long dispatch dated 7 August, 1816 Metcalfe submitted to the Supreme Government full details of his unsuccessful negotiations with the Jaipur *vakils* in Delhi. At first their response to his proposal was very unsatisfactory. Probably the ministers at Jaipur had not yet made up their minds as to the terms on which they should enter the proposed alliance. For a few days the *vakils* even omitted their ordinary visits on stated days, which they had never before omitted for years, as it ashamed of the apparent inconsistency of their own Court. Later on, they re-opened the negotiations with the proposal that an 'English gentleman' should be sent to Jaipur. Amir Khan was then advancing with a strong force against the city of Jaipur. 'The mission of an English gentleman,' wrote Metcalfe, 'would have pointed out to him the determination of the British Government to protect Jaipur, and would also have shown our anxiety to accomplish the alliance and to all appearance have reversed the relative positions of the two States in the negotiations.' The proposal was, therefore, rejected although he was quite aware of the possibility that such a mission 'might have tended to expedite the conclusion of a treaty from the advantage of direct intercourse with the Raja and his principal ministers.'

Amir Khan's purpose in advancing towards the city of Jaipur was to prevent the projected alliance 'by a decisive blow' either by 'bringing the Raja entirely within his own power or by effecting at least a change in the ministry and putting in men connected with himself.' But his threat had a contrary effect. After he began the siege of Jaipur the Raja sent a *vakil*

to Delhi with full powers to conclude a treaty. This *vakil* was a respectable banker named Sankar Das. The *vakils* who were already in Delhi were associated with him, but he was 'made the principal and most responsible person.'

After preliminary conversations it was decided that the expenses of the subsidiary force to be stationed at Jaipur would amount to 25 lakh of rupees per annum and the whole of this sum would be paid by the Raja if the resources of his territory could afford it. It was well-known, however, that the revenues of Jaipur were not sufficient for the payment of so large a sum, 'either under present circumstances or in past years of prosperity.' Metcalfe proposed that the treaty should contain an article 'establishing the principle that 25 lakhs ought to be paid, and should be paid whenever the resources of the country should admit of it, and that in the meantime the British Government should take a smaller sum, being as much as could be given according to a fair and just consideration of the resources of Jaipur, on which point the British Government should be the sole judge.' The Jaipur *vakils* apprehended that the inclusion of such an article would prove a warrant for insisting on the full payment of that sum hereafter.' They showed 'so decided a repugnance' to Metcalfe's proposal that he abandoned it and suggested that 15 lakhs should be agreed upon. Even then the *vakils* pleaded the inability of the Raja to pay so large a sum. Metcalfe thought that their argument was not absolutely without justification. As a result of the devastation which had affected the territory of Jaipur for many years, as also of 'the actual occupation of a considerable portion of the country by enemies,' there was reasonable ground for arguing that 'the payment of any considerable sum at first would be impracticable.' The following arrangement was finally agreed upon: 'for the first year nothing to be paid in consequence of the ruined state of the country, for the second and third years five lakhs each, for the fourth and fifth years ten lakhs each, ever afterwards fifteen lakhs annually.'

A draft treaty was prepared by Metcalfe and read to the *vakils*, but instead of accepting it they 'commenced their observations upon it in an altered tone.' They objected to the arrangement about payment of tribute previously decided upon.

After some delay Metcalfe agreed to take eight (instead of ten) lakhs per year for the fourth and fifth years. Then the *vakils* demanded the restoration of Tonk and Rampura which were at that time in the nominal possession of Holkar and actual control of Amir Khan. Metcalfe pointed out that Tonk and Rampura had been separated from Jaipur for a long period, and for two years (1804-1806) 'during the previous alliance' these districts had been in British possession 'without such a demand being made on the part of Jaipur.' But the Jaipur *vakils* declared plainly that they were 'not at liberty to sign any treaty without obtaining a satisfactory promise with regard to Tonk and Rampura.' The negotiations were thus abruptly terminated. Metcalfe, however, was still sanguine (7 August, 1817). The court of Jaipur, he wrote, had probably not 'really determined what course to pursue.' There were two parties, one recommending acceptance of Metcalfe's terms, and the other 'objecting, either to the terms, or to the alliance and urging an arrangement with the plunderers of the country.'

Soon afterwards, it became clear that the Jaipur *Darbar* wanted to protract the negotiations with the British Government in order to secure better terms from Amir Khan and Sindhia. Metcalfe was informed that a minister would soon be deputed to him for final adjustment of the terms of a treaty. He felt that this proposal was nothing but an excuse for further delay. He publicly declared the negotiations to be at an end 'on account of the persevering evasion of the Court of Jaipur.' But the Governor-General, although disgusted by 'the deceitful and evasive conduct of the Court of Jaipur,' was fully conscious of the fact that the advantages of an alliance with Jaipur were not immaterial to the Company. He was prepared, therefore, to 'receive and discuss any new proposition' that might be made without animadverting on what had passed. Metcalfe was authorized to conclude a treaty if the *vakils* of Jaipur accepted all the terms formerly agreed upon, as well as an additional provision stipulating that the British Government would be the arbiter of any demand preferred by any State on Jaipur. This arrangement was intended to 'form the basis of our resistance' to the opposition likely to be offered by Sindhia or other power to the treaty 'on the pretence' that it

invaded their rights with relation to Jaipur. This was no new point. Metcalfe had included in the first draft treaty a stipulation providing for the British Government's arbitration in 'all disputes between the Raja of Jaipur and other powers' as also in regard to all claims on him by other powers. The Jaipur *vakils* displayed extreme apprehension and reluctance against it, and Metcalfe did not consider it essential to insist on its acceptance. The power claimed for the Company through this special provision was 'inseparable', in his opinion, from 'the character of protector' which the treaty would give it, and no 'specific stipulation' was necessary.

Meanwhile the position of Jaipur was becoming worse day by day. Amir Khan was collecting revenue from the villages and one of his lieutenants was strengthening a fort within Jaipur territory which he had occupied. Bapu Sindhia did not obstruct Amir Khan's movements. There was no unity even in the capital of Jagat Singh. Rai Chand Singh, the principal commander of his troops, was pro-British. When the negotiations with Metcalfe broke down he resigned his command and left Jaipur in disgust. His successor, Ganesh Narain, was 'undoubtedly most anxiously bent on the formation of an alliance with the British.' Towards the end of September 1816 Metcalfe was hopeful that the course of events was likely to 'lead to a further application for our protection, with entire submission to our terms.'

This prophecy was soon fulfilled. In November 1816 some Jaipur *vakils*, led by Sankar Das, came to Delhi and renewed negotiations with Metcalfe. The question of Tonk and Rampura was revived. The *vakils* no longer insisted on the insertion of any stipulation on the matter in the treaty; they were ready to be satisfied if Metcalfe promised in writing that he would try to prevail on the Governor-General to comply with Jaipur's request if Tonk and Rampura happened to come into the possession of the British Government. Metcalfe expressed his inability to make any such promise. The *vakils* gave up their demand as if it had been 'made with a previous conviction that it would not succeed'. Then they wanted *jagirs*, or pensions for themselves. Metcalfe 'got rid of this most preposterous proposal by exposing its absurdity and laughing it off in a

manner that was likely to be least offensive.' The *vakils*' third request was that the Resident at the Court of Jaipur should be a man of 'mid and kind disposition and department.' Metcalfe gave them full assurance on this point. Then he proposed the additional stipulation about arbitration. The *vakils* obstinately opposed it; they did not know, they argued, 'to what extensive and indefinite demands they might be subjecting themselves should they bind themselves to abide by British decision on every claim that might be brought forward against them.' Metcalfe tried to remove their suspicions and agreed to put the article in the most harmless language. He suggested that the right of the British Government to arbitrate on all claims, preferred by other powers should be limited to claims, if any, advanced by Holkar and Sindhia relating to matter arising since the dissolution of Jaipur's alliance with the Company in 1806, for he suspected that the alarm of the *vakils* was particularly directed towards some bonds given by Jagat Singh to Holkar and some Pindari leaders before 1806. The *vakils* accepted this compromise, and every thing was ready for the formal conclusion of the treaty.

A strange difficulty was raised at the last moment: the *vakils* were not sure whether the treaty would be ratified by the Raja. They asked Metcalfe to be satisfied 'for the present' with a treaty signed by themselves. Metcalfe naturally rejected this 'extraordinary proposal', and, unwilling to tolerate further delay, cut-off the negotiations. He observed in his report to the Supreme Government that a protracted and open negotiation was attended with many advantages to the Raja of Jaipur. 'It overawes his enemies and enables him to make better terms with them. It does not bind him to any thing, and it puts it in his power to close with the terms offered in a case of necessity. It is attended with some of the advantages, without any of the sacrifices and restraints, of an actual alliance. And it keeps open the chapter of accidents in which the politicians of this country delight to put their trust.'

Soon after the termination of the negotiations the chief minister of Jaipur publicly declared that he had never authorized Sankar Das and other *vakils* to agree to any stipulation for the payment of tribute to the British Government. When Metcalfe

confronted the *vakils* with this declaration, they said that the minister was afraid to acknowledge 'the extent of the payment to which he had agreed' lest he should be driven out of office by those chiefs who were opposed to the British alliance. Metcalfe accepted this explanation as worthy of belief and wrote a letter of protest to the Raja and the minister. He remarked: 'Either the negotiators had agreed to these stipulations in disobedience of their instructions, in which case they deserved punishment and were not fit to be employed, or the Court, after giving assent to these stipulations, had uttered a falsehood in denying it ... in either case it would be difficult to place any confidence in the future negotiations of the Court.' The Raja sent an evasive reply which appeared to imply that the agents had 'agreed to more than they had authority for,' but it was recognized that the sum of money to be paid was the principal subject of discussion.

In March 1817 Metcalfe reported to the Supreme Government that Amir Khan was again advancing towards Jaipur. His march created alarm in Jaipur and Metcalfe found 'some light indication of a desire' to revive negotiations for British protection. Before the negotiations were formally resumed Lord Hastings had arrived at his final decision to crush the Pindaris. Sindhia, Holkar and Amir Khan were the three principal persons whose co-operation or submission was an essential preliminary to the success of this plan. Holkar was asked to abstain from all interference or connection with the States of Jaipur, Jodhpur, Udaipur, Kotah and Bundi.' Amir Khan, who had already opened negotiations for a settlement with the British Government, was required to withdraw his troops from all Rajput States and to restore Rajput forts occupied by him. With regard to the Rajput States the Governor-General's plan was to establish a barrier against the revival of the predatory system or the extension of the power of Sindhia and Holkar beyond the limits to be assigned to it by the measures then (i.e., October 1817) in progress.' Agreements were to be concluded with them on several conditions. The British Government should have entire control over their political relations and proceedings with each other and with foreign States; in return, it should secure to them the enjoyment of their territorial possessions and the

independent exercise of their internal administration under its 'protection and guarantee.' Their resources should be available for defraying the charge that would be incurred in 'the establishment and support of the system.'

There were two alternative methods of giving the new 'system' a concrete shape. The three principal Rajput States—Jaipur, Jodhpur and Udaipur—might be united in a common league under the paramount authority of the British Government, or separate agreements might be concluded with each State on the condition best adapted to its 'peculiar circumstances and situation.' Although there were 'some points of view in which the advantages of the former might be found to preponderate,' yet there were 'distinctions' among these States which rendered it difficult to 'frame any system of general confederation.' Moreover, 'feelings of pride or jealousy might lead them to prefer a separate alliance with the British Government, by which each would preserve the appearance and form of a substantive power, to an union which would bring their common dependence on the British Government too prominently forward.'

With regard to Jaipur Metcalfe was instructed to conclude a treaty containing the stipulations previously agreed upon, with one exception: the article relating to the right of the British Government to decide the pecuniary claims of other States on Jaipur was to be omitted. Lord Hastings was by this time convinced that neither Sindhia nor Holkar was justly entitled to claim tribute from Jaipur. It was, therefore, unnecessary to insist on a stipulation which had 'proved to be so repugnant to the wishes and alarming to the fears of the Government of Jaipur. Moreover, the amount of the subsidy originally demanded might be reduced, and the 'unqualified demand' of a fort for stationing British troops might not be necessary.

In October 1817 Metcalfe was ready to receive the *vakils* of Jaipur, but Jagat Singh still 'persevered' in his old policy of continuing the interminable and mutually faithless negotiations with Amir Khan. Tod explains the background: '... there were abundance of private and individual motives arrayed in hostility to the British offer. For example, the ministers dreaded the surveillance of a resident agent, as obnoxious to

their authority and influence; and the chieftains, whom rank and ancient usage kept at court as the councilors of their prince, saw in prospect the surrender of crown lands, which fraud, or force, had obtained for them.'

Towards the close of November 1817 Metcalfe decided that an advance of Ochterlony's army towards Jaipur would bring the 'procrastinating council of the Raja to a decision in favour of the immediate conclusion of the alliance.' A treaty had already been concluded with Amir Khan (9 November, 1817), and Major-General Donkin was proceeding towards Kotah. At this favourable moment Ochterlony might appear near Jaipur and utilize the implied threat of military operations for the purpose of coercing Jagat Singh into acceptance of the British proposals.

As expected, Ochterlony's advance caused considerable sensation and alarm in Jaipur. Some *vakils* were sent to his camp to ward off apprehended hostilities, and a deputation proceeded in a hurry to Delhi. Amir Khan had already retreated from Jaipur territory, but he reoccupied several districts as soon as he heard that fresh negotiations with Metcalfe had not yet begun. Naturally Metcalfe expected that his object would now be accomplished without further delay. But the progress of the *vakils* sent to Delhi was retarded by the intrigues of the Shekhawat chief of Sikar, Thakur Lachhman Singh, a partisan of Amir Khan. The interruption was temporary. In January 1818 Metcalfe began to negotiate separately with some tributary chiefs owing allegiance to the Raja of Jaipur. His object, as he himself stated, was two-fold: either 'to alert the Court of Jaipur and stimulate them to the conclusion of a suitable alliance by showing that the British Government was not 'entirely dependent on their will' but was 'able and willing to establish order without their concurrence,' or, 'if the Court should continue so senseless as not to be moved by the prospect of the dissolution of its power over the dependent States connected with it, to lay a foundation for the conclusion of separate engagements which should bring all those States under our protection.' A conditional engagement was concluded with the Raja of Khetri.

The military pressure exercised through Ochterlony's advance and the diplomatic pressure exercised through attempts to bring the 'dependent States' directly under British protection

were unfair to Jagat Singh who was under no obligation to conclude an alliance with the Company. Tod's explanation of the Jaipur Court's hesitation deserves mention. The circumstances connected with the surrender of Wazir Ali of Oudh, had provoked 'distrust of the British in the Rajput mind; it was a case of compulsion for violation of an ancient and sacred custom (*saran*). A more material difficulty was the amount of tribute asked for. In Metcalfe's insistence on 'a high rate of insurance for protection' the Jaipur Court saw, 'instead of the generous Briton, a sordid trafficker of mercenary protection, whose rapacity transcended that of the Maratha.' There were other factors, such as the fears of the ministers as also of the chieftains about the probable loss of their power and property. But the Jaipur Court had really no choice. The events rapidly happening around them—the expulsion of the orange flag of the Marathas, and the substitution of the British banner on the battlements of Ajmer—at length produced a tardy and ungracious assent to a treaty on 2 April, 1818.

Even at the last stage the question of tribute protracted the negotiations. As late as 8 March, 1818 Metcalfe was not confident of success. He wanted 15 lakhs, but the *vakils* offered 2 lakhs and 40 thousand. Metcalfe then proposed that in lieu of any fixed tribute the Raja should pay a certain portion of the revenue. The *vakils*, unwilling to accept a system of sharing the revenue, offered eight lakhs as a fixed amount. Metcalfe insisted on one-fourth of the revenue or 12 lakhs. The *vakils* replied that the Raja's revenue had scarcely ever exceeded 32 lakhs even in days of prosperity; so the income of the State could not bear the burden of 12 lakhs. At last a graduated arrangement was decided upon. In the first year the State would pay nothing; this was a concession to the 'depopulated State of the country.' During the second, third, fourth and fifth year there would be a rising scale of payment; 4 lakhs, 5 lakhs, 6 lakhs, 7 lakhs. For the sixth year and 'ever afterwards' the amount payable would be 8 lakhs, until the Raja's revenue should exceed 40 lakhs, when, in addition to 8 lakhs, the British Government should receive five-sixteenth of all the revenue above 40 lakhs.

The remaining Articles of the treaty were discussed and settled without difficulty. Article 1 provided for 'perpetual

friendship, alliance and unity of interest' between the two States. The territory of Jaipur was to be protected by the British Government (Article 2). The Raja promised to 'act in subordinate co-operation with the British Government,' to acknowledge its supremacy, and to maintain no connection with other chiefs and States (Article 3). He agreed not to enter into any negotiation with any Chief or State without the knowledge and sanction of the British Government (Article 4). All disputes between Jaipur and other States would be submitted to the arbitration and award of the British Government (Article 5). Article 6 laid down the arrangement for payment of tribute. Article 7 provided that Jaipur should 'furnish troops according to its means' at the requisition of the British Government. Article 9 provided that the Raja and his heirs and successors 'shall remain absolute rulers of their territory and their dependents according to long established usage; and British civil and criminal jurisdiction shall not be introduced into that principality.'

VI. British Intervention

Within a few weeks of the conclusion of the treaty Ochterlony as the Chief of the new Raipurana Residency, proceeded to Jaipur for the purpose of introducing some regularity and system into the administration of its affairs. This was, of course, not warranted by the terms of the treaty; but, as Tod points out, both the sixth and seventh Articles 'contain the seeds of disunion, whenever it might suit the chicanery or bad faith of the protected, or the avarice of the protector.' The situation in Jaipur, however, required British interference, at least at the initial stage. The fact that the payment of tribute had been excused for the first year was a testimony to the distress of the State; and neither Jagat Singh nor his ministers could be expected to provide the necessary healing touch even though they had been relieved from the depredations of Amir Khan and Sindhia. The ninth Article remained a glittering embellishment; the 'absolute rulers' of Jaipur found that the essential feature of the treaty was 'subordinate co-operation'.

As in the case of some other Rajput States, the British Government had to 'arbitrate the difference between the Raja and his vassals on the subject of the usurpations from the

crown lands.' In some cases the nobles 'took only what would otherwise have been taken' by Amir Khan. In Ochterlony's view, 'after the seizure has been actually made, influence and corruption have been successfully employed to obtain grants or sanads for lands in reality obtained by force. In June 1818 an agreement was prepared at a general meeting of the Thakurs held in the presence of the Raja and under Ochterlony's superintendence. It provided that all 'recent usurpations of the Thakurs were to be 'disposed of according to the will of the Durbar.' They agreed not to harbour thieves and robbers, not to oppress their tenants, not to molest merchants, and to render service to the Raja according to the usages of the Durbar. The Raja gave an assurance that the Chiefs should enjoy their ancient rights and lands. The arbitration (by Ochterlony) was, according to Tod, 'easy, and left no unpleasant feeling.' But some of the Thakurs were found to be unwilling to restore the *khalsa* lands, and in order to demonstrate the strength and stability of the new order two strongholds (Kushalgarh and Madhogarh) were reduced.

To what extent Jagat Singh was capable of making good use of his increased authority could not be ascertained, for he died a few months later (21 December, 1818). He left no natural or adopted heir. Next morning a boy of nine, named Mohan Singh, a distant relative of the ruling family, was installed on the *gadi* by the chief eunuch of the *razala* (seraglio)—a man named Mohan Nazir—who at that time held the reins of power in his hands. Tod describes this upstart as a man (if considerable vigour of understanding and not without the reputation of good intention in his administration of affairs. But the selection of Mohan Singh as Jagat Singh's successor, according to Tod, savoured more of self-interest than of loyalty; 'a long minority, with the exclusive possession of power, suggested the true motives of the Nazir.' The Nazir declared that the succession of Mohan Singh was in conformity with the desire of the deceased Raja, but then was no evidence in favour of this statement. The selection was 'in direct contravention of usage' which prescribed that, on failure lineal issue, the right to the *gadi* would be confined to the descendants of Man Singh and the branch *Madhani*, generally

styled *Rajawat*. Moreover, 'there was no previous consultation or concert amongst the military vassals, or the queens'; the *Nazir* 'acted entirely on his own responsibility.' But he had a powerful supporter in Megh Singh of Diggi, 'a chief who had contrived by fraud and force to double his hereditary fief by usurpations from the crown lands,' and behind him stood his clan (the Khangarot). This clan—the most powerful of the twelve great families of Amber—had 22 'fiefs, with a total rent-roll of 4,02,806 rupees annually.' Megh Singh's purpose was to prevent resumption by the *Durbar* of the lands usurped by him; naturally he wanted a weak Government dependent upon his support. The *Nazir* had other supporters. The personal servants of the crown, such as the *purohīts*, *dhabhais* (domestic chaplains and foster-brothers), and all the subordinate officers of the household accepted the new arrangement lest they should be dislodged from their places 'by the election of a prince who could judge for himself and had friends to provide for.' The nobles offered no active opposition, but they refused to make any definite commitment.

At the request of the *Nazir*, who was anxious to propitiate the new paramount power, the Resident in Delhi sent his confidential *munshi* to Jaipur with instructions to make full inquiries about the circumstances connected with the succession. The *munshi* reported in favour of the *Nazir*. On 7 February, 1819 the confirmation of the minor Raja, who was named Man Singh, by the British Government was publicly declared at Jaipur.

Even the approval of the paramount power could not secure the acquiescence of the nobles and the queens in this hasty and ill-considered arrangement. Jagat Singh's chief queen, sister of Raja Man Singh of Jodhpur, 'breathed nothing but open defiance of the *Nazir* and his junta.' She was supported by the nobles. Early in March 1819 the *Rjawati* Chief of Jhalai, who was the legitimate successor according to usage, decided to appeal to arms in support of his claim, and he was soon joined by the chiefs of Sarwar and Isarda. Another party tried to revive the claim of Man Singh, the posthumous son of Prithvi Singh, who had been living for many years in exile at Brindaban.

In this crisis the *Nazir* tried to make Raja Man Singh of Jodhpur the umpire, 'hoping by this appeal to his vanity, to

obtain his influence over his sister to an acquiescence in the irremediable step, which had been taken allegedly in obedience to the deceased Raja's will. The Jodhpur Raja replied that the right to choose the successor belonged to the elders of the twelve tribes of the Kachhwahs; if they accepted the new prince, his sister, and he himself, would agree, 'if requisite'. The *Nazir* then tried to 'get up a marriage between the puppet he had enthroned and the grand-daughter of the Rana of Mewar.' The proposal was not 'ill-received' by the Rana, and it was planned that he should simultaneously complete his marriage with Jagat Singh's sister which had been settled a dozen years back. Had the *Nazir's* plan to draw Mewar into the net materialised civil war would most probably broken out, and the direct intervention of the British Government would have been necessary. But Jaipur was saved by the timely discovery that Jagat Singh's Bhattiani queen was pregnant. On 25 April, 1819 she gave birth to a son. He was named Jai Singh III. He was recognized as heir by the Jaipur nobles as also by the British Government, and his mother was recognized as Regent. The *Nazir's* puppet was set aside.

During the long Regency of the Bhattiani queen (1819-33) Jaipur was 'a scene of corruption and misgovernment.' Tod disliked British interference in 'the two chief branches of government, the succession and finances'; but the internal problems of the State led necessarily to large-scale interference. Such interference implicated the British Government 'in the acts of the (Jaipur) Government functionaries and ... in the party views and intrigues of a court, stigmatized even by the rest of Rajwara with the epithet of *Jutha durbar*, the lying court. It was not possible for the Resident to keep aloof from the vortex of intrigue.' Tod says: The purest intentions, the highest talents, will scarcely avail to counteract this vice, and with one party at least, but eventually with all, the reputation of his government will be compromised.' This risk became graver when the British Government appointed Major Stewart in 1821, with authority to interfere in the internal administration of Jaipur, in order to guard its own interests and to secure the payment of the tribute. The situation was offensive to Rajput sentiment, and within a few years (as Tod says) the nobles of

Jaipur repented the alliance which 'temporary policy' had led their deceased ruler to accept.

Stewart was concerned primarily with financial arrangements. He expected a rapid improvement in the State's income and proportional increase of the tribute. In Sawai Jai Singh's reign the revenue amounted to a crore a year; in 1818 it amounted to 37 lakhs. This was due to diminution of territory, usurpation of *Khalsa* lands by the nobles, and large-scale speculation. But during the period of Maratha invasion and Pindari ravages the people of Jaipur had not fled from the State in large numbers as the people of Mewar had done. This was an important factor in favour of the Jaipur State's financial viability. By introducing a proper revenue settlement, by curtailing expenditure, particularly on the army, and by restricting religious and charitable expenditure to reasonable limits the State could be made prosperous. The Supreme Government decided that a direct and decided interference was necessary 'as the only effectual means of averting the apparently inevitable ruin of the country' and of enabling the State to fulfil its obligations in respect of the tribute.

The Bhattiani Rani had a paramour named Jota Ram. His influence over the Regent enabled him to acquire great power in the State. Towards the close of Lord Amherst's administration the British Resident banished Jota Ram and conferred the post of minister on Rawal Bairisal. But Jota Ram's party continued to disturb the State: Bairisal was dismissed. The Rani succeeded in inducing the British Government to sanction the recall of Jota Ram. The nobles remained hostile to the Rani and refused to acquiesce in the rule of an adventurer like Jota Ram. Sir Charles Metcalfe was able, however, to persuade the nobles to agree to the continuation of the Rani's Regency. This arrangement did not work satisfactorily. Jota Ram who had become minister with the approval of the British Government, exploited the peasantry and tried to crush the nobles. The latter's privileges were curtailed, and an attempt was made to substitute the Raja's troops for theirs in the garrisons of some strongholds. A civil war broke out in 1830. As Lord William Bentinck was in favour of non-intervention, the rival parties were left free to fight out their quarrel. A British force was,

however, sent against Jota Ram when he threatened the estates of some nobles whom the British Government had guaranteed in their possessions. Jota Ram gave up his plan, and soon afterwards his position was weakened as a result of the Rari's death (1833). The young Maharaja, Jai Singh III, died in 1835. It was strongly suspected that he had been poisoned by Jota Ram.

Jaipur was now confronted with a serious crisis. The heir to the throne was an infant two years old—Ram Singh, son of Jai Singh III. Jota Ram was all-powerful. The nobles were assembling at the capital at the head of their armed retainers. Major Alves, the Political Agent, came to Jaipur to make enquiries, reform the administration, and assume the guardianship of the infant ruler. Jota Ram made an insincere offer to resign and secretly organized a diabolical conspiracy. He raised a popular disturbance on the very day of the Political Agent's arrival, hired assassins to murder the English officers, and tried to embroil the *Thakurs* with the British Government in the hope that he would be restored to power through their being discredited. The Political Agent was wounded; his Assistant, Blake, was killed. Enquiries revealed the part which Jota Ram had played in organizing disturbances and instigating murders. He and his brother were imprisoned for life in the fort of Chunar. Soon afterwards a Council of Regency, consisting of five of the principal nobles, was formed under the superintendence of the Political Agent, and it was decided that all important measures were to be submitted to him for approval. Thus the State was virtually placed under complete British control. The primary object of the British Government was to realise the large arrears of the tribute which had accumulated during the last few years.

13

Marwar

I. Mughals and Marathas

The small Rathor principalities in western Rajasthan really formed a confederation, with the ruler of Jodhpur as its chief, till the reign of Maldev (1532-62). The political instability following his death led to the imposition of Mughal sovereignty over the State (1570-71). Imperial control was consolidated during the reign of Udai Singh (1583-1619). During the early part of Aurangzeb's reign Jaswant Singh of Marwar (1638-78) was 'the leading Hindu peer of the Mughal court' and his principality was the foremost Hindu State of Northern India.¹ After his death the Rathors were involved in a long and bitter struggle against the Mughals (1679-1708). 'A generation of time passed in Marwar in ceaseless conflict, captures and recaptures'. Peace was restored after Aurangzeb's death and Bahadur Shah's accession to the imperial throne; but the shifting policy of Ajit Singh, son and successor of Jaswant Singh, could not consolidate his position in the stormy politics of the Mughal Court. Marwar was weakened, first by a war against Bikaner in which Sawai Jai Singh was involved, and then by a war of succession between Ram Singh and Bakht Singh. The former was in possession of the *gadi* for about two years (1749-51); but he was thrown out by the latter in 1751. The successful contestant died soon afterwards (1752). His son Bijay Singh ascended the *gadi* and

ruled till his death in 1793; but Ram Singh, strengthened by Maratha aid, continued to challenge him.

Two factors played a decisive part in the history of Marwar in the eighteenth century. One was the traditional rivalry between the Rathors and the Kachhwahs of Amber²; the other was the continuous interference of the Marathas in the affairs of Rajasthan. The origin of that rivalry is to be traced to the contest for primacy in the Mughal Court which was a legacy from the seventeenth century. The interference of the Marathas was rendered possible by the fall of the Mughal Empire and the involvement of the Rajput States in mutual disputes and struggles over points of prestige and occupation of territory. Such issues had been decided by the Mughal Emperors as long as they were strong enough to impose their will upon the subordinate princes. Aurangzeb's successors were incapable of exercising this imperial function. 'All the pent up personal ambitions', says Sir J.N. Sarkar, 'and inter-State rivalries (in Rajasthan) now burst forth without fear or check, and Rajputana became a zoological garden with the barriers of the cages thrown down and the keepers removed'.³

Bijay Singh's fairly long reign may be described as a continuous struggle against the Marathas. In 1752 they espoused Ram Singh's cause in the war of succession. In 1756 Bijay Singh agreed to cede Ajmer to the Marathas, to pay a war indemnity of 50 lakhs in three years, and to make over to Ram Singh the city of Jalor and half the territory of Marwar. 'None of these terms except the first one was ultimately fulfilled'. The Marathas maintained their grip over Marwar, and the State became the special hunting-ground of the Sindhia family'. Bijay Singh remained constantly in dread of Maratha invasion. Another complication was the shelter offered to Ram Singh by Madho Singh of Jaipur who often threatened to restore him by force. Marwar passed through a period of uneasy peace till Ram Singh's death in 1773.

The long rivalry between Bijay Singh and Ram Singh ruined Marwar. It was a civil war in the worst sense of the term, for some of the most valiant Rathor families remained loyal to Ram Singh who had some of the qualities attractive to the Rajputs. Tod says: 'His person was gigantic; his demeanor affable and courteous; and he was generous to a fault. His understanding

was excellent and well cultivated...It is universally admitted that, both in exterior and accomplishments, not even the great Ajit could compare with Ram Singh. ∴ Bijay Singh was weak and unwarlike. A Rathor bard contrasted the character of the two rivals in the following words: 'Fortune never attended the stirrup of Bijay Singh, who never gained a battle, though at the head of a hundred thousand men; but Ram Singh, by this valour and conduct, gained victories with a handful'.

Civil war, external invasion and royal weakness conspired to increase the power and stimulate the ambition of the nobles. At the beginning of Bijay Singh's reign, says Tod the crown lands were uncultivated, the tenantry dispersed; and commerce had diminished, owing to insecurity and the licentious habits of the nobles, who everywhere established their own imports, and occasionally despoiled entire caravans'. Unable to keep them in check, Bijay Singh tried to keep them engaged by finding them military occupation. He carried his arms against some desert tribes and occupied Amarkot, 'the key to the valley of the Indus'. He also occupied the rich district of Godwar, which had been ruled by the Ranas of Mewar for nearly five centuries.

In 1787 Sawai Pratap Singh of Jaipur, then threatened by Mahadji Sindhia, concluded a defensive alliance with Bijay Singh. The Lalsot campaign gave the Rajputs a temporary respite but 'no final deliverance'. While on his retreat after that campaign Mahadji Sindhia had sworn to reduce Jaipur to ashes. He found his chance in 1790, when Ismail Beg induced the Rajas of Jaipur and Jodhpur to join him against Sindhia. Mahadji detached an army under the command of Gopal Bhau and De Boigne to punish Ismail Beg and crush the Rajputs. A decisive battle was fought at Patan (in the Shekhawat territory) on 20 June, 1790. De Boigne's skilful generalship secured a great victory for his master.

When the news of this battle reached Sindhia at Mathura he determined to press home the advantage and complete the subjugation of the Rajput who had asserted—and maintained—their independence since the battle of Tunga or Lalsot. He now ordered De Boigne to invade Marwar and reduce the Raja to submission. De Boigne invested Ajmer which, 'lying as it did

half way between Jaipur and Jodhpur, was the key of the country'. But, finding that it was not possible to take Ajmer by a *coup de man*, he left a detachment to continue the siege and marched with the rest of his army towards Jodhpur. Anxious to wipe out the shame of Patan, Bijay Singh summoned to his standard every Rathor between 14 and 60 years of age capable of wielding a sword. About 30,000 Rathors met De Boigne at Merta, the Gateway of Marwar'. Once again De Boigne's skill and presence of mind secured a decisive victory (10 September, 1790). The terms imposed on Bijay Singh were severe; these included, in addition to a contribution of 60 lakhs of rupees, the cession of the district of Ajmer. The Ajmer fort was surrendered to Sindhia on 7 May, 1741. For about ten years after the defeat at Merta Marwar did not venture again to challenge the Marathas.

Tod says that the last years of Bijay Singh's life were engrossed by sentimental folly with a young beauty of the Oswal tribe, on whom he lavished all the honours due to his legitimate queens. As a matter of tact he was a Vaishnav of the Vallabhachari sect and he treated the 'young beauty' as his Radha. From the Raja's point of view she was a religious mate rather than a concubine, and their union was morganatic marriage. However, this 'sentimental folly' created many troubles, not the least harmful of which was a disputed succession. She controlled the administration through a horse tamer named Bhairo Sani. She secured for her son Tej Singh the important 'fief' of Merta. After his death in 1783 she intrigued to secure the *gadi* for Man Singh whom she had 'put into her lap' (*i.e.*, adopted as her son). The nobles, whom her tyranny had already alienated, refused to accept this arrangement which was intended to maintain her control over the State. Their choice fell on Bhim Singh. Man Singh and Bhim Singh were grandsons of Bijay Singh.

Now began an era of terror and murder. The aged and faithful minister, Khub-Chand Singhavi, was murdered, along with his brother and eldest son, at the instigation of the all-powerful 'beauty'. She also poisoned Guman Singh, father of Man Singh. Her enemies—the discontented nobles—murdered her paramour, a minister named Bijay Singh, in January 1792, and four months later they murdered her. Raja Bijay Singh,

old and infirm, was shut out of the capital for about a year (April 1792-March 1793). He died on 8 July, 1793. At the time of his death this miserable prince left 'his dominions curtailed, his chiefs in rebellion, his sons and grandsons opposed to each other'.

Bijay Singh was succeeded by his grandson, Bhim Singh (1793-1803), the nominee of the nobles, who superseded the legitimate claim of his uncle, Zalim Singh, the eldest surviving son of the deceased Raja. The latter was 'defeated and forced to seek shelter at Udaipur where, with an ample domain from the Rana, his relative on the maternal side, he passed the rest of his days in literary pursuits'. All other rival claimants to the throne were removed in the Mughal fashion. Of Bijay Singh's other surviving sons, Sardar Singh was murdered and Sher Singh was blinded. Sometimes later Sher Singh released himself from life by dashing out his brains'. A single claimant remained to disturb Bhim Singh's repose—Man Singh, in safe shelter within the walls of Jalor. The stronghold remained under siege for about two years; and at the very moment when its surrender seemed to be imminent, Bhim Singh died. It was suspected that Man Singh's cause was supported by 'the high priest of Marwar, the spiritual leader of the Rathors', and Bhim Singh was supposed to have been poisoned.

Man Singh, whom the sudden death of Bhim Singh placed on the *gadi* of Marwar, was a remarkable man. During his long reign of about forty years (1803-43) he passed through many vicissitudes of fortune. Tod, who knew him personally, has left for us a vivid description of his appearance and character. 'In person', says he, 'the Raja is above the common height, possessing considerable dignity of manner, though accompanied by the stiffness of habitual restraint. His demeanor was commanding and altogether princely; but there was an entire absence of that natural majesty and grace which distinguished the prince of Udaipur (*i.e.*, Rana Bhim Singh), who won without exertion our spontaneous homage. The features of Raja Man are good; his eye is full of intelligence: and though the *ensemble* of his countenance almost denotes benevolence, yet there is ever and anon a doubtful expression, which, with a peculiarly framed forehead, gave a momentary cast of malignity of it'. Tod continues: The biography of Raja Man would afford a

remarkable picture of human patience, fortitude, and constancy, never surpassed in any age or country. But in this school of adversity he also took lessons of cruelty, he learned therein to master or rather disguise his passions; and though he showed not the ferocity of the tiger, he acquired the still more dangerous attribute of that animal—its cunning ... I received the most convincing proofs of his intelligence, and mature knowledge of the past history, not of his country alone, but of India in general. He was remarkably well read... whether the first gratification of vengeance provoked his appetite, or whether the torrent of his rage, once impelled into motion, became too impetuous to be checked, so that his reason was actually disturbed by the sufferings he had undergone, it is certain he grew a maniac; nor could any one, who had conversed with the bland, the gentlemanly, I might say gentle, Raja Man, have imagined that he concealed under this exterior a heart so malignant as his subsequent acts evinced'. Such was the man who presided over the destiny of Marwar in the tumult and strife of the early years of the nineteenth century.

II. Treaty of 1803

During the last two years of Bijay Singh's reign the Sindhia-Holkar rivalry for domination over Hindustan provided temporary relief for the Rajput States from Maratha depredations. The 'opposition and dissensions' to which Daulat Rao Sindhia was exposed from Holkar and Ali Bahadur, 'induced him', says Grant Duff, to grant them peace on their promising to pay a moderate tribute annually. De Boigne and Perron collected the tribute from the Rajput States 'with tolerable ease'. The situation changed a few years later. In April 1796, William Palmer, Resident with Sindhia, reported to the Governor-General that Lakhwa Dada's 'present intention' was to 'proceed to Jodhpur, Jaipur and Kotah, probably only for the purpose of levying contribution'; but the Rajas 'seem to be apprehensive that his designs are to make permanent acquisitions of territory and subvert their Government'. The Resident thought that this would be 'an enterprise too arduous in the present state of the Maratha force on this side of India, and while Daulat Rao is engaged in a serious contest in the Deccan'.

Encouraged by Sindhia's difficulties, the Rajput rulers talked half-heartedly of organizing coalitions against him (1796-97). Lakhwa Dada overran Mewar in 1799 and defeated a Jaipur-Jodhpur coalition in the battle of Malpura on 16 April, 1800. He was, however, suddenly dismissed by Sindhia. On 30 May, 1800, Collins, Resident with Sindhia, reported that Lakhwa Dada had entered into most solid engagements with the *vakils* of Raja Bhim Singh to defend the Jodhpur dominions should they be invaded by Mr. Perron, either on account of arrears of tribute or any other pretext. Lakhwa Dada's family and property found a safe shelter in Jodhpur. His agreement with Bhim Singh was not unknown to Perron. On 9 June, 1800 Collins reported that Perron had commenced his march towards the Jodhpur territories for the purpose either of detaching the Raja of that country from his connection with Lakhwa, or of punishing him should his admonitions to this effect be disregarded by the Rajput prince. A month later he reported that Perron had successfully 'intimidated the Jodhpur Raja into an acceptance of his own terms'. Within a fortnight, however, he was 'obliged to relinquish his object in Jodhpur and to march for Saharanpur in order to quell some disturbances' which had been created there by Lakhwa Dada's followers. After Perron's departure Bhim Singh continued his intrigues with Lakhwa Dada. Bhim Singh's death and the outbreak of the Second Anglo-Maratha War placed Rajput-Maratha relations in a new perspective.

This was the external situation which Man Singh had to face immediately after his accession. Internally his position was extremely critical. Sawai Singh of Pokaran, one of the leading chiefs of Marwar, who had to avenge the murder of his grand-father by Bijay Singh, 'put himself in hostility' to the new ruler. In Tod's picturesque language, he held his sword 'suspended over the head of Raja Man from his enthronement to his death hour'. He discovered a rival candidate for the *gadi* in a posthumous son of Bhim Singh. The infant was named Dhonkal Singh. For the time being, however, Sawai Singh's plot did not succeed, for the child was born under suspicious circumstances, and his legitimacy was not generally acknowledged.

Meanwhile Lord Wellesley had decided to use the Rajput States as 'a barrier against the return of the Marathas to the

northern parts of Hindustan'.⁷ Accordingly, treaties were concluded with Jaipur and Jodhpur in December 1803. Man Singh's position was then so critical owing to internal troubles created in Sawai Singh's intrigue that he did not hesitate to take advantage of an alliance with the rising British power. The terms of the treaty were similar to those granted by Lord Lake to Jaipur. 'A firm and permanent friendship and alliance was established between the two States, and it was agreed that 'the friends and enemies of one of the parties shall be considered the friends and enemies of both. Jodhpur was thus definitely implicated in the Anglo-Maratha struggle. The Company promised not to interfere in the internal administration of Jodhpur, and no tribute was to be demanded from the Raja. If 'any enemy'—the reference was obviously to the Marathas—'evinced a disposition to invade' British territory, the ruler of Jodhpur would 'send the whole of his forces to the assistance of the Company's army and . . . exert himself to the utmost of his power in repelling the enemy. As the Company guaranteed 'the security of his country against external enemies', the Raja agreed to submit to the British Government any 'misunderstanding' that might arise between him and any other State. If the British Government failed to settle the dispute owing to 'the obstinacy of the opposite party', the Company would grant military assistance to Jodhpur, provided the Raja paid 'the charge of expense of such aid, at the rate as has been settled with the other Chieftains of Hindustan'. He would also 'act, during the time of war or prospect of action, agreeably to the advice and opinion of the commander of the English army . . . employed with his troops'. He would not 'entertain in his service, or in any manner give admission to, any English or French subject, or any other person among the inhabitants of Europe, without the consent of the Company's Government'.⁸

Although the Governor-General ratified this treaty, Man Singh refused to ratify it and proposed a different draft. He was probably afraid of offending Jaswant Rao Holkar who was then present with his force near the frontier of Marwar. He entered into negotiations with Holkar and even helped him by giving shelter of his family. The British authorities were naturally exasperated, and the terms of Man Singh's draft treaty were

found unacceptable. It provided that the Company would not deprive the Raja of Jodhpur either of his ancient possessions or those which he might have lately acquired. In case of an internal rebellion the Company would give him aid for suppressing it. In time of war the Company would act agreeably to the Raja's counsel or to the advice of his approved servants. Ajmer would be handed over to the Raja if it happened to fall into the hands of the British Government; otherwise, when the Raja would find it convenient to seize Ajmer, the Company would assist him. In case of any person creating disturbances in, or carrying war into the Company's territories, the Raja would assist the British Government with his troops; but the Company should pay the expenses. Obviously Man Singh expected the Company to accept obligations which were incompatible with Lord Wellesley's new system of alliance and materially different from the provisions in the treaty with Jaipur. So his offer was refused and the treaty of 1803 was cancelled in May 1804. His name was removed from the list of the princes whose independence from Sindhia's authority was to be recognized according to the treaty of Sarji Anjangaon (30 December, 1803). After Holkar's retreat from the neighborhood of Marwar, Man Singh expressed his willingness to conclude a treaty of alliance, but the Governor-General did not consider it necessary to resume negotiations.'

Once more Marwar found itself exposed to Sindhia's depredations. Daulat Rao Sindhia, free—in the case of Jodhpur—from the restraints imposed upon him by the treaty of Sarji Anjangaon, demanded contributions from Man Singh. Unable to defend his State against Sindhia's powerful army, the Raja appealed for assistance to Lord Lake. Lord Wellesley decided that the Company had no obligation in this case, for the treaty had not come into force at all. Under the circumstances the British Government had no right of 'withholding Daulat Rao Sindhia from the prosecution of any demands upon the Raja of Jodhpur excepting only in the event of their being prosecuted under the denomination of tribute payable to the Emperor Shah Alam'. Sindhia was no longer entitled to collect the imperial tribute, for by Article 12 of the treaty of Sarji Anjangaon he had 'renounced all concern in the affairs of the Emperor. In

order to clarify Sindhia's position Major Malcolm, acting Resident in his court, was instructed to ask for 'an explanation of the nature and extent of those demands (upon the Raja of Jodhpur), or at least a disavowal of any intention to make those demands under the denomination of tribute to the Emperor' (May 1804). Sindhia adopted a policy of hesitation. Man Singh, relieved from immediate danger, instructed his *vakils* to inform Lord Lake that he did not want military assistance from the Company in the event of either internal commotion or external attack. Yet he was anxious for a treaty of alliance. Malcolm wrote in September 1805 that 'his sole object seemed to be the attainment of the avowed countenance of the British Government, and to have the security of written engagement for its never adopting the cause of his enemies'.¹⁰

In May 1806 Man Singh sent a *vakil* to Mercer, Resident at Sindhia's court, with the object of concluding a treaty of alliance with the Company. The acting Governor-General, Sir George Barlow, was fully committed to the policy of non-intervention. He rejected Man Singh's proposals on two grounds. First, by the treaty concluded with Sindhia in November 1805 the British Government was pledged not to contract any treaty with the State of Jodhpur'. Second, independently of that consideration, the system of policy adopted by the British Government in regard to all the chiefs and States with which we are unconnected by defensive alliance opposes the expediency of extending our connection with any of those chiefs and States beyond the limits of mere amity and concord.¹¹ As the treaty with Jaipur was about to be repudiated, the conclusion of a fresh treaty with Jodhpur was really out of the question.

III. Struggle with Jaipur

Meanwhile Sawai Singh's persistent intrigues had borne fruit: Man Singh had become involved in a desperate struggle with Raia Jagat Singh of Jaipur. The immediate occasion was their common object to marry the Mewar Princess, Krishnakumari. Behind this matrimonial rivalry there loomed the larger questions of social prestige and balance of power. Daulat Rao Sindhia's intervention in the dispute created new complications. A temporary compromise was made in August 1806, but Jagat Singh did not give up his plan of marrying Krishnakumari.

Soon afterwards the old feud between Jodhpur and Jaipur flared up again at the instigation of crafty Sawai Singh. With a view to bringing the administration of Jodhpur under his own control he tried to depose Man Singh with the assistance of Jagat Singh and to get his nominee Dhonkal Singh recognized as the legitimate ruler of Jodhpur. Sawai Singh was very shrewd and unscrupulous. He posed as a friend of Man Singh and at the same time tried secretly to endanger his position by bringing about a renewal of the struggle with Jaipur. He requested Jagat Singh to marry Krishnakumari as soon as possible, at the same time 'intimating to Raja Man that he would be eternally disgraced if he allowed the Prince of Amber to carry off the betrothed. As Tod says, 'The bait was greedily swallowed by Man Singh'. Preparations were at once undertaken for war. The bait was swallowed also by Raichand, the ambitious Dewan of Jaipur, who hoped that 'if Man Singh could be deposed, then his influence would rule both the principalities, besides having the ascendancy at Udaipur through the marriage of the Raja with the Princess'.¹² Raichand was an able man. He succeeded in enlisting the support of Daulat Rao Sindhia, Sharza Rao Ghatge (who was at this time the *de facto* ruler of Mewar) and Amir Khan. A powerful group of Jodhpur nobles, led by Sawai Singh joined him. This group secured a promise of assistance from Raja Surat Singh of Bikaner who was offered a sum of one lakh of rupees and the *pargana* of Phalodi.¹³

The policy of Jaswant Rao Holkar was uncertain, as usual. Man Singh, knowing that Sindhia was inclined to support Jaipur, appealed to Holkar for assistance. In December 1806 Mercer, Resident with Sindhia, reported that Holkar 'had written to the Rana of Udaipur dissuading him from encouraging the Jaipur Raja's views, but declaring at the same time that he himself was not engaged to assist either party'. It was confidently believed by the British authorities that 'if his endeavors (for peace) were ineffectual, he would take part with Man Singh, of whose services, in giving an asylum to his family during the late war with the British Government, he seems to entertain the most grateful sense. Holkar even sent a *vakil* to Jaipur 'to dissuade the Raja from going to war'. In reply, Jagat Singh

entreated him to take no part in the contest and offered him four lakhs of rupees as the price of his neutrality. Then Holkar made what British officials described as 'a proposal of desperate nature'. In January 1807 he sent a *takil* to the British Resident in Delhi with the proposal that, if that Government 'would give its consent to the measure, assist him with two battalions of sepoy, and settle what his share of the conquest was to be, he would take possession of the country of Jaipur, which produced a revenue of nearly a crore of rupees'. The Resident was directed by the 'Governor-General to express' an unqualified rejection of his proposal in mild and amicable terms. This rebuff led to an unexpected change in Holkar's policy; he made terms with Jaipur.¹⁴ Tod says: 'Raja Man had only the gratitude of Holkar to reckon upon for aid, to whose wife and family he had given sanctuary when pursued by Lord Lake to the Attock'. But Sawai Singh won him over by offering a bribe of £ 100,000, 'and the Maratha, then only eighteen miles from Man, made a sudden movement to the south'.

After some hesitation which was due to 'want of steadiness in character and policy Jagat Singh assumed the leadership of the coalition against Man Singh. In January 1807 Dhonkal Singh was brought to Jaipur and publicly acknowledged as the legitimate ruler of Jodhpur. Seton, Resident in Delhi, was anxious to prevent the outbreak of hostilities. He thought that 'an amicable accommodation between the two Rajas would in a political point of view be beneficial to our interest, since their going to war might eventually tend to increase the power of the Marathas'. When the preparations for war were complete he informed the Supreme Government that 'the circumstances of so large a force being collected in the vicinity of our dominions could not be received with perfect indifference'.¹⁵ But the policy of non-intervention had to be given upon active efforts were to be made for bringing about an 'amicable accommodation' between Jagat Singh and Man Singh. For such a change the British authorities in Calcutta and in London were not yet ready.

Man Singh prepared himself for the impending contest and marched at the head of his army to resist the pretender's supporters (January 1807). He sent a *takil* to the Resident in Delhi, apparently to ask for British aid; but the British

Government was not prepared to deviate from its policy of non-interference in the affairs of the Rajput States. While he was waiting for the arrival of the Jaipur army, aided by Surat Singh of Bikaner and Sawai Singh, Sharza Rao Ghatge attacked Jodhpur territory from the south and advanced as far as Pali. He was, however, defeated and repulsed from Jodhpur territory by a force detached from Man Singh's army. For a moment Man Singh became cheerful, but the discovery of 'a treacherous communication between his Thakurs and those attached to Dhonkal Singh' completely un-nerved him. Four chieftains only remained loyal to him; the others transferred their allegiance to Dhonkal Singh. He was induced by his friends to 'trust to the fleetness of his steed'. Sensible of his humiliating position, he remarked that 'he was the first of his race who ever disgraced the name of Rathor by showing his back to a Kachhwah'. He reached Merta in safety; but deeming it incapable of long resistance, he continued his flight and reached Jodhpur with a slender retinue. After his departure from Parbatsar the place was plundered by Amir Khan and Bala Kao Ingle, one of Sindhia's commanders.¹⁶

Jagat Singh's plan was to advance into Marwar, to occupy Jodhpur city, to place Dhonkal Singh on the Rathor throne, and then to precede towards Udaipur for the celebration of his marriage with Krishnakumari. Holkar's attitude was still uncertain. The Resident in Delhi reported in March 1807 that Holkar's *Sardars* were both 'amazed and discontented at his abandonment of Man Singh, and that the circumstance is likely to cause desertion in his army'. Towards the end of February 1807 the Dewan of Jaipur, Raichand, had purchased Amir Khan's support by paying him a lakh of rupees. The Pindaris attached to his camp were ordered to proceed to Jodhpur territory for the purpose of laying it waste. The Resident in Delhi heard a rumour that Holkar intended to assist Man Singh 'indirectly by permitting certain of his *Sardars* to own that chieftains provided the Raja agreed to pay him seven lakhs of rupees, it being understood that Holkar was not to appear to countenance the conduct of his *Sardars*'. Such rumours must have reached Jaipur also. The Jaipur *Durbar* delayed payment of the 'bribe' already promised to Holkar who tried to 'force a speedy conclusion' by plundering villages in Jaipur territory.¹⁷

It is difficult to extract from the available documents any consistent account of the movements of Holkar and Sindhia at this juncture. Mercer's report to the Supreme Government in February 1807 refers to their 'object of obtaining money from both parties' without actually engaging in mutual hostilities. But the Resident found it 'difficult to surmise' how this object could be prosecuted by both 'without the risk of an open rupture'. The result of Holkar's retirement from interference in the dispute on receipt of money from Jaipur would be, he wrote, 'a decided superiority of influence and authority with all the Rajput States in favour of Sindhia, who would remain the sole arbiter. . .'¹⁸

We have already referred to Man Singh's flight to Jodhpur. Reaching there in March 1807 and finding that it had 'no means of defence', he proceeded towards Jalor where strong shelter would be available. But at the suggestion of loyal officer he decided to defend the capital. He returned to Jodhpur, collected troops, and formed a garrison of 5,000 dependable men. Those *Sardars* who still stood by him took a special oath of loyalty, and this 'greatly revived the drooping spirit of the Raja'.¹⁹

Meanwhile the Jaipur army was advancing unopposed through Jodhpur territory. Everywhere the *Sardars* were won over and the 'name and authority' of Dhonkai Singh were imposed. The influence of Sawai Singh was found most useful by the invaders. The city and fortress of Nagor were occupied. On 1 April the main body of the army, under the command of Amir Khan and Chand Singh, reached Jodhpur. On the following day the erection of batteries began. Two weeks later Man Singh evacuated the town of Jodhpur and retired into the fort.²⁰

Then the troubles of the besieging army began. In the Jaipur camp there was 'the utmost distress for want of money and provisions of every description'. Some of those Rathor *Sardars* who had espoused the cause of Dhonkai Singh were so exhausted by their sufferings and disgusted when the depredation committed in their country by the invaders that they deserted Jagat Singh with their followers. Jagat Singh's troubles were increased by the arrival of a detachment of Sindhia's troops at Ajmer. It was rumoured that Sindhia would

set up a rival claimant to the *gadi* of Jaipur if Jagat Singh refused to pay him a large sum of money without delay. Twelve lakhs of rupees were paid to Ambaji Ingle, and for the time being Sindhia was pacified.²¹

But misfortune now obstructed Jagat Singh at every step. When his troops clamoured for pay he requested Sawai Singh and other Rathor chieftains to contribute to military expenses. 'This appeal proved a test of their zeal'. They proceeded to Amir Khan's camp. 'It required no powerful rhetoric to detach him from the cause (of Jaipur) and prevail upon him to advocate that of Raja Man; nor could they have given him better counsel towards this end, than the proposal to carry the war into the enemy's country: to attack and plunder Jaipur, now left unguarded'. As soon as Amir Khan's hostile intentions became clear, Jagat Singh directed his Commander-in-chief, Sheolal, to attack him. 'Astonished at his own success, and little aware that the chase was in the direction projected by his enemy, Sheolal, deemed he had accomplished his orders in driving him out of Marwar'. He left his camp and repaired to the city of Jaipur 'to partake of its festivities'. Amir Khan 'availed himself of the impudent absence of his foe', inflicted a crushing defeat on Sheolal's troops, and captured their camp, guns, and equipment (18 August, 1807). He followed up this victory by a hurried march to Jaipur; the capital of Jagat Singh was 'dismayed by the presence of the victory at her gates'.

This unexpected development at once broke up the confederacy against Man Singh. The Raja of Bikaner marched home. Jagat Singh aided the siege of the Jodhpur fort and started for Jaipur. He knew that his retreat was likely to be intercepted. So he bribed Sindhia's commanders—Bapu Sindhia, Bala Rao Ingle, and Jean Baptise—to escort him in safety to his capital. Even Amir Khan was bribed, so that he might not attack him on his way. In order to speed up the retreat Jagat Singh burnt his tent and equipage at every stage. At length he had to kill with his own hand his favourite elephant which, says Tod, 'wanted speed for rapidity of his flight'. In spite of these humiliating precautions Jagat Singh was defeated near the frontier of Marwar by some Rathor chieftains. He reached Jaipur in October 1807.²²

IV. Amir Khan's Ascendancy

Amir Khan now held the destiny of Rajasthan in his grip. He made full use of the growing weakness of Sindhia and Holkar and the mutual quarrels of the Rajput princes. His ambition of bringing the State of Marwar under his control was stimulated by the mistake of those Rathor chiefs who had intercepted Jagat Singh's retreat. They thought that it was necessary for them to secure the continuance of Amir Khan's military aid and, with the financial assistance of the Raja of Kishangarh who belonged to the Rathor clan, two lakhs of rupees were paid to the Pathan adventurer. They accompanied Amir Khan to Merta. Man Singh, who was still at Jodhpur, was invited to join Amir Khan in order that with their united forces they might capture Nagor where Sawai Singh had taken shelter with Dhonkal Singh. Amir Khan's treachery towards Jagat Singh and his insatiable greed for money had tilled Man Singh's mind with anxiety and distrust. He replied that owing to want of money and provisions it was not possible for him to leave Jodhpur at that time. 'It is probable', reported the Resident in Delhi, 'that the Raja thinks it safer to trust to the effects of time and to the efforts of his countrymen than to place himself in the power of one so capricious and so devoid of good faith as Amir Khan....'²³

Dhonkal Singh and his supporters also were in a precarious position. In December 1807 the Resident in Delhi received communications from them soliciting British aid, offering 12 lakhs of rupees as *nazarana* and five *parganas*, and promising to be guided by the advice of the 'English Gentlemen' who might be stationed at Jodhpur. The reply was fully consistent with the British Government's policy of non-intervention. The Company, it was stated, was committed to non-interference in the dispute of 'foreign' States, and it 'never entered into wars of aggression'.²⁴

Despite lack of trust in Amir Khan, Man Singh found it necessary in superior to him. The foreign of Marwar were Dhonkal Singh and Sawai Singh had found shelter, was protected by a double chain of walls and garrisoned by Sindhia's battalions; it was too strong to be occupied by Jodhpur troops alone. Man Singh had to occupy it in order to consolidate his authority

over his State. So he concluded an agreement with Amir Khan,²⁵ received him at Jodhpur with 'distinguished honours', and interchanged turbans with him. Three lakhs of rupees were paid and further rewards were promised. Amir Khan 'swore to extirpate Sawai's faction'.

From the first, says Malcolm, the Pathan adventure 'seems ... to have trusted more to art than force' for the accomplishment of his purpose'.²⁶ From Jodhpur he marched to Nagor which he decided to occupy by treachery unparalleled even in the history of that faithless age. Through intrigues he secured the withdrawal of the protection so long afforded by lean Baptise and Bapu Sindhia to the fort of Nagor. Then he met Sawai Singh and threw out hints on Man Singh's ungrateful return for his services. The Rathor chief was persuaded to conclude an agreement with him in favour of Dhonkal Singh. On an appointed morning (30 March, 1808) Sawai Singh visited Amir Khan's camp, attended by the chief adherents of Dhonkal Singh and about 500 followers. The tragedy²⁷ may be best described in Tod's words: 'a spacious tent was pitched in the centre of the camp for the reception of his guests, and cannon were loaded with grape ready to be turned against them. The visitors were received with the most distinguished courtesy; turbans were again exchanged, the dancing girls were introduced, and nothing but festivity was apparent. The Khan arose, and making an excuse to his guests for a momentary absence, retired. The dancing continued, when at the word *dhaga*, pronounced the musicians, down sank the tent upon the unsuspecting Rajputs, who fell an easy prey to the ferocious Pathans. Sawai Singh's head was cut-off and sent to Man Singh.

Dhonkal Singh was now altogether helpless. He saved himself by a hasty flight from Nagor. That city was plundered by Amir Khan and the spoils, including 300 pieces of cannon, were sent to his strongholds. After the terrible feat he returned to Jodhpur, realised ten lakhs in cash, and secured possession of two large towns yielding 30,000 rupees per year as the reward of assigned in family Man Singh took arrangement all followers of Dhonkal Singh, including the Raja of Bikaner who surrendered after bitter fighting (May-December 1808). Surat Singh evacuated Phalodi, agreed to pay four lakhs of rupees,

and engaged to employ a body of his troops in the service of Jodhpur.²⁸

After the fall of the pretender and the submission of Bikaner, Man Singh sought Sindhia's aid. He had two purposes: 'to revenge the injuries formerly offered to him by Raja Jagat Singh and to renew with Sindhia's support the subject of his marriage with the Rana of Udaipur's daughter'. Large offers were accordingly made to Sindhia; but as Close, Resident at his court, wrote on 24 December, 1808, his 'present policy' was 'to temporize with a view to reap advantages from both the Rajput States'. The Resident was right: Sindhia's only desire was to fish in troubled waters²⁹

One reason for Man Singh's failure to pursue the feud with Jaipur was the growing influence of Amir Khan in his own State. He found that he was no longer the master of his own dominions. As Tod says, Amir Khan was now 'the arbiter of Marwar'. He stationed his garrisons in strong fortresses like Nagor. He partitioned the lands of Merta among his followers. Man Singh gradually found himself in an intolerable position. After some years of suffering he requested Metcalfe, Resident in Delhi, to revive the treaty of 1803. Metcalfe gave a straight refusal, saying that 'independently of the policy by which the British Government in India was guided, and which led it generally to avoid such alliance, there were now additional obstacles to a treaty with Jodhpur founded on certain articles of our treaties with Sindhia and Holkar' (April 1814). The Raja was then compelled to agree to pay Amir Khan 18 lakhs of rupees by instalments.³⁰

In October 1815 Amir Khan murdered a minister and the chief priest of Man Singh in return for seven lakhs of rupees paid by their enemies. Metcalfe reported that 'either the Raja or some powerful party in the fort (of Jodhpur) must have been accessory to the murder of the minister'. According to Tod, Man Singh had consented the murder of the minister, but when he found that the minister's death 'incidentally involved' the death of chief priest, his reason was affected: 'He shut himself up in his apartments, refused to communicate with any one and then omitted every duty, whether political or religious'. So the chiefs of the State compelled him to transfer full political

authority to his only son, Chhattar Singh, to be exercised by the latter as Regent. Although this arrangement was 'compulsory'. Man Singh 'went through the ceremony necessary on the occasion, in public, with apparent willingness'. The helpless ministers tried in vain to maintain a balance between Amir Khan and Bapu Sindhia, both of whom were plundering Jodhpur territory. They did not renew overtures for an alliance with the British Government, probably on account of the 'systematic discouragement' with which the Resident in Delhi had received former proposals.³¹

V. Treaty of 1818

When Lord Hastings decided to crush the Pindaris he found it necessary to take all Rajput States under British protection. In October 1817 Metcalfe was instructed to conclude an engagement with Jodhpur. Although it was 'understood to be a country of small pecuniary resources', it was expected that the 'proverbial bravery' of its inhabitants would enable its government 'to bring forward a powerful body of auxiliaries for the service of the British Government and the allied States'. This, therefore, was to be the 'principal description of aid to be required from Jodhpur' in the event of establishment of an 'intimate connection with that State'. A pecuniary contribution towards the expenses of the protecting force was to be required, if attainable'. The tribute paid by Jodhpur to Sindhia and Holkar was to be appropriated to the purpose of maintenance of the protecting force if hostilities broke out between those Maratha Chiefs and the Company. If on the other hand the relations between those Chiefs and the Company remained unbroken, the sum paid to them by Jodhpur should be paid to the Company in order to 'make good' Jodhpur's engagements 'with Sindhia or Holkar, or both'.³²

Although negotiations were opened by Metcalfe as soon as he received these instructions, no properly authorized *vakil* came to him even in November 1817. The court of Jodhpur was at that time deeply involved in internal difficulties. There were opponents of Chhattar Singh's Regency who alleged that Man Singh's retirement from the management of affairs was not voluntary and that he had been kept under restraint. Taking

advantage of this dispute a section of the *Thakurs* became disaffected towards the Government.³³ However, some *vakils*, led by a Brahmin named Byas Bishen Ram, came to Delhi in December 1817. Negotiations were speedy and successful: a treaty³⁴ was concluded on 6 January, 1818.

Article 1 provided for 'perpetual friendship, alliance and unity of interests' between the two States. By Article 2 the British Government engaged to 'protect the principality and territory of Jodhpur'. By Article 3 the Raja promised to 'act in subordinate co-operation with the British Government'; to acknowledge its supremacy, and not to 'have any connection with other Chiefs and States'. By Article 4 he promised not to enter into negotiations with any Chief or State without the knowledge and sanction of the British Government. Article 5 provided that all disputes between Marwar and other States would be submitted to the 'arbitration and award' of the British Government.

With regard to the tribute payable by Jodhpur, it was decided that the tribute hitherto paid to Sindhia (1,08,000 Jodhpur rupees) was to be paid in perpetuity to the Company, and that the engagements with Sindhia respecting tribute should cease to be operative (Article 6). Man Singh declared that he had never paid tribute to any other power except Sindhia. So it was provided in the treaty that, 'if either Sindhia or any one else lay claim to tribute (from Jodhpur) the British Government engages to reply to such claim' (Article 7). This provision was intended, wrote Metcalfe, to give the British Government 'a claim to any other tribute that Jodhpur may have paid to other States besides Sindhia, if any such has been concealed from us'. The sums paid to Amir Khan were 'not acknowledged to be in the way of tribute.

Article 8 runs as follows: The State of Jodhpur shall furnish 1,500 horse for the service of the British Government whenever required; and when necessary the whole of the Jodhpur force shall join the British army excepting such a portion as may be requisite for the internal administration of the country'. The strength of the cavalry which the ruler of Jodhpur could muster did not generally exceed 6,000. The *vakils* argued that not more than one-fourth of this number could be placed at the disposal

of the British Government for 'foreign service'. A considerable body of cavalry, they said, was needed for the Raja's service inside the State. Moreover, those chiefs who provided horsemen for State service would not agree to send them outside the State. Metcalfe was disappointed, but the *vakils* 'protested solemnly that this (i.e., 1,500 horsemen) was the utmost that the resources of the State could furnish in a condition of efficiency'. They asked for an assurance that the Jodhpur contingent should not be employed in the Deccan. Metcalfe agreed.

Tod says that Man Singh disapproved 'the article relating to the armed contingents of his vassals to be at the disposal of the protecting power, in which he wisely saw the germ of discord, from the certainty of interference it would lead to'. No explicit reference was made in the treaty to the vassals' contingents.

Article 9 provided that Man Singh would remain 'absolute ruler' of his country and that the jurisdiction of the British Government should not be introduced into Jodhpur. The *vakils* asked for an assurance that the British Government would not listen to the Raja's relatives or the Thakurs of the State if they submitted 'self-interested proposals' which went against the 'interest of the State'. Metcalfe replied that this was 'understood' in the ninth Article of the treaty. In reporting this to the Supreme Government he observed that, if the Prince Regent applied for assistance against those chiefs who were disaffected against his administration, the application should be refused. The Thakurs, he wrote, 'have rights as well as the Raja, and we could not undertake to enforce obedience, without ascertaining that we were not about to become the instruments of oppression.'

The *vakils* of Jodhpur pressed some other demands, but they had to remain satisfied with Metcalfe's verbal assurances. Man Singh desired to resume the *Jagir* of two *parganas* given under coercion to Amir Khan, to recover the fort of Amarkot occupied by an Amir of Sind, and to retain possession of the *paragana* of Godwar secured from Mewar. Metcalfe promised that the British Government would not obstruct the Raja in these matters.

At the time when the treaty was concluded the government was in the hand of Chhattar Singh when he died soon after

the ratification of the treaty. He was a dissolute youngman quite incapable of dealing with the situation in which he was placed. He yielded to the guidance of evil counsellors who accumulated wealth by administering to his follies. Tod says: '... youth and base panders to his pleasure seduced him from his duties, and he died, some say the victim of illicit pursuits, others from the wounds given by the hand of one of the chieftains, whose daughter he attempted to seduce.'

VI. Last Years of Man Singh

At the time of Chattar Singh's premature death the affairs of the State were actually managed by an oligarchy headed by Salim Singh of Pokaran, son of Sawai Singh who had set up Dhonkal Singh as rival of Man Singh. Salim Singh was one of the principal *Sardars* of the State, and he was closely associated with the Dewan Akhi Chand. 'All the garrisons and offices of trust throughout the country were held by the creatures of a junto, of which these were the heads.' After Chattar Singh's death the Tokaran faction, dreading Man Singh's resumption of government, tried to adopt the only son of the ruler of Idar as their sovereign. The ruler of Idar refused to accept this offer unless it was supported by all the *Sardars* of Marwar. Such unanimity was found unattainable, for many *Sardars* disliked the Pokaran faction. That 'faction', therefore, had no alternative except the restoration of Man Singh.

Even after his restoration Man Singh took no active interest in the affairs of the State. Tod says: 'He listened to all with the most apathetic indifference.' Salim Singh continued to control the administration with the title of Bhanjgarh and Akhai Chand retained his office of Dewan. Man Singh seems to have forgotten these two persons' hostility to himself during the Regency of his son. He acted as an automation, moving as the Dewan pleased.' Their partisans continued to occupy all garrisons and to fill all offices of trust. The name of justice was unknown.' The Pathan mercenaries formerly employed by Man Singh³⁵ did not receive their pay; 'they were to be seen begging in the streets of the capital, or hawking bundles of forge on their heads to preserve them from starvation.' But the nucleus of an opposition to the selfish and oppressive Pokaran faction was

formed by Fatehraj the brother of the murdered minister Induraj, the victim of Amir Khan's treachery. For the time being, however, what appeared to be Man Singh's blind support enabled Salim Singh and Akhai Chand to act as they pleased.

'The total disorganization of the government' in Marwar did not escape the attention of the British authorities. In September 1818 the Supreme Government asked Ochterlony either to go to Jodhpur personally or to depute an officer to make enquiries about 'the state of the Raja's authority, and the degree to which the present Ministers possess his confidence as well as the justice of the grounds of dissatisfaction professed by the Thakurs in opposition to his Government.' The general policy was thus defined: 'Our obligation to maintain the just authority of the Raja does not absolve us from the duty of securing the rights of his subjects, the violation of which cannot, in any form or under any pretext, be sanctioned by the British Government.' But the Company's intervention was to be confined to 'general political arrangements', and 'direct interference in the internal administration of the country' was to be avoided. Circumstances, however, might be such as to 'compel' the British Government, as in the case of Jaipur and Udaipur, 'to take a more direct and ostensible part.' Should such an 'exigency' arise, the Governor-General 'would not, out of a scrupulous refinement which would defeat the essential expediency of the case,' refuse to meet it.³⁶

In December 1818 a British officer named F. Wilder, who was at that time Superintendent of the district of Ajmer, was deputed to report on Jodhpur affairs. He was instructed to offer the assistance of the British Government for the restoration of peace and order in the State. In a private interview with Man Singh he offered to place troops at his disposal. The crafty Raja declined this offer, for he knew quite well that the employment of British troops for internal administration would inevitably lead to British 'dictation and interference' in the internal affairs of the State. He told Wilder that he placed 'reliance on himself to place his State in order.' At the same time he 'failed not to disseminate the impression among his chiefs' that British troops were ready to come to his rescue. Tod aptly remarks: He felt that the lever was at hand to crush faction to the dust

and with a Machiavellian caution he determined that the existence of this engine must suffice that its power should be felt but never see that he should enjoy all the advantages this influence would give, without risking any of its dangers if called into action.'

Unable to convince Man Singh that 'his affairs were irretrievable without the direct aid of the paramount power,' Wilder left Jodhpur in February 1819. In the same month Tod had the political duties of Marwar added to those of Udaipur, Kotah, Bundi and Sirohi. He came to Jodhpur in November 1819 and found matters nearly in the same state as on Wilder's departure. During his stay of nearly three weeks Tod repeatedly assured Man Singh of the full support of the British Government and requested him to utilise it for the welfare of the State. Man Singh's response was the same as it had been in the case of Wilder's exhortation. The problems which confronted the Raja at the time were thus summarised by Tod:

1. Forming an efficient administration.
2. Consideration of the finances; the condition of the crown lands; the feudal confiscations, which, often unjust, had caused great discontent.
3. The reorganisation and settlement of foreign troops on whose service the Raja mainly depended.
4. An effective police on all the frontiers, to put down the wholesale pillage of the Mairs in the south, the Larkhanis in the north, and the desert Sahariyas and Khosas in the west; reformation of the tariff, or scale of duties on commerce, which were so heavy as almost to amount to prohibition; and at the same time to provide for its security.

After Tod's departure from Jodhpur the 'Pokaran' faction,' instead of trying to solve these problems, 'rejoiced at the removal of the only restraint on their narrow-minded views, (and) proceeded in the career of disorder.' Salim Singh and Akhai Chand sought 'to gratify their ancient animosities' by striking at those *Sardars* who were not their camp-followers. Ghanerao, one of the eight principal 'fiefs' of Marwar, was put under sequestration and released later after payment of a fine of more than a year's revenue. Several minor 'fiefs,' including

Chandawal, which was one of the sixteen second class 'fiefs,' suffered in the same manner. At length Akhai Chand had the audacity to put his hand on Awa, the chief 'fief of Marwar; but the proud Champawat *Sardar* defied the Dewan. Man Singh took shelter behind his 'sequestered habits'. Nobody knew whether he really approved the crusade of the 'Pokaran faction' against the holders of the 'fiefs.' Tod says: 'Gloom, mistrust, and resentment pervaded the whole feudal body. They saw a contemptible faction sporting with their honour and possessions, from an idea they industriously propagated, that an unseen but mighty power was at hand to support their acts, given out as those of the prince.' This position was quite intolerable to the proud *Sardars* of Marwar.

In 1820 Man Singh threw off the mask of insanity and inflicted terrible punishment upon the 'Pokaran faction'. Among those treacherously killed were Akhai Chand and Nagji, the commander of the citadel of Jodhpur and 'misleader of the late regent prince'. All victims of the Raja's ferocious wrath were compelled to disgorge the wealth which they had accumulated. The attempt to kill Salim Singh, however, failed, but Surtan Singh of Nimaj, 'his constant associate; could not escape. The latter's death was, in Tod's view, a 'prodigal sacrifice'.

Man Singh now installed Fatehraj in the post of *Dewan* and relentlessly pursued the policy of crushing all the *Sardars* irrespective of their loyalty or treachery in the past. His 'treachery and cold-blooded tyranny completely estranged all the chiefs.' But, as Tod points out, they could neither resist the Raja's mercenary battalions, amounting to 10,000 excluding the quotas, nor organize a league for defence defying 'the dreaded threat held over them, of calling in the British troops.' Reduced to helplessness, they fled from Marwar to seek refuge in Kotah, Mewar, Bikaner, and Jaipur.

In August 1821 the 'expatriated chiefs' tried to obtain the mediation of the British Government, but it was not available at that time. Three years later (February 1824) an accommodation between the Raja and the nobles was effected through the mediation of the Political Agent; by that time Tod had left India. The 'fiefs' of the *Sardars* of Awa, Assore, Nimaj and Rass were to be restored within six months from the date of the

agreement, but the *Sardars* of Chandwal and Budsu were not 'desirous of being recommended to (the Raja's) favour.'³⁷

Peace was, however, not restored to Marwar. In 1827 some disaffected chiefs decided to place the pretender Dhonkal Singh on the *gadi*. They assembled their followers in Jaipur territory, and with the connivance, if not the active support, of the Jaipur *Durbar* prepared to invade Marwar. They soon realised that the 1818 treaty had created a situation which was entirely different from the political instability of the early years of the century. The British Government censured the Raja of Jaipur and asked Dhonkal Singh to dissociate himself from the disaffected *Sardars*. This was not intended to be interpreted as a blank cheque for Man Singh. It was declared that 'although it might perhaps be required to protect the Maharaja against unjust usurpation, or wanton but too powerful rebellion, there was no obligation to support him against universal disaffection and insurrection caused by his own injustice, incapacity, and misrule.'³⁸

This warning remained unheeded. Further evidence of Man Singh's 'incapacity and misrule' accumulated in the Political Agent's office. Between the years 1824 and 1835 he was required to make over to the British Government 28 villages in the *parganas* of Chang and Kot-Kirana in Merwara with a view to bringing the lawless Minas and Mers into complete submission. Only seven of these villages were resumed in 1843; the others remained permanently under the administrative control of the British Government. In 1836 the district of Mallani was taken under the superintendence and control of the British Resident, for Man Singh was unable to maintain order there. In 1838 the district was restored to the Jodhpur *Durbar*. In 1832 Man Singh was required, under Article 8 of the treaty, to furnish a contingent to co-operate with a British force against freebooters who had occupied Nagar Parkar. As this contingent proved altogether useless, the obligation to furnish a contingent was commuted in 1835 to an annual payment of Rs. 1,15,000 towards the expenses of the Jodhpur Legion.³⁹

The climax came in 1839. The lingering disputes with the nobles paralysed the administration. Man Singh was rendered important for good or evil by his complete subjection to priestly influence. The British Government could no longer postpone interference. A British force occupied Jodhpur for five months.

On 24 September, 1839 Man Singh was compelled to execute an Engagement¹⁰ to ensure future good government. It was agreed that the Raja, the Political Agent, the sardars and *Uhal-i-Kars* and *Khuwas Pasbans* of the Raj would 'meet and institute rules for the good government of the country' which were to be 'acted upon now and henceforward.' They would also 'define and settle the right of the several chiefs and of the officers of the Government, and of others depending upon it according to ancient usage.' Secondly, the Political Agent and the *Uhal-i-Kars* 'having counselled together will conduct the affairs of the government according to these rules and after having consulted the Maharaja.' Thirdly, a British garrison was to be placed in the fortress of Jodhpur. Fourthly, those whose rights had been sequestrated would be 'repossessed in accordance with the principles of justice' and they would 'perform liege service to the *Durbar*.'

This Engagement practically placed the administration of Marwar under the control of the British Resident. But it was binding on Man Singh alone and not on his successors. He died on 5 September, 1843, and a long chapter of anarchy and tyranny came to an end. Blinded by a 'demoniacal spirit of revenge,' the last independent ruler of Marwar, as Tod says, lost his opportunity of 'modifying the institutions' of his State, of 'curbing without destroying the feudal chiefs,' and of 'making the whole subservient to the altered condition of affairs.' Unwisely 'reposing on external protection,' Tod adds, he 'broke up the entire feudal association and rendered the paramount power an object of hatred instead of reverence.'

Notes and References

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4. B.N. Rao, *Glories of Marwar and the Glorious Rathors*, pp. 186-8.
5. Sir J.N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. IV, pp. 53-57.
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7. S.C., ■ Sept., 1804, No. 6.
8. Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements and Sanads*, Vol. III, pp. 157-8.
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12. Prinsep, *Memoirs, of the Pathan Soldier of Fortune*, p. 312.
13. P.R.C Vol XI Nos 208, 216. P.C., 29 Jan. 1807, Nos. 22-23, 32, S.C., 19 March, 1807, No. 3.
14. P.R.C., Vol. XI, Nos. 209, 216, S.C, 29 Jan., 1807, Nos. 13, 16; 12 Feb., 1807, No. 13.
15. P.C., 9 Jan., 1807, No. 32; 5 Feb., 1807, Nos. 126-27, S.C., 19 March, 1807, No. 3.
16. P.C., 5 Feb., 1807, No. 92; 12 Feb., 1807, No. 96; 23 April, 1807, No. 25, S.C., 19 March, 1807, No. 3; 26 March, 1807, No. 1.
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21. P.C., 11 June, 1807, No. 16; 1 Sept., 1807, No. 6A.
22. P.C., 26 Oct., 1807, No. 21; 16 Nov., 1807, No. 1.
23. P.C, Oct. 1807, No. 20.
24. P.C., 4 Jan., 1808, Nos. 64,65,67, 68.
25. Prinsep, *op. at.*, p. 348.
26. Malcolm, *Memoirs of Central India*, Vol. 1, p. 335.
27. P.R.C., Vol. XI, Nos. 243, 243, P.C, 29 Aug., 1807, No. 38.
28. P.R.C., Vol. XI, Nos. 267, 270, P.C., 16 Jan., 1809, No. 84.
29. P.R.C., Vol. XI, Nos. 270, 272, 281, 285-7, 289, 290.
30. P.C., 22 April, 1814, No. 11; 20 Oct., 1813, No. 47.
31. P .C., 10 Nov., 1817, Nos. 14, 16; 14 June, 1817, No. 13; 13 Aug., 1817, No. 40.
S.C., 11 June, 1816, No. 28; 13 June, 1816, Nos. 10. 11; 12 Oct., 1816, No. 16; 28 Oct., 1817, No. 26.
32. S.C., 28 Oct., 1817, No. 26,
33. S.C., 19 Dec., 1817, No. 112.
34. Aitchison. *op. at.*, Vol. III, pp. 159-61, S.C., 6 Feb., 1818. No. 102.
35. A corps of 3,500 foot and 1,500 horse, with 25 guns.
36. N.K. Sinha and A. Das Gupta (ed.). *Selections from Ochterlony Papers*, No. 1.
37. Aitchison, *op. at.*, Vol. III, p. 167.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 141.
39. *Ibid.*, pp. 140-41, 161-h6. In 1824 Ochterlony had suggested an arrangement of this nature. (N.K. Sinha and A. Das Gupta, *op. at.*, No. 191).
40. *Ibid.*, pp. 168-70.

14

Other States

I. Karauli

The system of alliances planned by Lord Hastings covered all the principalities of Rajasthan irrespective of geographical position, political importance, military and financial resources, and capacity to assist the British Government in the suppression of 'predatory hordes'.¹ Taken together, they were expected 'to establish a barrier against the revival of the predatory system or the extension of the power of Sindhia and Holkar beyond the limits to be assigned to it' in the interest of the Company. 'Relieved from the thralldom of the military and predatory powers,' secured in the 'enjoyment of their territorial possessions and the independent exercise of their internal administration' under British 'protection and guarantee', they were henceforth to play a new role in a new imperial structure.¹

Karauli was the first of the minor Rajput States to accept the British offer of alliance in its new perspective. The ruler of Karauli had been a tributary of the Peshwa. By Article 14 of the treaty, of Poona (June 1817) Peshwa Baji Rao II surrendered to the British Government all rights and claims over his tributaries in Hindustan and Malwa. This surrender covered a tribute of 25 thousand rupees paid by the ruler of Karauli.

By a treaty² concluded on 9 November, 1817 the Raja of

Karauli accepted the supremacy of the British Government and promised not to enter into negotiations with any other power without its consent. All disputes between Karauli and other States were to be submitted to the arbitration and award of the British Government. No tribute was to be paid, but the Raja agreed to furnish troops at the requisition of the British Government 'according to his means.' 'Perpetual alliance and unity of interests' was established between the two States. The Raja was recognized as 'absolute ruler' of his territory. The jurisdiction of the British Government was not to be introduced into Karauli.

In 1825 the Raja of Karauli supported Durjan Sal in his attempt to usurp the *gadi* of Bharatpur. But he made his submission after the fall of the fort of Bharatpur, and the British Government did not consider it necessary to take serious notice of his conduct.

The Raja of Karauli died in 1852 without a natural heir but after adopting a boy without the previous sanction of the British Government. Lord Dalhousie recommended that the adoption should be disallowed and the State annexed to the Company's dominions. He admitted that Karauli, though 'not a very old State,' was, 'unlike the existing Maratha and Muhammedan dynasties,' entitled to the 'claim of antiquity in its favour.' He also admitted that the application of the Doctrine of Lapse to this State might create alarm and dissatisfaction in the older and more powerful States in Rajputana as being apparently significant of the intention of the British Government towards themselves.³ He had previously laid down the principle that in the case of States which 'owed subordination to the British Government as the paramount in the place of the Emperor of Delhi, the Peshwa, etc.,' the British Government had 'a right to refuse' permission for adoption, but 'policy would usually lead us to concede.' The Court of Directors overruled him in the Karauli case, and Karauli escaped annexation.⁴

II. Kotah

Kotah was one of the two principalities into which Haravati was divided in the reign of Shah Jahan, the other being Bundi. In the last quarter of the eighteenth century, during the reign

of the minor prince Ummed Singh, a powerful minister named Zalim Singh became the *de facto* ruler of the State. Tod has left for us a detailed account of the character and career of this remarkable man. 'Zalim Singh', he says, 'is Kotah, his name being not only indissolubly linked with her's in every page of her existence, but incorporated with every State of Rajputana for more than half a century.' The geographical position of Kotah exposed its territory to 'the desultory armies and ambulant governments, ever strangers to repose'; and 'its wealth could not fail to attract the cupidity of these vagabond powers.' Yet, says Tod, by the imposing attitude which he assumed Zalim Singh maintained, during half a century, the respect, the fear, and even the esteem of all, and Kotah alone, throughout this lengthened period, so full of catastrophes, never saw an enemy at her gates.'

Ochterlony paid a mixed tribute to Zalim Singh in 1823. Unlike other Rajputs he possessed, 'in early life at least, a quick and ready conception and rapid execution;' and he had 'no scruples as to the means' by which his objects were to be gained. 'Personally brave, active and enterprising, he never hesitated to enlist in aid of his ambition, deep dissimulation, hypocrisy and deceit ... which is dignified by the Rajputs with the name of policy.' Before forming his alliance with the British Government 'it was seen with a sort of wonder and admiration that his extraordinary character as the head of a very inconsiderable state should rather have increased, than *diminished*, her power and her territory, whilst far larger and apparently more powerful Governments were yielding to the sway of the Marathas, or what was yet more common, were falling into ruin, anarchy and disorder. 'In his conduct after the alliance, which was eulogised by Tod, Ochterlony found 'not a single trait... denoting magnanimity, virtue or any other indication of a strong and generous mind'; he found, on the other hand, 'the most unequivocal proofs of a low cunning, causeless suspicion, grovelling meanness, and consummate hypocrisy.'

The Second Anglo-Maratha War brought Zalim Singh for the first time into contact with the British Government. When Colonel Monson marched through Kotah (July 1804) to attack Holkar, he received from Zalim Singh supplies as well as men.

But when the British army retreated and its commander asked for admission within the walls of Kotah, he met a 'decided and very proper refusal.' Although Zalim Singh refused to invite Holkar's attack on his capital by offering shelter to a panic struck, beef-eating army' within his walls, he sent his troops to ensure the safety of that army until it left the Mükundara Pass in its rear. Holkar naturally took offence, encamped before the walls of Kotah, and realised three lakhs of rupees. Monson's charge of 'treachery and connivance with the enemy' against Zalim Singh was obviously untenable. Kotah had no alliance with the Company and, therefore, no obligation to assist British troops against a merciless raider like Holkar.

During the succeeding years Zalim Singh maintained conciliatory relations with Sindhia, Holkar, Amir Khan and the Pindaris. He rented several districts belonging to Sindhia and Holkar which joined the southern frontier of Kotah. 'Not satisfied with this hold of self-interest on the two great predatory powers, he maintained contact with their 'confidential ministers' who reported their movements to him. He also maintained in his own administration Maratha Brahmins 'of first talent. . . through whose connections no political measure of their nation escaped his knowledge.' To Amir Khan he provided military stores and supplies of every kind. When the Pathan adventurer's soldiers 'mutinied—a matter of daily occurrence—and threatened him with the *bastinado*, or fastening to a piece of ordnance under a scorching sun, Kotah afforded a place of refuge during a temporary retreat or ways and means to allay the fumuil by paying the arrears.' The castle of Shergarh was allotted by Zalim Singh for Amir Khan's family so that he could 'pursue his career of rapine' without anxiety for its safety. As regards the Pindaris, many of their leaders held grants of land in Kotah. In 1807, when Sindhia confined the Pindari leader Karim Khan at Gwalior, Zalim Singh not only advanced the large sum required for his ransom but pledged himself for his future good conduct. He provided for the exiled nobles of Marwar and Mewar estates in Kotah greater than their sequestered patrimonies. These dazzling acts of beneficence were not lost on a community amongst whom hospitality ranks at the head of the virtues.'

When Lord Hastings invited the Rajput States to accept

protection of the Company, the eagle eye of Zalim Singh saw at once the virtue of compliance and the grace attendant on its being quickly yielded.' His decision was based on 'a dispassionate consideration of the benefits which such alliance would confer upon Kotah, and of its utility in maintaining his family in the position it had so long held in that State.' His Maratha advisers were naturally 'adverse to his leaguings with the English.' He realised that an alliance with the Company would, mean 'unlimited obedience' to the paramount power and the sacrifice of that independence which he had maintained for half a century. Yet he chose what appeared at the moment to be the road to security. He did not take the British envoy seriously when he 'disclaimed all idea of its being a war of aggrandisement' on the part of the British Government against the predatory hordes.' He declared, just as Ranjit Singh is said to have declared afterwards: ...the day is not distant when only one emblem of power (*ekhi sikka*) will be recognised throughout India.' He had seen that the 'fundamental rule' which guided the Rajput princes—'obtain land'—was 'one both practically and theoretically understood by viceroys from the west.'

There was temptation too. It was hinted that the end of the Pindari War the territories conquered from Holkar in Central India would be distributed among the allies of the British Government. Zalim Singh sent a corps of 1,500 men, infantry and cavalry, with four guns, to co-operate with Malcolm. He also assisted the British Government in capturing several Pindari leaders. 'For all these important services' four districts ceded by Molkar were made over to Kotah in September 1819. It was at first intended to make a separate grant of these districts to Zalim Singh personally, but he insisted upon their incorporation in the Kotah State. 'At that time' says Tod, 'it appeared as an act of disinterested magnanimity, but subsequent acts allowed us to form a more correct appreciation of his motives.'

In October 1817 Metcalfe was instructed to conclude an alliance with Kotah on principles similar to those which were laid down in respect of other States. It was expected that the geographical situation of Kotah as well as the character of Zalim Singh would 'render him a useful adherent in the approaching operations against the Pindaris'. Under Metcalfe's orders Tod reached Zalim Singh's camp on 23 November, 1817.

His primary objective was to persuade the rulers of Kotah and Bundi 'to make such arrangements for guarding the principal passages of the Chambal as shall obstruct the flight of any bodies of Pindaris who may take that direction on the advance of British troops.'⁶ The terms of the treaty were finalised by Metcalfe in Delhi on 26 December, 1817 in consultation with Zalim Smith's agent there.

The general provisions of the treaty⁷ were similar to those which were incorporated in the treaties with Mewar, Jaipur and Marwar. With regard to the question of tribute, it was agreed that the amount hitherto paid by Kotah to the Marathas (the Peshwa, Sindhia, Holkar and Puar) should be paid to the British Government (Article 7). It was, therefore, necessary for the British Government to undertake to protect Kotah against any future claim from any State. Article 8 of the treaty ran as follows: 'No other power shall have any claim to tribute from the principality of Kotah; and if any one advance such a claim the British Government engages to reply to it.' Article 9 provided for military co-operation: The troops of the principality of Kotah, according to its means, shall be furnished at the requisition of the British Government.'

There were hereditary premiers in several States in Rajasthan. When the treaty between Mewar and the British Government was under negotiation the Raja's *vakil*, who was a relative of the Rawat of Salumbar, wanted to introduce a clause guaranteeing the position of *Bhanjgarh* to the Rawat of Salumbar, but Metcalfe merely gave an assurance that the good conduct of the minister would ensure His Lordship's (*i.e.*, the Governor General's) approbation. In view of Zalim Singh's great services: to, and pre-eminent position in Kotah, he was entitled to demand that his control over the administration of the State should be guaranteed. But no such guarantee was demanded from Metcalfe when the treaty was negotiated. This excited Metcalfe's surprise, for 'he not only, expected such stipulation but was prepared for admitting it.' This omission on the part of Zalim Singh, says Tod, was not due to inadvertence. He 'saw no occasion for any guarantee, for the plenty exercise of the powers of sovereign during more than half a century had constituted him, *de facto*, prince of Kotah'. Moreover, it is possible that a 'feeling of pride ... stifled' the expression of such a

stipulation even if he really wanted it. However, when the treaty was signed there was an informal understanding that the administration was guaranteed to Zalim Singh and his successors.

On 20 February, 1818 a Supplementary Article⁹ was added to the treaty of 26 December, 1817. It provided that Maharao Ummed Singh should be succeeded by his eldest son and heir-apparent, Kishore Singh, and that 'the entire administration of the affairs of the principality should be vested in Zalim Singh, and after him in his eldest son Madho Singh and his heirs, 'in regular succession and perpetuity.' According to Tod, 'the overture for this arrangement, in all probability, 'originated not with the Regent (Zalim Singh), but with the son.' In any case, it was an anomaly to recognize one person as a titular chief and another as the actual ruler. The 'faith' of the British Government was pledged to two parties in a manner, says Tod, 'which rendered its maintenance towards both an impossibility,' and it 'produced consequences that shook the confidence of the people of Rajwarra in our political rectitude.'

The new system was based on 'two pageants instead of one whose co-existence would have been miraculous.' It works for about two years, for the old understanding between Ummed Singh and Zalim Singh remained operative. Troubles began after the former's death (November 1819) leaving three sons—Kishore Singh, Bishen Singh and Prithvi Singh. Zalim Singh had two sons—the elder, Madho Singh, legitimate; the younger, Gobardhan Das, illegitimate. Gobardhan Das was regarded by Zalim Singh with greater affection and he was endowed with almost equal authority with Madho Singh the declared successor to the Regency. Kishore Singh was, in Tod's words, 'mild in his temper and demeanor but being brought up in habit of seclusion, he was more conversant with the formulae of his religion, and the sacred epics, than with the affairs of mankind.' Prithvi Singh, an energetic young man, determined to 'enfranchise himself and his family from the thraldom in which his father had left them, or perish in the attempt.' Gobardhan Das was jealous of Madho Singh and lived on terms of confidential friendship' with Prithvi Singh.

After Kishore Singh's accession to the *gadi* his counsellors, under the guidance of Prithvi Singh and Gobardhan Das, advised

him to repudiate the authority of the Regent. This policy was directed not so much against Zalim Singh, who was very old and quite blind, as against Madho Singh, the would-be Regent. An appeal was made against Article 10 of the treaty of 1817 which recognized the Maharao and his heirs and successors as 'absolute rulers of their country'. It was pointed out that the Regent's authority, being inconsistent with that Article, was illegal. The British Agent informed Kishore Singh that 'no pretensions of the titular Raja can be entertained by us in opposition to our positive engagement with the Regent.' He alone, it was added, was 'considered as the head of the Kotah State, and the titular Raja no more deemed the ruler of Kotah, than the Raja of Satara the leader of the Marathas, or the Great Moghul the Emperor of Hindustan.' This argument actually superseded one of the principal provisions of the treaty of 1817 in favour of the 'Supplementary Article added in 1818. It is probably to the results of this curious attempt to escape from an impossible situation that Tod attributed the Rajputs loss of confidence in the British Government's 'political rectitude'.

Attempts to settle the dispute having failed, Kishore Singh was blockaded in his castle. When reduced to extremity he broke-through the blockade at the head of 500 horses. He was, however, overtaken by the British Agent and conducted by him back to the castle. In order to free him from the influence of Gobardhan Das the latter was banished to Delhi. A public reconciliation took place between Kishore Singh and Zalim Singh. These incidents occurred in May-June 1820.

More than a year later Gobardhan Das was permitted to visit Malwa in connection with a marriage ceremony. His arrival there was followed immediately by the renewal of dissensions in Khotan. The troops of the Raj Pattan rose against Zalim Singh and joined Kishore Singh. When Zalim Singh assaulted the castle Kishore Singh escaped to Bundi and then went to Brindaban where he was joined by Gobardhan Das. The 'titular Raja' was supported by his vassals in his struggle against the powerful Regent who had full support from the British Government. This, according to Tod, 'exemplified . . . the nature and extent of *swamidharma* or fealty which has been described as the essential quality of the Rajput character, while, at the

same time, it illustrates the severity of the Regent's yoke.' However, Kishore Singh returned from Brindaban to Kotah at the head of a force; but he was defeated (October 1821) by a British force which had been sent to co-operate with the Regent. Prithvi Singh was killed. Kishore Singh retreated to Mewar, but he was soon afterwards persuaded to return to Kotah.

Kishore Singh's extremely injudicious attempt to recover his political right by armed force provoked the Supreme Government's severe displeasure. In a letter to Ochterlony from the Supreme Government, dated 31 October, 1821,¹⁰ it was stated that he had 'forfeited every right and title to the Raj of Kotah' and that unless he should 'spontaneously throw himself on our clemency and generosity, engaging to abide by whatever condition may be prescribed to him,' his brother Bishen Singh would be elevated to the *gadi*. In this connection the Supreme Government commented on 'the very erroneous impression which generally prevails in Rajwara regarding the character of the late proceedings against Kishore Singh, whose case ... is generally considered that of an unfortunate prince deprived of his hereditary dominion ... 'It was suggested that Ochterlony might 'make some communication to the Rajput Courts' of the real causes underlying the political settlement of 1817-18 with Kotah. But for the able management of Zalim Singh, Kotah would have long since fallen an easy prey to Sindhia and Holkar. The British Government found 'that the whole power and resources of the State' were in the hands of Zalim Singh who was 'universally acknowledged to be the actual ruler of the country.' By a 'tacit agreement' between Ummed Singh and Zalim Singh the former was 'maintained in the possession of the titular sovereignty of Kotah, while to all intents and purposes the Raj Rana (*i.e.*, Zalim Singh) was the ruler of the country with the uncontrolled and, undisputed power to govern it as he thought fit, and to transmit it to whom he pleased with the same power and right to hold it as that by which he had secured it for himself.' If Zalim Singh, instead of entering into an alliance with the British Government in 1817, had chosen to stand against it, Kotah would have succumbed to the force of British arms, and the principality would have become

'a legitimate conquest, at the disposal of the British Government.' The terms of the treaty, agreed to by both Zalim Singh and Ummed Singh, implied that no change should take place in the existing form of government. Ummed Singh's sons were entitled to succeed only to what had been stipulated by him and by the other contracting parties. What Kishore Singh tried to do after his accession was 'to meditate designs for the assumption of the executive power and authority of the Government in direct opposition to the stipulations which he was bound to observe.'

This argument was historically correct; but instead of explaining or justifying the contradiction between Article 10 of the treaty of 1817 and the Supplementary Article of 1818 it adds to the confusion. Had the Supplementary Article been a part of the original treaty, Kishore Singh and his supporters would have been completely in the wrong. But they found to their cost that the paramount power's interpretation of treaties could not be challenged. The terms on which the 'titular ruler' would continue to occupy the *gadi* were laid down in an Engagement¹¹ dated 22 November, 1821. He promised to 'submit cheerfully' to 'all that the British Government may command.' He recognised the validity of the Supplementary Article and declared that Zalim, Singh and his successors should 'conduct the entire administration of affairs.' He agreed not to entertain any troops beyond the personal guards allowed to him. For his maintenance he was granted an annual pension of Rs. 1,64,877.

On 7 February, 1822 Tod laid down several Articles defining the position of the Maharao.¹² His summary of their provisions was as follows: 'Besides the schedule of the personal expenditure, over which he was supreme, much of the State expenses was to be managed under the eye of the sovereign: such as charities, and gifts on festivals and military ceremonies. The royal insignia used on all great occasions was to remain as heretofore at this residences in the castly as was the band at the old guard-room over the chief portal of entrance. He was to preside at all the military or other annual festivals, attended by the whole retinue of the State; and gifts on such occasions were to be distributed in his name. All the palaces, in and about the city, were at his sole disposal, and funds were set apart for repair; the gardens,

rumnas, or game-preserves, and his personal guards, were also to be entertained and paid by himself. To maintain this ornament inviolate, an officer of the paramount power was henceforth to reside at Kotah.'

Tod was intimately connected with these developments in the political situation in Kotah. His dislike of the anomalous distinction between 'titular' rule and actual power is clear even in his cautious remarks in his *Annals and Antiquities*. Not only Ochterlony but also the Supreme Government took an adverse view of his proceedings, political as well as military, in connection with Kotah affairs. His explanation secured his exoneration, but he had a foretaste of the difficulties which led soon afterwards to his retirement.¹³

The settlement forced upon Kishore Singh merely plastered the cracks. As early as October 1822 the Supreme Government noted that 'the hatred and suspicions of each other evinced by the parties has not only suffered no abatement but there is no hope of a change of sentiment towards each other, nor any security against their secret animosity breaking out into some open act of violence.' Zalim Singh's conduct was 'placed in no favourable light; he displayed extreme jealousy of his 'power.' He not only 'grudged his prince the smallest addition to his comforts'; he 'regarded every word from the British Agent with the most jealous eyes.' Ochterlony wrote in April 1823: The State of Kotah is not only an anomaly in politics, but a moral bug bear which alarms and startles, and has the effect of thwarting and hampering our best views and most honourable intentions...¹⁴

Zalim Singh died in 1824. Madho Singh succeeded him 'with the full power exercised by his father,' but the Supreme Government desired that the proposal—already initiated—of creating a separate principality for him, and the consequential abrogation of the Supplementary Article, should be implemented. The 'real interests' of the Maharao as also of Madho Singh, the welfare of the people of Kotah, and the assured maintenance of holding the helm he would neither resign nor accept the offer given.¹⁵ This proved to be correct prophecy.

In 1828 Kishore Singh was succeeded by his nephew, Ram Singh. The old disputes between the 'titular' and the actual ruler broke out afresh, for Ram Singh could not co-operate with

Madan Singh, the son and successor of Madho Singh. There was danger of a popular rising for the expulsion of the minister. The Supreme Government decided, with Ram Singh's consent, to create the new principality of Jhalawar as a separate provision for the descendants of Zalim Singh. By a treaty¹⁶ concluded on 10 April, 1831 the Supplementary Article was repealed, 17 *parganas* (yielding a revenue of 12 lakhs of rupees) were made over to Madan Singh, the tribute payable by Kotah was reduced by Rs. 80,000 (which sum was to be paid by Jhalawar), and the Maharao agreed to maintain an auxiliary force at a cost of not more than three lakhs of rupees. In 1844 the cost of the auxiliary force was reduced to two lakhs. Thus the partition of kotah solved the problem created by the Supplementary Article.

The relations between the British Government and the new State of Jhalawar were defined by a treaty¹⁷ concluded with Madan Singh on 8 April 1838. In addition to the usual stipulations about subordinate co-operation and protection, the treaty provided that the ruler of Jhalawar would pay an annual tribute of Rs. 80,000 and supply troops according to his means. He was to be placed on the same footing as all the other rulers in Rajasthan and should receive the right of adoption if that right should be conceded to other rulers; but the succession was to be limited to the descendants of Zalim Singh.

III. Bundi

During the Second Anglo-Maratha War the Bundi *Durbar* gave valuable assistance to Colonel Monson when the British Army 'for the first time appeared in these regions avowedly for the purpose of putting down Holkar, the great foe of the Rajputs, but especially of Bundi. It was during Monson's humiliating flight, that a safe passage was not only cheerfully granted but aided to the utmost of the Raja's means, and with an almost culpable disregard of his own welfare and interests.

An application was made for an alliance with the British Government. It was supported by Lord Lake (July) 1805 who thought that, although the Raja's possessions were small, he could 'from their local position and natural strength, prove a useful dependant to the British Government.' Moreover, his

conduct during Monson's retreat was 'such as to give undivided proof his sincerity in the wish or meriting the protection of the British Government.'¹⁸ But on 24 December, 1805 the British Government concluded a treaty¹⁹ with Holkar by which it promised 'to have no concern with the ancient possessions of the Holkar family in Mewar, "Malwa and Haravan" (Article 3). Holkar continued his depredations in Bundi. The Bundi *Durbar* appealed for assistance to the British Resident in Delhi who 'thought it his duty to abstain from raising any hope.'²⁰ In October 1810 the Governor-General informed the Raja, Bishen Singh, who had ascended the *gadi* as a minor in 1804, in reply to one of his letters, that the conclusion of an alliance was incompatible with the principles which regulated the conduct of the British Government: 'It is the fixed principle of the British Government not to interfere in the concerns of other States excepting only in the degree required by the positive and legal treaties already existing...In spite of such discouragement the Raja renewed his application in 1814.'²¹ But Lord Hastings had not yet decided to modify Lord Minto's policy towards the Rajput States.

When the new policy was initiated the claim of Bundi naturally demanded favourable attention. Its territory was so situated as to be of great importance during the war in 1817 in cutting off the flight of the Pindaris. Full co-operation was available from the Bundi *Durbar*. 'Throughout the contest of 1817,' says Tod, 'Bundi had no will but ours; its prince and dependents were in arms ready to execute our behest . . .' The reward was generous. The districts held in Bundi by Holkar, some of which had been alienated for half a century, and which had come into British possession by right of conquest, were restored to the Raja without qualification. Moreover, the British Government secured from Sindhia the surrender of the districts held by him; the Raja agreed to pay to Sindhia, through the British Government an annual sum calculated on the average of the preceding ten years' depreciated revenue. This was in accordance with the 'general principles' adopted at the commencement of the war viz the Marathas should not have a foot of land in Rajasthan west of the Chambal. The Raja was, however, disappointed because his 'wings' had been clipped: Zalim Singh had contrived to get the principal feudatories of

Bundi—the chiefs of Indargarh, Balwan, Antardah and Khatoli—under the protection of Kotah.

In October 1817 Metcalfe was informed that the Governor-General was willing to afford Bundi the protection of the British Government 'on the simple condition of allegiance and of employing its military force with zeal and spirit in the common cause.' Tod was then entrusted with the duty of concluding a treaty with Bundi. By the treaty of Mandasor (Article 4), concluded on 6 January 1818, Holkar ceded to the British Government 'all claim of tribute and revenues of every description which he has or may have had upon the Rajput princes.' Sindhia's claim on Bundi, as calculated by Tod, amounted to about Rs. 80,000 or Rs. 90,000 per year; but Sindhia claimed Rs. 105,000. At first Lord Hasings was under the impression that Sindhia's share of tribute from Bundi amounted to Rs. 10,000 only. So he was prepared to exempt Bundi from the payment of tribute. But Metcalfe, who knew better, asked Tod to include in the treaty a condition that Bundi would pay to the British Government the amount which it had so far paid to Sindhia. The tribute paid by Bundi to Holkar was relinquished.²²

Tod's instructions reminded him that the cooperation of Kotah and Bundi in the military operations against the Pindaris will not depend on the previous conclusion of permanent engagements of alliance but is a duty incumbent on them and all other States which the British Government has right to demand. The Supreme Government did not explain why those States which had no treaty relations with the British Government should be bound to offer it military aid. Apparently, it was already inclined to claim the privileges of paramountcy. However, Tod arrived at Bundi on 8 February, 1818, and a treaty was concluded two days later. In accordance with the orders of the Supreme Government the terms offered to Bundi were 'tell and simple, providing for protection and guarantee on the one hand, and political dependence and subordinate co-operation on the other.' The Raja was exempted from the payment of the tribute due to Holkar; but he was required to pay to the British Government the tribute and revenue hitherto paid to Sindhia amounting to Rs. 80,000 per annum. He was

also required to 'furnish troops at the requisition of the British Government according to his means.'²³

Bishen Singh was, according to Tod, 'an honest man and every inch a Rajput.' 'He was somewhat despotic in his own little empire, knowing that fear is a necessary incentive to respect in the governed, more especially amongst the civil servants of his government . . .' Fully aware of the importance of money, he maintained a reserve fund to which his minister was required to add a hundred rupees daily. When the Marathas gradually curtailed his revenues he gave up 'unessential enjoyments' and turned his attention to the pleasure of the chase.

There was no trouble in Bundi during the remaining years of Bishen Singh's life. He died in July 1821 and was succeeded by his minor son, Ram Singh. During the latter's long minority the British Government had no more than one occasion to interfere in the internal administration of the State.

IV. Bikaner

The Rathor principality of Bikaner, established in the fifteenth century by a collateral branch of the ruling family of Jodhpur, was ruled in the early years of the nineteenth century by an unscrupulous usurper named Surat Singh. He supported the cause of Dhonkal Singh in the struggle for succession in Marwar and, according to Tod, spent 24 lakhs of rupees, 'nearly five years' revenue of this desert region.' In his own territories he established a 'system of terror.' Tod says: 'To supply an exhausted treasury his extortions knew no bounds . . . His cruelty keeps pace with his avarice and his fears. He put to death some of the 'chief feudatories' of the State. He was surrounded by a group of avaricious Brahmins, who are maintained in luxury at the expense of his subjects.' The badly administered country was 'annually deteriorating in population and wealth.

In one respect Bikaner was comparatively fortunate. Its geographical position and scarcity of resources virtually placed it beyond the 'ordinary sphere of predatory aggression. It was practically immune from the havoc which the depredations of Sindhia and Holkar caused in other Rajput principalities.

In 1808 Surat Singh had to surrender to Man Singh after bitter fighting for several months. On this occasion he appealed for the protection of the British Government, but the policy of non-intervention ruled out interference on its part in the affairs of principalities to the west of the Jumna. In 1812, Surat Singh tried to open fresh negotiations for British protection, but he was not encouraged.²⁴

Lord Hastings did not at first intend to bring Bikaner into the net of alliances because its assistance was not likely to be required in the military operations against the Pindaris. Metcalfe looked at the matter from a different point of view; a close connection with Bikaner was needed, he thought, in the interest of peace on the Haryana frontier. The region adjoining Bikaner and Jaisalmer was disturbed by 'nests of plunderers, leagued together by common habits and interests'. Among them were subjects of Bikaner. Some petty chiefs who had thrown off Surat Singh's authority committed depredations in the Company's territories. Oppressed by Bikaner's 'northern chiefs' and the 'Bhatti robbers', says Tod, many subjects of Bikaner sought shelter in the British frontier territories, in Hansi and Haryana, where they were 'kindly received'. The pacification of this disturbed frontier was likely to be facilitated by subordinate co-operation on the part of the ruler of Bikaner.

Apart from this special consideration, it would have been unusual to allow, in the case of Bikaner, a deviation from the general policy applicable to the States of Rajasthan. Metcalfe was authorized to negotiate with Surat Singh. A treaty²⁵ was concluded on 9 March, 1818. Bikaner was exempted from the payment of tribute, 'both because that State has not hitherto been subjected to the payment of any fixed tribute and on account of the inadequacy of its resource to meet such a demand'.²⁶ But the Raja engaged to 'furnish troops at the requisition of the British Government, according to his means'.

Apart from the usual clauses regarding protection and subordinate co-operation, the treaty contained three special stipulations. By Article 6 the Raja undertook to suppress all robbers and plunderers in his territory and to restore the property plundered by his subjects from British territory up to the time of the conclusion of the treaty. By Article 7

the British Government engaged to restore the Raja's authority over its rebellious vassals and subjects, provided he paid the expenses incurred by the British Government. This provision was approved by the Supreme Government on the ground that 'unless the authority of the Government of Bikaner be firm and efficient, it will not have the means of fulfilling the most important stipulations of the treaty.'²⁷ Thus Articles 6 and 7 were complementary. By Article 10 the Raja engaged to take effective measures for the protection of all trades routed within his territories, in order that trade to and from Kabul and Khorasan might be 'rendered possible and safe'.

Surat Singh died in 1828 and was succeeded by his son Ratan Singh. Next year Ratan Singh violated his treaty engagements by invading Jaisalmer to punish some subjects of the latter for depredations committed by them. Jaisalmer prepared an army to repel the invaders. Both parties asked for assistance from neighbouring States. The British Government intervened. The dispute was settled through the arbitration of the Rana of Mewar, both parties making reparation for the injuries done.

An incident which occurred in 1830 indicated that the obligations imposed upon the British Government by Articles 6 and 7 were intended to be purely temporary. Preparations were made by the Resident in Delhi to send a force to Bikaner to assist the Raja in reducing some rebellious nobles. The Supreme Government held that those Articles of the treaty referred to temporary circumstances and did not entitle the Raja to call on the British Government for military aid against his disaffected subjects at any future period.²⁸

V. Banswara

The three small principalities of Banswara, Pertabgarh and Dungarpur were offshoots from Mewar; but in the nineteenth century their rulers did not acknowledge the authority of the Rana of Udaipur. Pertabgarh was tributary to Holkar, Dungarpur paid tribute to Sindhia, Holkar and the Puaris of Dhar. Holkar's claim on these principalities was renounced in favour of the British Government by the treaty of Mandasor (24 December, 1805). When Metcalfe concluded the treaty with Mewar, the

Rana's *vakil* claimed the restoration of Mewar's suzerainty over the rulers of these principalities but the British Government had already decided to grant them independent recognition.²⁹

Ummed Singh, Regent of Banswara, managed affairs on behalf of his father who had 'retired from the cares of government.' In 1814 he sent a *vakil* to Metcalfe 'to solicit the protection' of the British Government. He had already applied for protection to the Government of Bombay and the Resident at Poona, but the latter had referred him to the Resident in Delhi. The *vakil* proposed to Metcalfe that a British force should be stationed in Banswara to protect the Raja against foreign and internal enemies, and that three-eighths of the revenues of the Principality should be paid to the British Government. The revenues at the time amounted to four or five lakhs, but an increase to seven or eight lakhs might be expected if peace was restored. It appeared that 'the aid principally required at the present moment would be against chiefs and subjects acting in rebellion.' The Governor-General declined to accept this offer, mainly on the ground that the Raja was a tributary of Holkar, Puar and Sindhia.³⁰

Ummed Singh renewed his proposal in March 1815, but no attention was paid to it till October 1817, when Metcalfe received instructions to bring all Rajput States under British protection. Lieutenant Dyson, an officer working under John Malcolm in Malwa, was deputed to ensure about conditions prevailing in Banswara, Pertabgarh and Dungarpur. His report is a mine of information.

On 16 September, 1818 Metcalfe concluded a treaty with the *vakil* deputed by Ummed Singh. The treaty was ratified by Lord Hastings on 10 October, 1818. Banswara was required to pay tribute to the British Government to the extent of three-eighths of its revenue and to 'furnish troops on requisition, according to its means, for the service of the British Government.' Article 5 was rather unusual: it provided for British intervention in internal affairs.

The Maharawal denied that he had sent any *vakil* to Delhi with authority to conclude a treaty with the British Government.³² So the previous treaty was regarded as invalid, and a new treaty³³ was concluded on 25 December, 1818 by Captain Caulfield, an Assistant of Sir John Malcolm. In addition

to the clauses incorporated in the previous treaty contained some important provisions, obviously included at Malcolm's instance. The Maharawal had to engage to pay the British Government all arrears of tribute due to the Puar Raja of Dhar or any other State. Article 9 laid down that the tribute 'is to increase annually as the territory of Banswara recovers its prosperity till it rises to whatever amount the British Government may deem adequate to cover the expense incurred by protecting the State of Banswara, provided that such tribute does not exceed three-eighths of the revenue of the country.' Article 13 authorised the British Government to collect through an Agent the taxes 'levied at the *chubutra* and its dependent *nakhas*' if the State failed to make punctual payment of the tribute. Article 4 contained the usual provision that the Maharawal would remain 'absolute ruler' of his territory, but Article 5 kept the door open for intervention in internal affairs: "The affairs of the principality of Banswara shall be settled according to the advice of the British Government, in which the British Government will pay all practicable attention to the will of the Maharawal.' This arrangement was probably purely temporary, for Metcalfe wrote to the Supreme Government on 22 September, 1818: The fifth Article was introduced in order to secure to us the right of interposing our advice and authority for the settlement of the disturbances which at present prevail in the State of Banswara.³⁴ By Article 11 the Maharawal agreed 'never to entertain in his service any Arabs, Makrains, Sindhis or other foreign troops; but that his army shall be composed of the military class of the inhabitants of the country.' By Article 12 'the British Government engaged 'not to countenance the connections or relations of the Maharawal, his heirs and successors, who may prove disobedient; but to afford to the Maharawal aid in bringing them under control.'

Agreements were concluded with Banswara in 1820, 1823, 1831 and 1836 regarding the amount of tribute.³⁵

VI. Pertabgarh

A treaty³⁶ was concluded with Pertabgarh on 25 November, 1804 by Colonel Murray who was at that time commander of the British army in Gujarat and Malwa. The treaty was cancelled

by Lord-Cornwallis in pursuance of his policy of withdrawal from connections with the Western Rajput States. The principality suffered much from Holkar's depredations.³⁷ By Article 4 of the treaty of Mandasor (6 January, 1818) Holkar surrendered to the British Government the tribute levied by him on Pertabgarh. On 5 October, 1818 a treaty³⁸ was concluded with the Raja of Pertabgarh, Sawant Singh, by Captain Caulfield.

This treaty had some special features. Instead of the usual clauses regarding perpetual alliance and subordinate co-operation it contained the following stipulation: 'The Raja promises to give up all connection with other States, and to the utmost of his power prove his obedience to the British Government, who, in return, agree to assist him in re-establishing good order throughout his district, and to protect him from the claims and trespass of all other States' (Article 1). All arrears of tribute due to Holkar, amounting to Rs. 124,657 were to be paid to the British Government; the annual tribute so far paid to Holkar was henceforth to be paid to the British Government. If punctual payment was not made, the British Government could collect the dues from the town duties of Pertabgarh through an Agent of its own (Articles 2,3, 12). By Article 4 the Raja agreed 'not to entertain Arabs or Makranis in his service' but to maintain 50 horsemen and 200 foot soldiers who were to be at the disposal of the British Government. Article 5 gave the British Government the right of interference in the internal administration of the State 'in the settlement of all predatory tribes and in the re-establishment of tranquility and good order.' By the same Article the Raja engaged not to 'levy any unusual duty on the mint or merchants, or on merchandise, throughout his territories. The British Government engaged to help the Raja in maintaining his authority over his subjects (Articles 6, 7, 8, 9).

VII. Dungarpur

Captain Caulfield concluded a treaty³⁹ with Jaswant Singh, Maharawal of Dungarpur, on 11 December, 1818. It contained the usual clauses regarding perpetual alliance and subordinate co-operation. Article 5 authorised British intervention in the internal affairs of the principality: The affairs of the principality

of Dungarpur shall be settled according to the advice of the British Government, in which the British Government shall pay all practicable attention to the will of the Maharawal'. All arrears of tribute due to Dhar or any other power were to be paid to the British Government (Article 8). In addition, the Maharawal would pay a tribute which was 'to be regulated by the prosperity of his country but never to exceed three-eighths of the actual revenue' (Article 9). If the tribute was not paid punctually, an Agent of the British Government would be appointed to collect it from the town duties of Dungarpur (Article 13). By Article 11 the Maharawal engaged 'to discharge all Arabs and Sindhis and to entertain no soldiers but natives of the country.'

VIII. Kishangarh

The little principality of Kishangarh was an off-shoot from Jodhpur. On 26 March, 1818 Metcalfe concluded a treaty⁴⁰ with Kalian Singh, Raja of Kishangarh. No tribute was demanded, for Kishangarh had never paid fixed tribute to any State. By Article 6 the Raja engaged to 'furnish troops at the requisition of the British Government according to his means. Metcalfe informed the Supreme Government that this Article was framed 'with reference to an expectation that the resources of the State, which are at present confined, will hereafter improve.'⁴¹ The usual provisions about perpetual alliance and subordinate co-operation were included.

After the conclusion of the treaty Kalian Singh became involved in a protracted quarrel with his nobles, which ultimately led to his abdication in favour of his son, Mokam Singh.

IX. Jaisalmer

The geographical situation of Jaisalmer had saved it from the depredations of the Marathas. In 1809 Maharawal Mulraj informed the Governor-General that he was prepared to co-operate with the British Government if a British force was sent against the troublesome Amirs of Sind. Naturally Lord Minto rejected this offer; apart from his general policy of non-interference in the affairs of the Rajput States, a war with the Amirs of Sind was not in contemplation.

By 1818 the Company's policy had changed, Jaisalmer's co-operation was not required for the suppression of the Pindaris; its distance from the scene of anti-Maratha operations made it 'an object of little solicitude' to the British Government. But this desert principality had a strategical and commercial importance which could not be ignored. It formed the boundary between Rajasthan, which was being brought under British paramountcy, and the territories of the Amirs of Sind. It would be a very useful barrier against 'the possible invasion of India ... through the maritime provinces of Persia.' Paramountcy over Jaisalmer would give the British Government 'the command of Upper Sind' and enable it to 'act against the enemy simultaneously' with its armies east of the Indus delta.

Moreover, Jaisalmer was a link in the chain of States which 'united the commerce of the Ganges with that of the Indus.' It was an important 'commercial mart... a place of transit between the eastern countries, the valley of the Indus, and those beyond that stream, the *kitars* (the term for a caravan of camels) to and from Hyderabad, Rori-Bakhar, Shikarpur and Uch, from the Gangetic provinces, and the Punjab, passing through it.' Tod adds: The indigo of the Doab, the opium of Kotah and Malwa, the famed sugar-candy of Bikaner, iron implements from Jaipur, are exported to Shikarpur and lower Sind whence elephants' teeth (from Africa), dates, coconuts, drugs, and chandan, are imported, with pistachois and dried fruits from Bahawalpur.'

A State of such importance could not be left out of the new system of alliances. A treaty⁴² was concluded with Mulraj by Metcalfe on 12 December, 1818. Apart from the usual clauses regarding perpetual alliance and subordinate co-operation, two stipulations deserve notice. Article 2 guarantees the succession to the 'posterity' of Maharawal Mulraj. Article 3 ran as follows: 'In the event of any serious invasion directed towards the overthrow of the principality of Jaisalmer, or other danger of great magnitude occurring to that principality, the British Government will exert its power for the protection of the principality, provided that the cause of the quarrel be not ascribable of the Rajah of Jaisalmer.' No tribute was demanded, nor was any liability imposed for furnishing troops at the requisition of the British Government.

Mulraj had a long reign of about sixty years, but he was a puppet in the hands of his ministers; Swarup Singh, a Bania of the Jain faith and Mehta family,' and his son Salim Singh. Swarup Singh was murdered by Rai Singh, the eldest son and heir-apparent of Mulraj, at the instigation of some nobles. Mulraj himself was placed in confinement and Rai Singh was made the ruler of the State. Within a few months, however, Mulraj was restored, Rai Singh was banished, and Salim Singh, who was only eleven years old at the time, was appointed his father's successor as minister. In Tod's words, Salim Singh 'united the subtlety of the serpent to the ferocity of the tiger.' He murdered Rai Singh and his two sons. Jait Singh, the second son of Mulraj, was blind; so was Jait Singh's son, Maha Singh. They were, therefore, incompetent to succeed. Man Singh, the third son of Mulraj, was killed by a fall from his horse. Man Singh's third son, Gaj Singh, was proclaimed heir-apparent by the all-powerful minister, although two elder brothers of Gaj Singh were living. Tod found them living as refugees in Bikaner territory.

At the time of the conclusion of the treaty of 1818 Salim Singh tried unsuccessfully to incorporate in it a guarantee that the office of minister would be hereditary in his family. But his authority remained unimpaired after the death of Mulraj and the accession of Gaj Singh in 1820. The new Raja, says Tod, was 'the submissive pageant Salim Singh required; he, with the members of his family was dependent on the minister's bounty, often capriciously exercised.' When the minister's 'outrages became past all endurance,' the British Agent reported to the Government that, in his opinion, the alliance had become 'disgraceful to our reputation, by countenancing the idea that such acts can be tolerated under its protection.' The problem was solved by Salim Singh's death in 1824. An attempt was made to secure the succession of his eldest son to the ministership; but Gaj Singh refused to agree to that arrangement, and he was supported by the British Government.⁴³

X. Alwar

The nucleus of the State of Alwar was formed by the 'fief' of Macheri in the Jaipur State. Pratap Singh Naruka, Rao Raja

of Macheri during the second half of the eighteenth century, may be regarded as its founder. His adopted son and successor, Bakhtawar Singh, concluded a treaty with the British Government on 14 November, 1803. This was preceded by his co-operation with the British forces under Lord Lake in the battle Laswari against Sindhia. As a reward for military aid the Rao Raja received several districts and his *vakil*, Ahmed Bakhsh Khan, received Ferozpur and Loharu.

The treaty⁴⁴ established 'permanent friendship' between the Company and Alwar; the friends and enemies of each were to be considered friends and enemies of the other. The foreign relations of Alwar were to be regulated by the British Government which guaranteed the security of the Rao Raja's territory against external enemies. In the event of any dispute between the Rao Raja and any other chief he would submit it to the British Government for amicable settlement. If such a settlement was prevented by the obstinacy of the opposite party, the Rao Raja would be entitled to British aid provided he agreed to meet the expenses of such aid. No tribute was to be paid, but Alwar troops were to co-operate with the British Government 'in the event of any enemy evincing a disposition to attack the countries now in possession of the Company or of their allies in Hindustan.' The British Government engaged not to 'interfere with the country' of the Rao Raja.

In 1811 the Rao Raja interfered in the internal affairs of Jaipur and made military arrangements to establish Khushhali Ram as minister there. Such interference in the affairs of neighbouring States was inconsistent with, but not specifically prohibited by, the treaty of 1803. So a fresh engagement⁴⁶ was concluded on 16 July, 1811, by which Bakhtawar Singh engaged 'never (to) enter into any engagement or negotiation whatever with any other State or chief without the knowledge and consent of the British Government.' Even after this specific undertaking he occupied the forts of Dhobi and Sikrawa and adjoining territory belonging to Jaipur and refused to restore them when asked to do so by the Resident in Delhi.⁴⁶ The British Government considered whether this direct violation of the engagement should be treated as ground for dissolution of the alliance. The principal argument against such drastic action was the apprehension that it would expose

Alwar to invasion by the Pindari leaders. It was, therefore, resolved to compel the Rao Raja to restore the forts and territory to Jaipur. A British force advanced into Alwar territory. Bakhtawar Singh yielded, restored the usurped territory and paid three lakhs of rupees as expenses of the British expedition, if actual hostilities had been required, the British Government would have punished him by resuming the districts conferred on him by Lord Lake; even complete annexation of the State was not ruled out, had his conduct justified such a measure.⁴⁷

Bakhtawar Singh died in 1815. The succession was disputed by two factions acting on behalf of two minors, his nephew and adopted son Banni Singh and his illegitimate son Balwant Singh. The former was supported by the Rajput *Sardars* and the latter by Ahmed Bakhsh Khan. It was finally decided, with the approval of the British Government, that Banni Singh should be the titular ruler while Balwant Singh should exercise actual power. When he grew up Banni Singh repudiated this com-promise, imprisoned Balwant Singh, and refused to surrender several persons who had tried to murder Ahmed Bakhsh Khan. In 1826 a British force advanced on Alwar, secured the surrender of the chief conspirators, and compelled Banni Singh to make provision for Balwant Singh and his successors.

In 1831 Banni Singh opened negotiations with Jaipur for the purpose of doing fealty to the Raja whose ancestors' territories had included Machen. The British Government considered this to be a breach or treaty engagement although it was, in itself, not of much importance.

XI. Sirohi

Sirohi was the last of the Rajput States to accept the protection of the British Government. Its importance lay in its position along the line of communication between Gujarat and Rajputana. In 1817 Carnac, British Resident at Baroda, received overtures from Sirohi for British support and alliance. Before any decision could be made the Raja of Jodhpur, Man Singh, claimed that since the days of his predecessor, Bijay Singh, Sirohi had been a tributary dependency of Marwar. Lord Hastings could not ignore his request not to 'prohibit the continuance of that connection.' Enquiries made by Tod indicated

that Sirohi was really an appanage of Mewar. The rulers of Sirohi belonged to a branch of the ruling family of Mewar, their connection with the latter was cut-off when Mewar was weakened by the depredations of the Marathas. Taking advantage of Mewar's distress Jodhpur imposed a tribute on Sirohi or rather a contribution which it levied from time to time by force of arms.' On the basis of these facts Tod concluded that if the ruler of Sirohi owed allegiance anywhere, it was to 'his own family and sovereign, the Rana.' The Supreme Government accepted Tods' view and rejected Man Singh's claim.

Meanwhile Rao Udaibhan, the ruler of Sirohi, was deposed and placed in confinement in 1818 by the nobles for his tyranny and oppression. His younger brother, Sheo Singh, was placed on the *gadi*. In 1819 Man Singh sent his troops to Sirohi to restore Udaibhan, but the attempt failed. During the disturbances arising out of this invasion Sheo Singh solicited the protection of the British Government. Captain Alexander Speirs concluded a treaty with him on 11 September, 1823.⁴⁸

The treaty⁴⁹ recognized Sheo Singh as regent of Sirohi during the time of his natural life, and guaranteed the succession to the lawful heirs of Udaibhan, should there be any such on the death of Sheo Singh.⁵⁰ The State was taken under the Company protection and its foreign relations were brought under British control (Articles 1, 2, 3). Several Articles authorized the British Government to interfere in the internal administration of the State. Article 4 ran as follows: 'The jurisdiction of the British Government shall not be introduced into the territories of Sirohi but the rulers thereof shall at all times attend to the advice of the officer of the British Government in the administration of their affairs, and act in conformity thereto.' Article 9 authorized officers of the British Government 'to recommend such rates of transit duties and regulation for the collection of customs within the limits of the Sirohi territory as may on further experience be judged expedient, and to interfere from time to time to enforce or amend the same.' Article 6 provided for the punishment of disobedient *Sardars*, in concert and concurrence with the officers of the British Government. Article 5 made it obligatory for the regent 'to follow the counsel of the British authority in all his proceedings for the restoration

of the prosperity of the country and the introduction of good order and regularity.' Article 8 provided for the payment of tribute, at the expiration of three years from the date of this engagement; the amount was not to exceed three-eighths of the revenues of the State Article 10 provided for military cooperation.

The weakness of the State and Sheo Singh's inability to suppress rebellions made it necessary for the British Agent to exercise an unusual interference in its internal affairs. In 1854 the State was taken under the direct management of the British Government. In 1861 the general control of affairs was made over to the heir-apparent, Ummed Singh; Sheo Singh, who continued to enjoy the honours of the princely office, died shortly afterwards. In 1865 the State was released from British management; Ummed Singh assumed full control.

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50. As Udaibhan died without children in 1847, Sheo Singh was recognized ruler of the State.

Index

A

Abu, Mount, [7](#)
Act-Pitt's India, [258](#)
Agriculture, [56](#)
Ahavamalla, [104](#)
Akbar, [51](#), [101](#), [196](#), [248](#)
Akbar-Nama, [140](#)
Alexander, [113](#)
Alwar, [352](#)
Amatyas, [66](#)
Ancient Association with
 Nilakantha Siva, [30](#)
Anglo-Maratha War, [130](#), [187](#),
 [212](#), [258](#), [341](#)
Arabia, [178](#)
Aranyaka Ciri, [49](#)
Arjuna, Kartavirya, [17](#)
Army, [170](#), [180](#)
Aryavarta, [25](#)
Aurang zeeb, [205](#)

B

Babur, [97](#), [201-02](#)
Bahadur, Gaj Singh, [51](#)
Ballala, [104](#)

Bania Corporations, [29](#)
Banswara, [346](#)
Barani, Ziauddin, [107](#)
Bardai, Chand, [7](#)
Battle of Haldighati, [97](#)
Beg, Ismail, [254](#)
Bhandarkar, D. R., [11-12](#)
Bandarkar, R. G., [27](#)
Bhima, Chaulukya, [7](#)
Bhoja, Paramara, [39](#)
Bikaner, [99](#), [344](#)
Brahma, [81](#)
Brahmin, [34](#)
British force, [850](#)
 government, [213](#), [300](#), [827](#)
 intervention, [296](#)
 political agent, [160](#)
 resident at Sindhia's Court,
 [146](#)
Buddhism, [29](#)
Buddhists, [7](#)
Bundi, [341](#)

C

Chand, Akhai, [324](#)

Chalukya, Sarangadeva, [108](#)
 Chauhana, [100](#), [102](#)
 Chauhan, Prithviraj, [96](#)
 Chahamana Vignaraja, [4](#)
 Chandella Kings, [34](#)
 Chandrasen, Rao, [98](#)
 Chiefs and the State, [163](#)
 Chwang, Yuan, [91](#)
 Clan System, [156](#)

D

Dada, Lakhwa, [211](#)
 Deo, Maniya, [33](#)
 Diet, [45](#)
 Discipline, [71](#)
 Dress and Ornaments, [43](#)
 Dungarpur, [349](#)

E

Economic Conditions, [174](#)
 Equipment, [70](#)

F

Fazl, Abul, [7](#), [52](#), [119](#), [140](#)
 Feudal Setup, [72](#)
 Feudal System in Rajasthan, [148](#)
 Foreign Courts, [236](#)
 Fort Library of Bikaner, [7](#)
 Fort of Chittor, [113](#), [202](#)

G

Gahadavala, [16](#)
 Gandhi, Somchand, [208](#)

Ganga, Rao, [166](#)
 Geography, [142](#)
 Ghorī, Muizuddin, [96](#), [103](#)
 God, [83](#)
 Govindachandra, Gahadavala, [38](#)
 Gupta, Samudra, [40](#)
 Gurg, Kamaluddin, [100](#), [115](#)
 Gwalior Inscription of Gurjara-Pratihara Boja, [30](#)

H

Haig, Walseley, [105](#)
 Hari-Hara-Pitameha, [81](#)
 Haroti, [101](#)
 Heber, Bishop, [130](#)
 Hindu Caste System as
 Kshatriyas, [8](#)
pad padabahi, [140](#)
 pantheon, [29](#)
 Holkar, Malhar Rao, [206](#), [252](#)
 Holkar, Tukoji, [207](#)
 Hunter, [146](#)

I

Ibn-ul-Athir, [27](#)
 Ilchak, [114](#)
 Invasions of Jaisalmer by
 Muslims, [129](#)
 Irrigation, [61](#)
 Iyalimish, Sultan, [104](#)

J

Jainism, [29](#), [191](#)
 Jaisalmer, [99](#), [350](#)
 Jalaluddin, [109](#)

Jalor, [115](#)
 Jat Cultivator of Mewar, [175](#)
 Jehan, Nur, [44](#)
 Jehangir, [101](#), [140](#)
 Jehan, Shah, [44](#)

K

Kali, [89](#)
 Kanhadas, Lemchu, [104](#)
 Karauli, [380](#)
 Karan, Udai, [102](#)
 Kaskafur, [262](#)
 Khalji, Alauddin, [100](#), [107](#), [112](#),
[123](#)
 Khusrau, Amir, [107](#), [115](#), [196](#),
[221](#), [238](#), [317](#)
 Khan, Khizr, [113](#)
 Khan, Khusrau, [123](#)
 Khan, Nusrat, [111](#)
 Khan, Timur, [104](#)
 Khan, Ulugh, [111-12](#)
 Khan, Zafar, [90](#)
 Khanis, Qaiam, [102](#)
 King George, [131](#)
 Kirtivarman, Chandella, [38](#)
 Kishangarh, [350](#)
 King William IV, [131](#)
 Kotah, [331](#)
 Krishna, [183](#)
 Krishna Kumari, [216](#)

L

Land, [56](#)
 Lieutenant-Colonel, [131](#)

Local government, [76](#)
 Lodi, Sikandar, [105](#)
 Lord Cornwallis, [216](#), [268](#)
 Lord Hastings, [224](#), [278](#), [320](#)
 Lord Lak, [215](#), [267](#), [341](#), [354](#)
 Lord Minto, [223](#), [271](#), [273](#)
 Lord of Champa, [112](#)
 Lord William Bentinck, [145](#),
[184](#), [215](#)
 Lord Wellesley, [283](#)
 Lunkaran, Maharawal, [100](#)

M

Major-General Johnes, [266](#)
 Mahabharata, [91](#)
 Mahmud, Sultan Nasiruddin,
[105](#)
 Maldeva, Rao, [98](#)
 Mantrins, [66](#)
 Marwar, [98](#)
 Metcalfe, Charles, [242](#), [300](#)
 Mewar, [95](#)
 Mewat, [102](#)
 Mewati, Adam Khan, [102](#)
 Military Administration, [88](#)
 Minister for Peace and War, [67](#)
 Misra, Krishna, [38](#)
 Mughals and Marathas, [248](#),
[302](#)
 Mugal Culture on Rajasthan, [43](#)
 court, [44](#)
 emperor, [44](#), [50](#)
 military, [201](#)
 Muslim Rulers of Delhi, [145](#)

N

- Naga, [84](#)
 Nizam and the Nawabs of Oudh
 and Bengal, [160](#)
 Nizamuddin, [120](#)
 Northern India in the post-
 Gupta period, [25](#)

O

- Ochterlony, David, [231](#)
 Osia, [55](#)

P

- Padma Purana, [82](#)
 Padmini, [116](#)
 Paramaras of Chaulukyas of
 Gujarat, [113](#)
Parvatman, [81](#)
 Persia, [178](#)
 Pertabgarh, [348](#)
 Pinduri War, [130](#)
 Political Decline, [200](#)
 Police and Judiciary, [79](#)
 Pratihara, Kakka, [120](#)
 Prakrit, [39](#)
Prithvipal, [56](#)
 Produce of the Land, [62](#)
 Pun, B. N., [68](#)

Q

- Qadir, Ghulam, [256](#)
 Quiqubad, Sultan, [109](#)
 Queen of Chittor, [116](#)
 Queen Padmini, [118](#)

- Quranic Hudhud, [118](#)
 Qutb-ud-din, [111](#)

R

- Rajput administration, [111](#)
 to Aryan, [137](#)
 women, [184](#)
 Ram, Jota, [301](#)
 Rana of Mewar [210](#), [214](#)
 Rani, Bhattiani, [300](#)
 Ranjan, Kalika, [116](#)
 Rani's Regency, [300](#)
 Rao, Jodha, [166](#)
 Rawal, Bappa, [157](#)
 Revenue Administration, [73](#)
 Roe, Thomas, [202](#)
 Royal Camp, [70](#)
 Ruler, [65](#)

S

- Sacred Law, [36](#)
 Sahasmal, Sirohi, [101](#)
 Saga, Rana, [102](#)
 Sarkar, J. N., [158](#), [248](#)
 Scythian, [193](#)
 Shah, Bahadur, [205](#)
 Shore, John, [258](#)
 Shah, Muhammed, [114](#)
 Shah, Sher, [98](#)
 Shah, Zaman, [260](#)
 Sindhia, Daulat Rao, [213](#)
 Sindhiya Mabadji, [207](#)
 Sigh, Amar, [140](#)
 Singh, Ajit, [140](#), [196](#)

- Singh, Ari, [207](#)
 Singh, Arjun, [209](#)
 Singh, Bijay, [304](#)
 Singh, Bishen, [344](#)
 Singh, Bhim, [158](#), [208](#)
 Singh, Devi, [161](#)
 Singh, Dhonkal, [312](#)
 Singh, Dungar, [97](#)
 Singh, Deva, [101](#)
 Singh, Gaj, [44](#)
 Singh, Jagat, [53](#), [269](#)
 Sindhia, Jankoji, [206](#)
 Singh, Jawan, [243](#)
 Singh, Jaswant, [302](#)
 Singh, Khushhal, [216](#)
 Singh, Kishore, [338](#)
 Singh, Kalin, [351](#)
 Singh, Karma, [98](#)
 Singh, Man, [150](#), [167](#), [312](#)
 last years, [323](#)
 Singh, Madho, [252](#), [346](#)
 Singh, Pratap, [206](#), [264](#), [304](#)
 Singh, Prithvi, [207](#)
 Singh, Rai, [52](#)
 Singh, Ratart, [346](#)
 Singh, Ram, [303](#)
 Singh, Raj, [206](#)
 Singh, Ratan, [121](#), [346](#)
 Singh, Rai, [99](#)
 Singh, Rawat Samar, [121](#)
 Singh, Salim, [324](#), [352](#)
 Singh, Sangram, [204](#)
 Singh, Sarubhu, [217](#)
 Singh, Sur, [51](#), [167](#)
 Singh, Sawai Jai, [251](#)
 Singh, Udai, [97](#), [99](#), [167](#), [201](#)
 Singh, Ummed, [332](#), [347](#), [356](#)
 Singh, Vir, [97](#)
 Singh, Vijay, [44](#)
 Singh, Zalim, [161](#), [173](#), [182](#), [209-10](#), [306](#), [332](#)
 Singhavi, Khub-Chand, [306](#)
 Sirohi, [101](#), [354](#)
 Siva, [81](#)
 Smith, Vincent, [1](#)
 Society, [183](#)
 Soil, [59](#)
 Sonigara, Udayasimha, [118](#)
 Struggle with Jaipur, [311](#)
 Submission to the Company, [228](#)
 Sultan of Delhi, [113](#)
 Suri, Dharmaghosa, [28](#)
 Suri, Jinapati, [29](#)
 Suri, Haribhadra, [84](#)
 Suri, Siddarsi, [91](#)
 Surthan, Rao, [101](#)
 System of Cultivation, [60](#)
 System of Government, [168](#)
- T**
- Territorial Administration, [75](#)
 Thomas, George, [257](#)
 Tod [135](#), [141](#), [149-50](#), [194-95](#),
 [208](#), [240](#), [344](#)
 in Mewar, [228](#)
 Treaty of 1803, [257](#)

Treaty of 1818, [283](#), [307](#), [320](#)

Tughlaq, Ghiyasuddin, [113](#)

Tughlaqs of Delhi, [98](#)

U

Udaibhan, Rao, [355](#)

Udaipur, [205](#)

Ujjain, [146](#)

V

Vagad, [97](#)

Vaishnavism, [31](#)

Vikramaditya, [51](#)

Vishnu, [31](#), [81](#)

W

Wellesley, Arthur, [212](#)

William the Conqueror in
England, [152](#)

Y

Yadavas, [102](#)

Yaksa, [84](#)

Yaksa-Karna, [31](#)

Yamuna, [105](#)

Yasovarman, [30](#)

Z

Zamindar, [50](#), [52-54](#), [248](#)

Zia-ud-din, [118](#)

Dr. S.R. Bakshi is Ph.D.; D. Litt in Modern Indian History and is the author of several research works on Indian Nationalism and freedom movement.

Dr. R. K. Gupta is well known scholar and author of prominent works in Modern Indian History. He has participated in several national seminars. Besides he is member of academic bodies which greatly contribute to various phases of social sciences.

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